


Vol. X No. 1. 1962.



TASHKENT

# ENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in  
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with  
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.



BUKHARA

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.


In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus Sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents :



Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,  
46, Great Russell Street,  
LONDON, W.C. 1.

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
OF  
KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN,  
UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAIDZHAN




- Borders of the U.S.S.R.
- Limits of Union Republics.
- Capitals of Union Republics.
- Railways.
- Canals.
- Canals under construction or projected.
- Sands.
- Main arterial road with pass.

# Communications in Northern Kazakhstan



- Existing broad gauge railways.
- Broad gauge railways under construction.
- Narrow gauge railways under construction.
- Proposed broad gauge railways.
- Sections of main motor roads.
- Motor road under construction.
- Proposed roads.



## Fergana Valley

Scale 1:1,000,000

- Canals.
- Main roads.
- Towns with population of under 10,000
- " " " " between 10,000 and 50,000
- " " " " 50,000 and 100,000
- " " " " over 500,000

J.P. 1956.

Specially drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre, -1956. - J.P.

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## CONTENTS

	Page
Editorial	1
<b>Soviet Central Asia</b>	
A British Family in the Kazakh Steppe. By Olivia Fell Vans-Agnew	5
The Kachak Movement in Azerbaydzhan	12
The Growth of the Working-Class of Turkmenistan up to 1941	19
Universities of Culture	31
Linguistic Survey 1960-61	39
Book Review : Eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs during the Period of the Incorporation of Central Asia in Russia. By B. I. Iskandarov	46
The National Question at the XXIIInd Congress of the CPSU	51
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Changes, Archæology, Conferences, Law, Literature, Irrigation, Music, Transport and Communications	57
<b>Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia</b>	
The Borderlands in the Great Soviet Encyclopædia Year-Books 1960-61	63
The Persian Revolution of 1905-11	78
Operations in Persia, 1914-1920	85
Pakistan's Military Alliances	90
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	95

## Maps

Distribution of the Turkic Languages	facing page 40
Fergana Valley	„ „ 58
Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan	at end

## Illustrations

Spring in the Kazakh Steppe	facing page 8
Scenes from old Kazakhstan	„ „ 10

---

---

## Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vednosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. X, NO. 1

---

## EDITORIAL

In the new Communist Party programme, as well as in the proceedings of the XXIIInd Party Congress which adopted it, considerable attention was paid to the question of national relations within the USSR. The relevant passages in the programme and the Congress speeches are examined elsewhere in this issue.

During the past eighteen months several Soviet periodicals have laid new emphasis on Lenin's view that federation in the Soviet sense was merely a temporary phase in the development of a unitary multinational state in which national frontiers and to a great extent national differences would disappear. Although this feature of Lenin's doctrine has no doubt always been known to close students of his writings, constant Soviet emphasis on national sovereignty, national economy and national culture has for a long time given the impression in non-Soviet - as well probably as in Soviet - Asia that the Muslim republics were there to stay, and that any degree of national self-government and independence which they enjoyed would be increased rather than lessened. Any illusions which may have been harboured on this score have been effectively disposed of in recent Soviet writing. In VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS No.2 of 1961 the following significant passage occurs: "Experience of the multinational state has shown that in the conditions prevailing in our country Soviet federation is the best form of state for the socialist solution of the national question, for the organization of the fraternal collaboration and mutual aid amongst socialist nations, for their multifold coming-together (sblizheniye) and for the preparation for the future merging (sliyaniye) of the nations under communism."

The process of sblizheniye, now said to be in full swing, was described in detail in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA No.4 of 1961. As if, however, to allay any apprehension which these plans for the withering

away of the national republics might arouse, the Party programme emphasized that the obliteration of national distinctions, especially of language, is a much more lengthy process than the obliteration of class distinctions.

During the new denunciation of Stalin which formed an important part of the proceedings of the XXIIInd Party Congress, no reference was made to the liquidation in 1944 of various autonomous republics and other national units in the Caucasus, the Volga Region and elsewhere, which in 1956 had been stigmatized as one of the major crimes resulting from Stalin's cult of personality. It was, however, mentioned on 17 November by Danyalov, First Secretary of the Dagestan Oblast Party Committee. Reluctance of the Soviet Government to revive memories of this deplorable incident can perhaps be attributed to the fact that reconstitution of the liquidated republics and the repatriation of their peoples have not so far been extended to the Crimean Tatars.

. . .

The first Asian History Congress convened in Delhi in December last year by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations was an event of considerable importance. The Congress was attended by delegates from some fifteen Asian countries, and although there might have been a strong case for confining the representation to Asia, invitations were also extended to Europe and delegates were present from Britain, France, Germany, Holland, and Italy. During the Congress the point was constantly made, although without rancour, that hitherto the greater part of published Asian history had come from the hands of Western writers, and that the time had now come for Asia to write her own history from her own point of view. It was, however, emphasized by more than one Asian speaker that great care should be taken to avoid the colouring and distortion of history by exaggerated nationalist sentiment.

The organization of the Congress and the atmosphere in which it was conducted reflect great credit on the conveners. There was no manifestation of any desire to make political capital out of the Congress; and the plan of accommodating all the delegates together in two adjoining blocks of flats provided much better opportunities for social intercourse than the usual dispersal in a number of hotels. There were naturally some points for criticism: some way might have been found to restrict the number of papers presented which was far too large to permit of proper discussion; there might also have been a better balance between the ancient and modern periods, the greater part of the papers and discussions being taken up with the former. A

regrettable feature of the Congress, for which the conveners were in no way responsible, was the absence of any representation from the USSR and China. It is understood that the Soviet Government had taken great interest in the Congress and four important delegates were expected - Azimdzhanova, Gafurov, Guber, and Tolstov. In the event, however, none of them appeared. Indeed, the only representative of any of the eastern bloc countries was one from the Mongolian People's Republic, who appeared for a short time on the last day of the Congress, and did not seem to attend any of the social functions.

Quite apart from the Asian History Congress, it is evident that Indian scholars are taking a new and lively interest in the present as well as in the past of the other countries of Asia. Particularly active in this respect are Aligarh University, the Indian Council for World Affairs, and the Indian School of International Studies, all of which were well represented at the Congress. It seemed to the Centre's representative at the Congress that the last-mentioned two bodies were in a position to make a unique contribution to modern Asian studies, which are at present being gravely neglected in Western universities and institutions. A defect in the Western treatment of Asian history which could have been, although it was not, mentioned at the Congress is the widespread failure to use Asian language source material, particularly in studies relating to the modern period. It is a curious fact that the Western authors of many so-called standard works on Asian history make no use whatever of current material in Asian languages, of which they very often have no knowledge. On the other hand, no British historian would be considered qualified to write a history, for example, of modern Italy, who was unable to read Italian and thus familiarize himself with the Italian point of view. It can hardly be said that the exact counterpart of this state of affairs exists amongst Asian historians, but it seems that on the whole they are more likely to know the languages of other Asian peoples and be able to understand their point of view than Western historians. Incidentally, a history of France, written in an Asian language by an Asian writer who knew no word of French and nothing of French historical literature except the small amount translated into his own language, would merely be regarded as ridiculous. In point of fact, Asian historians do not seem to be affected by this particular form of presumptuousness.

. . .

The story of the alleged shooting of the 26 Baku Commissars by or in the presence of British officers is a standard Soviet propaganda theme which, fabricated in the first place, has lost nothing in constant retelling over the past forty-three years. Even the bare undisputed

facts of the case, that the Commissars were shot on 20 September 1918 at a place near Vyshka, some 75 miles south-east of Krasnovodsk, are now apparently being distorted. According to a report published in THE TIMES of 3 October 1961, Professor Emelyanov, Soviet delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, had declared at a meeting held in Vienna on the previous day that as a schoolboy "he had witnessed the killing of 26 Commissars and of his own brother, aged 14, by British soldiers" at Baku. Later, THE TIMES published a letter setting forth the bare facts of the case from Mr. C.H. Ellis, who was in the region at the time and has published an objective account in St. Antony's Papers, Soviet Affairs, Number Two (1959).\* A little later THE TIMES published a remarkable letter from Ivor Montagu which, while seeming to admit that the Commissars were not actually shot by a British hand or on British instructions, seeks to pin responsibility for the incident on the British Government. In support of this he recounts what purports to be the judgment of Sir Robert Hodgson after a visit to the Caucasus in 1925 in order to investigate this and other matters. Mr. Montagu claims that Sir Robert Hodgson told him that the Commissars had been executed by the Government of Baku and that the execution had taken place "on an island". The incident, he is alleged to have said, could never have taken place "but for the British military occupation". It is hard to believe that Sir Robert Hodgson could ever have accepted or retailed such a garbled account of the affair. The Government of Baku had ceased to exist with the capture of the city by the Turkish Army on the 15th September and the British military occupation of Baku had of course ended shortly before that. It seems highly unlikely that Sir Robert Hodgson could have given currency to the Soviet story that Transcaspia was at any time under British military occupation. The small British force operating there from North Persia with the sole object not of intervention but of countering a possible German advance from the Caucasus, never amounted to more than 1,000 men of all arms.

Fortunately, THE TIMES eventually published a letter from Mr. W.E.D. Allen pointing out the historical inaccuracy of the statements which Mr. Montagu had attributed to Sir Robert Hodgson and explaining, what uninitiated readers might have failed to notice, that to blame the execution of the Commissars on the British was "merely a facile propaganda smear".

---

\* The Soviet version was also discussed in "The Revolt in Transcaspia, 1918-19", CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.2.

A B R I T I S H F A M I L Y I N T H E  
K A Z A K H S T E P P E

By

Olivia Fell Vans-Agnew

It was late in the year 1902 that my family first became interested in Kazakhstan then forming part of southern Siberia. My father was a mining engineer and had his headquarters in London from where he made frequent trips to various parts of the world to make reports on mines that appeared promising. His brother, a business man in London with mining interests overseas, had heard some outstanding rumours of a coal and copper mine that lay in what was known in those days as the Kirgiz Steppe or Stepnoy Kray, now called Kazakhstan, and he asked my father to go out as soon as possible and make a report on them.

In January 1903 my father left London, taking with him a young mining assayer. They went by train to Moscow where they changed into the luxurious Trans-Siberian Express, which left once a week for Vladivostok and took two weeks to make the journey to the Pacific. As there were no tunnels at that time on the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Russian gauge was wider than ours in the West, the dining and sleeping cars were more roomy and comfortable. There was even a piano in the dining car as well as a small library which consisted mainly of translations into Russian from Mark Twain and Bret Harte.

As the engines were wood-burning, the train moved at a leisurely pace and it took over five days and nights to reach Petropavlovsk, a small town on the railway in Western Siberia. Here the post-road started that led south to Akmolinsk, now called Tselinograd by the Russians. My father and his young friend found that their western ideas of winter clothing were totally inadequate to protect them from the icy gales sweeping across their little open sleigh that bounced over the rough roads that led from the railway station to their hotel. It was an astonished porter who met them on the hotel steps, for he saw his honoured guests crawl out from the bottom of their sleigh where they had covered themselves as best they could with sheets of the London TIMES.

After fitting themselves out in true Siberian style with huge sheepskin fur coats and other necessary equipment for the road, they started out on their 450 mile drive south to Akmolinsk where the post-road ended. They travelled day and night changing horses at the post-houses, and having plenty of hot tea from the samovar that was always boiling day and night in the rest-room reserved for travellers as well as something to eat. The post-houses were run by the Government and the postmasters, who also ran the mails and telegraph, were obliged under contract to supply horses at low fixed prices to all travellers passing through. However, my father invariably found there was a complete dearth of horses when he asked for them until he offered a slightly higher price, when immediately the best troika in the stables was produced as if by magic. Travelling in this way, they managed to cover about 100 miles every 24 hours and there were no hitches worth mentioning.

At Akmolinsk they had to buy a troika and a covered sleigh for themselves and their luggage, and hire a driver who knew the way to take them over the remaining 200 miles of trackless country to the Karaganda coal-mine, the first of the mines they had come to inspect.

My father found the Karaganda coalfields to be of almost limitless extent, and although the coal was of second grade and not fit for the making of coke, it served every purpose when existing conditions were adapted to the type of coal available. From Karaganda he drove 25 miles south again, to the smelter called Spassky, which he found rather old-fashioned and run-down in many ways. It managed, however, to produce a remarkable amount of pure copper bricks, owing to the fact that the great copper "Mine of the Assumption", 75 miles to the south, proved to be one of fabulous richness.

By the time the spring floods had receded sufficiently for the rivers to be forded, the report was ready and they returned to London. The report was so well received that a company was formed under the chairmanship of my uncle, Arthur Fell (who later became Member of Parliament for Great Yarmouth), shares were sold and the mines and smelter finally purchased in June 1904 under the name of "Spassky Copper Mines Ltd." from the owners, an old traditional Russian mining family in the Urals called Riazanov. My father was sent out to conclude the deal, and late in the autumn of 1904 he went out as general manager with carte blanche to develop the mines and the smelter they supplied to the utmost of their capacity.

When my father reached Spassky and started work, he found a little hospital already installed, with a couple of doctors in charge and several nurses. There was also a Russian Orthodox Church where beauti-

ful services were held, and the Psalmopevets or choirmaster had organized and trained a choir whose singing was as perfect as only Russian singing can be. There was also a school of sorts, where entertainments were held in the evening or on holidays. My father was also astonished to see that the workmens' cottages, supplied by the works, were comfortable and roomy when compared with those of our industrial slums at home. There was a plentiful supply of free coal for all, and by law each cottage was provided with a Russian steam bath attached to the back of it in the little compound. These steam baths were used on Saturday nights, when the workmen and their families used to emerge pink and shining, and smelling of the scented soap and perfume they so loved, to take part in the Saturday evening festivities.

My father, after sizing up the situation and the immediate needs of the place, sent agents to recruit Russian employees both north to the Railway, and to the scattered villages that lay here and there along the post-roads. Once the works were in full blast the Russian Government sent a village of peasants out from the Ukraine to establish themselves near the works, so that we could give them employment, and this turned out very well. From the Russians he got the white-collar men he needed - technicians, accountants, store-keepers, foremen for the furnaces, and the mines, and for the countless activities that sprang up on all sides like mushrooms. He had to hire thousands of manual labourers as well, and found willing response from the Kazakh\* nomads. These Kazakhs were a truly remarkable people. They had lived a nomadic life on the steppe since time immemorial, moving in spring, summer and autumn with their families and flocks from one fresh pasture ground to another. The rights of pasture had been allotted to them by tradition and although there were sometimes disputes over these, they were quickly settled by their magistrates, usually Kazakhs of some age and standing. There were almost no agricultural barriers to restrict them, for the Russian villages were few and far between at that time. The steppe was almost devoid of trees, except for the few birches that managed to survive in the sheltered hollows. Our pit-props came from a large Russian Cossack village which lay about 75 miles north-east of Spassky in a low granite mountain range where pine-trees were plentiful and where the Cossacks could raise wheat and other crops.

When the first spring winds softened the air, the steppe turned green, skylarks filled the air and flowers came out in sheets; the Kazakhs returned to the open air life for which they had waited all winter. They left their half-underground mud huts where they had spent

---

\* In the author's day the Kazakhs were wrongly referred to by the Russians as Kirgiz. To avoid confusion "Kazakhs" has been substituted for "Kirgiz" throughout the article. - Ed.


long months in what seemed to us, but not to them, incredible discomfort, and put up their large round felt tents known as yurts. The women changed into their brightest clothes that imitated butterflies in colour, and the men put on lighter, thinner coats and shed their high, felt boots for softer ones that smelled of Russian leather.

The nomads had no schools as we know them, but occasionally a magistrate or some other influential man, arranged for his scribe, poet, or other learned man attached to his household to hold lessons in a yurt crowded with children. It seemed to us that all they learned was to shout in unison portions of the Koran that they had learned by heart.

These people were of Mongolian race, and devout Muslims by religion; they spoke a Turkic dialect, and when they could write, which was very seldom, they used the delicate Arabic script of which they were very proud. There were occasional bards among them, who were very popular. They used to sit cross-legged on the floor scraping the strings of the little home-made instruments they called dombras and in loud strident voices, sing or rather yell, long improvised ballads to the delight of those assembled to hear them.

A large fair was held every year in June at Koyandy, about 80 miles east of Spassky, near a large freshwater lake. To this fair the Kazakhs brought endless quantities of animals: camels, horses, sheep, goats and cattle, to trade for what they lacked or could not produce themselves. Long camel caravans also made their way up from the south, from the rich lands of Turkestan, or the highlands of Central Asia and even from China, bringing with them silks, sometimes even a few yaks who suffered terribly from the heat while crossing the deserts that separated the uplands of Central Asia from the Kazakh Steppe. They also brought brick tea from China to trade with the Kazakhs, who always claimed that tea, to be drinkable, should never cross salt water. Russian merchants flocked to these fairs, bringing with them cotton goods, conical loaves of sugar, and iron. Many of the goods, some made by the Kazakh themselves, and some brought from far away Turkestan and Sinkiang, were bought by Russian merchants and eventually found their way to the still larger fair that was held during the summer at Nizhny Novgorod on the Upper Volga, not very far from Moscow. A branch of the Imperial Bank of Russia was opened to facilitate trade. The Governor of the Province came down in state and set up his large embroidered white yurts and camped amongst the bleating animals by the shores of the lake; he came ostensibly to see that all went well, but in reality to enjoy himself in the summer sunshine away from red tape and office routine.

Spring in the Kazakh Steppe



But when winter is past, in the soft  
spring air,  
Naked & plucked they stand shivering  
there.  
Shabby & ugly, half beast, half bird:  
Thin & contemptuous, proud & absurd!  
END

Reproduced by courtesy of the British Museum from a watercolour by Marian Fell, the author's sister



The Kazakhs had no doctors. They lived almost entirely on boiled mutton, stewed for hours in large iron pots, and rich greasy soups. They washed this down with fizzy fermented mares' milk or Kumiss which was plentiful in spring and summer. Goats' milk cheese was another thing they delighted in, but to us it tasted mainly of ink. There was almost no sickness among them save smallpox, which they accepted as an act of God and usually survived without much visible damage. If a man or woman fell ill, they were dosed with hot mutton fat. If they lived, it was Allah's will; if they died, it was Allah's will also. The Kazakhs were great sportsmen, and at the end of their gruelling month-long fast of Ramadan, called by them Uraza, when, as good Muslims, they ate and drank nothing between sunrise and sunset, they held hilarious games. These consisted of horse-racing, wrestling, and that age-old game of struggling, mounted, for the possession of a sheep's fleece, a game which, I believe, has gone on ever since the days when men first learnt to saddle a horse and ride.

It was to the nomads that the vital lines of transport were entrusted. These connected the "Mine of the Assumption" to the south, with the smelter and the Karaganda coal-mine, going on through Akmolinsk to the railhead at Petropavlovsk, a journey of roughly 700 miles. All day, and often half the night, weather permitting, the open sleds drawn by the great Siberian snow camel in winter, and the little four-wheeled ox-carts in summer, were kept moving by these hardy men. They hauled the million pure copper bricks that were produced every month at Spassky to Petropavlovsk, from where they were shipped by rail to Moscow to be sold by the agent of the mines. The caravans returned from Petropavlovsk laden with the supplies needed for the technical equipment of the mines and smelter, and goods for the thousands of workmen and their families who lived there. These transport men were faithful to their contracts and never a pound of copper was lost or stolen, nor were any of the goods brought back on the return journey, during all the four years my father was in charge out there. The Kazakhs were proud of their work, and had the spirit of the old caravans in their blood; a contract was a contract and therefore to be respected to the letter. They carried the mails in large leather bags on horseback from Akmolinsk to Spassky every week, and our fat little cashier drove up to the bank in Akmolinsk and fetched the huge pay roll back to Spassky in paper cash once a month. No one seemed to think of robbing him on the journey; all this again was under contract which was sacred even to the poorest of the poor.


My father sent for his family early in the summer of 1905 when he was well established and had found a suitable house for us. My mother started out from London with my elder sister, my young brother and myself, complete with governess, and enough luggage to last us several years. A young Russian tutor joined us in Moscow and we finally

arrived in Spassky to spend the happiest years of our lives. We used to ride with the Kazakhs while they hunted with eagles on their wrists. The eagles would circle high until they saw something moving in the long grass below, when they pounced down and attacked their prey. The game most prized by the Kazakhs were red foxes and large fluffy owls. The foxes were valuable for their fur and the young girls delighted in sewing bunches of the owls' feathers onto their bright velvet caps. What knives they had were used only for killing or cutting up animals, and the firearms owned by some of the Russians were only used for shooting game. They never used knives or firearms against each other, it never occurred to them to do so; in an empty land where people were scarce and it was all hands to the wheel, every man and woman was needed to keep life going.

The Kazakhs never intermarried with the Russians, who left them in peace to run their own lives in their own way, for a happy, prosperous race of nomads was invaluable to them. Everyone got on well together and we found the Russians very friendly to us and to each other and to the nomads, regardless of wealth or position. The Russians were a talented people in many ways, especially when it came to acting and music, and most of them could draw or paint better than most of us. My father was a good musician and we all revelled in the musical evenings that were held in our house every Saturday night when singing and dancing and private theatricals, interspersed with endless tea-drinking, went on into the small hours of the morning. It was during week-ends that we tried to have the Siberian officials visit us on their tours of inspection. These men came twice a year to inspect the school, the hospital, the company store, the smelter and the mines; there was even an inspector of explosives. These officials were sadly overworked and underpaid and smothered in endless red-tape, and they looked forward to their stay at Spassky, for there they found a little of the relaxation they so sorely needed.

About 200 miles south of Spassky lies the beautiful turquoise blue Lake Balkhash. We used to ride and drive down in April with our tents, taking a dug-out canoe with us. First we crossed 150 miles of green steppe, when the valleys were carpeted with flowers and the air full of the song of skylarks and cuckoos. Then we came to a pass in the last rocky ridge, which must have been an ancient battle-ground because here and there were dotted prehistoric monuments carved in stone. From this ridge we dropped down onto the alkaline desert called the Hungry Steppe; there were fifty miles of this, with only one brackish water-hole to keep men and beasts alive. The horses plodded along till, late on the afternoon of the second day, they suddenly whinnied and broke into a trot: they had smelled the fresh waters of Lake Balkhash and we all galloped down the last hill helter skelter. We camped on the sandy shores of the lake, bathing, hunting, and fishing, while the horses

SCENES FROM OLD KAZAKHSTAN



The Governor's yurt at Koyandy Fair



The great snow camel of the north



A yurt being moved



Magistrates



The doctor and staff of Spassky hospital



were rested and fattened for the return journey after our holiday was over.

We had some serious strikes during our stay. Some Russian agitators were prowling up and down the railway towns, and when they heard of the peace and prosperity at Spassky, they sent one of their most dangerous men down to us to stir up trouble. He was a beautiful creature, supposed to be endowed with hypnotic powers; he had the face of an angel but the eyes and nature of a madman. However, the trouble he started did not last long, as the workmen he tried to persuade to rise against the management, learned that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, and chased him away in the end. As he had threatened to use murder as one of his weapons, the Governor of the Province came down to try him; he was convicted but his sentence was, in our minds, far too lenient. The Governor banished him from the Province for life, with the result that it did not take him long to try and start trouble in the neighbouring provinces.

Spassky paid hand over fist after it was properly organized, and my father stayed out there for five years, and we with him for the last few years of his tour, till he finally retired in 1908. The mines carried on under the control of the same British company until the Revolution: they were finally taken over by the Russians in 1919, and since then the whole face of the country has been changed.

My sister had the gift of sketching, and during our stay on the steppe, she sketched in pen and ink, and painted water colours of all she saw. We brought her work back with us together with the rest of our collection of "Kirgiziana", when my father retired. Later we gave them to the Ethnographical Department of the British Museum, who were glad to have these reminders of the old Kazakhstan, for the way of life, the customs and the culture of the nomads of that country have now gone, possibly forever.

Looking back on a long life spent mining in many lands, the years we lived and worked in Kazakhstan early in the century now appear to us to have been the sanest, the most constructive and the happiest years of them all.

T H E   K A C H A K   M O V E M E N T   I N   A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N

This article is based on the 2nd volume of ISTORIYA AZERBAYDZHANA, edited by I.A. Guseynov and others (Baku, 1960), and on an article by I.M. Gasanov in IZVESTIYA AN/Az.SSR, No.4, 1961. The latter's main sources are unpublished material as well as KACHAK NABI, a collection of reminiscences of Nabi provided by his contemporaries and compiled by A. Akhundov (in Azerbaydzhani, Baku, 1941).

Though the general estimate of the Kachak movement and Nabi's role in it are similar in both works, the fact that their versions of the hero's life story differ in many details suggests that Soviet historians have not made up their mind yet what the official version of the story should be. Although the incident is represented as a demonstration of peasant opposition to social oppression, it appears on the basis of the evidence to be merely a case of boldly organized brigandage. Similar activities are or have been an endemic feature of many parts of the world over long periods. An interesting point is that in Azerbaydzhani as elsewhere the authorities found great difficulties in deciding what to do about the Kachaks. The name, which is Turkish in origin, has had a wide vogue all over the Near and Middle East. There were Kachaks on the Macedonia-Albania frontier in the 1920s. It is current in Turkish and Persian frontier districts, where it is almost invariably associated with smuggling, an activity at once regarded as illegal and romantic in most countries.

. . .

### Situation of the peasants

In the later decades of the 19th century Azerbaydzhani was still an agricultural country. Both the peasants holding State land and those owning their own land were subject to severe exploitation and oppression by the Government, landowning beks and rich peasantry. In these circumstances, the class struggle in the village took on various forms: complaints, unlawful seizure of land and water, felling trees, refusal to carry out various obligations, setting the beks' and rich peasants' property on fire etc.

The Kachak or Fugitive movement was the most acute form of the peasants resistance. The kachaks were fugitives escaping from persecution by the authorities; many of them had to do so because they had taken part in action against the beks, rich peasants and local officials. Some of them, on the other hand, were criminals escaping justice, "but they had nothing in common with any of the forms of the peasants' class struggle and so, naturally, they must stay outside the scope of our research." (Gasanov, p.37)

Conflicts with the authorities inspired by acute shortage of land and water, by the oppression of the beks, rich peasants, village administrative officials and Tsarist officials as well as the burdensome taxation caused peasants to turn into kachaks. On the other hand, "in the kachak groups people were frequently found who had broken the law concerning everyday life." (Gasanov, p.38)

In the period under consideration there were kachaks in all the uyezds of Azerbaydzhan. The most distinguished of their leaders was Nabi.

#### Nabi's early career

Nabi is believed to have been born in 1854, in the village of Ashaga-Molla in the Zangezur uyezd. His father was a poor peasant who could hardly provide for his large family. Nabi, when still a child, became shepherd to a rich peasant and suffered "all the horrors of bestial exploitation and unrestrained oppression". (Gasanov, p.38) He soon began to hate exploiters of the poor peasant. "In return, the rich elements in the village profoundly hated the proud and freedom-loving youth who refused to bow to power and wealth." (Ibid.)

Here two different versions of the origin of his career as a kachak follow. Gasanov (pp.38-39) says that "once a village elder came to herd the peasants out for forced labour. He brutally beat an ailing old man, Nabi's father, who was unable to work in the fields. Ali's [the father's] relatives pleaded for him. This caused an outcry in the village which made Nabi, then tending sheep in the fields, rush in. He stood up for his father and beat the elder. The rich peasants tried to attack Nabi but he put them to flight with his club. Then Nabi addressed his fellow-villagers, calling upon them not to do forced labour and the peasants went home. To escape prosecution by the authorities and rich peasants, Nabi escaped to the village of Binis where he worked as a shepherd for the peasant Stupan."

The ISTORIYA declares: "When Nabi was sixteen years old, the bek beat his father. In revenge the youth ambushed the bek and beat him. Denounced by the bek, Nabi was arrested by the police and sent to

prison. In 1890 a court in Yerevan sentenced him to forced labour." But Nabi escaped, organized a group of armed peasants and declared war on the beks and officials. (P.196)

At Binis Nabi did not stay long for he wounded a rich peasant during a quarrel and had to flee. After some time spent in hiding he returned to his native village where his assault on the elder had meanwhile been forgotten. On one occasion Tsarist guards came to the village and started to plunder the people; one of them beat Nabi's father as well as the women and children of the family. Nabi paid him back in the same coin and had to flee once more. He spent "many years" (Gasarov, p.39) working as an agricultural labourer at Gorus, Khochik, Khanlyg, Binis and Dalus and then returned home once more. Meanwhile the local landowner, Mamed Bek, helped by the village elder appropriated the peasants' land allotments and in 1875 he appeared at Ashaga-Molla to take over these lands. The guards accompanying him proceeded to drive away people working in the fields and shoot their cattle. Nabi attacked the bek with his stick, snatched a pistol from the guards and with it severely wounded the bek. This incident turned him finally into a kachak.

#### Nabi as a guerilla leader

Nabi now organized a kachak group of five men, among them Shakhmamed, Tundzh Veli and Telli Gara. Soon the number increased to ten; the newcomers included three brothers from the village of Anzyr in the Nakhichevan' uyezd, whose brother had been killed by a local kulak. They asked Nabi for help and he killed in revenge the kulak's brother.

Nabi's popularity among the poor grew and they regarded him as their protector against exploitation. In the village of Zeyva the best lands were occupied by rich peasants while the poor peasants could hardly survive. They complained to all possible authorities including the Tsar and at last a group of officials was sent from Tiflis to investigate the situation. The poor peasants informed Nabi about this and he stopped the officials on the way threatening them with his wrath. They were so terrified that they settled the dispute in favour of the poor peasants.

Nabi helped the peasants to resist excessive taxation. The inhabitants of the neighbouring villages of Nasiravaz and Urmus in Nakhichevan' were unable to pay the very heavy taxes levied on them and guards were sent to confiscate their goods. The peasants approached Nabi who promptly appeared, returned to the people their confiscated property and gave every poor man a certificate that he had paid his tax.

The authorities were so frightened of Nabi that they accepted these certificates.

Contemporary newspapers testify to Nabi's interference with taxation. KAVKAZ of 27.9.1895 wrote: "Nabi has written a letter to the chief of the Zangezour district, in which he declares that he has already collected the Government taxes from the inhabitants of the places mentioned, and advises him to stop thinking about gathering taxes from the said places. . ." It is not clear whether Nabi collected the taxes himself or simply said that he had in order to protect the peasants.

"The kachak activities had an international character" and Armenian peasants took part in the movement together with the Azerbaydzhanis. The newspaper AZERBAYDZHAN GYANDZHLERI of 11.1.59 published a story supplied by an old Armenian Communist, Akopyan, who had seen Nabi. In the spring of 1891 Akopyan together with four other peasants were conveying goods belonging to some village officials. On the way they came across Nabi's band which confiscated the goods and distributed them among the peasants of a village near by. One of Akopyan's companions was barefoot and Nabi ordered him to be given shoes and socks.

The kachaks could always rely on the support of the population which made the authorities' action against them ineffective. In the 1890s Tsarist authorities started to take serious action against Nabi's band, which often had to seek refuge in south Azerbaydzhan where the population received them warmly. On 23 July 1894 he appeared in the village of Karchevan', in the Nakhichevan' uyezd and confiscated from rich peasants and the local church property valued at some 8,000 rubles. The authorities were alarmed and the governor of Yerevan wrote that it was difficult to take action against the kachaks: "On the one side there is a small group of the police and on the other almost all the population." (Gasarov, p.42) The authorities could only succeed if the people stopped helping the kachaks, and the offending villages should accordingly suffer severe punishment. Heavy fines would be the most effective form. But, although the governor received the necessary permission the punishment did no harm to Nabi and in October 1894 he carried out his usual policy against the rich peasants of Nakhichevan'. On 27 October he fought a regular battle against the frontier guards on the banks of the Araks when he was trying to cross into Persia. Although the inhabitants of the Persian bank of the river helped him, the kachaks lost thirteen men, many horses and goods. In spite of this, by the following spring the kachaks felt strong enough to return to Nakhichevan' and reopen their usual campaign there.

The authorities were helpless and Freze, governor of Yerevan, wrote that the population gave almost unanimous support to the kachaks; for

example, on 11 May 1895 a skirmish took place between Nabi's band and a Government detachment. The detachment spent the whole day pursuing the kachaks and finally had to spend the night in the open air while Nabi and his men slept comfortably in a village 4-5 versts away. (Gasarov, pp.43-44) On 26 June 1895 Nabi crossed the Araks into Persian Azarbaijan while one of his subsidiary bands continued its activities in the Nakhichevan' and Zangezur uyezds, until it followed Nabi into Persia.

The success of the kachaks alarmed the authorities, and Freze sent a telegram to the commander-in-chief of the troops in the Caucasus, Sheremet'yev, in which he reported that six large and well armed kachak units were active in his guberniya while others were ready to cross over from Persian Azarbaijan. He asked for the immediate help of two Cossack squadrons and for permission to deal more severely with the population siding with the kachaks. (Gasarov, p.44) His request was granted and suspected individuals as well as whole villages suffered punishment. The most afflicted village was Tiva which had to maintain twenty-five Cossack troops and pay a fine of 300 rubles. Twenty-eight other villages of the Nakhichevan' uyezd were fined, each household paying three rubles.

At the same time steps were taken to suppress the kachaks. More Cossack troops were sent to the Nakhichevan' and Sharuro-Daralagez uyezds and three volunteer groups, ten men in each, were formed.

On 8 September 1895 Nabi and Shakh Guseyn (Shah Husayn) accompanied by 30 men crossed the frontier and appeared in the Zangezur uyezd. On the 12th they seized money, valuable goods and arms from rich peasants at Uz and then proceeded to the village of Dulus owned by Bek Teymur Ismailkhanov. In a skirmish between the bek's men and the kachaks seven of the former were killed and two wounded while the latter lost one man wounded. The following night Nabi descended upon the villages of Shabadin and Gedzhanan and, having seized goods worth 1,200 rubles, went to the Nakhichevan' uyezd. Freze reported that "the bandits intended to plunder rich peasants, kill their own enemies and then spend the winter in Persia." (Gasarov, p.45)

Although the authorities mobilized all the available forces: Cossacks, volunteers and mounted patrols, they were once more unsuccessful and the kachaks crossed into Persia.

#### Nabi's death Gasarov's version (pp.46-47)

The Tsarist authorities realized they could not suppress Nabi by ordinary means and decided to employ hired assassins. This plan was approved by Freze. Arrangements were entrusted to a merchant, Pasha

Gadzhi Faradzh ogly, a trader from Urmiya in Persian Azarbaijan. In September 1895 he went to Nakhichevan' to discuss the matter. There he agreed to watch the movements of Nabi's band in Persia and organize the murder, in return for which he was to receive a gold medal and 1,000 rubles for expenses should the murder take place. Returning home, Pasha and his brother Khusrau proceeded to watch Nabi and report his movements. In March 1896 Pasha bribed the kachaks Shakh Guseyn and Kerbalay Iman to murder Nabi within a week, and on the 12th they assassinated him in the Persian village of Larni. The Persian authorities claimed that they had organized the killing but Pasha in a letter denied this.

On 13 March Pasha informed the Tsarist Consul-General at Tabriz of what had happened. The news delighted the "Tsarist colonizers" and Freze lost no time in passing it on to his superiors. The Persian authorities declared that it was Persian guards who had killed Nabi, a claim firmly rejected by the Tsarist authorities in Transcaucasia.

Pasha tried to bring about the destruction of Nabi's band as well but the scheme failed, for it disintegrated in the absence of its leader.

The ISTORIYA's version (pp.198-9):

In order to destroy Nabi, Tsarist officials obtained the cooperation of Persia and Turkey. Mamed Mirzoyev, a court interpreter from Yerevan, says that he translated many letters from Freze and other high Tsarist officials which were then sent to Persia and Turkey. The Tsarist Government discussed the matter with the Persian and Turkish Governments and sent its agents to those countries. Among them were Pasha and his brother Khusrau as well as a number of other men from Nakhichevan'.

On 20 July 1894 some "agents of the authorities" murdered Mekhti, Nabi's brother, in the village of Gyurdzhivan and three days later Nabi took vengeance on the local landowners and merchants. Then, leaving his wife Khadzher at Chichekli, he crossed the Araks. The agents informed the authorities and she was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of Gerusy. On 28 October 1895 Nabi and his men surrounded the fortress and demanded her release. Selim bek, commander of the fortress, did so.

Returning from the town of Kerbala, Nabi stopped with his companions for the night of 12 March 1896 at Larni on the Turko-Persian frontier. There he was assassinated by men hired by the Russian and Persian authorities.

## Conclusion

"Now, after we have used Nabi's case to study in detail the kachak movement, we shall attempt to estimate its importance. We have tried to show that the kachaks struggled against the beks and rich elements of the village. In other words, the kachaks opposed social oppression. At the same time the kachaks struggled against oppressive taxation and made short work of Tsarist officials and particularly of village administrative functionaries - the elders who were the direct executors of Tsarist policy. All this allows us to describe the kachak movement as one of the forms of peasant movement directed against social and colonial oppression; as to its form, it could be called partisan struggle." (Gasanov, p.47)

"A special limitation was peculiar to the kachak movement. Often kachak bands engaged in banditry and plundering. Nevertheless, the struggle of many kachaks, genuine avengers of the people, was one of the peculiar forms of class struggle of the Azerbaydzhani peasants." (ISTORIYA, p.199)

## The prospects of Stalin in Frunze

One of the main streets in Frunze [? Prospekt Stalina] has recently been renamed "The XXIInd Party Congress Street". The new building of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, the Central Universal Store, the State Bank, Central Post Office, the "Son-Kul'" coffee-house and two large cinemas, the Ala-Too and the Oktyabr' are all in this street.

According to a resolution of the executive committee of the Frunze town soviet, two other streets, the Stal'ingradskaya and Stalinabadskaya, have been renamed Kommunisticheskaya and Bratskaya respectively.

SK. 18.11.61

## Encouraging official reading

There are about three hundred points in the Chardzhou oblast where would-be readers may take out a subscription for newspapers and periodicals, and at present there are 1,500 different publications available on subscription in the oblast. The Deynau rayon is picked out as having "distinguished itself especially in this matter": in the Dmitriyev kolkhoz, for example, every member has subscribed to some paper or magazine. The ultimate aim is for every family to be a regular subscriber to some paper and periodical.

TI. 4.12.61

T H E   G R O W T H   O F   T H E   W O R K I N G - C L A S S   O F  
T U R K M E N I S T A N   U P   T O   1 9 4 1

This account of the growth of the working-class in Turkmenistan up to 1941 consists of a summary of D.M. Redzhebov's article "Rost rabocheho klassa Turkmenistana v period II i III pyatiletok" in IZVESTIYA AN/TURK.SSR, Seriya Obshchestvennykh Nauk, No.3 of 1961, covering the years 1933-41, preceded by a less detailed account of the years before 1933 based on material in ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR (Ashkhabad, 1957), OCHERKI ISTORII KOMMUNISTICHESKOY PARTII TURKMENISTANA (Ashkhabad, 1961), and BOL'SHAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA (Vol.43, published in 1956).

. . .

Up to the First World War

The nucleus of a working-class first appeared in Turkmenistan with the construction of the Transcaspian Railway in 1880-6 (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol.IX, No.3, pp.235-40). With the opening of the railway, small towns began to appear. Their original inhabitants, soldiers and railway personnel, were later joined by craftsmen, merchants and factory workers. The urban population was almost exclusively immigrant (Russians, Armenians, etc.). At about the same time a few very small factories such as cotton ginneries were set up in Turkmenistan for the primary processing of raw materials, but none of them had more than a hundred workers. The mining of ozokerite, sulphur, oil and other minerals was even less developed. The total number of railwaymen and industrial workers before the First World War is estimated to have been between 7,000 and 9,000. The vast majority of railway workers were Russians. There were also many Persians and Azerbaydzhanis among the workers, particularly among the 1,500 loaders at Krasnovodsk port. The number of Turkmen workers did not exceed 200-300 and they were mostly employed as unskilled labour on the railways.

1921-1925 (the years of the New Economic Policy)

When Soviet power was finally established in Turkmenistan in 1920 with the ending of the civil war, the rudimentary industry that had

existed before the First World War was in ruins. Many undertakings were closed for lack of raw materials and the extraction of oil and ozokerite at Cheleken was practically at a standstill. The number of workers in industry was barely a seventh of the pre-war level. Steps were taken to restore industry under the New Economic Policy but it was a slow and painful process and although by 1925 progress had been made, production was still below the pre-war level. There was an acute shortage of labour, particularly skilled. This was not just an economic problem however. The small numbers of the working-class and the almost complete lack of Turkmen workers was one of the "main difficulties holding up the development of Party work and Soviet construction" in Turkmenistan. Government mobilization of labour which had been practised during the civil war continued during the first half of 1921, but voluntary recruitment increased in the second half of the year. Wages and working conditions had improved considerably by the end of 1925 and industry was supplied with the necessary number of trained workers. Problems however remained. One was the substantial turnover of labour and another the continued existence of unemployment. On 1 July 1925 there were 2,433 people out of work, of whom in fact only 27 were industrial workers. By the beginning of 1926 there were 7,165 workers in state industry. Altogether, with the workers in railway depots and workshops and local industry, there were about 10,000 workers in Turkmenistan of whom up to 4,000 worked at the Reutov Cotton Spinning Factory, which had been transferred from near Moscow in 1925 and served to train Turkmen workers for the republic's nascent textile industry. In 1924-5 the number of Turkmen workers in industry grew, particularly in the cotton factories and on the railways. In some sections of the railways the proportion of Turkmens was 34.4 per cent, whereas it was only 13.2 per cent in other branches of industry. In the last months of 1925 the numbers of Turkmen workers increased 50 per cent. The increase came mainly in transport and mining.

### 1926-1929 (the beginning of "socialist industrialization")

The XIVth All-Union Party Congress in December 1925 called for "socialist industrialization" with the stress on heavy industry. In Turkmenistan the years 1926-9 saw continued increases in production, the re-equipping of some industries and the construction of several new undertakings. In 1926-7 the number of workers in industry and transport increased 28.2 per cent to 13,566. By 1928-9 there were 60 major undertakings in the republic. Particular emphasis was laid on the creation of a national working-class which was regarded as essential for strengthening the union of the working-class and the dehqans (settled population of the villages), and the organization of the latter into a political force against feudal-bay elements. In May 1926 the All-Union Party Central Committee issued a directive calling for

the employment of more Turkmens in industry, and the IIInd and IVth Plenums of the Turkmen Central Committee in the same year paid special attention to this question. The building up of a Turkmen working-class was particularly successful on the railways, where in the 1925-6 economic year the number of Turkmen workers and sluzhashchiys\* rose from 426 to 1,176. By March 1927 there were 321 Turkmen workers at the Kizyl-Arvat Railway Workshops, or 23.8 per cent of the total. By the end of 1927, 17.5 per cent of industrial workers were Turkmens. In the newly-opened Ashkhabad Filature in the autumn of 1928, 70 per cent of the 500 workers were Turkmens. In the period 1 October 1926 to 1 October 1929, while the total number of workers and sluzhashchiys in trade unions in Turkmenistan increased 56 per cent, the number of Turkmens increased almost three times. The proportion of Turkmens among industrial workers rose from 11.4 per cent to 24.8 per cent and among transport and communications workers from 6 per cent to 14.8 per cent. Turkmens were in an overwhelming majority in the new industrial undertakings, 75.4 per cent, for example, at the Karakum Sulphur Mine. Some Turkmen workers were trained by Russians on the job, others in trade schools. Many were sent to trade schools and factories in the RSFSR and other republics for training.

#### 1929-1932 (The First Five-Year Plan)

During the First Five-Year Plan more than 90 new undertakings went into operation in Turkmenistan, and 1931-2 saw the first successes in the development of heavy industry in the republic with the construction of the Kara-Bogaz Chemical Kombinat and headway at last being made in the oil industry. The Party continued to call for more Turkmens in industry. By the end of the Five-Year Plan the number of workers and sluzhaschiys in the national economy was 110,600 as against 38,700 in 1925. By 1930-1 unemployment, which stood at 6,300 in 1929, had been abolished. On the eve of the Five-Year Plan the total number of women employed in all branches of the national economy was 2,600, of whom only 1,000 worked in industry. By 1931 the percentage of women in production rose to 22.9, 18.6 per cent more than in 1925. In 1932, 21,500 women worked in production in the towns and auls, 4,700 of them in industry, mainly cotton and silk reeling. The number of Turkmen women in textile undertakings was particularly large. For example at the Chardzhou Filature which opened in January 1931, 75 per cent of the 900 workers were Turkmen women. The Party had "successfully solved"

---

\* sluzhashchiy is defined in the SLOVAR' RUSSKOGO YAZYKA, Vol. IV, Moscow, 1961, as "someone who works for hire in various fields of mental work or physical labour connected not with production but with attending to someone or something". It includes office workers.

the problem of creating a national working-class. By April 1931 the highest percentages of Turkmen workers were in the textile industry (43.8 per cent) and the oil industry (41.5 per cent). In addition "thousands of skilled workers (oil workers from Azerbaydzhan, textile workers from Central Russia, etc. etc.)" had come from other republics to assist in the industrialization of Turkmenistan.

Absenteeism, lack of personal responsibility and a high turnover of labour continued to be serious problems hindering production. One reason for labour turnover was "leftist" wage-levelling which made no distinction between skilled and unskilled workers and thus gave the workers no interest in raising their qualifications. This was an All-Union problem and among the measures outlined at a conference called by the Party in July 1931 to improve labour organization were the abolition of wage-levelling and lack of personal responsibility, and the organized recruitment of labour in the kolkhozes.

The construction of the chemical kombinat at Kara-Bogaz-Gol was a matter of particular concern to the Party. The area was remote and inhospitable. Faced with an acute shortage of labour, in October 1931 the Turkmen Party decided to send 200 Komsomol members there and to try and get the local nomads to work on the construction of the kombinat. The raykom also made great efforts to recruit workers for Kara-Bogaz from the Volga regions, Baku and other parts of the country. The main emphasis, however, was on recruiting the local nomadic population and "as a result of great explanatory work", by the spring the number of workers increased substantially and former nomads were in the majority. By May 1932, 250 members of the Turkmen Komsomol had arrived to work on the construction of the kombinat in answer to an appeal in the spring.

. . .

The years 1933-41 are covered in more detail by Redzhebov's article, a summary of which follows:

The growth of industry and transport in the years of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans was accompanied by an increase in the numbers of the working-class, changes in its national composition and the increased employment of women in industry.

#### Increase in numbers

The following figures for different industries in Turkmenistan show the increase in the number of workers between 1933 and 1937:

<u>Industry</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1937</u>
Oil	1,500	6,360
Chemical Mining	1,910	4,600
Light	3,715	6,057
Local	1,660	2,727 (2,168 production workers)
Food	2,619	4,411 (production workers only)

The concentration of workers in the Republic's bigger enterprises was very significant. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the total number of workers and sluzhashchiys in industry, construction, rail and river transport, sovkhoz and MTS was 77,900. In 1933, 60 per cent were concentrated in the major undertakings; this rose to 70 per cent in 1937 and the trend continued in the following years.

The number of workers and sluzhashchiys increased again in the Third Five-Year Plan and in 1938 the figures for various industries in Turkmenistan were as follows:

Food	3,427	[This appears to be a decrease on the figure given above for 1937. - Ed., CAR.]
Light	6,880	
Local	2,831	
Textile	4,042	
<u>Turkmenneft'</u> (Turkmen Oil Authority)	2,074	
Railways	13,300	
Water and other transport	10,200	

The total number of workers and employees in industry, construction, transport, sovkhozes and MTS was 89,600 by 1940. The number for the national economy as a whole was 172,900 in 1940 as against 149,100 in 1937. Together with the increase in the number of workers, the proportion of young people among them grew year by year.

### National composition

As regards the national composition of the working-class of Turkmenistan, in 1934 the proportion of Turkmens and other local nationalities was 39.5 per cent. Although, compared with 1932, the proportion had decreased (in 1932 it was 44 per cent), and it decreased another .1 per cent in 1937, this was not a real decrease. The reason for it was that with the rapid growth of industry during the years of these five-year plans, labour was recruited not only locally but also outside the Republic. Thus in 1933 the working-class of Turkmenistan included Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Azerbaydzhanis, Belorussians,

Uzbeks, Tatars and Kazakhs. More than 55 per cent of the workers and sluzhashchiys at Ashkhabad Textile Factory were Russians, over 33 per cent Turkmens, about five per cent Armenians, two per cent Azerbaydzhanis and so on. To quote another example, in 1940, 56 per cent of the workers and sluzhashchiys at the Ashkhabad Filature were Russians, about 30 per cent Turkmens and the rest of other nationalities. It must be taken into account that during the Second Five-Year Plan the kolkhozes became better organized, the incomes of members of artels rose and exploiting elements in the countryside lost their former positions. These improvements kept the kolkhoz dehqans from moving to the towns or industrial settlements. Moreover, it was government policy to maintain the labour force in the cotton fields. There was another important reason for recruiting labour from outside. As industry became more highly equipped there was a demand for skilled workers of which there was a shortage in Turkmenistan at that time. But of course some of the industry's needs were met by an influx of kolkhoz dehqans. This can be seen in the oil industry. In 1931 it had 631 workers of whom 291 were Turkmens and workers of other local nationalities; in 1932 the corresponding figures were 948 and 474, and in 1933, 1,500 and 589. Since the percentage of local nationalities in the urban population was extremely small in those years, it is clear that the dehqans accounted for the increases.

The Turkmen Sovnarkom (Council of People's Commissars) issued a special decree on 20 October 1933 on the provision of labour for the oil industry. The Turkmen Central Committee called on the Republican Komsomol to send 500 of its members from the countryside to work in the oil and chemical industries. There was a quick response from the young people in the villages and dozens of Komsomol members went to Kara-Bogaz, Nebit-Dag and other undertakings.

### Employment of women

Bringing women into industry also contributed to the general increase in the number of workers. At the same time it was an important step in their emancipation. The number of women in the main branches of industry on 1 July 1933 was 16,960, of whom 15.2 per cent were Turkmen, and by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan women made up 30.8 per cent of those working in the industry of Turkmenistan. At the Ashkhabad Textile Factory 578 of the 937 workers were women, including 109 Turkmens and Uzbeks, at the Ashkhabad Filature of 876 workers 622 were women, including 187 Turkmens, and at the Chardzhou Filature out of the total of 1,250 workers 868 were women, 203 of the latter being Turkmens and Uzbeks. In light industry 2,227 of the 5,020 workers in 1934 were women, and in 1937 the figures were 4,559 and 6,348 respectively. In 1933 the number of women engaged in heavy industry was

1,668. There were Turkmen women also among the oil and ozokerite workers. They had joined the ranks of the working-class already in the 1920s. It should be noted that the highest percentage of female employment occurred in the Sewing Factory (87 per cent), in the silk reeling industry (76.5 per cent) and in the Textile Factory (63.7 per cent) since originally this form of work was closest to the domestic tasks of Turkmen women. In 1940 about 13,000 Turkmen women worked in socialist industry and transport in the republic.

Women gave excellent accounts of themselves in all industries. For example a women's brigade headed by Kuzbekova made a big contribution to the construction of the Kara-Bogaz Soda Factory. There were also several women stakhanovites. The Party and Government organizations did everything to encourage female employment thus serving to increase the country's economic power and simultaneously to overcome the inequality between men and women.

### Labour recruitment

The dehqans were the main source of labour for industry among the local population. At first the influx of labour was unorganized and came mainly from the rural population of the auls situated close to the industrial centres and the nomadic livestock breeders. The influx of nomads from the livestock breeding areas was a feature of the oil and chemical mining industry in particular. Many former herdsmen became outstanding production workers and one was elected a member of the TsIK (Central Executive Committee) of the Republic. The influx of nomads into industry did not, however, mean a slowing up in the development of livestock breeding. The change-over from nomadic to a more settled form of livestock breeding and mechanization led to the release of some of the labour force.

The unorganized influx of labour which occurred not only during the period of unemployment but also after it was eliminated (1931) had a number of serious negative features. First and foremost it prevented a correct distribution of labour. Furthermore it offered opportunities for hostile elements (former kulaks, nepmen [entrepreneurs of the period of the New Economic Policy], basmachis and members of nationalist counter-revolutionary groups) to infiltrate into industry. A correct distribution of labour in industry and other branches of the economy was particularly important in Turkmenistan where agriculture and industry developed simultaneously. In conformity with an All-Union decree of 10 September 1933, the Turkmen Sovnarkom and trade unions passed a decree on 19 September 1933 introducing changes in the system of labour recruitment. Agreements were to be made with kolkhozes, and Gosplan was given the task of coordinating the

plans. The scale of recruitment in each rayon was subject to confirmation by the Sovnarkom but the People's Commissariats and economic organizations were allowed to carry out the recruitment themselves. On 8 October 1933 the Sovnarkom passed a further decree "On Regulating Labour Recruitment" on the basis of which a special commission was organized which was given overall control of recruitment. On 2 November 1933 the Sovnarkom passed a new decree aimed at a further improvement in the organized recruitment of labour. It concerned mainly agreements between undertakings and kolkhozes, and the livestock breeding areas in particular.

A Sovnarkom decree of 4 July 1936 established the number of workers to be recruited by industrial enterprises in the kolkhozes as follows:

Organization for the construction of the Glass Works	240	) from kolkhozes in Tedzhen rayon
Ashkhabad City Building Trust	140	
Brick Factory of Ashkhabad City Council	150	
Building Trust of the People's Commissariat of Local Industry	145	) from kolkhozes in Kaakha rayon
Kizyl-Arvat Wagon Repair Factory	50	
Ashkhabad City Building Organization	100	) from kolkhozes in Bakharden rayon
Locomotive Depot	100	

and so on, to a total of 1,365 workers. The respective executive committees of the rayon soviets were charged with giving every assistance in the recruitment. To overcome acute difficulties in the supply of building materials, an earlier decree of 19 May 1936 had given the director of the Krasnovodsk Bureau authority to recruit 200 workers each in the Kazandzhik and Krasnovodsk rayons for the Gyushi quarry, 11 km. from Krasnovodsk. The Sovnarkom continued to regulate recruitment. By a decree of 15 May 1938 the Amu-Dar'ya State Steamship Company was allowed to recruit in the Chardzhou group of rayons and a decree of 5 September 1938 authorized labour recruitment for the Kalai-Mor Sovkhoz from kolkhozes in the Serakhs, Tedzhen, former Yerbent, Bakharden, Mary and Stalino rayons.

A special decree on the oil industry of Turkmenistan was passed by the All-Union Party Central Committee and Sovnarkom on 14 October 1940. This called on the Chief Directorate of Labour Reserves to assign 1,500 workers of the basic trades from among the graduates of the FZO and FZU schools to the Turkmen oil industry, and the Ukrainian

SSR, Tatar ASSR and Kuybyshev oblast were to supply 7,000 workers for the oil and ozokerite industry of Turkmenistan in the first quarter of 1941, 3,000 each from the Ukraine and Tataria and 1,000 from the Kuybyshev oblast.

At the same time, the unauthorized departure of kolkhozniks to work temporarily in the towns and unauthorized departure from the kolkhozes altogether was substantially limited. The All-Union decree of 17 March 1933 establishing regulations for the departure of kolkhozniks to work in industry played a big role in this. The decree emphasized that kolkhozes were obliged to give work to the able-bodied members of the families of kolkhozniks who had gone to work in industry under a contract.

All these measures strengthened both industry and the kolkhozes and created the conditions not only for a quantitative growth of the working-class but also an improvement in its social structure and an increase in the number of workers of local nationalities.

#### Turnover of labour and labour discipline

Besides regulating recruitment there was another problem to be solved connected with the movements of the labour force within the undertakings. As long as the machinery was fairly simple, a frequent turnover of labour did not cause substantial harm to production. But the position changed drastically when improved machinery was introduced which needed stable and skilled personnel constantly perfecting their knowledge. The Party and Government were faced with the task of stabilizing the skilled labour force and eliminating the turnover of manpower, infringements of labour discipline and absenteeism. The All-Union decree of 15 November 1932 "The Struggle with Absenteeism" played a decisive role. Whereas earlier the rate of absenteeism was 1-2 days a month for each worker and 2.1 days in heavy industry, it went down to 0.3 days after the decree. The percentage of labour turnover also decreased. But individual managers of undertakings and public organizations did not always carry out the directive correctly and the resulting distortions were the subject of special discussions in the directing organs. Thus the Turkmen TsIK in 1933, after hearing a report by the Turkmen People's Commissariat of Labour on the implementation of the decree, noted not only the unsatisfactory state of labour discipline in a number of enterprises but also infringements by certain managers in the implementation of the decree. The Dzhebel Salt Mines, Bayram-Ali Kombinat No.9, the Ashkhabad Glass Factory and some others were guilty of the wrongful dismissal of workers. The Filature and Engineering Works were also guilty of this. The former, for instance, in the first four months of 1933 dismissed 235 workers, of whom

only 39 were dismissed for valid reasons. The Presidium of the Turkmen TsIK demanded a campaign against absenteeism and strict observance of the law. Particular attention was devoted to labour turnover which destroyed the rhythm of production while new workers were trained. At the Ashkhabad Filature in January 1933 machines were idle for 1,147.16 hours, in March for 992.2 hours, in April for 2,518.41 hours and in the first half of May for 613 hours. In four months the machines were idle for a total of 5,198.01 hours because of labour turnover. Interruptions in production because of mechanical trouble due to the low qualifications of the constantly changing personnel totalled 2,794.65 hours. At the Chardzhou Filature 10-20 workers were dismissed and taken on daily, which slowed up the factory's fulfilment of the state plan.

Despite the substantial improvements resulting from the All-Union decree of 15 November 1932, there continued to be a high turnover of labour which remained the scourge of many industrial undertakings for some years. True, the reasons for this changed. In the years of the First Five-Year Plan the chief cause had been disorderly recruitment and organizational confusion in the kolkhozes which supplied the labour. In the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, however, the reason was that the development of industry and growth of the working-class had outstripped the establishment of proper living conditions for the workers, and also the growth of cultural and educational institutions particularly in areas where heavy industry was developing rapidly. Furthermore there were still many hostile class elements in industry, particularly in management, who consciously encouraged the turnover of manpower, hindered the provision of normal living conditions for the workers and were responsible for various violations in the work of the enterprise etc. They impeded the normal provision of food supplies and housing to the workers who became dissatisfied and gave up their jobs. A typical case was quoted in TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 2 October 1933. The workers' correspondent of the Merv Cotton Ginnery reported part of the consignment of potatoes for the factory was stolen on the way there and the rest was left to rot in a storehouse for several months. This was not an isolated case. In 1933, 100 people left work in 12 days at the Chardzhou Wadding Factory because of unsatisfactory supplies, and a similar case occurred in Krasnovodsk at the Kuuli Salt Mines. The labour turnover at the Ashkhabad Filature in 1933 was 25 per cent. In 11 months of 1933, 75 Turkmen workers alone left the Merv Depot because of bad housing and living conditions. At the works named after the 26 Baku Commissars between 1933 and 1935, the complement of workers was renewed twice over due to unsatisfactory housing and living conditions. This intolerable situation existed in 15 enterprises of local industry which were specially investigated. The labour force was renewed twice in the course of 1937 alone. In 12 light industry undertakings which employed 6,200 workers, there were 7,182 replacements in 1937, and in ten

undertakings of the food industry with 2,500 workers there were 2,816 replacements. In 1938 on the Ashkhabad Railway 2,175 infringements of labour discipline were registered and 688 of the worst offenders were dismissed.

Decisive measures had to be taken to eliminate such abnormal phenomena and to create conditions for the consolidation of the working-class in all branches of the economy. The international situation also demanded them. Therefore, in addition to a lot of organizational, political and educational work, the Party and Government issued a number of decrees aimed at stabilizing labour in industrial undertakings and in the economy as a whole and reinforcing production discipline. One such measure was the joint All-Union Government, Party and Trade Union decree of 28 December 1938 "Measures to Regulate Labour Discipline, Improve the Practice of State Social Insurance and the Fight with Abuses in this Matter". This was an important political document which the working-class greeted with great enthusiasm. Workers in Turkmenistan promised to raise production and improve labour discipline.

A number of Party and Government decrees passed after the XVIIIth Party Congress were also of great importance for the further growth of the economic and military might of the USSR. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 19 October 1940 regulating the transfer of engineers, technicians and skilled workers assured the country's undertakings of skilled technical personnel. The decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 26 June 1940 and 10 July 1940 forbidding unauthorized departure from an enterprise and introducing an eight-hour day and a seven-day working week, were aimed at increasing production and improving labour discipline. All these measures were intended to strengthen the Soviet state in the face of the Second World War which had begun. Local Party and soviet organs did everything they could to carry them out. On 27 January 1939 the Turkmen Central Committee passed a resolution calling on the management of the oil and ozokerite workings of Cheleken and Nebit-Dag and the Party and Trade Union organizations of these undertakings and rayons to do everything to improve labour discipline and carry out the All-Union decree.

In 1940 the IIIrd Plenum of the Turkmen Central Committee expressed its disapproval of the mass dismissal of workers and suggested that the People's Commissariats and managers of enterprises should take steps to eliminate labour turnover. The Plenum suggested that the trade unions should discuss the results of the reorganization of trade union work as a result of the change-over to the eight-hour day and seven-day week. The Party and Government measures led to a great improvement. Statistics for 33 enterprises show that in the course of one month alone, from June to July 1940, infringements of

labour discipline decreased more than twice. But at a number of enterprises infringements of discipline and the turnover of manpower continued to occur. The workers who dropped out were mainly those who had only just come into industry and had not had time to acquire production skills or the habit of work, and this occurred moreover mostly at those undertakings where the necessary housing and living conditions had not been provided. In addition, because of Turkmenistan's hot climate several new workers from the central regions of the USSR left work in the summer. In the Karakum Sulphur Mines the turnover of labour was 110 in July 1939 and only 31 in November. In the Gaudar Sulphur Mine the turnover of labour in the summer of 1940 was almost 50 per cent. But literally with every month and even week the number of such undertakings and workers decreased. The working-class of Turkmenistan was becoming more and more numerous and steadfast when the peaceful labour of the Soviet people was interrupted by the German attack on 22 June 1941.

. . .

The accounts of the years 1933-41 in ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR and OCHERKI ISTORII KOMMUNISTICHESKOY PARTII TURKMENISTANA say little about the growth of the working-class. OCHERKI ISTORII KOMMUNISTICHESKOY PARTII TURKMENISTANA does, however, dwell in more detail on difficulties in the oil industry than Redzhebov. Among the reasons given for a slowing down in its development in 1938-9 were a shortage of skilled workers and poor living conditions. Apart from appealing to the All-Union Party Central Committee and Sovnarkom, which resulted in the decree of 14 October 1940, the Turkmen Party took steps to improve medical attention and supplies for the workers. Additional workers were sent from the kolkhozes and the Bakharden rayon was switched over to vegetable growing to keep the oil workers supplied with vegetables and potatoes.

---

#### New symphony by Azerbaydzhani composer

The new symphonic work of the young Azerbaydzhani composer, Vasif Adigezalov, entitled "Africa Fights", written in honour of the XXIInd Party Conference, has been performed with great success by the symphony orchestra of the Azerbaydzhani radio.

BR. 12.11.61

## UNIVERSITIES OF CULTURE

Introduction - Structure of the universities - Scope of the  
universities - Difficulties - Mixed results of official aid

### Introduction

The universities of culture first appeared in 1958 and were said to have been "born of the initiative of the masses". They were set up by public organizations mainly in various cultural and educational institutions, clubs and palaces of culture, and also on radio and television. (Small Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.9, 1960, p.765.) After the XXIst Party Congress (January-February 1959) their numbers began to grow rapidly. The Congress decided that a new "Communist man" must be produced since the economic success of the Seven-Year Plan depended on raising the conscientiousness (soznatel'nost') of the workers. "All forms and means of ideological work, propaganda, agitation, the press, radio, cinema as well as cultural and educational institutions have been mobilized to create the new man with a Communist character. One of the more important means of Communist education of the workers are the universities of culture. . ." (KP. 17.6.60)

Although the term "university of culture" has perforce been used throughout the present article it must be admitted that it gives a misleading idea of the real meaning of "universitet kul'tury." As is often the case with international words used in Russian, "universitet" and "kul'tura" do not necessarily mean the same as their English counterparts - "university" and "culture". The new universities of culture are in fact little more than part-time courses in various branches of general and specialized knowledge some of which in the West would not be regarded as "cultural" at all. There is no evidence that they have any special buildings allotted to them and the staff seem to be drawn from people engaged in other professional work.

Their task is defined as follows: "The universities of culture are called upon to assist the Party in all possible ways to extend its ideological influence to every Soviet man, inspire their students with a desire for self-education and help them towards the better practical use of the knowledge they acquire." (BR. 11.1.61)

After 1958 the universities quickly grew in Central Asia. In September 1959 there were three of them in Turkmenistan and by the end of the 1959-60 school year they had increased to 10, with over 2,000 students. By April 1961 there were 5,000 such students in the republic. (TI. 26.9.59, 21.9.60, 8.4.61) In Uzbekistan in 1959 there were 36 universities with 9,000 students; in 1960, 56 with 17,000 students; and 75 with 20,000 students in 1961. In 1961, 40 of them (8 literary, 4 musical, 4 teaching aesthetics, 2 for parents, 3 of health, 1 for women and 18 non-specialized) were attached to cultural and educational establishments run by the Ministry of Culture. (PV. 4.3.61) By June 1961 the universities are said to have increased to 125 with over 23,000 students. (PV. 9.6.61) In Kazakhstan they did not appear until after the XXIst Party Congress but at the beginning of 1960 they were 110 in number, with over 22,000 students. The oblast "cultural directorates" of Alma-Ata, Semipalatinsk, North-Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Pavlodar and Gur'yev set up universities in the towns, rayon centres, kolkhozes and sovkhoses. There were 62 of them in the towns, of these 5 in Alma-Ata, 6 in Semipalatinsk and 7 in Karaganda - and 57 in the countryside, of these 8 in the Alma-Ata, 9 in the Gur'yev, 10 in the Semipalatinsk, 7 in the Pavlodar and 7 in the West-Kazakhstan oblasts. (KP. 6.1.60) Kirgizia had only 27 universities in March 1961. (SK. 21.3.61) The movement seems to be developed there as poorly as in Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan.

### Structure of the universities

Each university has a rector and council elected from among the local Party activists, komsomols, trade union officials etc. and also its lecturing staff. Its structure depends on local conditions: the economic character of the area it serves and requirements of the students. The more primitive type of these universities is not specialized and teaches a little of everything while others, broadly intellectual or specializing in some particular group of related subjects, are usually divided into faculties, each headed by a dean qualified in the subject of his faculty. The full course lasts from one to three years, lectures are normally given 2-3 times a month after working hours or on Sundays. A lecture with accompanying programme: recorded music, display of paintings or whatever the subject may demand, lasts 2-3 hours. Non-specialized universities and those teaching purely intellectual subjects are open to everybody, while the technical ones are presumably meant for people engaged in a corresponding branch of industry. The parents' universities are for parents and teach them how to bring up children. The existence of some special universities for women may be a concession to Muslim tradition.

The work of the universities is supervised by the Party organizations assisted by the trade unions, Komsomol, the republican branches

of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge and, at least in theory, by the republican unions of painters, writers and musicians. Lecturers are recruited from among Party "activists" and "agitators" as well as academicians and scholars, working intelligentsia, actors, writers and whatever the subjects taught may demand. "This provides good opportunities for contacts between the creative intelligentsia and the broad working masses for the purpose of propagating cultural achievements." (KP. 17.6.60)

Officially, the lecturers are not paid which is, apparently, the reason why qualified lecturers are so hard to get. There are cases of universities of culture offering handsome fees to attract lecturers, a practice deplored by the press. "In such circumstances [shortage of lecturers] rectors of the universities are often forced to break the rule that lectures are to be given free (na obshchestvennykh nachalakh i.e. the lecturers unpaid) and pay considerable sums of money to lecturers and artists." (BR. 12.4.60) At Almalyk, Uzbekistan, in one year 21,000 rubles were spent on lecturers by the local university. (PV. 30.3.61) [These are probably new rubles which makes the sum very considerable.] Although in theory the lecturers are unpaid, at the Ashkhabad university of culture the students pay fees of 25 rubles a year. (TI. 23.9.60)

At least some of the universities are bilingual. The Baku city university of culture provides lectures in Russian and Azerbaydzhani (BR. 7.11.59) and the Tashkent university of pedagogical knowledge has 1,500 students in the Russian and Uzbek groups. (PV. 9.6.61)

### Scope of the universities

The universities of culture are subdivided into many different types with different programmes. Some have faculties, like the university of culture run by the Azerbaydzhani State University, with a two-year course of instruction; it has faculties of literature and art as well as of science and natural science. It teaches Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, socialist realism, the history of literature, the theatre, cinematography, choreography, music, painting and Soviet literature, science and art. (BR. 7.11.59) The Ashkhabad university of culture has four faculties: literature, music, art, theatre and cinema, but all the students must attend lectures on social and political subjects and Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. (TI. 6.9.59) The university of culture at Termez has faculties of scientific atheism and technical knowledge, literature, art and ethics [sic]. (PV. 31.1.60) In Stalinabad two schools have universities of culture of their own where lectures are given by writers, scholars etc. on literature, art, new developments in science and medicine and a number of other subjects. (KT. 20.9.60) Everybody is encouraged to study, for instance, the

university of culture serving a number of streets in the Lenin rayon of Tashkent is meant for people who do not go to work. Academician Zhitov is the rector of this "university at home" (po mestozhitel'stvu) which has various faculties. It has been set up by the local housing office as a "very convenient way to encourage housewives to study". (PV. 5.7.60, 27.1.61) The Ordzhonikidze rayon of the Tashkent oblast has a university for women. Lectures are given twice a month and the work is supervised by the rector, a woman assistant of the chief of the local "propaganda and agitation" department, and a council of 11 members. In the lecture hours children of the students are looked after in the "children's room". (PV. 23.8.60)

The universities of technical knowledge and those of Communist labour teach workers how to produce more for the State. The technical university of Ashkhabad helps workers to improve their professional qualifications. It has faculties of mechanics and building, with 300 and 150 students respectively. Lectures are given by the staff of higher educational establishments and the Academy of Sciences and by various specialists from the ministries and industrial establishments, while practical work is done at factories and building sites. (TI. 24.3.60) The stocking and spinning factory in Kokand runs a "university of technical creativeness and the best working methods", which teaches its staff how to make better hosiery and yarn. (PV. 2.4.60) The "people's university of science and technology" in Frunze is attended by industrial workers, members of the Party organizations and trade unions and industrial innovators. (SK. 15.10.60)

A "university of Communist labour and way of life" has been planned for Sumgait in Azerbaydzhán, since "the workers of Sumgait, who have started [socialist] competition for the distinguished title of a town of Communist labour and life, try to improve industrial production on the basis of technical progress and to achieve in the coming year a substantial development of culture in work and life. The successful accomplishment of these tasks demands serious, systematic and purposeful study from the heads of factories and the best workers. The university of Communist labour and life has been founded to raise ideological and theoretical [sic] standards, widen technical knowledge and develop the aesthetic sense of the factory and building workers of Sumgait." This will be done during a two-year course of instruction in the faculties of metallurgy, chemistry, building and municipal trade. (BR. 8.9.60) The "university for the masters of Communist labour" at Rudnyy, Kazakhstan, has faculties of mining electromechanics and auto-mechanics and the course of instruction lasts two years. Lectures are given three times a week and the students, local workers and industrial specialists, take examinations. Successful students are given the title of "master" and special certificates. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.5, 1961)

The universities of health are another popular variety of the universities of culture. A university of this type in Baku has over 400 students including old age pensioners and middle school pupils. Lectures on hygiene and medicine are given by professors of medicine and are illustrated with appropriate films. The course of instruction lasts one year. (BR. 29.6.60) The Tashkent city House of Health Education has set up a university of health for women. A year's course includes lectures on new developments in Soviet medical science, hygiene, prevention of disease, child care, nutrition and also beauty aids. (PV. 6.3.60)

The universities for parents teach how to bring up children. A university of this type works at the Artem Palace of Culture in Baku. Lectures include subjects like "The Classics of Marxism-Leninism on Fostering Communist Morals", "The Parents' Authority and Bringing up Children", and "Getting Children Used to Work". There is one lecture a month and it is followed by a film or a show produced by amateur actors. (BR. 1.2.61) The incomplete middle school in Kuybyshev sovkhov, Kurgan-Tyube rayon, Tadzhikistan, runs a university for parents where lectures are given by the local teachers, doctors, agronomists and other specialists. The subjects include "Cultured Speech and the Pupils' Conduct" and "Religion - the Enemy of a Soviet Family". There is a film after every lecture and a wall newspaper, THE FAMILY AND THE SCHOOL, gives advice on bringing up children and what to read. (KT. 25.5.60)

Another important type of the university of culture are the universities of socialist law. The city Party committee of Mary has set up such a university with a two-year course of study. Local Party officials and lawyers lecture there on Soviet law to 286 students, 53 of whom are workers, 24 directors of factories and other establishments, 92 chairmen and members of factory committees (fabzavkom), 32 members of the people's wardens (druzhinnik) and 12 members of the Comrade Courts. (TI. 8.7.61) Tashkent city university of legal knowledge is attended by officers of the people's warden units, members of the Comrade Courts and people's assessors. (PV. 27.1.61) The same sort of university exists in Frunze. (SK. 24.5.60)

The less common type of university of culture includes the universities of musical culture such as that attached to the Tashkent Institute of Railway Transport Engineers. (PV. 9.3.60) A similar university in Frunze caters for school pupils only and is attended by 150 senior form pupils of the city schools. (SK. 30.9.60) Another variety of the university of culture which seems rather rare is the universities of agricultural knowledge, like the one in Dimitrov kolkhoz, Nizhne-Chirchik rayon. (PV. 9.6.61)

Broadcasting and the press also run universities of culture. The Azerbaydzhan radio and television committee have regular broadcasts in the university of culture series (BR. 11.1.61), so does the Semi-palatinsk radio while the oblast papers, PRIIRTYSHSKAYA PRAVDA and SEMEY PRAVDASY, publish lectures like "The Role of the Soviet Communist Party in the Development of Literature and Art" as part of their own university of culture. (KP. 17.6.60)

Finally, universities of culture cannot for various reasons exist in all inhabited places and in the Akmolinsk (now Tselinograd) oblast their lack is remedied by "schools of culture", 40 of which were to be set up in the local kolkhozes and sovkhozes. They are a "simplified form of aesthetic education of the national masses". (KP. 2.11.60)

### Difficulties

The most common weakness of the universities of culture is considered to be kul'turnichestvo, or a preoccupation with theoretical subjects, particularly with those relating exclusively to the past, and failing to connect these studies with corresponding aspects of Soviet life and to draw the usual patriotic conclusions from it. "The most serious of them [shortcomings] is preoccupation with kul'turnichestvo and razvlekatel'stvo (entertainment) prejudicial to the ideological Marxist-Leninist education of the workers. There is no proper system in arranging the syllabus of the universities of culture at Tashauz, Kerki and Cheleken; the study of masterpieces of literature and art is often detached from the tasks of forming a Communist outlook and inspiring the student with love for work and Soviet patriotism. . . A number of universities carry on their work in an abstractedly intellectual and academic manner. Their work plans are drawn up without much consideration, little connected with life and tasks of the present, and they do not provide for the various spiritual needs of the workers. Current problems of the Party's policy and achievements in science and technology have no place in the programme of Krasnovodsk university of culture." (TI. 8.4.61) "Some lectures on literature and art show love for the past while ignoring the task of forming a Communist outlook and inspiring the audience with patriotism and socialist internationalism." (PV. 30.3.61) Moreover, the majority of the universities of culture are concerned with art, literature and music (they are iskusstvovedcheskogo profiliya), while without a knowledge of contemporary science and technical developments no man can be called cultured. There has been severe criticism of some universities where "important questions of Communist morality and ethics were limited to narrow everyday problems like "How to Lay the Table", "How to Dress Smartly and Tastefully" and "Good Manners". But this criticism resulted in the abandonment of all lectures on culture in everyday life, and this also is found to be wrong. (PV.5.2.60)

The shortage of lecturers is a serious problem. Thus in Baku various writers, painters, musicians and actors invited to lecture refused to do so. In the provinces it is even worse: when universities of culture were founded in the Kuba, Lenkoran' and other rayons, their rectors looked in vain for help from Baku, and it was thought good if as many as 5-6 lectures a year were given in the provincial universities by people from the capital. The writers' and other "creative societies" are not interested in the universities. Some members of the painters' and composers' unions lecture, but they are very few in number and always the same. Baku theatres also fail to send their actors to meet the university of culture students. All this makes the rectors pay handsome fees to tempt lecturers. (BR. 12.4.60) The Kazakh Ministry of Culture asked the societies of writers, composers, painters and cinematographers and the Kazakh Academy of Sciences to send lecturers to the provinces for the opening of the 1959-60 school year but none of them responded. (KP. 6.1.60) Uzbek scholars, on the other hand, are more willing to educate the "working masses": the Institute of Language and Literature of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences has opened a number of universities of culture in the kolkhozes of the Tashkent region. Lectures are given by members of the Institute and of the Institutes of History and Archaeology, Oriental Studies, Philosophy and Law. In the Kzyl Uzbekistan kolkhoz, Ordzhonikidzeabad rayon, a university has been set up by the humanist institutes of the Academy and a university for women was to be started in the same kolkhoz; Uzbek scholars were to lecture there. (PV. 15.6.60, 1.7.60)

A fairly frequent complaint is that lectures are not illustrated with appropriate films, reproductions of paintings, experiments, plays, concerts etc. This, combined with the shortage of the right kind of lecturers and an occasional shortage of recommended books, makes people abandon some universities. In some of the Azerbaydzhani universities less than half the students remained by April 1960 (BR. 12.4.60), while at the end of the 1959-60 school year only 30-35 students out of 230 were still attending Krasnovodsk university of culture, and in Tashauz 70-80 remained out of the original 289. (TI. 21.9.60) Similar cases are reported from Kirgizia. (SK. 20.10.59)

#### Mixed results of official aid

The authorities try to help the universities and thus to control their choice of subjects to be taught. In the 1959-60 school year in Azerbaydzhan their programmes were modelled upon those used in Moscow and Leningrad, without reference to local needs. Other syllabuses swarmed with "unsystematic subjects from the dim past" or simply provided for series of lectures on ethical or literary problems. To remedy all this, the republican Ministry of Culture set up an educa-

tional methodological centre whose members were directors of theatres, heads of cultural and educational establishments etc. They held one meeting and no action followed, so it was suggested that the universities should be handed over to the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. The Society, however, refused to accept this new responsibility, and another educational methodological centre, attached to the republican union of the trade unions, was organized, only to prove the same failure as its predecessor. Thereupon the universities appealed in vain to the Ministry of Culture for help. Next, the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Komsomol Central Committee undertook to look after the universities, but again nothing happened, while Baku Komsomol Committee ignored them altogether. This was the situation in April 1960. (BR. 12.4.60)

In Kazakhstan the oblast authorities are sometimes in charge. The "cultural directorate" of the North-Kazakhstan oblast has set up "mobile lectorates of the universities of culture", that is, groups of specialists in various branches of art (the theatre, painting, music) who hold meetings to discuss the texts of prepared lectures and then read them in village universities which have no such lecturers of their own. (KP. 6.1.60) The Semipalatinsk oblast "cultural directorate" has organized a council of the universities of culture consisting of five departments: literature, visual arts, film, theatre and music, with a qualified specialist at the head of each. The council sends out lecturers and discusses the texts of lectures. The town and rayon Party committees have confirmed as rectors and pro-rectors of the universities various scholars, headmasters and experienced Party functionaries. (KP. 17.6.60) Such control does away with kul'turnichestvo, razvlekatel'stvo, undue "love for the dim past", neglect of the Soviet present and other weaknesses of these "means of Communist education of the working masses."

### Teachers' conference on language teaching

The Foreign Languages Departments of the Academies of Sciences of the Soviet Union held a conference between 9-14 October 1961 in Tashkent. The conference discussed the methodological problems arising in the teaching of foreign languages.

PV. 10.10.61

## L I N G U I S T I C   S U R V E Y   1 9 6 0 - 1

The purpose of this article is to give an account of the more important Soviet literature on Central Asian linguistic subjects received by the Central Asian Research Centre during the year 1960-1. Details of the publications can be found in No.2, 1960 and No.1, 1961 of the BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS BORDERLANDS.

Among the vernacular languages of the Muslim Republics of Central Asia, Tadjik and Uzbek are the most important and the most developed, and have a considerable literary history; it is therefore natural that they should be given priority in publications concerning their present state. In the series of comprehensive dictionaries published under the auspices of the local Academies, the Tadjik-Russian dictionary was the first to come out in 1954. (The Russian-Kazakh, -Kirgiz, -Tadjik, -Uzbek and -Turkmen dictionaries had all appeared by 1957.)

Uzbek

The Uzbek-Russian dictionary, compiled by a team under the direction of A.K. Borovkov, was published in 1959. It contains about forty thousand words, and appendixes which include a summary of Uzbek grammar by A.K. Borovkov, an alphabetical list of suffixes, and a list of about twenty thousand words in Arabic characters arranged according to the Arabic alphabet with their equivalents in the Cyrillic. These words were selected on the basis of literary works of the period from the 15th to the 19th centuries. The introduction to this section explains the rules of the simplified Arabic alphabet which was in use from 1922 to 1929. There is, however, no mention either of the first Latin alphabet made on the basis of nine vowels of the non-iranized dialects and officially accepted between 1929 and 1935, or of the second, six-vowel Latin alphabet which was in use from 1935 to 1940, when the present Cyrillic characters were introduced. According to the editors a unique feature of this dictionary is that it contains all Russian words now used in written or spoken Uzbek, except for highly technical terms. Archaic words are included only if they figure in living expressions or proverbs. Sentences are given to illustrate the use of the more important words. Idiomatic expressions and proverbs are also included.


In 1960 another essential work on contemporary Uzbek appeared in A.N. Kononov's Grammar of Modern Literary Uzbek. This is the first comprehensive descriptive grammar of modern literary Uzbek, the official language of Uzbekistan. It appeared in the same series of grammars published by the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR as Kononov's GRAMMAR OF THE MODERN TURKISH LITERARY LANGUAGE. As the author mentions in the foreword to his book, in working on this grammar he relied to a large extent on his earlier GRAMMAR OF THE UZBEK LANGUAGE published in 1948. The new grammar is, however, much more extensive; it deals with every aspect of the language without, however, being too detailed and therefore unwieldy. It is clearly divided into sections and paragraphs and ample examples are given to illustrate each aspect of the language. At the end there is an alphabetical index of prefixes, suffixes, postpositions, particles and auxiliary verbs. Kononov adheres to the traditional indo-european grammatical terminology. Unlike many Soviet linguists, he does not load his explanations with theoretical statements and definitions based on Russian grammar, which are not easily applicable to other languages and least of all to Turkic languages. In spite of the fact that modern literary Uzbek is based on the iranized Tashkent dialect, as is clearly shown by its vocalism, Kononov seems to avoid mention of this fact. It is also strange that he should make such scanty reference to Polivanov's work, which was in fact the first to lay down the rules of the literary language in the 1920s.

### Tadzhik

A new work on Tadzhik dialectology is A.A. Kerimova's THE DIALECT OF THE TADZHIS IN BUKHARA. Among all the northern dialects of Tadzhik it is perhaps the Tadzhik of Bukhara on which the influence of Uzbek is most strongly felt. Apart from many Turkic words in the vocabulary, there are considerable morphological changes. The assimilation of vowels often indicates a trend towards vowel harmony, for example, durun for darun. The prepositions of the southern dialects and standard Tadzhik are sometimes used as suffixes, and the use of the Turkish suffix '-den' is frequent. The intensive form as in zab-zard is derived from Uzbek. Kerimova's book forms in a sense a supplement to V.S. Rastorguyeva's TADZHIC DIALECTAL STUDIES, the second volume of which is concerned with the northern dialects. In fact familiarity with the other northern dialects is necessary for the complete understanding of this work. Kerimova gives references to and makes comparisons with the northern dialects rather than with standard Tadzhik. Unfortunately she has arranged her material in the same slightly confused way as Rastorguyeva, and there is no index. In the first part she gives a straightforward description of the various forms and usages peculiar to the Tadzhik spoken in Bukhara. There are no historical references nor conclusions of general theoretical interest. She does not mention Borovkov's very

# Distribution of the Turkic Languages

Miles  
 200 0 200 400 600 800



- |                         |                      |                             |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 Chuvash               | 10 Kirgiz            | 23 Azerbaijani              |
| 2 Yakut                 | 11 Kazakh            | Dialects in Southern Iran   |
| 3 Tuva                  | 12 Karakalpak        | (Kashkai, Ainallu, Bokharlu |
| 4 Karagass              | 13 Noghai            | and Najari)                 |
| 5 Shor                  | 14 Kumyk             | 25 Turkey Turkish           |
| Abakan and Yüz          | 15 Karachai, Balkar  | with Anatolian dialects     |
| Steppe Languages and    | 16 Tatar dialects    | 26 Balkan Turkic            |
| dialects (Sagai, Kacha, | 17 Bashkir           | 27 South Crimean Tatar      |
| Koibal, Kizil, Kuarik,  | 18 Western Karaim    | 28 Eastern Karaim           |
| Belvir and Kamas)       | 19 Eastern Turkistan | 29 Cholim, Aba and Cherni   |
| 6 Kumanda, Lebéd,       | (Turki) dialects     | (Yish)                      |
| 7 Sarigh-Uighur         | 20 Taranchi          |                             |
| (Sarı Yogur)            | 21 Uzbek             |                             |
| 8 Baraba                | 22 Turkmen           |                             |
| Altai languages         |                      |                             |
| (Kumanda, Lebéd,        |                      |                             |
| Tuva, Otrot, Teleut,    |                      |                             |
| Teleg, Tolos etc.)      |                      |                             |
- Coloured numbers indicate scattered or sparse Turkic population.



interesting studies on the mutual influence of Tadzhik and Uzbek on each other. The second part of the book contains two thousand sentences which she recorded and collected from conversations. These are arranged according to the grammatical forms which they illustrate and constitute very valuable material.

### Persian

An interesting work on the rather neglected field of Persian syntax is PROBLEMS OF PERSIAN SYNTAX by L.S. Peysikov. His basic assumption is that the central problem of syntax is the "combinations of words". There are two main types of word combinations, and predicative (i.e. sentences). The first part of the book is devoted to the first type. Within this type he distinguishes three different classes: syntactical, phraseological and morphological. From these only the syntactical combination of words are free combinations, that is, combinations of any two or more words within the limits of logical rules. The first chapter is devoted to the explanation of the general principles of word combination and how the rules and categories accepted in Russian syntactical studies can be adapted to Persian; the lack of inflection and consequently the lack of concordance and government, and the stricter word order are all dealt with. Peysikov assumes the following grammatical means of combining words in Persian: 1. ezafet, 2. word order, 3. prepositions and 4. pronominal (enclitical pronouns). In the first part of the book he deals with these four categories in detail. In a separate chapter he discusses the complex case of word combination in which more than one of the above categories occur at the same time. In the second part of the book on the simple sentence, Peysikov first examines some concepts important from a general theoretical point of view. He gives three groups of grammatical relations existing between parts of a sentence: 1. attributive and adverbial, 2. objective and 3. modal. He also maintains that the ways of sentence construction are essentially the same as in the case of word combinations, except that in sentences they are more varied. He states that there are three ways of expressing predication: 1. morphological and syntactical, 2. intonational and syntactical and 3. intonation. Also he assumes five types of predicate instead of two: 1. verbal, 2. nominal, 3. nominal-verbal, 4. adverb-interjection and 5. predicate expressed by a predicate-type syntactical group.

All these theoretical propositions are based on V.V. Vinogradov's views and theories which Peysikov makes applicable to Persian.

### Kazakh

Among the Academies of the Central Asian Republics the greatest bulk of material on linguistics is published by the Kazakh Academy of

Sciences. Articles appear in the IZVESTIYA AN/KAZ.SSR, Seriya filologii i iskusstvovedeniya, and in collections of essays and studies on Kazakh philology and dialectology. Almost half of the material is written in Kazakh. Many of the studies deal with practical problems of usage, helping those who wish to perfect their knowledge of Kazakh and sometimes that of Russian. These articles serve as guide for translators of literature as well as of scientific works (the problem of scientific terms is a much discussed one); presumably not enough attention has been paid to the teaching of "good" Kazakh in the schools and, as written Kazakh has not so far been found sufficiently rich and polished for the wide range of subjects that are being translated into it at present, the standard of translations, both from the point of view of correctness and style, leave much to be desired (cf. S.A. Amanzholov's article "Scientific Terminology and Translated Literature in Kazakh" in VOPROSY KAZAKHSKOGO YAZYKOZNANIYA. Trudy Inst. Yazykozn. i literatury, Tom 1). The Izvestiya as well as other collections of linguistic studies apparently aim also at offering opportunity to young students to publish the results of their reading. Some of the articles do not so much contain results of individual research as summaries of literature on a certain field of study. Their approach is sometimes rather naive and tentative, for example, Sh. Sarynbayev's article "The Linguistic Relation of Mongolian and Kazakh" in VOPROSY ISTORII I DIALEKTOLOGII KAZAKHSKOGO YAZYKA, vyp.2.

Another subject to which much attention is paid in Kazakh linguistic publications is the state of the Kazakh language and style in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, before the great reforms of alphabet, grammar and vocabulary were made during the 1920s. In the difficult process of creating a standard written language, the journal AYQAP played a very important role. N. Karasheva examines this role in two articles, one "The Special Grammatical Features of Kazakh Journalism at the Beginning of the 20th Century" in VOPROSY KAZAKHSKOGO YAZYKOZNANIYA, Trudy Instituta yazyka i literatury, Tom 1. And the other "The Spelling of Kazakh in the Language of the Journal AYQAP" in VOPROSY ISTORII I DIALEKTOLOGII KAZAKHSKOGO YAZYKA, vyp.2. Occasionally some interesting and thorough studies in a particular field of research also appear in Kazakh publications: for example, A. Amanzholov's studies on the government of the verb in old Turkish (one in VOPROSY KAZAKHSKOGO YAZYKOZNANIYA) bear the results of a careful analysis of old and middle Turkish texts.

### Kirgiz

Most works published by the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences on linguistic subjects appear in Kirgiz. Almost all of these deal with a particular aspect of modern Kirgiz grammar and usage. This is only very natural,

since the Kirgiz written language is even less developed than Kazakh. It was created after Soviet rule had been established, mostly on the basis of a rich oral epic tradition; it is therefore still in a rather fluid state. Understandably Kirgiz Turkologists are too busy with problems of their own language to do research on other problems. Some books and articles, however, appear in Russian. The first part of an interesting work, KIRGIZ LEXICOLOGY, by B.M. Yunusaliyev appeared in 1959. This book gives a survey of root-words in Kirgiz, and their development through the history of the language, as far as it is possible to trace it. Yunusaliyev carefully distinguishes between roots and root-words in a language and concerns himself only with the latter. Root-words in the contemporary state of language may be developed forms from more simple ones which were root-words at a certain stage in the past, but, since the word-forming suffixes found in them are no longer active, they have at present to be regarded as root-words to which the active suffixes are attached. In Kirgiz simpler forms are in most cases supplanted by developed ones which carry the same meaning, whereas the same simple forms may be preserved in related languages. After a careful examination of modern Kirgiz, Yunusaliyev found 27 different types which consist of permutations of one or more vowel plus consonant.

In the second chapter he discusses homonyms, of which he assumes three different classes: 1. phonetic, 2. lexicological (polysemia) and 3. lexical grammatical homonyms where not only the phonetical forms are identical, but the meaning they convey also refers to the same concept, even though they belong to different grammatical categories, e.g. 'tyn-' to rest and 'tyn' rest (noun).

In the following chapters the author deals with the various ways in which the vocabulary of a language develops. The first of these is the so-called polysemia, where a new meaning is attached to a word without any phonetic or morphological change. Since this way of development has been the most significant in the past few decades, he treats it at length and explains its ideological and political importance. He then discusses the two ways root-words developed in Kirgiz: morphological (agglutination) and syntactical (combination of words). A separate chapter is devoted to symbolic and onomatopoeic root-words. In the last chapter he surveys the loan-words from the various languages with which the Kirgiz have come into contact: Mongolian, Persian, Arabic and, most of all, Russian.

#### Problems of Turkic philology

Several articles of the symposium entitled TURKIC AND MONGOLIAN LINGUISTICS AND FOLKLORE deal with problems of Turkic philology. There are two articles on Chagatay. "The Conditions of the Formation and

some Characteristics of the Language of Central Asian Poets before Ali-Shir Nevai", V.D. Artamoshina analyses the language of three little known Central Asian poets of the 15th century - Altai, Sakkaki and Lutfi. She does not apply the term "Chagatay" to this language, but following A.N. Samoylovich calls it "Central Asian Turki of the 15th century", reserving the term "Chagatay" for the spoken dialects of the nomadic tribes under the Chagatayids and the Timurids. The language of poets writing in "Central Asian Turki" at an early period of its development clearly shows the various elements from which it is formed: dialects of Transoxania, Khorasan and East Turkestan on the one hand and the literary tradition of the Uygur and Karakhanid empires on the other. Artamoshina concludes that as the language became more polished, more and more words of Arabic and Persian origin came into it. She gives the percentages of the Arabic-Persian and Turkish words found in the language of each of these poets.

Although the literary language of Central Asia remained essentially the same for two or three hundred years after its formation in the 15th century, there were always minor variations in the use of words as well as of grammatical forms, depending on the native dialect of the writer. Apart from this there was another dividing line as F.G. Blagova points out in her article "The Characteristic Features of the so-called 'Chagatay' Language of the End of the 15th Century". Whereas in prose Babur and Nevai wrote in almost the same language, which was very close to the dialect spoken in Andizhan at that period, the poetical works of Nevai contain much more archaic forms inherited from Uygur and from its successor, the literary language of the Karakhanid empire.

In the same symposium there is an interesting study on "The Origin of the Past Tense in '-dy' and of the Verbal Noun in the Turkic Languages" by P.I. Kuznetsov. He begins with a brief survey of the much discussed problem why the possessive suffixes are used in the declension of the '-dy' past instead of the verbal endings which are found in all other tenses, and how the ending '-k' came to form the ending of the first person plural. His views are essentially the same as those of Baskakov, namely, that the form '-dy' goes back to the verbal form '-dyk', which originally was immutable; but he does not accept some of Baskakov's arguments. He maintains that it is not the verbal noun from which the finite forms developed but that, on the contrary, the independent and actual verbal forms expressing action but with no indication of the person, served as the basis for the formation of verbal nouns under the influence of their function in a sentence. This peculiarity poses the problem whether verbal nouns are to be regarded as subordinate clauses or simply as developed sentence-parts. This is discussed in the next article by E.A. Grunina "The Role of the Impersonal Forms of the Verb in Compound Sentences in the Turkic Languages". In Turkic languages most subordinate clauses are constructed with the non-finite forms of

the verb (participles, verbal nouns and gerunds). From the point of view of grammatical usage the non-finite forms of the verb are, if not equivalents of the finite forms, in any case of the same category. Grunina concludes that morphological criteria are never sufficient for determining subordinate clauses; they have to be analysed from the points of view of syntax and intonation as well.

R.R. Yusipova's article, "The Special Lexical and Semantic Features of the Permanent Verbal Compounds in Turkish", is merely a straightforward description and classification of verbal phrases and locutions. Another aspect of the same problem is treated in A.A. Ruzhanskiy's article "Idiomatic Word Combinations Based on the Verb in Modern Turkish". He first gives a theoretical assessment of word combinations and explains the criteria of phraseological combinations as opposed to the free combination of words. Like many Russian linguists, he bases his argument on V.V. Vinogradov's theories and definitions worked out specifically in relation to Russian. He maintains that in Turkish idiomatic expressions with verbs, it is always the meaning of the verb which is decisive. Finally, he suggests a method of classification for idiomatic expressions according to the general concept they express.

The last article on Turkish philology in this symposium is by R.A. Aganin "The Principles Governing the Inclusion of Onomatopoeic Words in Turkish Dictionaries", and gives suggestions on how to include such words in Turkish dictionaries, in which entries they should figure and how their meaning should be described.

### The first Uygur historian

The first Uygur historian, 25 year-old Kharmayev, has recently presented his doctoral thesis at the Institute of Linguistics of the AN/Kaz.SSR. Kharmayev's work, on the rhythm in Uygur classical and contemporary poetry, was highly praised by the examiners for devoting attention to this little-studied and yet important aspect of Uygur poetry.

KP. 10.10.61

## B O O K R E V I E W

By a Correspondent

VOSTOCHNAYA BUKHARA I PAMIR V PERIOD PRISOYEDINENIYA SREDNEY AZII K ROSSII (Eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs during the Period of the Incorporation of Central Asia in Russia).  
B.I. Iskandarov. Tad.Gos. Izdat., Stalinabad, 1960. 213pp.

The author examines the political and economic history and the social structure of the small khanates on the north-west slopes of the Pamirs, bounded by the Gissar (Hissar) range in the north, and the Amu-Dar'ya in the south, between the end of the Crimean war and about 1890, i.e. during the period of Russia's establishment in Central Asia and the establishment of Bukhara's firm suzerainty over them. The fiefs fall into groups: Gissar, Kulyab, Karategin, Darvaz in the foothills, and Shugnan, Vakhan, Rushan, Badakhshan in the high Pamirs along the Pyandzh river. The short book has an ethnographic introduction, followed by a history of the relations between the small khanates and Kokand and Bukhara during the 19th century. The author then analyses the political status and social structure of the whole region. He next examines in some detail the struggle of the khanates against annexation by Bukhara, which by that time had become a Russian protected state and had surrendered her sovereign rights in foreign relations. The last section estimates the effects the region's inclusion in the Russian imperial sphere had on its internal social and economic structure.

The present work is one of several monographs and small books which have been published in the last five or six years in Tashkent and Stalinabad (now Dushanbe) on the history of the region,\* during the 19th century. The two main authors are Dr. Iskandarov and Dr. N.A.

---

\* Khalfin, N.A. TRI RUSSKIYE MISSII, Tashkent, 1956; ANGLIYSKAYA KOLONIYAL'NAYA POLITIKA NA SREDNEM VOSTOKE, Tashkent, 1957; POLITIKA ROSSII V SREDNEY AZII, 1857-1868, Moscow, 1960.

Iskandarov, B.I. OB NEKOTORYKH IZMENENIYAKH V EKONOMIKE VOSTOCHNOY BUKHARY NA RUBEZH XIX-XX VEKA, Stalinabad, 1958.

Kislyakov, N.A. OCHERKI PO ISTORII KARATEGINA, Stalinabad, 1954.

Khalfin. They both use material from the archives of the old Turkestan Governor-Generalship (now in the Central State Archives of Uzbekistan), and from the central archives of the old Ministry of War (now in the Central State Archives of Military History in Moscow). In the present book, Dr. Iskandarov also quotes local documents, now deposited in the Oriental MSS. section of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, as well as one or two documents from local collections in private hands. Use of the latter type of material is not very common in Soviet historical study.

Dr. Iskandarov is primarily a sociologist and an economic historian. But though his book does not tell us as much as we should like on "what devil's cauldron was stewing behind the Hindu Kush", it nevertheless gives an interesting account of the way in which it came about that Bukhara spread eastward into the valley of the Gissar, and into the Pamir high mountain regions thus becoming Afghanistan's and Kashgar's neighbour, so that the two expanding European empires never in fact confronted each other across a border in the Asian heartland. Prior to 1870 both groups of small khanates were the prey of Kokand, Bukhara or Afghanistan. The ill-defined dominions of each of these three much more powerful states at times stretched over the regions in question. But there was nothing permanent or stable about such dominion. Thus a report by Capt. Arandarenko to General Kaufman states (p.44): "Since they were difficult of access and unattractive because poor and barren, these [principalities] until their contact with European power and with calculating European influence, remained aloof from the events which shook the valley and from the ensuing ethnographic changes; they retained their character of independent appanages, and occasionally fought among themselves. These mountain fastnesses, which straddled the watersheds of the Amu-Dar'ya and the Zeravshan, Kulyab, Bal'dzhuan and Kafirnigan, Darvaz, Shugnan, Karategin, Matcha, Fon, Fal'gar, Kshitut and Magian rivers, retained their independence under the rule of hereditary or usurping shahs, mirs, and beks. Although this political conglomeration at times attracted the attention of more powerful neighbours, Bukhara and Kokand, it so happened that it did not come under their effective influence for any length of time, but on the contrary shook it off and re-established its independence." These small fiefs did not have established frontiers or stable state formations. Family feuds produced kaleidoscopic changes, though there was in the middle of the century a fairly stable pattern of Shakhriyabz alliances against the reigning Mangit family of Bukhara. The rivals, Kokand and Bukhara, fought over the Gissar lowlands, and over the mountain fastnesses of Karategin and Darvaz. The latter on the whole were more constantly associated with Kokand, though they supplied armed soldiers not only for Kokand but also for Bukhara and Kashgar. Kokand's ruler invaded Karategin in 1869 for the last time. By that time he was himself being pressed by Russian troops in the north, and threatened by

his perpetual rival, the Emir of Bukhara. The Gissar fiefs and Shakhrisyabz were the most constant objectives of the latter, though neither Nasrullah nor Muzaffar managed to hold them uninterruptedly. Afghanistan's threats were usually against Badakhshan and through it to Shugnan and Rushan. Dr. Iskandarov considers that British 19th century writers (Col. H. Yule and Col. T.E. Gordon) exaggerated the permanence of the latter's dependence on Afghanistan and points out that even in the 'sixties Dost-Muhammad's hold on them was precarious and that all three khans were actively negotiating with Nasrullah. Shir Ali's domination and more emphatically that of Abdur Rahman, with English support, produced hardship and unrest throughout Badakhshan, and inclined its indigenous rulers to ask the Russians for protected status during the 1880s, when the latter were advancing into the Western Pamirs.

Russia's peace treaty with Bukhara of 1868 and her further treaty of 1873 by which the Emir had in future to deal with the Turkestan Governor-General and not directly with the Tsar, set the scene for the definite establishment of Bukhara's domination with Russian help over Shakhrisyabz, Kulyab and Gissar. This was done by the defeat, with General Abramov's troops, of Muzaffar's son, Abdul Malik. Campaigns into Karategin and Darvaz in 1877-8 by the Bukhara Emir grew to serious proportions because of the strong local resistance, with aid from Afghanistan. The fighting was protracted and even after victory, the Emir had to keep his hold on the two khanates by military occupation. Russian observers reported in the '80s on the devastation and depopulation of the area. In 1895 the remaining High Pamir khanates adjacent to Kashgar were formally acknowledged as Russian territory by the series of Anglo-Russian boundary commissions, and Bukhara's suzerainty was extended to include them.

Dr. Iskandarov is not primarily interested in political history, and on the whole fails to set his account of local conflicts into the broader picture of two competing imperialisms. He does not examine Russia's policies in regard to Bukhara or compare them with Britain's and Vice-Regal India's in regard to Afghanistan, though he records Kaufman's caution in not giving Muzaffar unlimited support against Kokand. Once Kokand had been annexed by Russia, Bukhara's advance into the Pamirs was encouraged, but without involving Russian troops, or allowing any one campaign to grow into more than of local significance. The author records Russia's aloofness in the matter of how the Emir handled his newly (and rather insecurely) acquired territories. Dr. Iskandarov does not attempt to examine British policies, except in passing references to increased domination in Afghanistan and to the support of rival claimants to the mountain fiefs. While using and quoting English (and French) books of the period, he makes no reference to modern English historical work such as the relevant sections of the

CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA, or Sir K. Fraser-Tytler's study of Afghanistan.

The most interesting sections of the book concern the social structure and economic features of the khanates. The author describes the mixed ethnic composition of the region and the fairly frequent moves by clans and groups over the mountain passes. There was no definitive settlement even by the end of the century, when hard boundaries in the European sense had been marked out by Great Britain and Russia, and communities continued to cross even these borders in both directions. He contrasts the Ismaili adherence, originating from Khorasan, of the Pamir regions, with the Sunnite faith of the powerful valley emirates.

Dr. Iskandarov examines the variations in land tenure between the groups of khanates, though he considers that they all fall within the same five categories of land-holding as recognized by the sharia' and evolved by customary law. (P.101) He is anxious to show that individual land-ownership, with rights of sale and inheritance, had come into existence, and quotes one or two documents to support this view. He says in a note that such documents dealing with land sales are in the possession of individual families and that the Institute of Ethnography and Archaeology of the Tadzhik Academy is making a collection of them. He examines current practice in regard to waqf lands and points to the increasing tendency to use the land as an economic asset for personal benefit by waqf administrators. He lists servile dues and services, though without attempting comparisons with Russian systems.

Dr. Iskandarov discusses the penetration and the set-backs of cash crop agriculture, and the balance of grain and livestock over the economy of the region as a whole. His description of the flourishing state of the Gissar valley, the importance of Karshi as a local market, and the decline of both after definitive annexation by Bukhara, illustrates the changes brought about in a local community by extraneous political factors. Regional crafts and standard of workmanship were fairly highly developed and commanded comparatively wide markets. In particular, metal-work was well developed, and Gissar knives had a wide reputation. No coins were minted locally; Kokand, Bukharan, Afghan and some Chinese coins were in use. Trade with Kashgar, however, was not on a big scale. Dr. Iskandarov quotes some contemporary accounts of gold panning.

Social structure was stratified. Functionaries were entitled by customary law to certain dues for their services to the community. Initiative in regard to all local agricultural affairs rested with gatherings of elders. When a powerful neighbouring emir, such as that

of Bukhara or Kokand, overran the mountain khanates, he superimposed members of his own family or of his following as rulers or overlords; these mostly imposed additional dues for their own maintenance. At the bottom of the hierarchy stood the peasants. Most of the peasants lived in extended families. Share-cropping was increasing. The author's analysis of the transition from communal peasantry to individual share-cropping is not very clear. Individual cases of personal slavery persisted in the high mountain communities, though this was on the way out. Dr. Iskandarov quotes in full a deed of freedom, dated 1820-1 (p.165).

The last section discusses the social and economic consequences of the annexation of the Pamir khanates by Bukhara, and their consequent drawing into the Russian economic system. This would be an interesting chapter both for the economic history of Russia and for a study of economic and political contact between a well-developed trading and rural craft society, and a society which was already partially industrialized and equipped with modern management and banking techniques. Dr. Iskandarov lists the local merchant families as well as the Russian trading firms in Bukhara; he describes the retail trade radiating from the city (mostly in the hands of Tatars from Kazan'). He describes the trade with Afghanistan and India and with Persia in mid-century, and the gradual replacement of and alteration in the former through Russia's establishment in Turkestan.

As a whole, the study is rather repetitive and confusing. Its merit lies in its concentration on local issues, but this adds to its diffuseness. This may only seem so because the dates and episodes concerning the region most familiar to an English or a Russian reader are missing. Dr. Iskandarov makes interesting attempts to point to the importance of popular risings and resistances when economic pressures became intolerable. His work as a whole provides a very interesting pointer to the groupings and the break-ups in Turkestan and particularly in the extended Bukhara emirate after the 1917 Revolution, and on the recurrent Basmachi risings which continued in the region as late as 1932.

The chief criticism in presentation is the absence of a map. Secondly, a bibliography, besides the page notes, would have been helpful. Original titles of books quoted in Russian translation are missing (though in fact these are quite easy to identify from library catalogues). There are no Russian translations for documents referred to by their Arabic titles. There are some misprints in titles of non-Russian books. For archive materials, exact dates of each extract should be given besides the reference to the archive file. The book would have looked more attractive and been easier to read if chapter headings had been better set out and if the longish documents quoted in full in the text had been inset or printed in small type.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AT THE  
XXIIND CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

At the recent congress of the CPSU a new Party Programme was adopted to replace that of 1919. Part One of this programme reviews the achievements of the Revolution and the present state of affairs in the world. It has the following to say on what the Party has achieved in the field of national relations:

"The solution of the national question is one of the greatest achievements of socialism. This question is of especial importance to a country like the Soviet Union, inhabited by more than a hundred nations and nationalities. Socialist society has not only guaranteed the political equality of nations and created Soviet national statehood, but has also abolished the economic and cultural inequality inherited from the old system. With reciprocal fraternal assistance, primarily from the great Russian people, all the Soviet non-Russian republics have set up their own national working-class and intelligentsia and developed a culture that is national in form and socialist in content. Many peoples which in the past were backward have achieved socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development. The union and consolidation of equal peoples on a voluntary basis in a single multi-national state - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - their close cooperation in State, economic and cultural development, their fraternal friendship and flourishing economy and culture, constitute the most important result of the Leninist national policy."

Part Two of the Programme outlines the Party's tasks in building a Communist society over the next 20 years, section IV being devoted to "The Tasks of the Party in the Field of National Relations". The following is a summary of this section:

Nations prosper under socialism and develop along the lines of their drawing together (sblizheniye), mutual assistance and friendship. Such developments as the appearance of new industrial centres and the reclamation of the virgin lands increase the mobility of the population, and peoples of many nationalities live and work together in

harmony in the Soviet republics. The republican boundaries are increasingly losing their former significance since all nations are equal, enjoy the same socialist system, have their material and spiritual needs satisfied in equal measure and are all united into a single family with the common goal of Communism. Soviet people of different nationalities have developed common traits in their spiritual make-up, engendered by the new type of social relations and embodying the finest traditions of the peoples of the USSR.

Full-scale Communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved. The building of the material and technical basis of Communism leads to a still closer unification of the Soviet peoples. The exchange of material and spiritual wealth between the nations becomes more and more intensive. The obliteration of distinctions between classes and the development of Communist social relations make for a greater social homogeneity of nations and contribute to the development of common Communist traits of culture, morals and way of life as well as to a further strengthening of their mutual trust and friendship.

With the victory of Communism in the USSR the nations will draw still closer together. However, the obliteration of national distinctions, especially of language, is a much more lengthy process than the obliteration of class distinctions.

All questions of national relations are solved by the Party from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism and in strict accordance with Lenin's policy on nationalities. The Party permits neither the ignoring nor the exaggeration of national characteristics.

The Party sets the following tasks in the sphere of national relations:

1. To continue the all-round economic and cultural development of all the Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their ever closer cooperation and drawing together in every field, thus strengthening the USSR in every way; to make full use of and perfect the forms of national statehood of the peoples of the USSR.
2. In the economic sphere to continue to pursue the all-round development of the republics; to ensure a rational geographical location of production and to perfect the socialist division of labour between the republics, correctly balancing the interests of the whole State with the interests of each Soviet republic. Since the extension of the rights of the republics in managing their economy

has given good results, such measures can be continued in the future, taking into consideration that the establishment of the material and technical basis of Communism will call for a still closer inter-relationship and mutual aid among the republics. The closer the intercourse between nations and the greater the awareness of all-national tasks, the more successfully can manifestations of parochialism and national egoism be overcome.

To coordinate economic activity inter-republican organs, particularly for such matters as irrigation, power grids, transport, etc. may be set up in certain regions.

The Party will continue its policy ensuring real equality for all nations and nationalities and paying special attention to those areas which are in need of more rapid development. The benefits accruing in the process of building Communism must be distributed fairly among all nations and nationalities.

3. To strive for the further all-round flowering of the socialist cultures of the peoples of the USSR. The wide scale of Communist construction and the new victories of Communist ideology enrich the cultures of the peoples of the USSR which are socialist in content and national in form. There is a growing ideological unity among the nations and their cultures draw closer together. Experience shows that national forms do not ossify but change, advance and come closer together, shedding what is obsolete. An international culture common to all Soviet nations is developing. Each nation's culture is increasingly enriched by works of an international character.

Attaching decisive importance to the development of the socialist content of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR the Party will promote their further mutual enrichment and drawing together, the strengthening of their international basis and thereby the formation of the future single world-wide culture of Communist society. While supporting the progressive traditions of each people and bringing them within reach of all Soviet people, the Party will in every way develop new revolutionary traditions of the builders of Communism common to all nations.

4. To continue to ensure the free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR and complete freedom for every Soviet citizen to speak and bring up his children in any language, not permitting any privileges, restrictions or coercion in the use of any particular language.

The voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is a constructive feature since it facilitates reciprocal exchanges of experience and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural achievements of other peoples of the USSR and of world culture. The Russian language has in effect become the common medium of international intercourse and cooperation between all peoples of the USSR.

5. To continue the consistent implementation of the principles of internationalism in the sphere of national relations; to strengthen the friendship of peoples as one of the most important gains of socialism; to wage a relentless fight against manifestations of any kind of nationalism and chauvinism, against tendencies to national narrow-mindedness and exclusiveness, idealization of the past and the glossing over of social contradictions in the history of peoples and against customs hampering Communist construction. The growing scale of Communist construction demands a constant exchange of trained personnel among nations. No manifestations of national isolation are permissible in the education and employment of workers of different nationalities in the Soviet republics. The elimination of manifestations of nationalism is in the interests of all nations and nationalities of the USSR. Each Soviet republic can prosper only in the great family of socialist nations of the USSR.

In his report to the congress on the new programme Khrushchev stressed the common characteristics already present in the Soviet nations:

"In the USSR a new historical community of people of various nationalities with common characteristics has arisen, the Soviet people. They have a common socialist motherland, the USSR; a common economic basis, the socialist economy; a common social class structure; a common world outlook, Marxism-Leninism; a common aim, the building of Communism; and many common traits in their spiritual make-up and psychology."

Under socialism, he said, nations both develop, with the rights of the republics being extended, and draw closer together. Dealing with the five tasks outlined in the programme Khrushchev said that "the key to the strengthening of the cooperation of the nations is above all a correct economic policy." His remarks on the value of learning Russian were the only ones to draw applause apart from the conclusion of this section of his speech. Khrushchev emphasized that, though "in the course of the full-scale construction of Communism complete unity

yedinstvo) of the nations will be achieved", "even after Communism will be built in the main it will be premature to proclaim the merging (sliyaniye) of nations. Lenin, as is known, pointed out that state and national differences will exist for a long time after the victory of socialism in all countries." To those who "lament" that national differences are being obliterated he replied that "Communists will not preserve and perpetuate national differences". [Soviet descriptions of the eventual form of the Soviet State are vague and the Russian expressions used in these descriptions are difficult to render with precision. The word yedinstvo, usually translated in this context "unity", seems in effect to mean the same as yedinoye gosudarstvo or "unitary state". - Ed.]

The spokesman on the national question at the congress was N.A. Mukhitdinov, the Uzbek secretary of the Central Committee. His speech added nothing of substance to what is in the Party programme, its chief points of interest being a description of the beneficial effects which the XXth Party Congress and the routing of the anti-Party group had brought to the national republics (i.e. a tribute to Khrushchev's leadership), praise of "the great Russian people" and emphasis on the importance of learning Russian. Mukhitdinov attributed the "decisive role" in the successful implementation of the nationalities policy to "the great Russian people - first among equals" whom the Soviet nations call "their elder brother" out of love and deep respect. The merit of the Russian people, he continued, is that it set an example of "profound internationalism and humanism" and selflessly helped the other peoples to become advanced socialist nations, to attain their sovereignty and develop their economies and national cultures. As regards the study of Russian, Mukhitdinov said that "in the further development of every socialist nation, of the international education of the rising generation and the completion in the country of the cultural revolution, the Russian language is of fundamental importance." He quoted a remark made by Lenin before the Revolution on the "progressive significance" the Russian language had had for the small and backward nations. Now, through the development of the culture and economy of the Soviet peoples, he said, Russian has become the second native language of all the nations, and this has happened quite voluntarily without any coercion. "In Russian the Soviet nations have acquired a powerful means for their own development and mutual intercourse." In order to satisfy the enormous desire to learn Russian the teaching of Russian must be improved. "Life itself, the interests of each nation and the building of Communism demand still greater efforts in the organization of a profound study and mastery of the Russian language by all peoples of the Soviet Union."

Two further points of interest at the congress concerning the national question were, firstly, that the deportation of the North

Caucasian peoples (Karachay, Chechen, Ingush, Kalmyks and Balkars) during the war, which was one of the main crimes of which Khrushchev accused Stalin in his secret speech at the XXth Party Congress, was not mentioned in any of the denunciations of Stalin at the XXIInd Congress. It was, however, brought up by Danyalov, First Secretary of the Dagestan Oblast Party Committee, at a Party meeting on 17 November 1961 when he said: "Nor can we omit from among the consequences of the personality cult the ruthless treatment of whole peoples of the North Caucasus, Chechen, Ingush, Cherkess,\* Kalmyks and Karachay peoples, who in the course of a single night were evicted and their state autonomy destroyed."

The second point of interest is the partial rehabilitation of the historian M.N. Pokrovskiy, whose works were condemned in the 1930s as anti-Marxist. One of Pokrovskiy's theories was that the incorporation within the Russian empire of such adjacent nations as those of Transcaucasia and Central Asia was an "absolute evil". (See CAR, Vol.I, No. 3, pp.1-2.) While there is no suggestion that the present line that the incorporation brought great positive benefits to these nations is being in any way modified, in his speech to the XXIInd Congress, L.F. Il'ichev, head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, named "the prominent Marxist historian and old Bolshevik M.N. Pokrovskiy" as a victim of the "period of the cult of personality". "In both his academic and political activity there were many mistakes. That is true", said Il'ichev, but went on to quote in toto a short letter from Lenin to Pokrovskiy praising the latter's book RUSSIAN HISTORY IN BRIEF-EST OUTLINE. In Vol.45 of the first edition of the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA published in 1940, in this very same letter Lenin was said to have "revealed with extraordinary penetration the main failing of all Pokrovskiy's historical works, i.e. their sketchiness (skhematizm) and that they are divorced (otvlechnost') from concrete historical material". The first sign that a reassessment of Pokrovskiy's work was taking place appeared in an article "Some Questions of the History of Soviet Historiography" by M. Nechkina, Yu. Polyakov and L. Cherepnin in KOMMUNIST, No.9 of June 1961. The authors claimed that "despite mistakes of a fundamental nature" in his work Pokrovskiy was "a major historian of the Marxist school. . . who did much for Soviet historical science", and suggested that his historical works should be republished.

---

\* The Cherkess are not known to have been deported and their inclusion with the others was perhaps a slip on Danyalov's part.

## NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 October-31 December 1961. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

## ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Administrative changes are recorded in the following appointments only: First and Second Party Secretaries, Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers (Prime Ministers), Chairmen of the State Planning and State Security Committees, and Ministers of Communications.

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 24 October 1961, Kh.Z. Tairova has been appointed Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Tadzhik SSR. KT. 25.10.61

Territorial changesAzerbaydzhan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 4 September 1961, the following settlements have been transferred to the category of town-type settlements: Vartashen, Vartashen rayon, and Shaumyanovsk, Shaumyanovsk rayon. VVS. 16. 9.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 15 November 1961, the Stalin rayon of the town of Baku has been renamed the 26 Baku Kommissars rayon. VVS. 3.12.61

Turkmenistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 14 November 1961, the Stalin rayon of the town of Ashkhabad has been renamed Soviet rayon. VVS. 25.11.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 14 November 1961, the Stalin rayon, Mary oblast, has been renamed Murgab rayon and the town-type settlement Stalino has been given the name Murgab. VVS. 25.11.61

### Uzbekistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 28 November 1961, the following place names have been changed:

The Voroshilov rayon, Andizhan oblast, has been renamed Il'ichev rayon. The Stalin rayon, Andizhan oblast, has been renamed Moskovskiy rayon and the village Stalino has been given the name Moskovskiy. VVS. 15.12.61

### Kirgizia

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 September 1961, the settlement around the Kurment concrete factory, Tyup rayon, Issyk-Kul' oblast, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlement and named Ak-Bulak. SK. 7.10.61

Following the inclusion of the village Alamedin in the town of Frunze, by decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 September 1961 Frunze has been made the centre of the Alamedin rayon. VVS. 10.10.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 20 November 1961, the Stalin rayon, has been renamed Moskva rayon and the centre of the rayon Stalinskoye has been given the name Belovodskoye. VVS. 3.12.61

### Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 11 November 1961, the capital of Tadzhikistan, Stalinabad, has been renamed Dushanbe. VVS. 18.11.61

### Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 26 August 1961, the centre of the Keles rayon, South-Kazakhstan oblast, the village Abay-Bazar has been renamed Abay. VVS. 16. 9.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 October 1961, the following settlements have been transferred to the category of towns of rayon subordination: the settlement Yermak, Yermak rayon, Pavlodar oblast, and the town Shemonaikha, Shamonaikha rayon, East-Kazakhstan oblast. VVS. 16.11.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 18 November 1961, the Stalin rayon, Tselinograd oblast, has been renamed Lenin rayon. VVS. 3.12.61



By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 5 November 1961, the Stalin rayon of the town Alma-Ata has been renamed Soviet rayon.

VVS. 3.12.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 14 November 1961, the Stalin rayon of the town Karaganda has been renamed Oktyabr' rayon.

VVS. 3.12.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 15 November 1961, the Voroshilov rayon, Karaganda oblast, has been renamed Ul'yanov rayon. The centre of the rayon, the village Kolkhoznoye, has been renamed Ul'yanov.

VVS. 3.12.61

### ARCHAEOLOGY

In December 1961 an expedition from the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences succeeded in solving the mystery of Adzhina-tepa (Hill of Jinns), near the town of Kurgan-Tyube, Tadzhikistan, about which there are many local legends. The team, under the direction of B. Litvinskiy excavated the ruins of a Buddhist monastery. Among the many fragments of statues found the most remarkable is a head of Buddha, about one metre in diameter, part of a gigantic statue probably dating from the 7th century A.D. Adzhina-tepa is one of the many Buddhist monasteries in Soviet Central Asia mentioned by Chinese sources. IZ. 1. 1.62

In April 1961 members of the Kattakurgan forestry farm presented 47 copper coins which they had found while working on the land, to the Historical Museum of the Academy of Sciences, Uzb.SSR. A preliminary examination of the coins revealed that they had been minted in Bukhara and date back to the first half of the 15th century, i.e. to the reign of Ulugh-Beg. OBSHCH. NAUKI V UZB. 1961, No.7

### CONFERENCES

The fourth Congress of Azerbaydzhani artists opened on 20 November 1961 in Baku. The introductory speech was made by the oldest Azerbaydzhani artist, Amir Gadzhiyev. The main report was given by the chairman of the Union, M. Tarlanov. On 22 November the new directing body of the Union was elected: Nadir Abdurakhmanov became president, and his deputies are Fuad Abdurakhmanov and Baba Aliyev.

BR. 24.11.61

## LAW

On 30 September 1961 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Kirgizia issued new laws regulating the keeping of livestock as private property. According to the new law all workers and employees of sovkhoses, timber farms and other State agricultural establishments, living in rural or urban areas may own one cow and a calf up to six months old, per family; or, instead of a cow, one milk mare and foal not older than eight months, and three sheep or goats with young not older than one year, or instead of the latter, one pig. In cities and town-type settlements it is forbidden to own livestock. Shepherds, herdsman, workers on sovkhoses and State agricultural enterprises who are permanently engaged in livestock breeding in remote pastures, are permitted to keep one cow, one milk mare, and five sheep and their lambs up to one year, per family.

No livestock can be kept as personal property by kolkhoz households.

All livestock owned above this established limit had to be removed by 15 November 1961 at 50 per cent of the current purchase prices.

All those who do not comply with these regulations are liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for a period up to one year, or corrective labour for the same period, or are liable to pay a fine not exceeding 100 rubles. SK. 1.10.61

A new decree has been passed by the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet against "anti-social and parasite elements" in Kirgizia. According to this, all adult, able-bodied citizens who avoid "socially useful labour" and draw "unearned" income from the exploitation of land, living-space, and cars, or commit any anti-social act which enables them to lead "a parasitical way of life" will be banished to specially designated areas for a period of 2-5 years forced labour.

The same applies to people who have been given nominal work at State and public enterprises and institutions as a cover for their anti-social activities: those who thus "enjoy the privileges of workers but, in fact, concern themselves with private property and live on means acquired by ways other than socially useful labour." SK. 29. 9.61

## LITERATURE

In LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, No.7, 1961, M. Ibragimov wrote a very favourable appreciation of the activities and literary works of Nariman Narimanov, "a writer, journalist, teacher, physician, indefatigable revolutionary and statesman". As a playwright and a follower of Mirza Fatali Akhundov, Narimanov, says Ibragimov, rendered a very valuable

service to the development of drama in Azerbaydzhan. All of his works aimed at some social reform, the condemnation or ridiculing of the feudal and capitalist systems and their social and moral values. In conclusion, Ibragimov writes: "As a man, Narimanov followed the glorious road of struggle and, although, naturally, in some periods of his life he had doubts and made mistakes, by virtue of the faith and pure intentions so characteristic of him he remained an ardent propagator of the high ideals of socialist revolution for the realization of which he fought with all his strength up to the very last day of his life."

[In spite of his important role in the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan and in the Revolution, after his death in 1925 Narimanov was out of favour with official Party opinion for a long time. In the article on Azerbaydzhan in the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, published in 1949, the only reference to him is among other Azerbaydzhani playwrights. His biography was not included in its proper place but appeared in the supplementary volume which was published later, in 1958. Since 1958 he has been fully rehabilitated. - Ed.]

#### IRRIGATION

Last October the construction of the Kafirnigan canal was completed. By four successive pumping stations the water of the river Kafirnigan is raised to a height of 220 metres, and this enables a large area of arable land to be irrigated. IZ. 11.10.61

Work on the second stage of the Bugun' reservoir, South-Kazakhstan oblast, is now in progress. By last summer it held 200 million cubic metres of water, which is half the quantity projected for the 200 kilometre long Arys'-Turkestan canal which it is to supply. [The first stage was completed in 1957 - see CAR, 1958, No.2, p.200; and 1955, No. 3, pp.225-8 for details of this project. - Ed.] KP. 15.12.61

#### MUSIC

The third Congress of Kirgiz composers was held in the Kirgiz State Theatre from 27 November to 1 December 1961. The Congress was opened by a speech by A. Maldybayev, President of the Kirgiz Composers' Union; he reported on the development of Kirgiz music during recent years. The speech was followed by a symphony concert of works by living composers, such as "Glory to you, the Party" by A. Maldybayev and M. Abdrayev, A. Tuleyev's last symphony dedicated to the XXIIInd Congress of the Party, the "Day of the Tien Shan" by A. Amanbayev dedicated to

the life of Kirgiz cattle breeders, etc. In the course of the five days of the Congress, the assembled composers discussed various problems of Kirgiz music, and gave concerts. A special concert was arranged for the performance of works by young and amateur composers. SK. 28.11.61

Last autumn the Kirgiz opera started its season with a performance of the opera, "Dzhamila" by the Kirgiz composer M. Raukhverger. The text is based on the popular story of Chingiz Aytmatov and the libretto is the work of S. Gogomazov and Ch. Aytmatov. The music contains many Kirgiz popular melodies, as for instance, the chorus in the first act which is based on the "Komsomol Song". Kirgiz folk-songs are also included. SK. 12.11.61

#### TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

The 220 kilometre highway along the northern shore of Lake Issyk-Kul' has been completed. The road runs from Rybach'ye to Przheval'sk which is 1,700 metres above sea level. The work involved the construction of bridges across several rapid mountain rivers such as the Dzhergalan, Tyup, Chon-Ak-Su and Kichi-Ak-Su. The construction of a road along the southern shore of Lake Issyk-Kul has now been started. [According to Soviet maps, there has been a road along both shores of Lake Issyk-Kul' for many years; the present work is therefore probably only an improvement of the existing road. - Ed.] PV. 11.10.61

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET  
CENTRAL ASIA

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE GREAT SOVIET  
ENCYCLOPAEDIA YEAR-BOOKS 1960-61

Each year since 1957 the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA has published an annual Year-Book to supplement the 51 completed volumes of the latest edition. In this Year-Book the editors summarize events in the world and in the Soviet Union during the preceding year, and it is meant to supplement, and in some cases replace, what has already appeared in the Encyclopaedia. The present article aims at reporting what the Russians have written on the Borderland countries in the 1960 and 1961 Year-Books, which cover the years 1959 and 1960. The countries covered are Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Persia and Tibet, the latter appearing in the section on China. There was no mention of the Sinkiang Uygur Autonomous Region in this section in either year.

The section on each country in the Year-Book usually comprises seven or eight parts. The first contains general information about the country, including its location, area, population, capital and principal languages and religions. The second part summarizes the state structure of the country, including the heads of state and government. There is usually a section on the political parties and, sometimes, the main trade unions. A fourth section deals with the economy of the country. This section opens with a general comment on the state of the economy as seen from the Soviet point of view, and then gives more details on the state and development of industry and agriculture. The fifth section describes what the editors see as the most important events in the country in the preceding year. The sixth section gives the Soviet interpretation of the country's foreign policy. For some countries there is a section giving details on the armed forces, and for some others there is a section on culture. These last two groups are of interest because of the very countries for which this information is provided. Information on the armed forces is given only for the principal members of NATO or CENTO, or for those regarded by the Russians as strongly pro-Western, such as Jordan, Spain and Japan. The two Borderlands countries for which information on the Armed Forces is provided are Pakistan and Persia. No such information is given for any

countries in the Communist bloc or for any of the "neutralist" countries, thus seeking to create the impression that only the Western countries are maintaining armed forces. In both the 1960 and 1961 Year-Books information on cultural developments was given for the majority of the countries in the Soviet bloc, as well as for Brazil, Great Britain, Greece, the United States, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. In the 1960 Year-Book information was also included on the cultural life of India, but this did not appear in the following year. Such a section did not appear for any other Borderlands country.

In this article, attention will be focused on the sections dealing with important events and with the foreign policy of the Borderlands countries in 1959 and 1960, including both what is said and what is omitted. Mention will also be made of general comments on the countries' economy, though purely economic facts will be omitted. A summary of the sections on state structure and political parties and trade unions will also be given when of particular interest. For purposes of comparison with Western reporting THE ANNUAL REGISTER OF WORLD EVENTS (1960 and 1961), published by Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London, has been used.

. . .

#### AFGHANISTAN

In describing the state structure of Afghanistan, a country with whom the Soviet Union has had increasingly close relations in recent years, the 1960 Year-Book (for 1959) described the Afghan Parliament as consisting of a National Council of 171 deputies, elected for three years, and a Senate of 50 members, appointed by the King for life. In addition, according to the report, when resolving more important questions, the King convokes a "so-called Greater Jirga, a representative organ comprised of leaders of tribes and important figures of the country." The 1961 Year-Book makes two interesting changes in this description. Besides the National Council, there is also an "Assembly of the Nobility (fulfilling the functions of a Senate. . .)". In the 1961 description the Greater Jirga is called "a representative organ of distinguished representatives of tribes, high officials and others". In both years the Year-Book notes that 85 per cent of the Afghan population are engaged in agriculture, and that "the survivals of feudalism" are a serious obstacle in the development of the country's productive forces. In 1960 it is noted that in connexion with the current five-year plan, the Afghan Government is taking steps for the development of the national economy, especially the State sector (including almost half of the budget for irrigation, road and energy construction, air transport,

etc.), for encouraging private capital investment, and for the use and attraction of foreign financial and technical aid. Stress is laid on the aid given by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. It is interesting to note that in 1961 the text is almost identically worded, with the exception of the omission of the words "especially the State sector". The Year-Book does say that Afghan industry is very underdeveloped, and that in 1959 there were no railways in the country though a 5 km. extension of the Kushka line into Afghan territory was built in 1959-60. The sections on Afghan agriculture in both years are almost identical, except that in the latter year it is stated that 500,000 Afghan peasants have no land at all. There is one peculiar discrepancy in figures in the two articles. The 1960 Hand-Book gave the percentages of exports and imports from and to Afghanistan in 1957 and 1958 with the USSR, USA, India, West Germany, Pakistan, Japan and Great Britain. In the 1961 Year-Book, figures are given for 1958 and 1959. Allowing for slight statistical errors, the two sets of figures for 1958 should be approximately identical. This is indeed so with Afghanistan's imports. However, the comparative figures for exports are quite different in several instances. The most flagrant discrepancy is in the case of Afghan exports to Pakistan. According to the 1960 Year-Book, exports to Pakistan in 1958 comprised 11 per cent of Afghanistan's total exports. However, in 1961 it is stated that exports to Pakistan in 1958 amounted only to 3.9 per cent. Corresponding increases were noted in exports to the Soviet Union and India.

The Year-Book had one combined section for the most important events and foreign policy of Afghanistan. In 1959, according to the 1960 Year-Book, the Afghan Government, "as formerly, conducted a policy of 'unfailing neutrality and peaceful disposition'". Prime Minister Daud, in commenting on the military agreements signed by the United States with Pakistan, Turkey and Persia, is reported as considering military pacts a fundamental cause of international tension, threatening peace and security. The Year-Book notes that the Afghan press attacked the Pakistani Government's policy on Pushtunistan, accusing the Pakistanis of "striving to suppress the liberation movement of the Pushtuns living in Pakistani territory". Much space is devoted to the aid given to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, including the Russian undertaking to build a 750-kilometre highway from Kushka via Herat to Kandahar and the construction of an irrigation dam at Jalalabad. Mention is also made of aid given by Czechoslovakia, the United States, India and West Germany. There is no mention of the Soviet gift to Afghanistan of 40,000 tons of surplus wheat in face of a bad harvest, possibly because the United States gave 50,000 tons. There is a favourable comment on the visit of Mr. Naim, the Afghan Foreign Minister, to the USSR at the beginning of 1959, and the visit of Prime Minister Daud in May. Other journeys of Messrs. Daud and Naim were noted, and visits to Afghanistan were described as follows: "The General-Secretary of the United Nations,

Dag Hammarskjöld (March), a delegation of cultural personalities from China (June), J. Nehru on a goodwill visit (September), D. Eisenhower (December)." It is curious to note that the Soviet report records visits by Mr. Naim to China, Japan and Persia in September, but omits any mention of his visits that month to Moscow and the next month to the United States, nor is any mention made of the two and a half-month visit to Moscow of the Deputy Chief of the Afghan General Staff. One important development in Afghanistan in 1959 was the Government's attempts, the first since 1928, to bring women out of seclusion, allowing wives of Government officials in Kabul to appear unveiled at public receptions for the first time, and unveiled women to be seen in the streets. No mention of this or of subsequent rioting in Kandahar appears in the Soviet report.

The 1961 Year-Book article on Afghanistan, as would be expected, features the visit of Khrushchev in March 1960. Emphasis is made on points of agreement between the two countries: the two Governments exchanged opinions on the "fate of the Pushtun people", and agreed that a reasonable way to solve the question was the acceptance of the principle of self-determination, on the basis of the UN Charter. Mr. Daud expressed his gratitude for Soviet economic aid to his country, and Mr. Khrushchev promised continued aid in the future. Mr. Daud's five-week rest cure in the USSR (April-May 1960) is described as an opportunity for the prolongation of personal contacts between the heads of the two States. The Soviet article continues to stress disagreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, indicating Soviet support for Afghanistan. It accuses the Pakistani Government of not wanting to settle the Pushtun question. It also notes Afghanistan's complaint to the American and Pakistani Governments over the flight of the U-2 plane from a Pakistani aerodrome and over Afghan territory, on its way to the Soviet Union. Favourable mention is made of the approval by the National Council of Afghanistan to the appeal made by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January on universal and complete disarmament. Mention is made of visits by Messrs. Daud and Naim to a number of countries, with stress on expressions of Afghan support for Khrushchev's United Nations declaration on the liquidation of the colonial system and for the "heroic national liberation movement of the Algerian people". Continued detailed mention is made of Soviet economic and technical aid to Afghanistan, and of the sending of Afghan workers and technicians to the USSR for practical training. Agreements between Afghanistan and other countries, including the United States, are fairly presented, though not in as much detail as those with the USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc. The signing in August 1960 of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Afghanistan is reported, though it is interesting to note that no mention is made of the simultaneous renewal of existing commercial and payments agreements between the two countries.

## INDIA

The description of the state structure of India is almost identically worded in both Year-Books; it is quite straightforward, with a description of the two chambers of Parliament, how the deputies are elected and for how long, and the number of seats held by the major parties. The treatment of political parties, trade unions, and social organizations is also similar. The major parties are listed, in order of the date of their founding rather than of their size, which results in the Communist Party of India appearing immediately after the ruling Indian National Congress. The membership, leaders and leading press organs of the parties are given. The membership of the Indian National Congress is given as 8,800,000, and that of the Communist Party as nearly 229,500.

In both years the Soviet review of the Indian economy is mildly critical in most respects. It is noted that "semi-feudal survivals" still have a strong influence on the economy and that foreign capital, especially that of Great Britain, plays a very important role. The fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, according to the author of the Soviet summary, was hindered by the rise in prices, the strengthening of inflationary tendencies and a fall in currency reserves. Reference was made to parts of the plan which were not fulfilled, such as those for rolled metal, coal and railway coaches. In discussing the state of Indian agriculture, it is reported that India does not produce enough foodstuffs for the population, and foodstuffs are her largest import. Steps which have been taken in India towards land reform, such as the limitation of land-ownership, the establishment of a fixed rent, the defence of the rights of tenant farmers and the giving of land to landless peasants, are not regarded as a solution of the agrarian question. According to the Soviet articles, 60 per cent of the peasants still have no land, or only plots of less than one hectare, while 3.5 per cent of the landowners (who own 10 hectares and more) own 34 per cent of the land. The main criticism is that the immediate producers are still, as formerly, deprived of land, while rent payments are still high.

The 1960 Year-Book mentioned in detail the regular session of the Indian National Congress as the first important event in India in 1959, and reported the resolutions taken on the need for agrarian reforms, the increase of production of foodstuffs by the organization of co-operatives, on support for the peoples fighting for national independence, and an appeal for the ending of the armaments race. Prominence was given to a plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Indian Communist Party which took place in Delhi in February. This plenum was reported to have discussed the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Indian trade unions, the problem of supplying food-

stuffs and land reform, as well as the work of the session of the Indian National Congress, expressing support of the resolution taken by the latter on agriculture. The Soviet survey commented on the formation of the new Swatantra (Independent) Party, which was formed by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, the former Governor-General of India in opposition to the National Congress and based on individual freedom. The Party is described as being the right-wing opposition of the Indian National Congress, seeking to "fight against the ideas of socialism", as well as coming out against the economic programme of the National Congress. Soviet comment in this article on the dismissal of the Communist Government in the state of Kerala is fairly mild. It is noted that by presidential decree the executive power in the state was handed over to the President of India, until the holding of new elections. The Central Executive Committee of the Indian Communist Party was quoted as declaring that the Government violated the spirit of the Indian constitution and the interests of Indian democracy. There was also a paragraph on strikes which occurred in India in 1959, mainly for increases in wages and a lowering of taxes.

Indian foreign policy, according to the Year-Book, continued to be one of non-alignment with large blocs, as well as advocating a solution to the problem of disarmament and the ending of atomic weapons testing. The Indian delegation to the United Nations once again supported the admission of the Communist Chinese Government to the United Nations, and note was made of Nehru's efforts to reactivate the international commission for observation and control in Laos. Considerable space was given to Soviet aid to India, and Nehru's message to Khrushchev and Eisenhower welcoming Khrushchev's visit to the United States was reported. There were brief references to the visits to India of the heads of state or government of Ghana, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Australia, the United States and Sweden. President Prasad's visits to North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, S. Vietnam and Ceylon were reported, as were those of Mr. Nehru to Nepal, Afghanistan and Persia. Indian agreements with Japan and Italy on the settlement of claims arising out of the Second World War were also reported. The only Soviet comment on Indian relations with China was contained in one sentence: "In September there was an exchange of letters between J. Nehru and Chou En-lai concerning the regulation of border questions." No other mention is made of India's dispute with China over the Sino-Indian northern frontier, of Nehru's declaration on Indian responsibility for the defence of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, or of Chinese-Indian border clashes. Nor was there any mention of the flight from Tibet to India of the Dalai Lama, or of the many demonstrations which took place throughout India in protest against Chinese military action in Tibet. There was little comment in the Soviet article on relations between India and Pakistan, though it was noted that in September Nehru met President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and discussed relations between the two countries, and the need to solve disputed

questions by means of friendly conversations. In December an Indian-Pakistani trade agreement was also signed. No mention was made of several military incidents between the two countries during the year, nor of the signing of an interim agreement on the Indus canal waters dispute.

The 1961 Year-Book article on India also reports on sessions of the major Indian Parties in 1960. The 65th session of the Indian National Congress is quoted as having again approved the policy of non-participation in military blocs, full and universal disarmament, and an ending of the colonial system. There is a brief reference to the further reorganization of Indian states on linguistic lines. Sessions of the Central Executive Committee and the National Council of the Indian Communist Party were apparently mainly concerned with the meetings of Communist Parties in Bucharest and Moscow. An attack is made on the Congress of the "reactionary" Swatantra Party, which is quoted as having passed a resolution directed towards a disruption of the foreign and domestic policies of Nehru, especially against the policy of neutrality, and the development of the State sector in industry and planning. Mention is also made of the new elections held in the state of Kerala, resulting in the formation of a coalition government of representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Popular Socialist Party, with the Communist Party holding 26 seats. Once again there is mention of strikes which occurred in India, especially of demonstrations made by Government employees demanding the establishment of a minimum wage. In July a decree by the Indian President gave the Government the right to forbid strikes in any branch "having special significance". On the basis of this decree, a general strike of Government employees is reported to have been declared illegal, and repressed.

The article on Indian foreign policy in 1960 comments favourably on any occasion when the Indian Government agreed with the Soviet Government's position on international affairs, especially at the United Nations. Khrushchev's visit to India in February 1960 receives great prominence, and other exchanges of visits between leading officials of the two countries are noted. A number of trade and economic agreements between India and other countries are mentioned. Long and heated verbal exchanges between India and China are ignored in the Soviet article. It notes that Chou En-lai came to Delhi in April "for conversations on the settlement of border questions between China and India" and that an arrangement was made for "the study of the question of the Indian-Chinese border by groups of experts of both countries." No mention is made in the Year-Book of the continued flight of Tibetan refugees to India following reports of renewed fighting between Chinese troops and Tibetans, nor of the meeting in Delhi in April of delegates from 18 Asian and African countries to demand a reversal of China's policy. The long report of the legal inquiry by the International

Commission of Jurists condemning China's action is also ignored. It is reported that the agreement ending the 12-year-old dispute over the Indus waters was signed in Karachi in September by India, Pakistan and the International Bank. There is no mention of an agreement signed between the two countries on four out of five disputed areas on their western border, nor, indeed, of the generally improved relations between them in 1960. India's dispute with Portugal over the Portuguese possessions in the sub-continent is ignored, nor is there any mention of Indian contributions to United Nations forces in the Congo and the choice of two Indians as assistants by Mr. Hammarskjöld.

### NEPAL

In describing Nepal's first constitutional government, which was headed by Mr. B.P. Koirala's Nepalese Congress Party, the 1960 Year-Book mentioned without comment that the King has legislative power, and the right to appoint the government and to declare a state of emergency. It described the two-chamber parliament which was formed under the Constitution promulgated by King Mahendra in February and which took effect in June 1959. There was a brief enumeration of the major parties in the country, given in the order of the number of seats won in the elections for the lower chamber of the parliament in April, and indicating also the date of founding and the leader of each Party. The Nepalese Congress, which won 74 seats, is followed by the Gurkha Parishad, described by the article as a "reactionary" party, with 19 seats. The Communist Party, with four seats, comes fourth, after the United Democratic Party, with five seats. The article reported that 95 per cent of the people of Nepal are engaged in agriculture, and mentioned what the author calls "feudal survivals", including a rental system for land involving two-thirds of the harvest, and a tradition by which landowners are exempt from taxes. It was noted that industrial development is beginning in Nepal, and some space was given to Soviet aid in 1960 in determining the sites for construction of a hydroelectric station, sugar factory and tobacco plant, all of which will be built with Russian aid.

In describing the main events in Nepal in 1959, the author of the 1960 Year-Book stated that one million of the four million eligible electors took part in Nepal's first election. The Communist Party was described as having taken an active part in the electoral campaign, advocating a programme of land reform, more widespread land-ownership, the development of industry, especially the State sector, the ending of the recruitment of soldiers for Britain, a re-examination of the treaty with India regarding the expansion of Nepal's sovereignty, and the limiting of "American penetration" into Nepal.

The 1960 article commented favourably on King Mahendra's declaration that Nepal would not enter any blocs and that she would develop friendly relations with all countries, especially her neighbours. The Government in May invited all friendly countries to open embassies in Katmandu, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Austria, Italy, Ceylon, Yugoslavia, Poland and Thailand was noted. The article referred to the economic aid agreements between India, the United States and Russia. In June Mr. Nehru paid a four-day visit to Nepal, and the article said that "questions linked with the Indian-Nepalese trade agreement and on the stationing of Indian troops on the Nepalese border" were considered. However, no mention was made of Nepal's disagreement with China over the events in Tibet or of the fact that Nehru, on his visit announced that at the request of the Nepalese Government, India would man 18 strategic posts on Nepal's northern frontier with troops to be replaced by Nepalese as soon as the latter were trained. The article avoided any reference to Mr. Nehru's statement that India would defend Nepal against Chinese aggression, which had led to a demonstration by Nepalese Communists against Indian "interference".

In describing events in Nepal in 1960, the 1961 article first comments on the approval of the Nepalese Congress Party in May of a policy of "positive neutrality" and non-entry into blocs, and its determination to carry out land reforms and aid industrial development. According to the article, "in the last months of 1960, some groups of large feudal lords opposed measures of the Government, chiefly in connexion with the introduction of courts subordinate to the Central Government and a tax on various kinds of feudal land-ownership. . ." Because of what the author sees as a "more acute internal political situation", the King on 15 December dismissed the Government and both chambers of the Parliament, and introduced a state of emergency, revoked several articles of the Constitution, and took on himself all powers for ruling the country. A large number of leaders of the ruling and other parties, including the Prime Minister and 10 other ministers, were arrested, and on 26 December the King formed and headed a new Government. Mention is made of King Mahendra's three and a half-month world tour, including visits to Thailand, Japan, the United States, Persia, Afghanistan and other countries in Europe and North America. In October he visited Great Britain. Economic aid granted by Britain and the United States is also mentioned. A visit by Voroshilov and other Russian officials to Nepal in February is reported, as is that of Chou En-lai in April. Details are given of an agreement on economic aid to Nepal by China, under which China would send equipment, machines, materials and specialists, and Nepalese students would be sent to China. In April a treaty of peace and friendship between Nepal and China was signed. There is no mention in the article of the further dispute between China and Nepal caused by China's claim to the whole of Mount Everest, nor of an incident in which Chinese troops raided Nepalese territory, killing

one army officer and taking a number of prisoners, but for which China later apologized, returning the captives and agreeing to pay compensation. The arrival of a total of 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal by the end of 1960 is not reported.

## PAKISTAN

Both the 1960 and 1961 Year-Book articles on Pakistan go out of their way to depict Pakistan as a military dictatorship over a poverty-stricken people all of whose troubles are caused by Pakistan's links with CENTO and SEATO. In describing the State structure, both articles say that "after the revolution in October 1958, a military dictatorship was established. Power is concentrated in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mohammad Ayub Khan. He occupies the posts of President, Minister of Defence and Minister of Kashmir Affairs. There is also a 'Presidential Cabinet' of 12 ministers." The articles state that in October 1958 all legal parties were dissolved by Presidential decree, although a list is given of the parties existing until that time. The Communist Party of Pakistan is declared to have been created as an independent party from the Indian Communist Party in 1948, and banned in July 1954.

According to the 1960 article, the per capita income in Pakistan was 243 rupees, one of the lowest in the world. The whole economic section linked Pakistan's economic situation with her military obligations. The author of the article claimed that military expenditure amounted to nearly two-thirds of the State income, and that economic difficulties are aggravated by "the preservation of feudal survivals, strong dependence on the foreign market and the domination of foreign capital". Considerable space was allotted to the position of landowners in the Pakistan economy, though mention was also made of a law on agrarian reform which was published in February 1959. Under this law, it was noted, maximum land plots were limited to 200 irrigated hectares or 400 non-irrigated hectares, plus up to 60 hectares extra for gardens. Land exceeding the established maximum was to be handed over with appropriate compensation to the Government, which was to "distribute it for redemption among the lessees and other legal pretenders to the land". The reform was to be carried out within two years (from September 1959). However, the article said that only 15 per cent of the land area was involved, not indicating whether this means arable land or total land area, and that the measure "did not affect the basis of land-ownership".

Pakistani industry is described as being mainly light industry, including cotton, jute, food and leather. According to the article, the absence of fuel and energy, the failure to set up key industries

(machine construction, metallurgy, chemistry, etc.) and the growing dependence on imports, all combine to make industrial development very uneven and limit the possibilities of its growth. It was claimed that the new Government announced its intention of limiting industrial development to the creation of medium and small industrial enterprises specializing in the processing of agricultural raw materials. The financing of industrial development would be carried out mainly by private capital, with a significant decrease in the State sector, while foreign companies would be given maximum opportunities. According to the article, Pakistan's general foreign trade turnover in 1958 was 10.7 per cent less than in 1950, with the export of cotton and tea down by about half. During this same period prices for Pakistani jute, leather and cotton were also alleged to have dropped considerably. Large amounts of American economic aid to Pakistan were mentioned. In the 1961 article it was noted that in 1959-60 there was some growth in agricultural production, but the author attributed this to "favourable weather conditions", a surprising statement in view of the severe cyclones and droughts which are known to have affected the country during the period. In the 1960 article the author stated that because Pakistan had to import so much grain, the import of machine and transport equipment, and of ferrous and non-ferrous metals was strictly limited. Yet the 1961 Year-Book says that "despite import limitations, American monopolies increased their sale of equipment (20 per cent), ferrous metals (15 per cent) and medicines (by one-third)."

The main event in 1959, according to the Soviet article, was still the establishment of what the author called the "military dictatorship". He claimed that "mass repressions were carried out against progressive organizations, wide arrests of democratic figures were effected, and the Government established a cruel censorship of the press. Under Martial Law, strikes were, in fact, banned, and the activity of trade unions was limited." Many enterprises were accused as having taken advantage of the situation to lower wages and carry out dismissals and lockouts. Several strikes were mentioned and, according to the author, unemployment went up in one year from 137,000 to 185,000. All this contrasts rather sharply with the picture presented in THE ANNUAL REGISTER, where 1959 was described as a year virtually free of labour troubles and without any major stoppages. No mention was made in the Soviet account of the promulgation of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance in October, providing for the creation of permanent Industrial Courts to adjudicate any industrial dispute.

The other major event in 1959, according to the Soviet report, was the transfer of the seat of government from Karachi to Rawalpindi, where, it went on to say, "are located the headquarters and Chief-of-Staff of the Pakistani Armed Forces, most of the Army divisions and the military air bases built by the Americans." Government plans for the

restoration of a form of representative government based on a four-tier pyramidal system of councils was only mentioned, the author adding that half of the deputies to the local organs would be "appointed by the military cabinet". Thus, according to the Soviet report, "the Government, through special commissars, would have strict control on the activity of local self-government". Most of the section on Pakistan's foreign policy revolved around her participation in sessions of the Councils of SEATO and CENTO, and her military agreements with the United States. No mention was made of the signing by India and Pakistan of the interim agreement on the Indus canal waters dispute, or on other steps taken to improve relations between the two countries.

In the 1961 Year-Book, the main events of 1960 in Pakistan are presented by the author as showing a worsening of the internal situation, in particular the rise in the cost of living and large-scale strikes. A law passed by the Government in January on Basic Democracies and elections to local councils is seen as an attempt to weaken dissatisfaction in the country, and the councils themselves are said to have no rights in practice. There is no mention of the personal vote of confidence in the President taken in the country, of the Constitutional Committee set up by the President to seek a return to full democracy, nor the arrest of some prominent demagogues. The use of a Pakistani military base for the U-2 flight occupies a prominent place in the Soviet review of Pakistan's foreign policy in 1960. It is claimed that there is a growing movement in Pakistan for improved relations with the USSR, and prominence is given to Pakistan's request to the Soviet Union for aid in oil-prospecting and the sending of Soviet specialists to Pakistan in October. The agreement with India on the Indus River waters, exchanges of visits between leaders of Pakistan and other countries including the United Arab Republic, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Japan are also mentioned. The signing of an agreement settling four western border disputes between India and Pakistan is not mentioned. Other disputes between Pakistan and her neighbours, Afghanistan and India, are summarized in one sentence: "Pakistan refuses to settle the question of Pushtunistan; the Kashmir question remains unsolved."

#### PERSIA

The articles in the Year-Books on Persia are comparatively short, and as Persia is linked with the West in CENTO, the reports are generally unfavourable. According to the account appearing in both years, only one-third of arable land in the country is being used. Both articles say that foreign capital controls the country and various "feudal survivals" continue. Persian industry is poorly developed, according to the Soviet report, and the second Seven-Year Plan is allegedly under-

fulfilled, because of "military expenses". Nearly three-fourths of the people are engaged in agriculture, with nearly 70 per cent of the cultivated land belonging to land-owners, 10-11 per cent to the State and to the Shah, 12-14 per cent to the peasants, 5 per cent to religious organizations, 1-2 per cent being public land. It is said that 60 per cent of the peasants have no land, while nearly 90 per cent of them pay land rent. Some mention is made in the 1961 article of the law on agrarian reform passed in May 1960. Under this law, it is reported, maximum land-ownership of 800 non-irrigated or 400 irrigated hectares of land was stipulated, with the Government buying the surplus from the land-owners, and leasing it to the peasants for ten years. However, the article maintains that "because of the many reservations in the law it would affect, even if realized, only a very limited group of land-owners."

The Soviet account of leading events in Persia in 1959 claimed that the Government further militarized the country by increasing the size of the Army and equipping some divisions with American weapons. The Government is accused of having agreed to sites for American rockets and other military bases, and of having introduced military courses in middle schools. The author said, however, that "Persian society has come out against further dominance by the United States in Persia, and in favour of a strengthening of the country's national independence and the overcoming of the impasse in which Persia found herself as a result of a policy of collusion with imperialist powers, carried out by a determined faction of Persian ruling circles." It claimed that some Persian generals have sought to get rid of all foreign, "that is, American" advisers and experts. The result of this "policy of militarization", according to the article, has been "a further worsening of the situation of the masses". It alleged that prices have risen daily and that there have been more strikes. The Persian Government was accused of "treachery" in its relations with the Soviet Union. It further alleged that "desiring to blunt the vigilance of the USSR. . ." the Persian Government proposed the examination of the possibility of concluding an agreement of friendship and non-aggression between the two countries. It was claimed that the Russians accepted a draft proposal submitted by the Persians, and that Persia's signing of a military agreement with the United States in March 1959 was a direct violation of previous assurances given by the Shah and other officials not to conclude bilateral treaties with third countries directed against the Soviet Union. Considerable details are given of Western aid to Persia, most of them without comment.

The 1961 Year-Book gives a short account of the elections for the National Assembly held in Persia in the summer of 1960. These elections are seen by the author as "a demonstration of protest by wide sections of the population against the policy of the former Prime Minister

M. Eqbal." The Shah's dissatisfaction with the conduct of the elections and the forced resignation of Eqbal receives little comment, and it is merely noted that the Government resigned, the results of the elections were annulled, and new elections postponed to 1961. The general internal situation in Persia is alleged to have worsened in 1960, resulting in more strikes and protests among the intelligentsia. It remarks that the Persian decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel resulted in a break in relations with the United Arab Republic. The declaration of the new Prime Minister, Sharif Emami, that he intended to improve relations with the Soviet Union, "corresponding to the real interests of the Persian people", is reported to have been warmly greeted by Persian society. Persia's continued participation in CENTO and in the military agreement with the United States is described as a renunciation of Persia's traditional neutral policy. It is curious to note that the Soviet article reports that American delegations came to Persia to study the economic and financial situation of the country with the purpose of seeking the expansion of Persian-American trade, the investment of American capital in the Persian economy and the granting of new loans to Persia. This is immediately followed by a brief statement that the American-Persian trade agreement of 1943 was annulled and that some Persian Ministers went to the United States and other countries for conversations on new loans. Though it does not actually say so, it appears that the article is seeking to give the impression that American aid to Persia was halted and that Persia was forced to ask for more aid. [In fact, Washington officials had warned the Persian Government that unless Persia adopted a stabilization programme acceptable to the International Monetary Fund, there would be no more American loans. After certain steps were taken to combat inflation, the I.M.F. agreed to lend Persia more money and postpone repayment of previous debts.] It is also interesting to note that no mention is made in this article of the execution in May in Tabriz of four members of the Tudeh (Communist) Party charged with organizing a spy-ring, of the Shah's assurance to Khrushchev that Persia would not permit its soil to be used as a base against the USSR, or of the personal message from Khrushchev to the Shah on the resumption of friendly ties between the two countries. On the whole, the tone of the 1961 article is less hostile in its treatment of the Persian Government than that of 1960.

#### TIBET

The Tibetan uprising against the Chinese garrison and the escape of the Dalai Lama to India in the early part of 1959 was reported in the 1960 article on China as a "counter-revolutionary revolt on the part of the reactionary feudal leadership of the local government of Tibet, instigated and supported by imperialist circles and the Chang Kai-shek clique, with the purpose of separating Tibet from China." It was claimed that

the local population and "patriotically inclined" representatives of the local authorities of Tibet helped in "liquidating" the revolt, and that democratic reforms directed towards "the gradual liquidation in Tibet of the feudal-serf stratum and of economic and cultural backwardness" were planned. The Chinese Government was said to have taken decisions on the handing over to the peasants of land which belonged to the "ringleaders" of the revolt, to have reduced rent payments for land and to have organized peasant unions. In December the creation of the "Tibet Committee of the Peoples' Political Consultative Council of China" was reported. As is to be expected, no mention was made of the report of the International Commission of Jurists on Tibet, of the Dalai Lama's appeal to the United Nations, or of the resolution sponsored by Ireland and Malaya calling for the restoration of civil and religious liberties to the Tibetan people and its subsequent adoption by the General Assembly. There was also no mention of Mr. Nehru's report of the Indian Consul-General in Lhasa having been advised by the Chinese that visits by Indian nationals to Tibet for pilgrimages or other purposes would be discouraged. In the 1961 Year-Book there is no mention of Tibet.

## THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION OF

1905 - 11

The subject of the Persian revolution and constitutional movement is one to which the Soviet writers have devoted a good deal of attention during the past 10 years. The principal exponent of Soviet views on the revolution is M.S. Ivanov who dealt with it in some detail in his OUTLINE OF PERSIAN HISTORY (OCHEK ISTORII IRANA), the relevant portion of which was analysed in detail in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.3, pp. 288-303. The same writer has now returned to the subject in an article entitled "The 50th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1905-11 in Persia as Treated in Persian Literature" (NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No.4, 1961, pp. 145-55). In this he examines some recent Persian writing which has appeared on the occasion of the anniversary and much of which takes the form of memoirs and reminiscences by actual eye witnesses and participants in the revolution. Ivanov does not claim that this writing sheds any new light on the principles involved in the revolution, but he believes that it contains much new and interesting information about actual events and about the personalities involved which makes it possible to "present more precisely and more concretely the progress of events, the meaning of various tendencies and the positions adopted by the various classes". He claims that this information also gives the lie to certain attempts which have been made to "denigrate the Soviet Union and its policy in Persia". He criticizes several recent Russian publications on this period for their "wrong evaluation" of several of the leading figures of the revolution, and it is noteworthy that whereas in his earlier work he himself made only one passing reference to Taqizadeh, the outstanding figure of the constitutional movement and of the first Majles, his present article pays considerable, although not always favourable, attention to him.

At the beginning of the article Ivanov describes the Persian revolution of 1905-11 as the biggest anti-feudal and anti-imperialist popular movement of this period of Middle East history. This runs counter to the view of the great majority of Persian historians, who regard the movement as primarily directed against the despotic rule of the Shah. They also consider that the movement gained considerable sympathy from the British Government and people, whereas the Tsarist Government came out strongly in support of the Shah. In the course of the article, Ivanov repeats the standard Soviet claim that British support was nothing but a hypocritical sham. There is, however, less tendency than in the

previous work to whitewash the attitude taken up by the Tsarist Government.

Ivanov concentrates his attention mainly on two Persian books which appeared during 1960 to mark the anniversary of the revolution. The first is a transcript of a series of lectures delivered by Taqizadeh in a Tehran club in January 1959 together with the ensuing discussion. Taqizadeh was an actual participant in the revolution and constitutional movement, and although Ivanov does not consider his judgment on historical processes in various countries to have much significance, he concedes that the book presents some "new and interesting information and objective evaluations" about the revolution in Persia. Those which he actually mentions, however, seem to be of little importance. Much more prominence is given to Taqizadeh's mention of Soviet Russia's annulment of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and to his reported statement, made, however, with reservations, that the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921 served for more than 20 years as an obstacle to aggression "by others" against Persia.

Far more space is devoted to the second book, THE AZARBAIJAN UPRISING AND SATTAR KHAN which is the second volume of a history of the origin and preparation of the Persian constitutional movement and for the uprising in Persian Azarbaijan. The author is Isma'il Amirkhizi, who in April 1908 was elected a member of the Azarbaijan Provincial Council. During the Tabriz uprising and until October 1910 he was Sattar Khan's secretary and adviser. Subsequently he worked under the Ministry of Education as a teacher of Persian literature, as headmaster of a middle school in Tabriz and in Tehran, as Head of the Department of Education in Persian Azarbaijan, and as Inspector of the Ministry of Education. Ivanov criticizes Amirkhizi for his exaggeration of his own role, but he considers that "in spite of this, from the point of view of factual material the book is the most valuable of all recent Persian literature on the history of the revolution of 1905-11."

Amirkhizi is credited with giving many interesting details on the progress and circumstances of the battles in Tabriz and on Sattar Khan, including a description of the differences arising among the leaders of the "reactionary bands" after their first unsuccessful efforts to seize Tabriz. Amirkhizi refers to a previously unknown letter which is supposed to have been written by 785 students of Moscow University to Sattar Khan, expressing "limitless admiration" for the struggle for freedom of the Persians and Sattar Khan himself. Ivanov cites Amirkhizi's views on the differences between Sattar Khan and other representatives of the democratic wing of the revolution on the one hand, and the representatives of the liberal wing who were accused of trying to limit the development of the revolutionary movement and come to an agreement with reactionary forces on the other. After Mohammad Ali Shah

was deposed, the representatives of this liberal current began to seek an agreement with "the reactionary forces".

Ivanov says that although Amirkhizi recounts many facts witnessing to the significant differences between the leaders of the democratic group in the Persian revolution and representatives of "feudal-liberal circles", he himself does not see any difference between them on questions of principle. It is of interest here to note that Ivanov also criticizes some Soviet orientalist for making the same mistake. In particular, he cites an article by S.M. Aliyev on "Some Facts on V.I. Lenin's Familiarity with Persian Progressive Figures" which appeared in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA (1960, No.2). Apparently Aliyev, borrowing information mainly from the works of the Persian liberal historian Mahdi Malekzadeh, wrongly described several figures of "feudal circles" who were temporarily adhering to the revolutionary movement, as "democratic figures of that time" or as "famous Persian revolutionaries", that is, as figures who were progressive in their time. In reality, however, according to Ivanov, two of these were Karim Khan Rashti, who was "connected with British imperialist circles and Persian reaction" and was an enemy of the democratic movement, and his brother and close associate, Mo'ez-es Sultan Sardar Mokhi. Ivanov also quotes another Soviet book, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905-11 AND THE BOLSHEVIKS OF THE TRANSCAUCASUS by G.S. Arutyunyan (Yerevan, 1956), which describes Karim Khan and Sardar Mokhi as fighters against the Shah and against foreign rule, and Sardar Mokhi as "a known Persian revolutionary". Aliyev is also criticized for reporting as a progressive Persian figure and "one of the leftist deputies of the first Majles" one Mo'azed es-Saltaneh, one of the ministers who in December 1911 signed a report to the Regent on the dissolution of the second Majles thus facilitating the formation of a counter-revolutionary move the same month. Yahya Daulatabadi, called "a Persian liberal figure" by Aliyev, was, according to Ivanov, "close to reactionary circles and had come out against the democratic movement".

Amirkhizi gives considerable biographical details about Sattar Khan. In the 1880s, when he was only 16 or 17 years old, he was put into prison for two years for his opposition to the authorities. After escaping from the fortress, where important criminals were kept, Sattar "led an armed partisan struggle against the authorities, in defence of the poor and downtrodden." He was arrested and imprisoned repeatedly. For some years Sattar served in the Amniyeh (road guards) in north-east Azerbaijan and later as bodyguard to the heir apparent and governor of Azerbaijan, Mozaffar-ed-din, at which time he was given the title of khan. All the time, according to Amirkhizi, Sattar was well known for his defence of the peasants from marauders. In the years immediately preceding the revolution, not wanting to be in the service of the state, he remained in Tabriz as a horse-dealer. He became very popular among

all classes of the population of Tabriz, and sometimes even the authorities of Azarbaijan were forced to turn to him for aid.

Amirkhizi, according to Ivanov, describes Sattar Khan as coming from a petty bourgeois family, who right up to the revolution carried on his struggle "against the arbitrary rule of the authorities". It is of interest to note here that Ivanov points out that this information does not corroborate that given in the newspaper RUSSKIYE VEDOMOSTI, which said that Sattar Khan had spent a long time in Transcaucasia and had been a worker on the Yerevan railway, a foreman in a brick kiln and for five years had worked in the Baku oilfields. Amirkhizi also states, according to Ivanov, that there were close and friendly relations between Sattar and the Armenians and Georgians who came to Tabriz to help the Tabriz revolutionaries. The Transcaucasians are depicted as having regarded Sattar with great affection, and the latter responded to them "as if he felt special care for them". According to Ivanov, Amirkhizi said that more than 50 Georgians and Armenians coming from Russia had given their lives fighting against "reactionary bands" in Tabriz. Among the participants from the Transcaucasus Amirkhizi names Sadrak, who is mentioned in documents in the archives of G.V. Plekhanov as an active member of the Tabriz social democratic group.

Earlier in his article Ivanov notes that in 1958 a second edition of a translation into Persian of E.G. Browne's, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), was published in Tehran. In 1956 and 1958 a translation of another of Browne's books, THE PRESS AND POETRY OF MODERN PERSIA (Cambridge, 1914), appeared in Tehran. The translator, Mohammad Abbasi, added a short preface and comments. Abbasi also added to the book an article on Browne by the Persian man of letters Mohammad Qazvini. These publications are only just mentioned at the beginning, but much later in the article, after discussing Taqizadeh's and Amirkhizi's books, Ivanov develops a violent attack on Browne. He accuses him of having used information from Persian emigrants in London, a group of "liberal anglophiles", and of having in his book libelled Sattar and also Baqer Khan, another of the defenders of Tabriz. Browne, he says, calls Baqer a cowardly braggart, and against Sattar "he lays slanderous accusations of corruption, drunkenness, plundering of defenceless townsmen, and of having taken up an unpatriotic attitude etc." Browne writes that he received this information from a man he fully trusted, and that he is convinced that Taqizadeh would confirm this description. A.Kasravi (author of other works on the Persian revolution) considered that this calumny of Sattar and Baqer was written to Browne by Mohammad Ali Khan Tarbiyat on the instructions of Taqizadeh. Here Amirphizi is quoted by Ivanov as "decisively refuting Browne's fabricated defamation of Sattar", and as writing of Sattar's higher moral qualities - his bravery and daring, firm will, good faith, fairness and generosity and of his great love for his country and of

his desire to see her independent.

At this point there is a somewhat strange paragraph about Taqizadeh. In his comments in the Tehran Club which were later published as a book, he had described Browne's comments as impartial and truthful. He was asked how he viewed the assertions made in Browne's book against Sattar Khan and to the statement that he, Taqizadeh, would confirm them. In reply, Taqizadeh expressed regret at the publication in Browne's book "of fabrications about the chief hero of the constitutional movement". He declared that he had always had a good opinion of Sattar Khan, and did not understand why he, Taqizadeh, was alluded to as a witness to this severe judgment of Sattar Khan. He also regretted the opinion expressed by Kasravi that the letter defaming Sattar Khan had been signed by Tarbiyat on Taqizadeh's instructions.

Ivanov continues his attack on Browne by accusing him of "obscuring the imperialist character of Britain's policy in Persia" and of trying "to present Britain as the defender of freedom, independence and democracy in Persia". He alleges that he distorted the character and role of the motivating forces behind the Persian revolution, disparaged the role of the popular masses, democratic organizations and the Fedai, and extolled the role of the "clergy, panislamists and Persian bourgeois liberals who were in touch with the British". Each of Ivanov's attacks on Browne is explained by his reiteration of his charges that Britain's policy towards the Persian revolution was a "hypocritical mask of sympathy". His motive becomes clear when he claims that many Persian authorities who have written on the history of the Persian revolution have merely repeated Browne's version of Britain's sympathetic attitude toward the Persian liberation movement, describing Browne himself as an impartial commentator and a defender of freedom and democracy in Persia. Ivanov protests that these mistaken notions have left their imprint on literature appearing in connexion with the 50th anniversary of the revolution. For example, according to Ivanov, Rezazadeh Shafaq asserts that "the British in Tehran and other places in Persia supported the constitutional movement, while the Russians harshly opposed every national movement." Shafaq praises Browne's books on the Persian revolution, extols the American, Baskerville, who was involved in the defence of Tabriz, and casts aspersions on the aid given by Russian revolutionaries to the Tabriz revolutionaries.

Taqizadeh is again quoted as defending Browne's book "as the best of all those published in foreign languages on the Persian constitution." The translator of Browne's book on the Persian revolution, Ahmad Pazhuh calls Browne "the standard-bearer in Britain of Persia's freedom." All these statements, according to Ivanov, are "the result of the influence of tendentious British propaganda, designed to obscure the imperialist aims of British policy in Persia." Ivanov goes on to say that Britain's

policy, as well as that of Tsarist Russia, was deeply harmful to the Persian revolutionary movement and to the nation's freedom and independence. He accuses the British of having been enemies of Persia's national independence, and claims that in the early years of the revolution they repeatedly violated Persia's sovereignty and her territorial integrity, and sought to strengthen Persia's dependence on Britain and to preserve her monarchical structure. Britain's representatives in Persia are accused of having been associated "with those most reactionary of Persian feudal lords Zill-as-Sultan, Shaikh Khaz'al, Qavam-ol-Molk Shirazi and others". Ivanov further claims that after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 on the partition of Persia into spheres of influence, Britain often sent her troops and warships to various areas "to repress the revolutionary movement" in Persia. In 1909, according to Ivanov, British representatives in Persia "persistently demanded that Tsarist troops should be sent to Tabriz", and at the end of 1911 "the revolution was repressed by Tsarist and British troops jointly with Persian reactionaries." He does not mention the fact that whereas Russian troops did enter Persian Azarbaijan in 1909 and stayed there until the First World War no British troops did. It is standard Soviet practice to magnify the British consular escorts at Mashhad and Bushire, amounting in all to about 40 men, into large forces occupied in "ravaging the cities of Persia".

The author praises Mohammad Abbasi, the translator of Browne's book on the Persian press and poetry, for his comments on Qazvini's article praising Browne which is published with the translation. Abbasi writes that he does not share Qazvini's opinions and claims that Qazvini himself in the latter years of his life had changed his opinion of Browne. Ivanov does not deny that Tsarist Russia's policy towards Persia had imperialist aspects, but he says that the British fully supported what moves Russia took, as a result of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Ivanov says that "Abbasi's notes and comments are very much to the point. They show that in present-day Persia, there are people who are not taken in by imperialist propaganda, and who are capable of correctly understanding historical facts and seeing the real difference between the policy of the Soviet Union and the imperialist policy of Tsarism and Britain." Ivanov also attacks a book of Ali Kamalvand, BASKERVILLE AND THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION, claiming that the author uses his theme to bestow exaggerated praise on the United States. Kamalvand is further criticized for devoting only five lines to the aid of the Russian Transcaucasians to the Persian revolution, as well as for exaggerating the role of Baskerville in the defence of Tabriz.

Ivanov's article concludes with an examination of some comments by Taqizadeh and Amirkhizi on A. Kasravi's HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN CONSTI-

TUTION. This is described by Ivanov as the best Persian book on the history of the Persian revolution, both from the point of view of factual material and because it adopts "a critical approach to the widely disseminated claims of E. Browne and British propaganda". Amir-khizi and Taqizadeh "while recognizing the great value of Kasravi's work", also assert that there are many mistakes in it. Taqizadeh declares that at least three-quarters of Kasravi's book does not accord with the facts. Much of this attack, according to Ivanov, is based on Kasravi's personal attack on Taqizadeh accusing him of cowardice for having gone off to London during the defence of Tabriz. Kasravi alleges that after his return to Tabriz, Taqizadeh accused Sattar and Baqer of looting and thus hindered the activities of these leaders of the revolutionary forces. Taqizadeh, according to Ivanov, does not disclaim his own role in the dissolution of the armed bands before the revolution of 23 June 1908, but says by way of explanation that the leaders of the constitutional movement at that time did not consider it expedient to begin on their own initiative an armed struggle against the Shah. Amir-khizi also justifies Taqizadeh's conduct in this and many other respects.

Ivanov describes the literature which has appeared in Persia on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revolution as "interesting" and as reflecting the "moods of Persian society". He says that "it shows that the attempts of the imperialists to denigrate the Soviet Union and its policy in Persia cannot delude the Persian people." Nevertheless, his article makes it clear that Persian historians still adhere firmly to three convictions - that Taqizadeh was an outstanding figure of the revolution and constitutional movement, that Britain and especially Professor Browne supported the revolution, and that Russia did all in her power to oppose it. The main purpose of the article is clearly to register Soviet resentment of these persistent notions, and particularly of the first two.

## O P E R A T I O N S   I N   P E R S I A   1 9 1 4   -   1 9 2 0

Soviet accounts of the operations in Persia during and immediately after the First World War have already been examined in previous issues of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. L.I. Miroshnikov, author of an article analysed and criticized in CAR, Vol.VIII, No.3, pp.296-8, has now produced a full length book under the title of BRITISH EXPANSION IN PERSIA (1914-1920).<sup>\*</sup> This book was in the press when Miroshnikov visited London early in 1961. One would like to believe that his visit was with the object of carrying out wider and more objective research than he had so far undertaken and that he will shortly see his way to correcting some of the many distortions and making good the startling omissions in his present work.

At some later stage it may be possible for CAR to undertake a full analysis or even a full translation of this extraordinary book, which is surely one of the curiosities of modern historical literature. For the present, however, it will be enough to give a full translation of the introduction and conclusion, which together give a good idea of the official purpose lying behind the publication of the book. As in his previous article, Miroshnikov virtually brushes aside the fact that Britain was at war with Germany and Turkey between 1914 and 1918 and contends that the sole object of the British forces in Persia was directed against Persia herself and against Transcaspia.

## I N T R O D U C T I O N

The imperialist powers' battle for Persia which had begun in the 19th century flared up with special force during the First World War and it culminated in the occupation of the country by British troops and the establishment of complete domination by British imperialism. Persia's dependence on Britain allowed the latter to use Persian territory as a springboard for the carrying out of armed intervention against the Soviet Union. The object of this intervention was the overturning of Soviet power and the extension of the British colonial empire at the expense of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, both of which bordered on Persia.

---

<sup>\*</sup> Angliyskaya Ekspansiya v Irane (1914-1920), Moscow, 1961.

The period of the occupation of Persian territory by British troops and of British intervention in Transcaucasia and Central Asia coincided with the rise of the anti-imperialist and national liberation movement in Persia. This movement of the Persian people was a natural consequence of the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and of the establishment of the power of the Soviets in Azerbaydzhan and Turkestan which bordered on Persia. The liberation movement of the Persian people served as an obstacle to the final enslavement of Persia by the British colonizers and to the use of its territory for the conduct of operations against Soviet Russia. The victories of the Red Army over the united forces of counter-revolution and intervention in the Russian provinces bordering on Persia acted as an inspiration for the Persian patriots who had risen against the colonizers. This allowed the Persians to rely in their fight against imperialist Britain on the political support of Soviet Russia, and thanks to this, to establish the administrative and political independence of the country.

The central theme of the present work is the history of British expansion in Persia between 1914 and 1920, and of British armed intervention in Transcaucasia and Transcaspiia. The author has not set himself the task of examining in uniform detail all the events of this period of history of Persia. Such events, for example, as the Gilan Revolution or the National Democratic Movement in Persian Azarbaijan and some others are examined by the author only in connexion with those matters which constitute the main theme of his research. Matters relating to the British armed intervention against Soviet Russia are examined mainly from the point of view of its organization, its use of Persian territory as a jumping-off place, and the attitude of the Persian ruling classes towards it. The actual course of the intervention in Russian territory is only described as briefly as possible.

In writing the work the author has used Russian, British, Persian and French sources and literature. The most interesting and useful of these have been the material in the Central State Archives of the Red Army, Russian and Soviet periodical literature, numerous reports, communications and memoirs by British political and military figures who took part in the events under examination, and finally published British official documents.

The maps and plans have been compiled by the author on the basis of Russian and foreign, mainly British, sources, literature and cartographic material.

## CONCLUSION

The principal aims of British imperialism in the First World War were: the weakening of its powerful rival, Imperial Germany, and the seizure of new colonies in Asia and Africa. It was for this latter reason that during the war the main forces of the British and Anglo-Indian armies were engaged on the African and Asian fronts - in East Africa, Asia-Minor, Syria, the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia and Persia. The creation of a continuous chain of British colonies from Malaya to Egypt was the main task towards the realization of which Britain directed all her forces and resources.

At the cost of the destruction of hundreds of thousands of its subjects, and primarily of its Indian subjects, British imperialism succeeded in conquering from Ottoman Turkey the territories of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, and by its occupation of neutral Persia in achieving the fulfilment of the ambitious plans of Lord Curzon, who, even at the beginning of the 20th century, had stated that the frontiers of British India should be on the Euphrates. The enslavement of Persia by the British came about not only in the form of armed conquest, as had happened in Mesopotamia and Syria, but by the subjection of the Government and Shah of Persia to British influence. At the same time, there was a difference in the character of the domination which the British colonizers exercised in the north and in the south of Persia. In the first years of the war the southern provinces were subjected to the direct military occupation of Britain and were looked upon by her as an inseparable part of the empire. Roads were built there and punitive expeditions were carried out with a view to the suppression of the Persian nomad tribes. Before the British occupation, the authority of the central Government had in fact not extended to the south of Persia, and accordingly, the new masters - the British colonizers - did not consider it necessary to pay any attention to that Government.

When the Revolution took place in Russia and the evacuation of Russian troops began, Britain immediately profited by this circumstance to occupy the north of Persia. British troops were everywhere except in the capital, but the dependence of the Persian Government on Britain was so great that their presence in Tehran was unnecessary.

The imperialist aggressors replied to the socialist revolution in Russia by organizing anti-Soviet armed intervention, and Persia was transformed into one of the principal bases for military operations directed against the south and south-east of the Soviet republic. The reasons why Britain selected Persia as a spring-board for its anti-Soviet intervention were: (a) the presence close to Persia of considerable British armed forces - the Anglo-Indian Army in Mesopotamia,

(b) the concentration in south Russia (i.e. not far from the frontiers of Persia) of the forces of counter-revolution, (c) the attraction which the provinces of Soviet Russia bordering on Persia had for the British imperialists as useful objects of exploitation, (d) Persia's dependence on Britain, (e) the strategic importance of the Caspian Sea, and (f) the possibility that intervention might be used for the final seizure of the whole of Persia and her conversion into a colony.

The policy of British imperialism in Persia from 1918 to 1920 was bound up with the two projects of armed intervention against Soviet Russia and the simultaneous total enslavement of Persia. The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was a camouflaged plan for a British protectorate over Persia.

Nineteen-twenty was the year of the defeat of the hordes of the White Guards by the Red Army. The counter-revolutionary forces retreated to the borderlands of Russia and beyond her frontiers under the protection of foreign imperialists. Part of the forces of Denikin and Kolchak, as well as of the Azerbaydzhan and Turkestan counter-revolutionaries, took refuge in northern Persia, where there were considerable forces of the Anglo-Indian Army. The British imperialists were getting ready to renew their armed intervention; but the wave of national liberation which swept Persia itself under the influence of the October Revolution and the absence of reliable troops did not allow them to carry out their plans. Factors which contributed to the failure of the plans for a renewal of intervention from Persian territory were the anti-British risings in 1920 in Iraq and India, the national liberation and democratic movement in Persian Azarbaijan, Gilan and Khorasan, and the destruction by the Red Army and fleet of the British intervention base in the north of Persia.

The Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union which was concluded by Persia in February 1921 acted as a stimulus to the national patriotic forces of the Persian people in their struggle with the British colonizers. British troops were evacuated from Persia and the country had a chance of independent development.

But Persia continued to attract the attention of the imperialists. Twenty years after the expulsion of the British from Persia the German fascists tried to make use of her territory. It was their intention to create in Persia a springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union. But they too were unsuccessful. In order to remove the threat to the frontiers of the USSR, Soviet troops were sent into Persia on the basis of the 1921 Treaty. A British Army appeared in Persia at this time exercising its right as an ally of Soviet Russia in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The Second World War is over, but the imperialists (now not only the British, but also the Americans) continue to concoct plans for the use of Persia as a military base at the approaches to the Soviet Union. Persia has become a member of the aggressive Baghdad Pact, which later became CENTO, of which Britain is also a member. Reactionary Persian circles have tied their country to the aggressive imperialism of America. They have not stopped to consider that in the history of Persia there have already been unsuccessful attempts to use her territory as an anti-Soviet base. The real reason why nothing has resulted from these attempts is that a pro-imperialist policy runs completely counter to the basic national interests of the Persian people.

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY ALLIANCES

The magazine AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA has recently published a number of articles attacking Pakistan's participation in the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern military and economic groupings CENTO and SEATO. As Pakistan is the only non-European country which is a member of both pacts, it is hardly surprising that the Russians should launch these attacks, especially in view of their recent efforts to establish close relations with Pakistan's neighbour, Afghanistan.

In the first of these articles (No.8 of 1961, pp.12-13), entitled "Abortive Efforts of SEATO", A. Dolgov claims that SEATO has failed in its attempt to create a real regional organization. This alleged crisis "is deeply worrying the strategists of Washington", who are accused of attempting not only to avert the break up of the bloc, but are also trying to bring in new members. As a result, there is an increasing emphasis on questions of ideology and culture at sessions of the SEATO Council. The leaders of the bloc, according to Dolgov, are trying to present this "aggressive bloc" as a peace-loving association concerned with the economic and cultural blossoming of the whole geographic region, with the object of attracting the participation of the independent countries of Asia in cultural measures, "and by devious ways to drag them into the snare of a military bloc".

The author then asks what this cultural development has done for three members of the pact, choosing Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines for the purpose of his attack. In Pakistan, he says, illiteracy is still a national problem, and quotes a Pakistani newspaper as saying that the needs of only one-third of the urban population are being met. The screen in Pakistan "is monopolized by Hollywood", and he blames the films coming from America as being a cause of the increase in crime. Dolgov accuses the Pakistani Government of liquidating democratic freedoms, and of launching an attack on the press, literature and culture of the country. "Many progressive magazines, books and text-books have been banned on the grounds that they contained "subversive" ideas. A ban has been put on the import of books from India. The importing of progressive literature from Britain has been halted." [sic] The author sees the main object of this to be the desire to break all cultural links with the outside world. The chief efforts of SEATO in this cultural programme, according to Dolgov, have been directed toward a propaganda war, stressing anti-communism and the glorification of Western civilization. He accuses the leaders of SEATO of spreading

lies and slander against the socialist camp, and of suffering from an "abortion of ideas". However, he expresses the belief that socialist ideas are gaining ground in this part of the world. He sees capitalism as having been compromised in the eyes of Asian peoples because of "years of colonial yoke and piracy". He claims that more and more often voices are heard in these countries "criticizing the neo-colonial policy of Washington, supporting a policy of neutrality and peaceful co-existence". The author says that the SEATO countries are trying to suppress the struggle for independence of "freedom-loving peoples" and that SEATO serves as "the main hindrance for the development of good neighbourly relations in South-East Asia". He states that "SEATO must be liquidated as opposing the national interests of the peoples of South-East Asia", and advocates the creation of a "zone of peace".

In another article in the same issue entitled "The Workers of Pakistan are Fighting", the author, T. Ruziyev, links Pakistan's participation in CENTO and SEATO with "a sharp worsening of the living and working conditions of the people of Pakistan". He claims that Pakistan remains as formerly an agrarian raw material appendage of the industrial powers of the capitalist world, with foreign capital controlling the economy, foreign trade and finances of the country. The working day in some branches of industry is 10 to 12 hours long, according to Ruziyev, and the majority of unskilled workers receive wages far lower than the minimum needed for living. He goes on to claim that almost two million people are without jobs, and the shortage of housing is presented as a chronic problem. The large military expenses involved by Pakistan's participation in CENTO and SEATO are connected with these problems. Ruziyev claims that 70 per cent of State income is allotted to military expenditure, and "the militarization of the country is accompanied by an uninterrupted increase in the price of necessities". The rise of prices results in a fall in the real wages of the workers, and Pakistan is accused of lagging behind Iraq, India, Ceylon, Lebanon and Persia in the per capita income of its people.

The author sees as a natural consequence of this situation, "into which the imperialists, with the help of local authorities, have put Pakistan", the growth of dissatisfaction among the workers. He claims that immediately after the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan a strike wave seized the country, with 57 big strikes taking place in 1948. By 1957, he claims, the workers of Pakistan had carried out 161 strikes, "demanding the departure of the country from military blocs, the nationalization of the basic branches of industry and invested capital, the legalization of the Communist Party, the recognition of workers' unions, the raising of wages and other economic concessions." The growth of the workers' movement, says Ruziyev, "terrified the bourgeoisie, and especially the owners of foreign monopolies", and this resulted in the establishment of a military regime in October 1958. The

new Government of General Ayub Khan passed a series of laws limiting still further the rights of the people. In October 1959, a "Decree on Industrial Disputes" was passed, forbidding the organization of strikes and stoppages. In May 1960, Article 79 of the Martial Law came into effect, forbidding the workers "to organize, conduct and visit any meeting or demonstration of a political character". Violations of this Article carried a prison term of up to seven years. The author also cites "Article 144 of the so-called Pakistani Penal Code", forbidding the people to gather in groups of more than five people. The aim of these laws, according to Ruziyev, is to weaken the organized struggle of the proletariat. New regulations on the registration and recognition of trade unions, transferring their registration from the provincial governments to the central government, had the same object.

The new Military Government is also accused of putting "the progressive press" under cruel controls. In April 1960 a decree on the press and publications was signed, regulating permits for the publication of newspapers, books and magazines. By this decree all material criticizing the internal and foreign policy of the Government was banned, "under the pretext of not provoking 'disrespect for any class or group of the population' or of avoiding 'damage to friendly relations of the Government with the governments of other states'." In the newspapers and magazines, according to the author, nothing can be printed about "the demands of the population for improving their life". However, the author goes on to say that "these draconian laws did not frighten the democratic forces and their spearhead, the working-class". Nineteen fifty-nine was marked by a new outbreak of strikes, involving workers in textile and jute factories, railway workers and also employees of State institutions in Karachi and Lahore. In 1960, Ruziyev says, a strike wave in Pakistan affected almost all branches of industry. Some of these strikes involved clashes with the police. All this, the author continues, bears witness to the "growth of self-consciousness and activity among the working-class". The chief method of struggle for the time being is the economic strike, although in recent years the role of the working-class in the political life of the country has grown. The strikes take place mainly in the bigger and highly organized enterprises with a large number of workers. The Government is accused of trying in every way to extinguish the strike movement, and of organizing "special mobile police detachments" and military courts "to make answerable all who participate in the democratic movement of the country."

The author asserts that "neither arrests nor cruel court action can quell the militant spirit of the workers of Pakistan." He claims that through their fight for their rights the workers have forced the authorities to consider their demands. Thus, "it is not by chance that in the Second Five-Year Plan the Government of Pakistan has been forced

to take such measures as creating a national council to deal with labour problems, and to reorganize existing labour exchanges and open new ones". Fifty million rupees have been appropriated for this. In addition, the plan stipulates the careful observation of safety techniques, the improvement of sanitary and health conditions, the abolition of child labour, the regulation of industrial disputes and the introduction of a programme of social insurance. It is hard to understand how the author reconciles these measures with his accusation of oppressive military dictatorship and widespread injustice.

In conclusion, Ruziyev claims that the working-class and "the whole progressive society of the country" is protesting against the "subordination of Pakistan to imperialist powers" and demanding the establishment of friendly relations with the states of the socialist camp.

In yet another article in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA (No.9 of 1961), L. Vasil'yev asks "What does Participation in Blocs Bring to Pakistan?" He cites Pakistan as one of the initiators of the historic Bandung Conference, and accuses the country of having travelled far from the principles of Bandung. In the spring of 1961, according to the author, the Pakistan authorities called on the participants of SEATO to send their troops to Laos "to fight against the patriotic forces united around the legal Government of Prince Suvanna Phouma". In April, at the session of the CENTO Council in Ankara, the delegate of Pakistan is reputed to have demanded the creation of united forces headed by an American general. He accuses the Pakistan Government of "dragging the country into a quagmire of military expenditure". In 1959-60, he claims, this expenditure totalled 882.2 million rupees, or more than half of all budgetary appropriations. With additional marginal expenses, this comes to three-quarters of the budget.

Vasil'yev accuses the Pakistani authorities of ignoring social, economic, national, internal and foreign political problems in their attempts to militarize the country. He attacks the construction of military bases, especially in the northern part of Western Pakistan, near Afghanistan, China and the Soviet Union, as well as in the former North-West Frontier Province, where the "freedom-loving Pushtun tribes live". He mentions the flight of the American U-2 plane from such a base in May 1960. In addition, the author claims that in Eastern Pakistan American specialists are directing naval construction in the port of Chittagong and in Dacca. Military bases are allegedly being created in "the occupied part of Kashmir". All this is happening, according to Vasil'yev, when the country has "the lowest per capita income in the world", only half that of Japan with approximately the same population.

The author criticizes the state of agriculture in Pakistan. Formerly the rich granaries of the Punjab and Eastern Pakistan fully supplied the population with foodstuffs, but now Pakistan every year has to import from other countries. The author quotes Pakistani statistics (unidentified) as saying that in Western Pakistan crop rotation has resulted in nearly 12 million acres being taken out of production, or 50 per cent of all irrigated land, including saline and water-logged soils. Scientists regard this as a "national catastrophe". Vasil'yev describes Pakistan as lagging behind the Arab and other Asian states in industrial development; it does not possess a single metallurgical factory. He even claims that as a result of the niggardly state expenditure on social needs and health, epidemic illnesses and natural calamities constantly threaten millions of the country's inhabitants. Another result of the Military Government's actions, states Vasil'yev, has been the liquidation of all remaining "bourgeois democratic freedoms".

All these things, the author says, are the "barren fruits of militarization and one-sided orientation toward participation in military blocs." He says that part of the Western aid given is dissipated on the cost of keeping the "colossal apparatus of American specialists, scattered through all the cities of Pakistan". In comparing the situation in Pakistan with that of neighbouring neutral states, Vasil'yev says that the more far-seeing Pakistanis have come to the conclusion that instead of a one-sided orientation toward Western countries, Pakistan should develop mutually advantageous links with all states, and follow a policy of neutrality and non-participation in military blocs. He cites the experience of India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan as precedents.

Vasil'yev says that recently in Pakistan more and more voices have been raised demanding a re-examination of the country's present foreign policy. He here quotes the recent TASS allegations which claimed that top-secret documents of CENTO showed plans for creating along the southern border of the Soviet Union a zone of "death and devastation", which would involve an attack on the USSR, and the reduction to ashes of cities and populated areas in Persia and Pakistan. He accuses the leaders of Pakistan of taking part in "American and British military adventures against the Soviet Union", and of being ready "to hurl their country into the hell of an atomic war". He nevertheless expresses the hope that while there is still time Pakistan, like other young states, will adopt a course which will lead to the strengthening of its independence and will be compatible with its national interests.

T H E   B O R D E R L A N D S   I N   T H E  
S O V I E T   P R E S S

Below are reviewed reports on the borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 October-31 December 1961. The only items on India which have been included are those relating to the Indian Communist Party and to the general subject of Soviet-Indian relations, with brief notes on the coverage given to the visit to India of the Soviet President, Brezhnev, in December and the Indian occupation of Goa and other Portuguese establishments in India. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of this issue.

AFGHANISTAN

On 1.10.61, PR and TI reported the grant of the Soviet medal "for saving from drowning" to four Afghan soldiers, who at the risk of their own lives had rescued a Soviet engineer and his wife whose motor-car had been submerged by floods in the Rabad-Sangi district last spring.

Considerable space was given to various visitors to and from the USSR. These included a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to Kabul (PR, KT, BR and TI, 4.10.61), an Afghan delegation to Moscow on 4 October to discuss the conclusion of an agreement for economic cooperation in connexion with the second Afghan Five-Year Plan (IZ. 6.10.61), an Afghan agricultural delegation to Tadzhikistan on 4 October (KT. 4.10.61), an Afghan farm workers' delegation to Turkmenistan during October (TI. 13.10.61), and an Afghan State economy delegation to Moscow on 16 October (PR. 17.10.61). Marshal Sokolovskiy visited Kabul on 21 October and was received by the King. (KZ. 22.10.61)

On the occasion of the signing of the Afghan-Soviet Agreement relating to economic and technical cooperation during the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of Afghanistan's economy. a brief congratulatory article appeared in IZ (19.10.61).

Major Gagarin's visit to Kabul on 13 December was warmly but briefly reported in PR, IZ, and the Central Asian newspapers.

Sporting exchanges, mostly of football, between Afghan and local teams in Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan were reported in some detail. Considerable notice was taken in KT of 18.11.61 and 26.11.61 of a visit to Tadzhikistan of a troop of Afghan singers and musicians. The troop performed in Dushanbe (Stalinabad) and Kurgan-Tyube.

PV of 21.10.61 and IZ of 24.10.61 reported that in response to an Afghan request, Soviet foreign trade organizations had started buying fruit from Afghanistan. This was being despatched to the USSR by air and had already included nearly a thousand tons of fresh grapes. This friendly act was said to have been greatly appreciated in Afghanistan as the export of Afghan fruit to normal markets through Pakistan territory had been stopped by the rupture of Afghan-Pakistan relations. It was referred to again later in PR of 4.12.61 with the comment that by it "Russians had acquired a good reputation in this small, neutral country."

#### INDIA

In addition to printing a full report of Ajoy Kumar Ghosh's speech at the XXIInd Party Congress, PR of 16.10.61 published an article by him on the subject of the Congress. No mention was made in any Soviet paper of Ghosh's subsequent statement in India to the effect that India would be fully justified in repelling any attack made by China on Indian territory. BR of 3.11.61 and 6.11.61 described the visit to Azerbaydzhan of Z.A. Ahmad and S.G. Sardesai of the Indian Communist Party. PV of 10.11.61 described their subsequent visit to Uzbekistan.

The Soviet press carried a number of articles, statements and speeches by Indian writers and politicians extolling Soviet-Indian friendship and contrasting the Soviet peace-loving policy with the bellicose attitude of the United States. Chief among these were an article called "Yesterday a Reserve of Imperialism, Today an Ally of Socialism" by Nikil Chakravarti (PR. 3.12.61), and speeches by the Secretary-General and Secretary of the All-Indian Trade Union Congress at the WFTU Congress held in Moscow in December (PR. 12.12.61, 19.12.61 and KT and SK of 7.12.61). Other articles by Indians of a slightly less political character which have appeared in the Soviet press are "White Sail", a reminiscent article by M. Elias, Secretary-General of the National Federation of Metallurgical and Machine Building Workers of India (PR. 8.12.61), and "The Poetry of my Friend" by S. Sajjad Zahir describing an edition of the works of the poet Makhdum Muhieddin published in the USSR. In this article the writer says that "In no country of the world have so many editions of modern Indian authors been published as in the Soviet Union." (LG. 2.12.61)

PV of 8.10.61 carries an article by O. Polinova, a teacher at the Tashkent State University, written on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the death of the Indian writer Prem Chand. The author points out that the works of Prem Chand are well known in the USSR since they have been translated into several Soviet languages, including Uzbek.

Apart from visits by individuals, the only delegation reported during the period under review was that of Indian professional and technical educational workers to Tadzhikistan in October 1961. This visit lasted about six weeks. (KT. 25.10.61 and 24.11.61)

The visit of Major Gagarin accompanied by his wife to Delhi, Bombay, Lucknow and Calcutta in December was given extensive coverage and that of President Brezhnev a fortnight later even greater coverage. The latter visit was made the occasion for a large number of affirmations of Soviet-Indian friendship and uniformity of views on world problems. In his closing broadcast on 28 December (PR. 29.12.61) Mr. Brezhnev referred briefly to the occupation of Goa and other Portuguese establishments in India which had coincided with his visit.

The Soviet press accorded full support to Indian action in Goa. Indian charges of Portuguese oppression of the local population were repeated in great detail and the whole incident was acclaimed with jubilation as being one more victory over colonialism. The Western view that India had committed an act of aggression was treated with ridicule.

#### NEPAL

The signing in Peking on 5 October of "a Treaty about the Frontier between the Chinese People's Republic and the Kingdom of Nepal" was briefly reported in PRAVDA of 6.10.61 without any comment beyond the statement that the Treaty was a new landmark in the development of friendly relations between China and Nepal. King Mahendra's reception by Mao-Tse-Tung and his departure for Nepal on 23 October were likewise very briefly reported with no comment. Both these reports were given a Tass date-line but both began with the words "As reported by the Sinkhwa Newsagency. . ."

#### PAKISTAN

Two notes predominate in the very small amount of coverage given in the Soviet press to Pakistan during the period under review - uncompromising hostility to the policy of the Pakistan Government, and gloomy foreboding about the future of Pakistan's economy and the standard of

living of her people. Characteristic headlines are "In a Quagmire", "The Fruits of Militarization", "The Standard of Living in Pakistan Falls", and "Ever Nearer to the Abyss". The favourable report on his visit to the Soviet Union given by a Pakistani surgeon, Habib Patel, was given some prominence. The appointment of new Pakistan and Soviet Ambassadors to Moscow and Karachi was briefly reported, as was the message of congratulation sent by Field-Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan to the Soviet President on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution.

#### PERSIA

During the period under review the Soviet press maintained a strongly anti-Shah and anti-Government attitude. In December there was a marked increase in news items designed to paint a picture of growing distress, falling standard of living and increasing opposition to the Shah and Government. These items appeared mainly in the metropolitan and Azerbaydzhan press and included reports of suicides said to be caused by hunger and despair. In one such item (TRUD 26.12.61) it was mentioned that the suicide had occurred near the Prime Minister's office.

An article called "Persia in the Grip of a Crisis" by Shulyakin in TRUD of 2.12.61, sought to prove that the Government's declarations about plans for economic improvements and the eradication of corruption were meaningless and that the people were aware "whence blew the wind which was turning their country into an uninhabited desert". "The wretched position of the Persian workers is felt particularly sharply against the background of the prosperity of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics." The article insists that people are demanding that Persia's present "policy of participation in the aggressive alliance of the Western powers" should be changed.


TI of 27.12.61 contains an article signed by Reza Rusta, described as "General Secretary of the Central Council of the United Trade Unions of Persia". This article was said to have been written at the request of the TI's correspondent during the recent WFTU Congress in Moscow. The article is called "Country of Mass Grief and Beggary" and presents Persia as in the final stages of poverty, hunger and despair owing to the "reckless and anti-Soviet policy of the Shah" whose "misanthropic plans" include one "to turn a number of Persia's northern cities into an atomic screen, a zone of death and devastation". The whole article of some 2,000 words is written in violent language. No mention is made of the fact that the author does not now hold any trade union office in Persia and is not in fact living there.

During the period under review there was no mention of Sinkiang or Tibet in either the metropolitan or the Central Asian and Azerbaydzhani press.





Vol. X No. 2. 1962.



TASHKENT

# ENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in  
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Social Science Foundation  
of the United States of America

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with  
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.



BUKHARA

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus Sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents :

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,  
46, Great Russell Street,  
LONDON, W.C. 1.

Price : Seven Shillings & Sixpence

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## CONTENTS

	Page
Editorial	100
<b>Soviet Central Asia</b>	
Islam in Central Asia : Recent Soviet Writing	104
Sources of Turkmen Folklore	119
The Muslim Republics and the XXIIInd Party Congress : Reactions to the Personality Cult and Anti-Party Group	125
Transport in Azerbaydzhan	129
Private Property Tendencies in Central Asia and Kazakhstan	147
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Changes, Conferences, Irrigation, Public Works, Publishing, Religion, Communications	157
<b>Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia</b>	
Peaceful Co-existence and Revolutionary War	164
Soviet Views on Colonialism	168
Pakistan Since 1947	178
The Political and Economic Situation in Persia : The Soviet View	188
Coal-Mining in Persia	194
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	197

## Maps

Communications in Azerbaydzhan

facing page 131

Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia,  
Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan

at end

---

## Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Tadjik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadjikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

## CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL.X, NO.2

## EDITORIAL

Several times during the past seven years Central Asian Review has drawn attention to the rapid development of oriental studies in the Soviet Union. The main points which we have noted have been the essentially political approach to these studies adopted by Soviet scholars, and the fact that they pay far more attention to modern developments in Asian and African countries than do Western scholars. Quite recently (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1961, No.3) we commented favourably on the Soviet decision to drop the words oriental and orientalism (vostochnyy and vostokovedeniye) from the Russian academic vocabulary and to speak instead of Asian studies. For some time past the British Government and some, although by no means all, British scholars have been conscious of the need to modernize what are still called oriental studies in Britain in order to bring them into line with the rapid evolution now taking place in Asian and African countries. This need was first felt in 1946, and in 1947 certain recommendations were made by an interdepartmental commission of enquiry presided over by Lord Scarbrough. These recommendations were due for review in 1957, but it was not until 1959 that the University Grants Committee appointed a sub-Committee under Sir William Hayter to carry out this review.

The Report of the sub-committee, which has just been published, made a number of recommendations which the sub-committee believed "would go a long way towards bringing the study of the non-Western world into the main stream of University life." The application of the recommendations "would also provide the nation with the fundamental knowledge about these countries without which Great Britain cannot play an effective part in world affairs." The recommendations have evoked a good deal of criticism - much more, we suspect, than has appeared in letters to the newspapers. The main ground for complaint seems to be the report's relegation of language study to a relatively minor position. Some critics argue that Asian and African studies must "be

based on a massive foundation of language work" which, "whether classical or modern, must take any responsible scholar far beyond its own linguistic implications." The suggestion that language should be regarded as ancillary to other subjects such as economics and geography and that economists and geographers should be enabled to extend the scope of their studies in respect of Asian and African countries by "intensive courses" is regarded with misgiving in some quarters.

That Asian and African studies do require modernizing, and that scholars and students in non-language departments should be able to specialize in Asian and African regions and learn their languages there can be no doubt. Whether the universities alone are the proper place for the process of modernization is perhaps less certain. Ideally the university should be an educational rather than a training establishment, and it can be argued that the study of the ancient East on the basis of its languages and literatures is of greater educational value than the study of the modern East with its veneer of Western civilization. The merging of both studies into one discipline would be hardly more practicable than the merging of the classical and modern languages schools in respect of European studies. The fact is, however, that in many disciplines the universities are becoming training as well as educational establishments and for this reason there is a case for ensuring that some, if not necessarily all, of the modernization of Asian and African studies should take place inside the universities. But if the study of Asian and African modern political, economic and cultural affairs is to be raised to the same level as that of European affairs, then some much more drastic changes than those envisaged by the Hayter sub-Committee would eventually be necessary. A correspondent in THE TIMES of the 5th March raised a good point when he asked some of the critics of the Hayter Report whether they would "expect schools of French, Italian or Medieval History to yield authorities on European economics or geography".

A possible criticism of the Hayter Report which has not so far found expression is that it confines its attention exclusively to the universities. The curious fact is that although European political, economic, and cultural affairs can be and are actively studied outside the universities, similar facilities for the organized study of Asian and African affairs scarcely exist at all. That courses for such studies can be organized with excellent results has been proved by the creation of the Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies at Shemlan in Lebanon. This Centre has produced many students whose practical knowledge of the modern Arabic language is at least comparable with that gained in a four years' degree course at a university, and whose grasp of spoken dialects and of modern Middle East affairs is considerably better. The same sort of comparison could be made in the somewhat different field of Russian studies: students who complete the 18

months' Russian interpreters' course at the Army School of Education and qualify as first class interpreters have an equally good practical knowledge of Russian as honours graduates from the universities and a far better understanding of Soviet affairs. The universities can no doubt be made to contribute something towards the modernization of Asian and African studies, but in view of the entrenched position still held by classical studies at the universities, it seems possible that the sub-committee's aim of providing "the nation with the fundamental knowledge" about Asian and African countries "without which Great Britain cannot play an effective part in world affairs" could be better and more quickly achieved by the establishment of special courses, not as recommended by the sub-committee's Report solely under university auspices, but also under some entirely separate arrangement.

. . .

Anyone who makes a careful study of the press and other literature published in the Muslim republics of the USSR is likely to be struck as much by the subjects with which they do not deal as by those of which they treat regularly and in the greatest detail. For example, one of the most remarkable features of the press of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan is the virtual absence of any reference to the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region of China, with which all these republics have long frontiers amounting in all to over 1,500 miles. This omission appears all the more extraordinary when account is taken of the frequent references in the Azerbaydzhan, Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadzhik press to the affairs of the neighbouring countries of Persia and Afghanistan. Like both these countries Sinkiang has considerable demographic and cultural affinities with the peoples over the Soviet frontier: it contains over half a million Kazakhs and several thousand Kirgiz, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks. There are also considerable Dungan and Uygur communities in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Apart from this, there has, since 1949, been the additional bond of union of Communism between the USSR and China.

The fact that Sinkiang has been an integral part of the Chinese empire since 1758 has not had any particular significance for the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Tadzhiks, except perhaps in the sense that the devastation of Dzhungaria by the Chinese in that year removed once and for all the Kalmyk menace from which the Kazakhs had suffered for the best part of a century. Before China came under Communist control in 1949 Chinese rule over Sinkiang underwent many vicissitudes and was sometimes little more than nominal, and the population remained overwhelmingly Turkic and Muslim. Over a thousand years earlier, the Arabs had regarded their conquest of Transoxania and Semirech'ye as the

seizure of territory from the Chinese, and during the campaigns of Qutayba ibn Muslim frequent embassies were despatched to Peking both by the Turkic rulers appealing for Chinese aid against the Arabs, and by the Arabs in order to ensure that no such aid was given. After the resounding defeat of the Chinese by the Arabs in 751 Chinese prestige waned. Thereafter, and particularly after Russia began her conquest of the Steppe Region and Central Asia, China was not regarded there as a great power. She was, however, to some extent regarded as a friendly power by the Asian peoples living under Russian rule: the Kalmyks took refuge there from Russian oppression in 1771, and there have been similar migrations since, notably after the 1916 revolt. How Chinese prestige stands with the Kazakhs, Kirgiz and Tadzhiks today it is impossible to say with any degree of precision. The Soviet authorities are probably not anxious to publish the fact that Sinkiang is now more firmly under Chinese rule than ever before, and that since the early 1950s Chinese have been pouring into the region to form the so-called "military colonies". It seems unlikely, however, that the peoples of the three republics bordering on Sinkiang can be unaware of the recent great increase in Chinese power. In this connexion, the greatly increased attention recently paid to the Dungans (Chinese Muslims who originated from Sinkiang) must be regarded as significant (see CAR, 1961, No.2). At the same time, there have been reports that as a result of disturbances in Sinkiang there has recently been a considerable new influx of Turkic Muslim refugees from Sinkiang into Soviet Central Asia.

I S L A M   I N   C E N T R A L   A S I A :  
R E C E N T   S O V I E T   W R I T I N G

The first two Soviet books dealing with Islam in individual Central Asian republics were published in 1960. They are THE ANTI-SCIENTIFIC NATURE OF ISLAM AND PROBLEMS OF THE ATHEISTIC EDUCATION OF THE WORKERS IN THE CONDITIONS OF SOVIET TURKMENISTAN by Nedir Kuliyeu(1) and ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN by O.A. Sukhareva(2). Kuliyeu's book is a straightforward exercise in anti-religious propaganda in accordance with the current Party line. It suffers from a lack of facts and figures about the organization of Islam and number of believers in the republic both before the Revolution and at the present time. Readers are referred to "Islam in the USSR" in CAR, 1961, No.4, pp.335-51 for such information as is available on these questions. One point on which Kuliyeu is particularly insistent is that "the loyalty of the Muslim clergy to the Soviet regime" does not mean "a reconciliation of Marxist and religious ideologies". No doubt the extensive use by the Soviet Union of the Central Asian Muslim clergy in its propaganda towards the Middle East countries has been partly responsible for this confusion. A further point worth noting is that the book is published only in Russian.

Sukhareva's book, despite its comprehensive title, is mainly concerned with how Islam affected the lives of the peoples of Uzbekistan at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. A good deal of factual information is given showing that Central Asian Islam absorbed the beliefs and rites of many ancient cults which it found there. The treatment of mazars (shrines) and Sufiism is particularly hostile. The book is intended for "agitators and propaganda workers, and the general reader" and aims at giving them an understanding of certain features to be found in the present-day Uzbek way of life. In view of this it is somewhat strange that after the long section on Sufiism Sukhareva makes no mention of specific Sufi practices when listing current religious survivals in Uzbekistan.

- 
- (1) ANTINAUCHNAYA SUSHCHNOST' ISLAMA I ZADACHI ATEISTICHESKOGO VOSPI-TANIYA TRUDYASHCHIKHSYA V USLOVIYAKH SOVETSKOGO TURKMENISTANA, Izd. AN/Turk.SSR, Ashkhabad, 1960. 166pp.
- (2) ISLAM V UZBEKISTANE, Izd. AN/Uzb.SSR, Tashkent, 1960. 88pp.

The main interest of these books lies in their implicit recognition of Islam as a force still to be reckoned with and of their refusal to see any good in Islamic doctrine or in the specifically Islamic way of life.

A summary of both books is given below, the headings being those used in the books themselves.

---

THE ANTI-SCIENTIFIC NATURE OF ISLAM AND PROBLEMS OF THE ATHEISTIC EDUCATION OF THE WORKERS IN THE CONDITIONS OF SOVIET TURKMENISTAN  
by Nedir Kuliyeu

Introduction

Kuliyeu examines the reasons why "religious prejudices" still exist in the Soviet Union although the social and economic conditions which gave rise to religion have long been eliminated. The reasons he gives are: that religion took deep root in the lives of believers, and a way of life changes much more slowly than social and economic conditions: "the comparatively low general educational level of a certain section of the Soviet people"; the occurrence of natural disasters and "the existence among a certain section of the people of certain material difficulties and adversities"; increased activity by religious organizations encouraged by a slackening of atheistic propaganda; and the use by the capitalist world of increasing contacts with the Soviet Union for bourgeois propaganda including the revival of religious prejudices. (Pp.6-7) Kuliyeu goes on to say that the fight against religious survivals is exceedingly important during the transition to Communism, but anti-religious propaganda can only be successful if it is backed by a profound understanding of religion and a deep knowledge of its concrete local forms. Most books are devoted to general questions. The present book "tries to show the anti-scientific, reactionary essence of Islam and also the problems of the atheistic education of the masses. . . on the basis of the concrete conditions and peculiarities of Turkmenistan." It is important to study Islam since it is widespread in the Soviet Union, particularly in the Central Asian republics, and little has been written about it, much less than on Christianity. (P.11)

The spread of Islam and its social role in pre-revolutionary Turkmenistan

In the first section of this chapter Kuliyeu deals with the religious beliefs of the ancestors of the Turkmens before the arrival of Islam. These included nature worship, totemism, shamanism, fire-worship,

cult of ancestors, belief in good and evil spirits, Christianity, Buddhism, Manicheanism and Zoroastrianism. Various survivals of these ancient beliefs are still to be found in Turkmenistan and archaeological data shows that Islam borrowed many rites from the pagans inhabiting the territory of Turkmenistan.

Kuliyev turns next to the rise of Islam in Arabia as a result of radical changes in the social and economic life of the Arabs and its use as an ideological banner for Arab expansion. He says that it is important to stress that Islam was introduced into Central Asia largely by force and met with bitter resistance in the towns and even more among the nomads. The local aristocracy, however, wishing to keep their wealth and influence, were quick to come to terms with the Arab conquerors and adopt Islam. The Arabs imposed heavy taxes, destroyed literary and artistic works and persecuted local scholars, showing Islam's hostility to science and art. Nevertheless there was a certain flowering of culture prior to the Mongol invasion. Many popular uprisings in Central Asia took place under religious slogans but this was inevitable in the circumstances of the Middle Ages. (P.28)

Kuliyev says that the researches of Soviet orientalists have shown that the Muslim clergy were always on the side of those who exploited the masses and with their great wealth and enormous immovable property (waqf lands) themselves oppressed the masses and were thus directly interested in suppressing their resistance and clouding their minds with religious beliefs. Islam supported feudalism and later bourgeois exploitation and is at present being used by the bourgeoisie of Muslim countries to keep the workers under and strengthen the capitalist order. With the collapse of the Baghdad caliphate and the strengthening of feudal exploitation beginning from the 11th century, philosophical and mystical teachings such as Sufiism and Dervishism became widespread among the peoples of Central Asia including Turkmenistan. Sufiism, which arose originally as an expression of the masses' dissatisfaction with the Arab yoke, soon became an ideological weapon of the ruling class. Thus Shaikh Abu Sa'id (968-1049) was one of the founders of Sufiism in Khorasan. (P.33) Sufiism had a "profoundly negative influence" on the life of all Muslim peoples including those of Turkmenistan.

Kuliyev next asserts that in their attempts to subjugate the Turks, the Shahs of Persia, the Khivan Khans and the Emirs of Bukhara made extensive use of Sufiism by despatching Muslim clergy to preach among them. (P.33) The Tsarist Government, in its turn, also used Islam for its own purposes. While being extremely hostile to preachers from Khiva, Bukhara, Turkey and Persia because it wished to keep the Central Asian peoples disunited, it actively supported the clergy in Turkmenistan itself as an ally in oppressing the people. (P.36) Kuliyev goes

on to describe Panislamism, "the political ideology of the bourgeoisie of the Muslim countries in the imperialist epoch." Its anti-imperialist nature did not prevent its being used also by the imperialists since it is an ideology of the exploiter classes. "After Central Asia was incorporated in Russia, panislamists together with feudal and clerical reaction often tried to organize anti-Russian movements with the support of Turkey and Britain to tear Central Asia from Russia," but "they did not enjoy the support of local progressive elements" and even more important of the working people. (P.39) Kuliyeve then deals with the use allegedly made of Islam and panislamism outside the Soviet Union by the imperialists during and since the Second World War.

Kuliyeve goes on to say that Muslim propaganda by Arab, Bukharan, Khivan, Persian and Tatar religious figures enjoyed much less influence in Turkmenistan than in other countries. The reasons he gives for this are that the Turkmens "led a semi-nomadic life and were under the powerful influence of pre-Islamic religious beliefs," (p.45) and also the reactionary activity of the clergy which made the working people sceptical. Thus many folk tales, proverbs, etc. throw light on the unsavoury deeds of the clergy, their greed, bribery and deceit, and the leading Turkmen poets exposed the deceits and corruption of the clergy, although they were not completely free from Islamic ideology, due to the period in which they lived. (Pp.48-49)

#### Opposition between the ideas of science and Islam on the origin and cognition of nature and human society

Kuliyeve devotes this chapter to showing that Islamic teachings about such things as the creation of the universe and man are incompatible with the scientific explanations, that agricultural and technical progress in Turkmenistan as elsewhere have resulted from man's efforts, not God's, that Islamic fatalism is harmful since it deliberately perpetuates the oppressed condition of the masses and calls on them to refrain from the fight with evil for a better future. And further, that Islam, like other religions, is hostile to any form of progress and has persecuted and even killed many leading thinkers including the Uzbek astronomer and mathematician Ulugh Beg, the Uzbek poet and thinker Alisher Navoi, the poet Omar Khayyam and Avicenna.

#### The dogmas of Islam on the position of women in society

Kuliyeve says that Islamic views on women are "profoundly reactionary" and goes on to describe the various marriage customs in Turkmenistan before the Revolution as well as the widespread practice of self-immolation by widows, suicide being "the only way out of their oppressed position". (P.85) The influence of "progressive democratic culture", especially Russian, aroused in Muslim women the desire to

throw off the yoke of slavery and later the Revolution ensured that women have equal rights with men. Many Turkmen women have taken advantage of this but there are still instances of "feudal-bay" attitudes towards women. They should not only be strictly punished in accordance with the law but an angry public opinion should be created condemning those who practise the barbaric customs of the past. (P.94)

### Muslim fasts, holidays and rites; their origin and class nature

Kuliyev describes the Muslim fasts, holidays and rites as observed in present-day Turkmenistan. He points out that the fast (oraza, i.e. Ramazan), the slaughter of animals at the Kurban-Bayram ('Id uz-Zuha) festival and circumcision are not peculiar to Islam but were borrowed from earlier more primitive religions. Orazia and circumcision are both potentially injurious to health. When oraza falls during periods of intensive agricultural work it reduces the kolkhoznik's capacity to work and harms both the kolkhoznik himself and the kolkhoz as a whole. Kurban-Bayram, "when an enormous number of domestic animals are killed", also harms materially both the economy and the kolkhozniks. Attendance at the mosque on religious holidays and the holding of funeral feasts distract people from their work. Kuliyev goes into some detail about the numerous "holy" places to which pilgrimages are still made. In the past the exploiter classes and clergy put a lot of effort into attaching a religious flavour to monuments of material culture such as graves, and the legends are still current and used by clever businessmen among the clergy for their own aims. The graves can be divided into two groups - those of "holy" sheikhs and those of big feudal lords - and, Kuliyev asserts, the "holy" sheikhs were often feudal lords as well and associated with the exploiter classes in oppressing the people. Some "sacred" places were connected with people who had hallucinations, or were simply adventurers. Pilgrims come hoping for cures, sometimes at great cost to themselves. Among the sheikhs looking after the shrines, he says, are ex-criminals and a number of charlatans who have set themselves up as holy men and prophets and take money for "cures" and selling amulets etc. while leading immoral lives themselves. "The religious fasts, rituals and holidays and also the so-called "holy" places are used by the Muslim clergy to inflame religious fanaticism and for their own enrichment, serving as a source of income for the Muslim organizations and also as a way of educating the faithful in a spirit of servile obedience to the clergy and their heavenly masters." (P.111)

Two other survivals condemned by Kuliyev are that tebibs\* continue

---

\* An Arabic word signifying one who practises eastern as opposed to western medicine. Kuliyev uses it in a derogatory sense.

to flourish despite excellent medical facilities, and the refusal to eat pork. The latter is a totemistic survival taken over by Islam and harms the economy by preventing believers from engaging in pig-breeding.

### The ways and methods of overcoming the survivals of Islam

Kuliyev starts this chapter by saying that Marxism is implacably hostile to any kind of religion, but attempts to combat it by coercion or administrative measures are condemned. The Party relies mainly on daily, patient, systematic scientific and religious propaganda.

Kuliyev next reviews relations between State and Mosque since Soviet power was established. The Government proclaimed freedom of conscience and the separation of Church and State and does not meddle in the internal affairs of religious organizations. The All-Union and Republican Councils for Religious Cults regulate questions between Church and State for all except the Russian Orthodox Church for which there is a separate council. There are four Muslim spiritual directorates in the USSR in Tashkent, Ufa, Baku and Buynaksk. Kuliyev then shows how the attitude of the Muslim clergy to Soviet power has changed over the years. At first the vast majority were on the side of the counter-revolutionaries and opposed all measures to build socialism, such as the emancipation of women, land reform, and the introduction of the Latin alphabet. Their reactionary, anti-popular role was particularly clear when locusts descended on Turkmenistan in 1929. They said it was a punishment from Allah for Turkmenistan's becoming Soviet and demanded the expulsion of Soviet workers and the return of confiscated lands. A number of leading clergy were arrested for this "open counter-revolution". The attitude of the clergy towards the regime led to a mass abandonment of religion by the workers which both weakened the religious organizations and made the clergy realize that to keep any hold on the workers they would have to abandon anti-Soviet propaganda. Therefore they "went over to positions of strict loyalty to Soviet power". This change-over was finally completed during the war and now the majority of the clergy are loyal to the Soviet State. In view of this the Soviet Government allowed the opening of mosques and seminaries, and the publication of newspapers and journals [but see CAR, 1961, No.4, p.339-340]. Kuliyev stresses that the loyalty of the clergy to the regime does not mean a reconciliation of Marxist and religious ideologies as some people seem to think, and are encouraged to think by certain clergy who, "to preserve the remnants of their influence on believers. . . have recently begun to preach the 'theory' that Islam and Communism do not contradict one another." Confusion on this score leads in some cases to letting things ride and in others to administrative interference in the affairs of ministers of religion, both of which are to be condemned. The war and the earthquake in Ashkhabad led to a

substantial revival of religious beliefs. The Party called for improvements in atheistic propaganda but, though it did improve, mistakes were made in offending religious feelings.

Kuliyev states that participation in building a Communist society is a very important factor in overcoming religious survivals, because the more actively a man participates the more he will become convinced from his own experience that there are no supernatural forces and that man controls the development of society. At the same time ideological work must be improved.

Kuliyev then deals with the various forms of scientific and atheistic propaganda, the organization of this work in Turkmenistan and its shortcomings. Anti-religious propaganda is conducted both by the Party and by the Turkmen Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge founded in 1947. The society gives an increasing number of lectures every year, publishes brochures and placards, and provides material for lecturers. It holds seminars for lecturers and together with the Ashkhabad City Party Committee has set up a University of Scientific Atheism to train lecturers. Lecture offices have been attached to schools in a number of towns and in Ashkhabad 26 have been set up in such undertakings as the footwear factory. Among the failings noted by Kuliyev are that lectures do not take account of the audience's demands and are usually not illustrated with films because there aren't many; that most lectures take place in the towns whereas they should be given in the country and in Turkmen, which does not happen yet as there is a shortage of trained lecturers; that insufficient use is made of individual talks with believers and that those conducting them are not sufficiently equipped to argue with believers; that some cultural workers, including Communists are bearers of religious survivals and have their children circumcized, blaming their observance of religious practices on living with their old parents; that the arts, particularly literature and films, have done too little in the field of anti-religious propaganda; that school-teachers are not always convinced atheists; and that the press is far from making the most of its exceptional opportunities. Kuliyev warns that anti-religious propaganda must never be allowed to slacken or religion immediately revives. Thus, as a result of a weakening of atheistic work, the number of worshippers at the Mazar-i-Sharif tomb near Chardzhou on the first day of Kurban-Bayram in 1959 was more than twice the number which had been present the year before.

### Conclusion

In conclusion Kuliyev reiterates that religion is and always has been against the interests of the masses. At present, however, in the Middle East Islam has a dual role. In some countries, such as Iraq, the

Sudan and Yemen, it is used by supporters of the liberation movement but in others, such as Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, it is used to justify a pro-imperialist and anti-liberation policy. The imperialists also use Islam for their own ends. Thus the Americans try to penetrate the Middle East under the guise of protecting Islam. Kuliyeu ends by saying that the overcoming of religious survivals is a lengthy and complicated process. Improvements in economic and social conditions and the continual strengthening of the socialist world play a big part, but they must be accompanied by daily untiring ideological work including scientific and atheistic propaganda.

---

ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN by O.A. Sukhareva

Introduction

After a brief summary of Marxist-Leninist views on religion, the author quotes recent statements by the Communist Party and Khrushchev on the necessity of eliminating capitalist survivals in Soviet society, of which religion is one. "In the Soviet Union Islam is widespread among the Tatars, many peoples of the Caucasus, in Azerbaydzhan, and among all the peoples of Central Asia except the Central Asian Jews." A study of Islam and the concrete forms it took is "extremely important for an understanding and correct evaluation of the way of life and traditions peculiar to each people," particularly as the shariat regulates all aspects of a Muslim's life. (P.5) Islam bred passivity towards social injustice, hindered progress in every field, taught intolerance towards non-Muslim peoples and had a bad effect on the position of women.

The rise and spread of Islam

Sukhareva gives the usual Soviet account of how Islam arose in Arabia as a result of social and economic changes and was used as a banner for Arab conquest. The people of Central Asia fought against the imposition of Islam and there was more than one rising against the Arabs. Even after they were quelled, the people secretly practised their old rites but, "handed down from generation to generation, Islam, in 12 centuries of existence in Central Asia, became the ideology of the masses. Social oppression and the ignorance of the workers created the conditions for its supremacy." (P.14)

### The religious obligations of Muslims and Muslim ritual

Sukhareva describes the various Muslim obligations - prayers (namaz), the fast (ruza), the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) and payment of alms in the form of a property tax (ziakat) - and how they were observed in Uzbekistan in the last century. The prayers were very onerous for the working people and the upkeep of the large number of parish mosques was a heavy burden on them. The fast was injurious to health and often not observed by the clergy. The pilgrimage to Mecca was seldom performed owing to lack of funds or of religious ardour. Instead the Muslim clergy encouraged pilgrimages to local shrines (mazars) as they had a pecuniary interest in the prosperity of the latter and hoped they would increase their influence with the masses. As for the ziakat which was originally meant to go to the poor, it turned into a tribute exacted by the State, and other offerings went into the pockets of the clergy or the elders of craft guilds. Circumcision (sunnat) was taken over by Islam from ancient semitic tribes. In time it came to be regarded as a hygienic as well as a religious necessity and prevented friendship between Muslim and uncircumcized people who were regarded as unclean.

Sukhareva also describes how the various religious holidays were celebrated in Uzbekistan. Apart from Fridays these were the two big holidays of Ramazán and Kurban-Bayram, Muhammad's birthday (mavlud), which was celebrated particularly in Tashkent, and the New Year (nauruz) held in March according to the solar calendar. Nauruz was clearly of non-Muslim origin, having much in common with the Zoroastrian New Year celebrations. Though canonized by Central Asian Islam there was a trend at the end of the 19th century to replace it by the more orthodox mavlud.

### Islamic mythology and survivals of ancient beliefs

"The mythology of Islam included the most diverse elements: Muslim legends about Muhammad, his family and associates; biblical myths borrowed from Judaism and Christianity; and ancient beliefs which took on Muslim dress." Sukhareva says that in Central Asia the figure of Muhammad was popular mainly in clerical circles. The figures of Ali, Hasan and Husain, "closely linked with local religious traditions and mythology", were much more vivid. Ali was regarded as a defender against enemies and though Ismailism and Shiism which deified Ali was banned at the end of the 10th century, Ali's name continued to be invoked in later centuries. The rites attached to the worship of Hasan and Husain in Central Asia make it clear that it was connected both with the local ancient cult of a "dying god" and also with the ancient universal cult of twin deities, since against general Muslim tradition they were regarded as twins in Central Asia. The Bible patriarchs were

revered in Central Asia was the patrons of certain professions, for example, Adam of the tillers of the soil, Noah of carpenters. A cult was devoted to each patron and the religious element was dominant in the guild charters. Another important belief among the Muslims of Uzbekistan was that a man has two souls: one (jan) goes straight to Allah on death but the second (ruh) hovers near the grave and requires sacrifices and prayers. This idea is connected with the cult of ancestors.

The cult of saints occupied a big place in Islam. In Uzbekistan their numerous shrines were known under the general name of mazar (literally: place of worship) or auliye (holy). Sukhareva divides mazars into the following categories according to their origin: (a) those going back to ancient nature-worship though later connected with the names of Muslim saints, e.g. piles of stones, stones of unusual shape, whole rocks, caves, curative springs and ancient trees. "Many of these mazars were connected with mythical names, e.g. "holy Job" (curative springs), King Solomon (rock throne) and especially Ali (the imprint of his hand or foot on a stone, or a cleft or valley said to have appeared at a blow from his sword); (b) the numerous places in Central Asia called mashhad. Sukhareva connects these with the same ancient cult of "suffering deities" as appeared in the cult of Hasan and Husain. In Samarkand the ancient myth was transferred to the imaginary Qusam ibn Abbas worshipped at the Shah-i-Zinda mazar, and from the nature of the non-Islamic rites performed at the mazar of Hoja Bahauddin Nakshbandi in Bukhara it is clear that it also goes back to the same ancient cult. Islam was forced to recognize these ancient shrines with their centuries-old traditions. On their sites, which were often surrounded by cemeteries, new mazars arose which were the real or more often imaginary graves of Muslim "saints", and their cult included rites connected with the old pre-Muslim holy place; (c) the graves of historical persons - poets like Rudaki, kings such as Ismail Samanid in Bukhara, and most often Sufi ishans (heads of Sufi orders);\* (d) imaginary graves of "saints" of comparatively recent origin. These included those discovered by fortune-tellers and by people who saw how profitable they could be.

"The influence of mazars on the way of life of the population of Uzbekistan, as of Central Asia as a whole, was great not only because the people, powerless in the fight against illness, were forced to turn to false methods of cure but also because the mazars were established, supported and popularized by the clergy and the rulers." (P.39) Timur,

\* The word ishan is the honorific use of the third person plural of the Persian personal pronoun as an attribute or title of a sheikh or murshid, words with which it is virtually synonymous.

for instance, built up the Shah-i-Zinda, and some sheikhs (guardians of mazars) spared no efforts to improve their mazars to encourage pilgrims. "Despite the incompatibility of the cult of saints and mazars with Islam, the worship of saints and mazars became an established part of Central Asian Muhammadanism. It was born of the cultural backwardness of the population and, supported by official religion, in its turn reinforced that backwardness, sanctifying the performance of absurd rites, filling people with unrealizable hopes in the assistance of supernatural forces and giving an enormous army of parasitic sheikhs the opportunity of living at the expense of the working people." (P.40)

"Certain survivals of ancient beliefs and cults underwent substantial Islamization", Sukhareva continues. These included the cult of chihil tan (40 secret just men), and of the female deities Bibi-Seshanbe and Bibi-Mushkilikushayi who were turned into saints. As among other Muslims, animistic ideas were preserved among the Uzbeks, particularly the belief in paris (fairies). Persons chosen by paris had to become shamans and perform shaman rites of which the main one was kamlaniye ("driving out" evil spirits in a state of ecstasy). In most areas of Uzbekistan by the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries only women were shamans. Some shamans who were mentally deranged genuinely believed in their calling but others became professionals and made a good income from it. They tried to give their protecting spirit a Muslim aspect such as an ishan or mulla, and in fortune-telling used a religious book or beads instead of the usual shaman tambourine. Belief in magic, witchcraft, the evil eye and charms was also widespread. "Survivals of ancient cults existed under the cover of Islam and acquired a Muslim aspect by the inclusion in exorcisms and appeals to the spirits of the name of Allah" etc. (P.44)

### Sufiism

Sukhareva says that Sufiism has undergone changes since it arose in Iraq in the 9th century and the forms it took in individual countries have not been sufficiently studied. Originally it was a "protest against official religion and rejection of its ritual, which was progressive for its time". It was responsible for poetry of great artistic achievement which sometimes goes as far as atheism and has nothing in common with the bigoted narrow-mindedness supported and propagated by orthodox Islam. "At the same time reactionary elements developed in Sufiism based on denial of the dominant role of reason and complete abandonment of one's will which opened the way to the most out and out obscurantism." This was seen in the demand that a novice (murid) should submit himself unconditionally to his spiritual director (pir or murshid).

"A characteristic feature of Sufiism. . . is its extreme syncretism, a combination of elements of very varied origin (from orthodox Islam and various philosophic systems to modified elements of ancient cults)." Sukhareva says that the elements of ancient cults, "taking on new life in Sufiism, have been preserved till the present day and wherever they appear - in the Soviet East in the guise of survivals, or in countries in which Islam is the state religion - they have a reactionary significance and drag the followers of Sufiism backwards to ideas, emotions and actions going back to the primitivism of primitive religions."

Sukhareva finds clear links between Sufiism and shamanism. "Analysis shows a genetic kinship between one of the ideals lying at the basis of Sufi philosophy and the ideology of shamanism", namely the idea of sexual ties with the other world expressed as mystical union in Sufiism, and the "relationship between Sufi ritual and kamlaniye is no less clear." (P.50) Like kamlaniye the Sufi zikh leads to a state of ecstasy. But while shamanism influenced Sufiism, Sufiism had a powerful effect on surviving forms of shamanism and Allah's name was invoked during kamlaniye.

Sukhareva then describes how Sufiism broke up into a number of different orders and their offshoots which by the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries had little link with the original Sufi orders. "Sufiism turned into Ishanism - each major ishan was, in effect, the initiator of a separate order headed as a rule by descendants of its founder. The fragmentation of the Sufi orders. . . corresponded exactly to the fragmentation typical of the late stages of feudalism." Sukhareva names the leading Sufi orders in Uzbekistan, to which women also belonged. The only order which required its members to wear distinctive clothes and abandon their normal way of life was the Kalandars, an order of mendicant dervishes founded in the 18th century. Their clothing was very reminiscent of shaman costume, particularly Siberian.

"The syncretism of Sufiism facilitated. . . its dissemination among the various classes of a feudal society. Among the ruling classes membership of a Sufi order was considered a sign of good form" and Sufis fought for the honour of becoming the spiritual adviser of an emir or khan. Among the educated it "took on the character of a refined literary and philosophical movement". Sufi orders also embraced broad sections of the ordinary people. "Sufiism was particularly widespread among the Uzbek tribes, semi-nomadic in the recent past, due to the fact that shamanistic survivals were very strong among them and consequently those elements of Sufiism which go back to the ancient cults found favourable soil here."

Sukhareva concludes that "the appearance of Sufiism marked an important stage in the history of Islam. Muhammadanism introduced by

force. . . and alien to the people. . . drew nearer to the ancient beliefs rooted in local traditions with the aid of Sufiism. This allowed Islam to penetrate deeply into popular life. Sufiism was a convenient weapon for the spiritual enslavement of the masses and for subordinating them to that class system of which Islam was the ideology." By the second half of the 19th century Sufiism "was the most reactionary trend of Islam. In it religious ideology took on the crudest and most primitive forms of out and out obscurantism, in it the most backward and barbaric rites were practised and the most despicable means of spiritual enslavement of the people were applied, poisoning them with the poison of religious dope and using 'spiritual directors' for fleecing the workers." (Pp.57-58)

### The Muslim clergy and ministers of surviving cults

After Islam finally triumphed in Central Asia there was no religious struggle for many centuries and the "army" of orthodox Muslim clergy lived peaceably with the Sufis, shamans and sorcerers. Sukhareva describes first the official Muslim clergy, and their functions. The imams, and the higher clergy in particular, enjoyed substantial incomes from the waqf lands and the imams also received payments in cash and kind for services to their parishioners. The lawyers (mufti) and judges (kazi) of the shariat courts, and the teachers of the maktab and medrese (primary and higher mosque schools) were also members of the clergy. "The kazi court was a class institution and the peculiarities of Muslim law. . . gave the kazi the wide possibility of defending the interests of the rich and noble," while the education in the schools was poor and the medreses were virtually closed to ordinary people.

The numerous Sufi clergy were closely connected with official religion and sometimes attached to mosques where they held public zikrs after the Friday prayers. Despite the bitter rivalry between the orthodox and Sufi clergy for influence over the masses and the powerful of this world (and in the final analysis for income), there was no conflict between Islam and Sufiism and they supported one another. The ishans not only had spiritual power over their murids but were entitled to a share of their income. At harvest time they went to the villages to exact their due and the peasant murids were too frightened of the consequences to refuse even unreasonable demands made by the ishans. "The power of the ishan over the murids and their incomes, based on ideological pressure, was an expression of the non-economic compulsion which was one of the characteristic features of feudalism." (P.65)

The sheikhs formed a special category among the clergy. Often they claimed descent from the person buried in the mazar. At the major mazars the offerings constituted a large income, but at such mazars there were usually many sheikhs to fight over it. The sheikhs also drew incomes

from any waqf property belonging to their mazars.

In addition to the Muslim clergy there were as many if not more sorcerers, soothsayers, shamans and magicians of all kinds who made a good income from the ignorance of the masses and in every way supported backward ideas.

"The numerous ministers of cults, in particular the Muslim clergy, kept the people in spiritual slavery and in faith and truth served the ruling class, defending also their own class interests. The army of the clergy opposed anything new and progressive and was the main bulwark of feudal reaction." This was particularly true in Bukhara and Khiva. But popular sayings and folklore show that the people realized that the clergy, and the ishans in particular, often acted from mercenary motives. (P.68)

#### The use of religious ideology by the exploiter classes

Sukhareva says that the shameless exploitation of the peasant farmers and poor craftsmen in Uzbekistan was justified by religion and in the khanates religion and State authority were in complete accord. The higher clergy were big landowners and occupied State posts. The colonial authorities of Turkestan also used Islam to halt the spread of progressive ideas. However, although the Tsarist Government supported Islam in its own interests, the more important Muslim clergy, fearing a loss of their power with the disappearance of the khanates, were against Russian rule and were behind many revolts against the Russians. The colonial authorities pursued a policy of non-intervention in Muslim affairs until the Andizhan revolt of 1898 demonstrated that this was short-sighted and dangerous, and the administration began to take a greater interest in Muslim institutions. "The 1905-1907 revolution showed the Russian colonialists that Muslim reactionaries were essentially their allies." At the same time they kept a good eye on them as panislamic ideas spread. However, there were already signs of a decline in the importance of Islam under the effect of Russian democratic culture and the incipient revolutionary movement.

#### Changes in the way of life of the masses after Central Asia was joined to Russia

The clergy and fanatics were against any form of change even in minor matters of dress and food, but, as a result of the economic and cultural development of Uzbekistan, rapid changes took place such as the introduction of machinery.

Islam in Uzbekistan after the Great October Socialist Revolution

Sukhareva's account of the hostile attitude of the Muslim clergy to the Revolution and the change it underwent when they realized the success of the Soviet regime follows the lines of Kuliyeu's. She concludes by saying that "the majority of Uzbeks have begun to give up observing the harmful old customs. However, not a few continue to perform religious rites and, what is worse, force their children to follow their example." (P.81) These practices include the fast, circumcision, religious marriage rites, concealed forms of kalym, funeral feasts, offerings at mazars, the shaman rite of kamlaniye, fortune-telling, isolation of womenfolk and occasionally polygamy. The family events - circumcision, marriage and funeral feasts - are very costly but few have the courage to go against tradition.

New edition of Ferdausi's works

A nine-volume edition of the complete works of "the great Tadzhik writer", Ferdausi, has been completed by Tadzhik orientalists. At the same time a monograph of the work of Khoja Kirmani, a poet and thinker of the 13th century, will also be published. PR. 11.1.62

Boosting modern agricultural methods in Kazakhstan

A new publishing house called Kazsel'khozgiz, working under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, is to be set up in Kazakhstan. In addition to the publication of scientific and technical literature on agriculture, Kazsel'khozgiz is to publish pamphlets popularizing the achievements of modern agricultural methods as practiced in kolkhozes and sovkhazes. KP. 4.3.62

## S O U R C E S   O F   T U R K M E N   F O L K L O R E

The following is a summary of an article by Kh. Kor-Ogly, "Osnovnyye Kul'turnyye Traditsii v Turkmenskoy Fol'klore" in VESTNIK ISTORII MIROVOY KUL'TURY of July-August 1961, based on oriental source material and a number of secondary works, both Russian and foreign.

. . .

Introduction

In the oral poetry of the Turkmens two trends are strongly pronounced: Persian and Oguz Turkic. The first is peculiar mainly to epics (destan and fable) but it occurs also in proverbs and ceremonial and seasonal songs. The Oguz Turkic element is found in almost all genres of folk literature and is particularly obvious in lyrical songs and the epos.

This double source of Turkmen folklore is due to the origin of the Turkmens, going back to the indigenous agricultural and cattle breeding tribes who were Iranized at the turn of the 2nd millennium B.C. In the 8th century B.C. northern Turkmenistan was inhabited by the Saki, Dakhi and Massagets while its south-eastern and southern regions were occupied by the Hyrcanians and Margians. All these were Iranian peoples speaking Iranian languages up to the 9-10th centuries. In the 6th century, the period of the Turkish kaganate, a very large number of Turkic-speaking tribes moved to Turkmenistan from interior (Tsentral'naya) Asia. They constituted the second group in the formation of the Turkmen people.

In the 9-11th centuries Oguz tribes became predominant in Turkmenistan, where they mainly inhabited the Caspian shore and the delta of the Syr-Dar'ya and the terms "Turkmen" and "Oguz" were for a long time synonymous. In the 12th century and later the term "Turkmen" extended to cover tribes strongly intermingled with the Iranian population. Apparently, in the 10-11th centuries and maybe much earlier, the Turkic-speaking inhabitants of the steppe which had close links with the settled Tadzhik and Khorezmian population, was called Turkmen. This group lived on the borders of and within the Central

Asian agricultural area, and it included remnants of ancient Central Asian steppe tribes. Presumably the 10-11th century Turkmens differed from other Central Asian Turkic tribes in their well-developed agriculture, cultural affinity with the Tadzhiks, a language related to that of the Tadzhiks and Khorezmians, advanced feudalism and wide adherence to Islam.

### Iranian traditions

Almost nothing is known about the culture of the inhabitants of the Turkmen steppes in the pre-Islamic period. Zoroastrianism was professed in part of this territory: Khorezm and Parthian lands. Oral poetry and customs of the modern Turkmens preserve some traces of this religion. For example, in the 1920s the Yomuts of the Atrek on "black Wednesday" (Kara-Charshambe), and the Ali tribe of the Kaakha rayon on the Wednesday before New Year's Day (Alchyr-Charshambe), used to light bonfires in their villages before dark. Women with children in their arms jumped over the fire in order to be purified and get rid of all disease before the arrival of the New Year. The cult of purifying by fire is common among the Azerbaydzhani, Persians and Tadzhiks. Another ancient Iranian custom is telling fortunes on the night of nauruz (beginning of the vernal equinox) and singing seasonal (kalendarnyye) songs. Other seasonal songs have been lost as a result of the amalgamation of the indigenous population with the Turks, or their character was modified after conversion to Islam. Thus a song sung on the night before Ramazan in Turkmenistan is strikingly similar to an Azerbaydzhani nauruz song, the former being originally a nauruz song as well. The Turkmen version runs:

"Let your black yurt turn into a house,  
And let a wedding be celebrated in your house.  
Let a son be born to him that gives more  
Let a daughter be born to him that gives less."

The Azerbaydzhani version is:

"Pleasant evenings have come,  
[Let God give] a son to him who gives,  
To him who gives not [let God give] a daughter." (P.58)

Traces of the ancient beliefs of the population of the Turkmen steppes are preserved in the Turkmen fantastic epics whose characters are often evil spirits - the divs, azhdahas and sometimes peris. Among the Turkmens, however, these Iranian spirits have assumed quite a different character. They also appear in destan (tales) with fantastic subjects. The divs are represented as evil and at the same

time good spirits. This may be due to the fact that the ancient population of Turkmenistan regarded the divs as gods and subsequently, under Zoroastrian influence, they came to be regarded as evil. A 5th century B.C. Persian inscription enumerating the countries subject to Xerxes declares, "Among these countries was one where the divs were worshipped before. Then, by order of Ahuramazda, I have destroyed that haunt of the divs and announced, 'Do not worship the divs'. There, where the divs used to be worshipped I have introduced the cult of Ahuramazda and the heavenly Arta." (P.58)

The magic bird Simurg, a good genius in disguise, is another Iranian survival in Turkmen folklore. Another such trace is the motive of struggle between good and evil found in all Turkmen destans and fables. Their typical feature is that in the duel between man and an evil being the former always wins. Such a belief in human power was peculiar to the Scythians who played a part in the formation of the Turkmen nationality, and was also found in Zoroastrianism.

Iranian elements in Turkmen folklore were native to the Turkmen steppes before the Oguz migration and not imported from Persia. Thus divs occur not only in literature, which could be ascribed to Persian influence, but also in songs and spells - divs are driven out of the insane with the help of an appropriate spell "white div, black div".

### Turkic traditions

Oguz Turkic elements are predominant in Turkmen folklore. These ancient Turks had a well developed epos. A poem about Oguz Khan was translated from Turkic into Persian in the 6th century and in the 13th century a poem "Oguz-name" was recited by bards of the Oguz Turks. The existence of a heroic epic OGUZ-NAME among the Oguz inhabiting the Caspian shore was recorded in the 17th century by a Khivan khan, Abul Ghazi in his GENEALOGY OF THE TURKMENS. He says: "Many years after that Turkmen mullas, sheiks and beks heard that I knew history well. And lo! once they came all to me and said: 'Our people have many various records of the tale about Oguz (Oguz-name), but not one of them good. They are full of errors and contradict one another, each of them being different'. And then they made this request: 'It would be good if there was one correct and reliable story'. I complied with their request." (P.59)

An ancient Turkmen epic is mentioned also by Ferdousi in the SHAH-NAME. He gathered materials for this poem from old Persian sources including the KHVADAY-NAMAK compiled by Zoroastrian priests from ancient legends, and stories preserved by a wise old man of Merv, Azad-Sarv. (Pp.59-60)

Much information on ancient Turkmen legends is provided by literature in other Turkic languages. One of such sources is the KITABI DADA KORKUT epic describing events in the Caucasus, but some legends it includes refer to the period when Oguz tribes lived on the floodlands of the Syr-Dar'ya and the Aral shore. Korkut himself is a legendary hero; there was a Korkut-ibn-Abul Hamid who was the head of a group of Oguz tribes. The name Korkut is very ancient and he is mentioned in the 7th century legends, a period when the Oguz tribes were still concentrated in Central Asia.

Epic legends were abundant in the ancient period and they inspired subsequently numerous poems whose final forms did not appear until the 16-17th centuries when the Oguz migration was almost over. During that period the Oguz settled in large numbers on the Caucasian Plateau and Asia Minor.

The Oguz Turkic contribution to Turkmen folklore includes also a very large number of songs which are still extremely popular.

#### Pre-Islamic traditions

Pre-Islamic religions followed by the Oguz (shamanism, Buddhism and Christianity) have left very little trace in Turkmen folklore. The ceremony of driving away an "impure power" from an insane man is a shamanistic survival. Porkhan is sung with music; its text usually comes from works of classical authors like Navoi, but it ends with an address to the divs. Another trace of shamanism and dualistic beliefs is the worship of ancestors; a rule that a Turkmen women must not leave her kibitka at night and that she must not stand under a tree where a bonfire has been or where bread has been baked and cattle slaughtered, for at night such places are haunted by evil spirits which can make her ill or insane. These spirits, al or arvah, are responsible for misfortunes occurring to women in childbirth and to children, as well as for epidemic diseases and cattle plague. The only way to pacify them is to give food to the poor, hold funeral feasts in memory of the dead etc.

Christianity has left very little trace in Turkmen folklore. Khyzyra (Khizra) or Khydyr Il'yas who figures in fantastic fables and poems is sometimes regarded as the Elias of the Bible, though in fact "folk legends adopted this name several centuries before Christianity" [sic]. (P.61)

#### Islamic traditions

The influence of Islam is very considerable, although as a religion it has never been so strong among the Turkmen as among the

settled peoples. Ali, the first imam of the Shiites, is an important figure in folk literature, though he is represented there not so much as a religious symbol but rather as a people's hero who always protected the weak and fought against evil. Muslim religious literature also gave Turkmen folklore such characters as the first caliphs, though they figure in it much less prominently than Ali. Mansur Hallaj and an Azerbaydzhani poet, Nasimi, became popular owing to their opposition to official Muslim dogma, and their demands for religious reform and "democratization" of Islam. Muslim jinns took their place in folk literature beside Persian divs.

The main contribution of Islam to Turkmen folk literature was ideological: pessimism, a sense of the transitory character of the world and Sufi mysticism. This ideology, foreign to the people, was propagated by those connected with religion; they created a literature of their own and spread it among the people. In this category belong poems like "Yusup-Ahmad" and "Aly-beg-Baly-beg", preaching war, seizure of other people's land and so oppression of other peoples under the pretext of war against the infidels; religious poems of the zikr and munajat type, religious aphorisms etc. At the same time Islam to some degree influenced genuine folk literature and gave a religious flavour to some works. Thus some proverbs and other folklore genres teach humility and patience which deprive the people of initiative even where personal happiness and well-being are concerned. They inspire non-resistance, a spirit of compromise, and hope in the intervention of some supreme power - God and fate.

### Other influences

Folk poetry always reflects a synthesis of various cultures which is particularly apparent in the case of Turkmen poetry. Many peoples passed through Central Asia as a result of wars, nomad migrations etc. all of which have left a trace in the culture of the indigenous population. The conquest of the region by Alexander the Great and the decline of his empire from which the Greco-Bactrian state in Central Asia emerged, created a culture described as oriental Hellenism which influenced the culture of the eastern peoples including the Turkmens. Although such influences affected first of all the dominant peoples who created Persian-Arab culture, they penetrated also into Turkmen culture, particularly into fables and poems. Even in the period when Islam was supreme, Greek influence continued through Arab literature. Christian Arabs translated into Arabic Greek works on history and philosophy as well as Greek literature, which promoted the spread of Greek culture also outside the Arab world. The names of Greek philosophers entered not only Turkmen literature but also folklore: Eplaton - Plato, Sugrat - Socrates, etc. Platonism helped mysticism to reach folklore

through literature and some "legends" from the Old and New Testament, like the story of Joseph the Fair, Moses etc. became part of Turkmen folk literature.

Close relations with the Persians, Tadzhihs, Afghans, Indians and Arabs have left more perceptible traces in Turkmen folklore, particularly in the epics, proverbs and sayings. For example, the tales about a parrot are derived probably from the work of a Central Asian, Ziya-ad-din Nakhshabi (Nakhshab - medieval name of Karshi in Uzbekistan) who lived in Delhi and in 1330 translated from Sanskrit into Persian a collection of fables, SHUKASAPTATI ("Seventy Tales of a Parrot"). This collection subsequently became very popular in Central Asia.

Many tales entered Turkmen folklore directly or through the literatures of neighbouring peoples, for example, from various Indian collections, like KALILA I [and?] DIMNA, often believed to have been compiled by Rudaki from Indian tales about animals. Many anecdotes connected with an Arab 7th century poet, Hatim at-Ta'i, are part of Turkmen folklore and stories from the THOUSAND AND ONE NIGHTS are very popular with the Turkmens; some of them are embodied in folk poems.

Uzbek influence is also strong in Turkmen folk literature. This is true particularly of the anecdotes and aphorisms ascribed to the Timurid Sultan-Husein Baykara (1469-1506) and Navoi (c.1440-1500). Azerbaydzhani and Turkmen songs and fantastic epics are closely related; the majority of these songs have a common origin, their melodies and the way they are performed are very similar, while in form many of them are identical, such as the seasonal and ceremonial songs. Ritual fortune telling is accompanied in Turkmenistan and Azerbaydzhan with almost identical songs; it is done by girls on the Nauruz night. Turkmen and Azerbaydzhani love and lyrical poems and heroic epics show even closer affinities, like KER-OGLY (Kör Ogly) and GEROGLY. Almost every Turkmen poem of this type has a parallel in Azerbaydzhan. The action of many of them takes place in the Caucasus or in Azerbaydzhan, which testifies to the close relations between the two peoples. Moreover, in many of them even all the words correspond. It is difficult to decide to which nation these poems owe their origin, which is sometimes ascribed to the Oguz who later amalgamated with both the Turkmens and Azerbaydzhani, while the early Oguz were "basically Turkmen". (P.65) Thus the poems might well have been brought by the Oguz to the countries where they settled.

Such are the origins of Turkmen folklore which absorbed not only the traditions of the peoples from whom the modern Turkmens are descended, but also a good deal of the folklore of the neighbouring nations. The numerous sources of Turkmen folklore reflect the stages in the formation of the Turkmen people.

THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS AND THE  
XXIIND PARTY CONGRESS:

REACTIONS TO THE PERSONALITY CULT AND THE ANTI-PARTY GROUP

During November 1961 meetings of the Republican Party aktivs of Azerbaydzhan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan, and of the Alma-Ata and Tashkent City and Oblast Party aktivs were held to discuss the results of the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU which had taken place in the previous month. At all the meetings the renewed condemnation of the cult of Stalin's personality and the activity of the anti-Party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others, which took up so much time at the XXIInd Congress, were brought up, but, judging from local press reports of the meetings, there were certain differences in treatment in the various republics.

The First Secretary of the Tadzhik Party, D. Rasulov, contented himself with explaining why these questions had been brought up again at the Congress. This was because it was important that everyone should know the harm done by the personality cult and because Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, the leaders of the anti-Party group "who bear personal responsibility for many mass repressions", had continued to oppose Party policy even after they had been routed at the June 1957 Plenum. (KT. 25.11.61) Another republic in which these questions were discussed in only the most general terms was Uzbekistan, where the First Secretary, Sh.R. Rashidov, put the emphasis on the improvements in every sphere since the condemnation of the personality cult at the XXth Congress. (PV. 22.11.61)

Similarly in Kirgizia the First Secretary, T. Usubaliyev, confined himself to an account of why the matters were brought up at the XXIInd Congress and made no reference to any direct harm done to the republic as a result of the personality cult or the activities of the anti-Party group. However, A. Tokombayev, Secretary of the Frunze City Party Committee, revealed that Shepilov, one of the members of the anti-Party group who had been sent to Frunze as director of the Institute of Economics of the Republican Academy of Sciences, had been subsequently demoted to deputy director. Instead of taking "the opportunity to earn the forgiveness of the Party and the nation by honest work. . . for two years he has virtually not worked and has sought cheap authority by various means." (SK. 28.11.61)

In the other three republics references were made to the damage done to them as a result of the personality cult, though in Kazakhstan no names of victims were given. The very condensed report of the speech of D.A. Kunayev, First Secretary of Kazakhstan, contained only a passing reference to the personality cult but O.A. Baykonurov, rector of the Kazakh Polytechnical Institute, "noted what a ruinous effect the personality cult had had on the development of culture in Kazakhstan and on the training of technical personnel for the Republic's industries". Z.D. Shashkin, secretary of the Party Organization of the Kazakh Union of Writers, said its effects were still to be found among writers in the republic in "intolerance of criticism, the megalomania with which many young poets are infected, and the cliquishness existing in Kazakh literary circles". A.A. Arstanbekov, Chairman of the Kazakh Committee of State Security, spoke of "the careerists who esconced themselves in the organs of the republican NKVD in the years 1937-8 and who, for the sake of their own well-being, abused their authority, sowed suspicion and distrust towards people and did all they could to arrest as many prominent honest leaders and rank and file Communists as possible. Enormous harm was done to the young Kazakh republic; it lost the best trained personnel in many fields of the national economy." Arstanbekov assured the meeting that "after the exposure of the cult of Stalin's personality and of the hostile activity of Beriya the organs of State security were strengthened with politically mature and well-trained personnel experienced in Party and soviet work" and purged of "careerists and infringers of socialist legality". "In recent years. . . there has not been one case of infringement of the laws." (KP. 11.11.61)

"The memory of a number of Party and soviet officials of Turkmenistan who were repressed in the period of the personality cult cries out to the conscience of the participants of the anti-Party group," said B. Ovezov, First Secretary of the Turkmen Party, at the meeting of the republican Party aktiv. He went on to list some of those unjustly condemned and shot during this period: K.S. Atabayev, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars; N. Aytakov, Chairman of the Turkmen Central Executive Committee; Batyr Atayev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Control Commission of the Republican RDI; Annumukhamedov, Chary Velikov and Khan Atamyshev, Secretaries of the Turkmen Central Committee; Dovlet Mamedov, People's Commissar of Education; K. Kuliyeu, People's Commissar of Social Security; B. Mukhammedov, Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan with the USSR Government; and D. Khalmuradov, Niyazov and Soltanniyazov, heads of department of the Turkmen Central Committee. Among the many prominent figures of science, literature and art who were repressed and have now been rehabilitated were: Oraz Tashnazarov, chief editor of SOVET TURKMENISTANY; Khodzha Nepes Charyyev, chairman of the Union of Writers;

Mered Aliyev, chief editor of the Turkmen State Publishing House; and Petr Grigor'yevich Galuzo, rector of the Turkmen Higher Communist Agricultural School. (TI. 24.11.61)

A vivid account of the atrocities committed by Bagirov, former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan who was tried in April 1956 and executed, was given at the meeting of the Azerbaydzhani Party aktiv by the First Secretary, V.Yu. Akhundov. He said that "the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality can best be understood from the example of our republic. The events which took place before our very eyes, which concerned people known to us and which painfully affected many, many families allow a fuller realization of all that is connected with the personality cult. In Azerbaydzhan acts of the grossest tyranny and lawlessness. . . were carried out by the political scoundrel Bagirov and his gang" who were "close and active accomplices of the inveterate enemy and adventurist Beriya". "The Azerbaydzhan Party organization suffered great losses. Among those innocently shot and posthumously rehabilitated were such prominent figures as Rukhulla Akhundov, Ali Geydar Karayev, Dadash Buniyatzade, Gazanfar Musabekov, Sultan Medzhid Efendiyev, Levon Mirzoyan, Mirza Davud Guseynov, Gamid Sultanov and many other true sons of the Leninist Party who had been through the school of the revolutionary struggle in the ranks of the glorious Baku proletariat." Akhundov said that "many outstanding writers, artists, scientists, industrial and agricultural specialists, workers, kolkhozniks and others were subjected to persecution, arrest and physical annihilation with the knowledge and on the direct orders of Bagirov". The outstanding scholar Geydar Guseynov was driven to suicide by Bagirov's threats because he had not made Bagirov the author of his work on 19th century social and philosophical thought in Azerbaydzhan. To emphasise the scale of the terror Akhundov gave examples of Bagirov and his assistants, Sumbatov and Borshchev, carrying out arrests by lists. He also quoted letters showing that, despite dreadful brutalities, many innocent people kept their courage, rejected the charges against them and wrote to Stalin to declare their innocence. One such was Ali Geydar Karayev "whose indictment included the allegation that in his book IZ NEDALEKOGO PROSHLOGO (From the Recent Past) he had completely ignored Stalin's historic role as the founder and leader of Transcaucasian Bolshevik organizations," and another was Rizayev, the former chairman of the GPU, who assured Stalin that "the shady activities of Bagirov and Sumbatov. . . will sooner or later be uncovered by the Central Committee of our Party." Both were shot. One of the other speakers at the meeting in Azerbaydzhan was the veteran Bolshevik M.K. Veysov who had himself been a victim of the cult of personality. (Br. 30.11.61)

Of those mentioned by Akhundov as victims of Bagirov's purges, D. Buniyatzade, Geydar Guseynov and Rizayev were not named in the account of Bagirov's trial given in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 27.5.56, nor was Sumbatov listed among the persons tried with him. Akhundov's speech provides the first information that Geydar Guseynov was driven to suicide. In 1949 he was awarded a Stalin Prize for his book, but this was taken away the following year because of his positive evaluation of the Caucasian national hero, Shamil.

On the question of the expulsion of the anti-Party group from the Party, the six republics differed. Four - Azerbaydzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan - supported demands for their expulsion while two - Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan - limited themselves to strong condemnation of their activities. None of the accounts of the meetings in the six republics mentioned any specific crimes in which members of the anti-Party group had been involved in these republics, though such crimes have been quoted in other republics.

### Getting to know Kirgiz culture

This year the many different sides of Kirgiz culture will be exhibited not only in Kirgizia but in the neighbouring Central Asian republics. In March there will be a joint exhibition of Kirgiz and Kazakh graphic artists in Alma-Ata, and in April on "Artists Day", an exhibition of Kirgiz and Uzbek book-illustrators will be opened in Frunze and Tashkent. An exhibition entitled "Impressions from Abroad" will be opened in the Kirgiz capital in May. It is planned to hold an exhibition of Kirgiz fine arts in Dushanbe (Stalinabad) in June, to be followed by a week of "Tadzhik fine arts" in Frunze in July. Finally, at the end of 1962 there will be an exhibition in Frunze covering every field of art in the republic, to be called "Kirgizia Today".

PR. 11.1.62

T R A N S P O R T    I N    A Z E R B A Y D Z H A N

The present article, which is largely based on reports in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY from January 1960 to October 1961, deals with the working of the transport services in Azerbaydzhan during that period. It is preceded by a general description of the main forms of transport in the republic. For the sake of consistency all sums of money are given in new rubles which were introduced on 1 January 1961 at the rate of one new ruble for 10 old rubles.

During the period under review the Caspian merchant fleet received a number of new tankers and cargo ships. The tankers, by far the most important part of the fleet, worked satisfactorily but the cargo ships consistently ran at a loss. The work of the railways was less satisfactory and in 1961 the head of the railways was replaced, apparently after a number of serious accidents. Many shortcomings were found in the work of the Ministry of Road Transport and an improvement was hoped for after the appointment of a new Minister in August 1961. From the few details available about the Civil Air Fleet it appears to be growing rapidly.

---

1. General Introduction - II. Railway Transport - III. Sea Transport - IV. River Transport - V. Road Transport - VI. Civil Aviation.

I. General Introduction

More than half Azerbaydzhan is mountainous with the Greater Caucasus in the north and the Lesser Caucasus and Karabakh range in the southwest. The centre and east of the republic are occupied by the Kura-Araks Depression. This conformation has had the inevitable effect on the development of land transport. The main railways run along the coast, north to Central Russia (Baku-Rostov) and south (Baku-Astara), and along the valleys of the Kura (Baku-Tbilisi) and the Araks (Baku-Dzhul'fa-Yerevan). The mountainous areas, on the other hand, depend almost entirely on road transport. The other geographical feature

which is of enormous importance for transport in Azerbaydzhan is the Caspian Sea which links Baku with Astrakhan' and the Volga, with Central Asia via Krasnovodsk, and with Persia.

The main forms of transport in Azerbaydzhan are rail and sea. The total length of the railways is more than 1,650 km. and the freight turnover in 1958 was 11.5 milliard tariff ton-kilometres. The heaviest goods traffic is on the Baku-Derbent line. Oil and oil products, machinery, cement, cotton and food products leave the republic by rail, while metal, coal, timber, motor vehicles, mineral fertilizers and other goods are brought in. The total length of the roads is 11,000 km., the main ones being Baku-Tbilisi, Baku-Astara, Yevlakh-Zakataly-Tbilisi and Yevlakh-Stepanakert. The Kura, from Yevlakh to its mouth, is the only navigable river in Azerbaydzhan. The river fleet serves the cotton-growing areas and the fish and oil industries, and the main wharves are at Yevlakh, Sabirabad, Ali-Bayramly and Sal'yany. Sea transport is very important for the republic. Baku has one of the biggest freight turnovers of any port in the USSR. Most of this is accounted for by oil and oil products which continue to be sent to Makhachkala and Astrakhan' despite the development of the huge Tatar and Bashkir oil fields which now send oil down the Volga to Makhachkala for refining at Groznyy. Timber is the main article brought down the Volga to Baku. At one time grain used to be sent to Central Asia from Baku via Krasnovodsk, but since the virgin lands were cultivated the grain traffic has been in the opposite direction. Other goods shipped from Krasnovodsk are cotton and agricultural machinery while mineral fertilizer, oil machinery, building materials, motor vehicles, consumer goods and fresh water are shipped from Baku to Krasnovodsk. The ports of Astara, Lenkoran' and Port Il'icha south of Baku have lost their significance as a result of the construction of roads and railways in those areas. Azerbaydzhan has air communications with many towns in the European part of the USSR and with Central Asia as well as internal air services. There is also an oil pipeline from Baku to Batumi on the Black Sea and gas is sent by pipeline from Karadag to Tbilisi and Yerevan.

## II. Railway Transport

### Electrification and modernization

There has been no major railway construction in Azerbaydzhan since 1941 when the Dzhul'fa and Astara lines were completed. New (unspecified) branch lines are being laid and are of particular importance for areas rich in minerals, according to the head of the railways. (BR. 6.8.61) In general, however, the emphasis is on electrification and modernization. Electrification of the Baku-Tbilisi line is due to be completed

by 1965. The section from Baladzhyary to Karadag was completed in June 1960 (BR. 21.6.60), and electric trains were running as far as Sangachal by June 1961. (BR. 9.6.61) In October 1961 it was reported that an electric train had just done the first trial run on the Sangachal-Duvanny section. (BR. 26.10.61) It was hoped to complete electrification as far as Alyat by the end of the year. (BR. 9.6.61) On the Apsheron peninsular, where the first electric trains in the Soviet Union started running in 1926, the newly-electrified Baglar-Bil'gya 11 km. section started to function on 6 November 1959 (BR. 7.11.59), and in April 1961 this line was being extended along the coast to Sumgait so as to form a second electric ring railway on the peninsular. (BR. 11.4.61) In addition to electrification, the Baladzhyary-Karadag section was equipped with an automatic block system and in the first half of 1960 work was in hand on the installation of a double-track automatic block system on other sections and a semi-automatic block system on the Alyaty-Glavnaya to Osmanly section. Work had been completed on the centralized electric points control at Baladzhyary, Kishly (near Baku) and Puta. (BR. 23.7.60) At present steam locomotives are in general use on Azerbaydzhan railways but they are due to disappear completely by 1965. Meanwhile, in anticipation of the early arrival of the first diesel engines, many engine drivers are learning how to drive them. (BR. 17.5.61, 18.5.61)

#### Efforts to increase traffic

Among the practical measures to increase the freight capacity of the railways are campaigns calling for the haulage of trains weighing more than the prescribed norm and for the tighter packing of such goods as cotton, grain and tobacco. The press has reported numerous successes in these campaigns. The heaviest train so far is one from Adzhikabul depot weighing 6,300 tons or nearly three times the norm. (BR. 16.5.61) In the first seven months of 1960 more than 20,000 heavyweight trains were despatched and about 4,000 wagons freed by tighter packing. (BR. 7.8.60) In April 1961 the average weight of trains was 300 tons above the standard, and in May 353 tons. (BR. 9.6.61) A competition to save fuel has been started at Baku and Baladzhyary depots. One engine crew saved almost 100 tons of mazut in the first ten months of 1960 and promised to drive two heavyweight trains a month on the fuel saved. Another crew had saved 130 tons by maintaining an even temperature in the fire-box which also brought economies in the replacement of fire-resistant bricks. The competition spread to other depots, but in November 1960 for the railway as a whole there was still a consumption of 4,000 tons of fuel above the plan. (BR. 29.11.60)

# COMMUNICATIONS IN AZERBAIDZHAN

15 0 15 30 45 60 75 Kms.

- Union frontier.
- Republican frontier.
- ==== Railways.
- ==== Electrified railways.
- ==== Main roads.
- ==== Minor roads.
- ..... Sea routes.





Baku Wagon Repair Workshops and Baladzharly Washing and Steaming Station

The work of both the Baku Wagon Repair Workshops and the Baladzharly Washing and Steaming Station were highly praised in the press. The Wagon Repair Workshops which regularly over-fulfilled its plan and consistently did well in all-Union competitions, was the first undertaking in Azerbaydzhan to be awarded the title of "Undertaking of Communist Labour" on 13 May 1960. (BR.14.5.60) The Baladzharly Washing Station, where oil cisterns are cleaned, was also later given this title.

Plan fulfilment and replacement of head of Railways

During the period under review the railways fulfilled the six-monthly and annual plans for the despatch of freight by between 99 and 105 per cent but invariably failed to fulfil the main indices for the use of rolling stock (average daily run of wagons, speed of trains and turn-round of wagons). The carriage of freight in 1959 was 14 per cent up on 1958, 1960's total was 17 per cent higher than 1959's and the plan for 1961 called for an increase of 12.2 per cent over 1960.

From these figures and the various reports in the press it appeared that the railways were working more or less satisfactorily when suddenly in June 1961 a long article spoke of "a drastic change" for the better in the work of the railways. Various quality indices were now being fulfilled, and time-tables observed, accidents had been reduced to nothing and paper work drastically cut. The head of the railways was personally visiting the depots and a new traffic safety inspector had been appointed with beneficial results since he concentrated on averting accidents rather than simply recording them. (BR. 9.6.61)

Later, at the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan in September 1961, the First Secretary, Akhundov, said that "in 1960 the Azerbaydzhan railways did not fulfil the plans for freight turnover, receipts or capital investment nor the plans for an increase in labour productivity and the lowering of costs, and committed a number of gross violations in the safety of movement of trains, in connexion with which the Central Committee was forced to change the railways' management." The position had since improved, he continued. Freight turnover was 11.6 per cent up on 1960 and certain quality indices had improved. But the railways were still not fulfilling the plans for the carriage of various classes of freight and "accidents and other violations which cause great material damage" had not stopped. (BR. 8.9.61) The Resolution adopted by the Congress stated that: "On the Azerbaydzhan railways the main quality index, the turn-round of wagons, is systematically not fulfilled, the time-table for the movement

of trains is not observed and the question of traffic safety is unsatisfactory. The electrification of the railway and development of the line are proceeding very slowly." (BR. 13.9.61)

### Turn-round of wagons

Criticisms of delays in the turn-round of goods wagons recurred again and again in the press. A large part of the blame was put on industrial and trade organizations which preferred to pay large fines rather than collect their freight from railway stations, or load or unload it expeditiously at their own sidings. The Azerbaydzhan Kom-somol initiated a campaign in 1960 to speed up all loading operations on the railways, road and sea transport, which was copied in other republics. By June 1960 the loading and unloading of about 60,000 wagons had been speeded up (BR. 8.6.60), but in August figures for the turn-round of wagons still showed an excess of four hours over the prescribed time of return. (BR. 7.8.60) In October 1961 the situation was as bad as ever. Tens of thousands of wagons had been held up on industrial sidings since the beginning of 1961 and the total of fines paid by organizations for these delays and for not collecting their freight from railway stations was more than 1,000,000 rubles. More than 70 per cent of the fines were incurred on the Baku section of the railways. Criticism was made of the loading arrangements, and lack of mechanization and warehousing at a number of industrial sidings. At Khachmas, Goradiz, Yevlakh, Kirovabad and Udzhary stations in particular, unloaded timber, fertilizer, building materials, machinery and consumer goods are left in the open. The railways themselves pay little attention to mechanization of loading operations and at the major freight stations of Baku-Tovarnaya, Goradiz, Khachmas, Ali-Bayramly and Yevlakh there are no mechanized freight yards. At Baku-Tovarnaya not more than 10 per cent of loading operations are mechanized. Work on the mechanized freight yards at Kishly has been going on for four years, but so far only one section has been brought into operation and that is incomplete and has many defects. In one section of the Kishly yards work stops if there is a high wind. There is a grave shortage of storage capacity, loading platforms and warehouses on the railway. Railway workers should do more to collaborate with their customers and work out joint schemes of loading operations at stations. The railway regulations for fines should also be changed: at present the railway administration often turns fines into an aim in themselves and the customers are prepared to pay anything to be left in peace without thinking of the harm done to their undertaking's finances or to the transport system. (BR. 4.10.61)

### Passenger services

With the introduction of the summer time-table in 1960 a number of

improvements were announced in long-distance passenger trains from Baku. Trains to Moscow and Kiev were speeded up by approximately four hours each, through carriages to Lvov, Krasnodar, Leningrad, Nal'chik and Sochi were introduced and two new trains started to run, to Voronezh and Odessa. There were also improvements in the arrangements for the sale of tickets. (BR. 29.5.60) In June 1961 a special day express from Baku to Tbilisi on odd dates was introduced. The train has a new type of all-metal carriage with adjustable upholstered seats and a buffet. Similar expresses are soon to be introduced on the lines Baku-Astara and Baku-Derbent. (BR. 7.6.61, 9.6.61)

Baku and Dzhul'fa passenger stations are said to give good service to passengers. At Baku tickets can now be ordered by telephone six to eight days before departure and delivered to the passenger's home or place of work. (BR. 21.6.61) Baggage can also be collected from the house and there are four advance booking offices in the town. Passengers from Krasnovodsk wishing to continue their journey by rail from Baku can now buy their railway tickets at Krasnovodsk Marine Station and their luggage is brought to Baku station from the port for them. (BR. 6.8.61)

Attention to the passengers' comfort at other stations and on trains, however, seems to leave much to be desired and there are frequent calls for improvements in this field. One article complained that, while some train attendants gave excellent service, others were unshaven, slovenly-dressed and rude. They hired used bed-linen to the passengers and took bribes from those who had no tickets, and their carriages were dirty with little or no illumination, no curtains or tablecloths, and no tea or even drinking water. Some fine new stations had been built in recent years, particularly on the Baku-Yerevan line, but this was not enough when the staff were unhelpful. Often there were long queues for tickets because the booking offices were not opened at the right time, and seats were sold twice over. At Akstafa in the heat of summer there was a choice of sitting in the stuffy waiting room or standing under the trees outside because nobody would bring the benches from Kirovabad. At Alyaty-Glavnaya and Karadag passengers had to crawl under goods trains to reach the passenger trains. There were no arrangements for mothers and children arriving at night in Yevlakh, Kirovabad or Nakhichevan'. Newspaper kiosks rarely had the latest editions, service in the hairdressers was bad and there were no public telephones or cars for passengers at Alyaty, Sangachal, Yevlakh, Sal'yany and other stations. Buffets and restaurants were crowded, dirty and smoky. Spirits were readily available but no mineral water, and at Kirovabad station you could eat but you had to cross the square to the chaykana for a glass of tea. (BR. 31.7.60) These accusations were admitted to be true by the railway authorities and were drawn to the attention of all those connected with passenger

services. Three-day seminars were held for certain staff and other measures were taken. (BR. 27.8.60) In August 1960 a reader complained that although a station had been built at Dosta on the Baku-Yerevan line several months before, it had never been brought into use and passengers still had to clamber up into the trains from the line, which was so difficult that frequently many passengers were left behind. Meanwhile the station building was deteriorating; the walls were damp, grass was growing through the cracked asphalt of the platform and doors and windows were broken. (BR. 26.8.60) "Hares" (passengers without tickets) are apparently a common phenomenon on Azerbaydzhan railways and it is well known that the standard payment to the train attendants is half the normal fare. Some attendants even canvas for "hares" in the ticket queues. One attendant manages to carry up to 40 a trip. When the inspector comes tickets are borrowed from the next carriage or the inspector himself takes his cut for not inspecting the carriage. One attendant, by arrangement with the cashier, was given unpunched tickets which could then be used again at a good profit. Those caught are punished but soon reinstated in their old jobs and everything goes on as before. (BR. 8.4.61) As a result of these charges one attendant was given a year's prison sentence, others were sacked, transferred to other work or given stern warnings. (BR. 17.5.61)

There have also been complaints about the electric train services on the Apsheron peninsula. One reader said that services were irrational, several stations were in need of repair and the trains did not run according to the time-table. (BR. 18.12.60) The first of a weekly series of lectures on a train on the Apsheron ring railway was given on 9 October 1960. It was entitled "Technical Progress in the Seven-Year Plan" and earned the unanimous approval of the passengers. (BR. 11.10.60)

### III. Sea Transport

#### Additions to the fleet

Since the Caspian is shallow at the mouth of the Volga, in the past all freight had to be transferred to barges in the roads outside Astrakhan<sup>1</sup> for passage up river. To obviate this new ships built for Kaspar (Kaspiyskoye Parokhodstvo - the Caspian Steamship Agency) in recent years have been of shallow-draught construction. Six shallow-draught oil-tankers with a freight-carrying capacity of 4,300 tons have been constructed for Kaspar in Bulgaria. Two arrived in the Caspian in 1960 and a further three in the spring of 1961. The sixth was temporarily operating in the Black Sea in 1960. (BR. 28.10.60, 24.1.61, 18.5.61) In 1961 two new tankers for Baku were being built in Soviet

yards. (BR. 11.4.61)

A number of large new shallow-draught cotton and timber freighters were added to Kaspar's fleet in 1960 and 1961. Two had arrived by September 1960 and a further two were expected before the end of the year. (BR. 24.6.60, 14.9.60) Five new ones were expected in 1961: of these two had arrived by October and the remaining three were expected before navigation on the Volga was brought to a standstill. (BR. 3.10.61, 15.10.61) In September 1961 it was reported that one of these ships, the Shamkhor, had done a trial trip up the Volga as far as Kineshma and that from 1962 eight such ships will be taking cotton up the Volga and bringing back salt and timber. (BR. 6.9.61)

In the spring of 1960 the "Kirgizstan", the first of a series of new Soviet-built passenger ships for the Caspian, arrived in Baku and made its maiden voyage to Astrakhan' via Makhachkala on 13 June 1960. The ship is of modern design with the latest navigational aids and every comfort for the passengers. It also operates on the Baku-Krasnovodsk run. On 1 June 1961 the "Kirgizstan" started a direct express service to Astrakhan' from Baku. It takes only 36 hours to reach Astrakhan' and its arrival there is timed to connect with the Volga steamers. (BR. 4.6.60, 14.6.60, 24.5.61, 6.6.61) The "Tadzhikistan", a new cargo and passenger motor-driven ship built in Leningrad for the Caspian, was expected to arrive there at the end of November 1961. It is intended for the Baku-Astrakhan' and Baku-Krasnovodsk runs. (BR. 26.10.61) Another new passenger ship, the "Sulak", is also being built in the Soviet Union for the Caspian. (BR. 11.4.61)

### The "Soviet Azerbaydzhan"

The most important new project in hand is the construction of five enormous railway ferries to run from Baku to Krasnovodsk. They are being built in the Krasnoye Sormovo yards at Gor'kiy. All five are due to be completed by 1965 but the shipbuilders have promised to finish the job a year earlier. The first ferry, the "Soviet-Azerbaydzhan", was put on the stocks on 26 August 1960 and launched on 23 February 1961. It is 133.8 metres long, 18.3 metres wide and the hull is 6.2 metres high. It has a speed of 30 kilometres an hour and will take 30 50-ton 4-axle railway trucks in four rows and 300 passengers in the greatest comfort. There is remote control from the bridge and closed circuit television will be used in loading and unloading operations. The new ferry will double productivity and reduce transport costs by 30 per cent. It left Gor'kiy for the Caspian on 27 October 1961 and will go through its trials on arrival in the Caspian. (TI. 1.3.61, BR. 14.2.61, 31.3.61 and 31.10.61) Work on the

special quays that are being constructed for the ferry in Baku and Krasnovodsk is not going so well. In June 1961, although work had been going on on the quay in Baku for almost two and a half years, the plan had been fulfilled only 54 per cent and it was clear that the quay would not be ready by October as scheduled. (BR. 20.6.61) In September a warning was given that unless the pace of construction on the quays in both Baku and Krasnovodsk was forced the ferry's trials would be seriously interfered with. (BR. 24.9.61)

### Other new developments

After several years of experiments a "flexible tanker" has been produced. It consists of a large collapsible container of plastified polyamide, a new material, and will last several years. It can carry tens of thousands of tons of liquid and is hundreds of times lighter than a normal tanker. It is ideal for shallow waters and will not need ballast for the return trip, thus eliminating damage to fish reserves from oil-tainted water. The first "flexible tanker" filled with 1,000 tons of fresh water was to be towed from Baku to Krasnovodsk in 1961 and would be brought back folded up on the deck of the tug or in tow. It is anticipated that it will be followed by hundreds of others and that they will become the main means of transporting liquid goods. (BR. 12.4.61)

Plans have been worked out to convert the tanker, "Inzhener Aleksey Pustoshkin", into an experimental fully-automated vessel. The work will be carried out at the Zakfederatsiya Shipyards in Baku and will be completed in 1962. All operations will be controlled from panels on the bridge and in the engine room. Computers will make a collision impossible. The ship will need only half the normal crew. (BR. 27.6.61, 24.9.61)

### Plan fulfilment

Kaspar overfulfilled the plan for the transport of freight in 1959, 1960 and the first six months of 1961. Ships and ship repair yards gave a profit of 1,400,000 rubles above the plan in 1960. (BR. 31.3.61) But for a long time the cargo ships have been operating uneconomically, their losses being covered by profits from the tankers (BR. 31.3.61) and in 1960 the port workers and Vano Sturua Ship Repair Yards did not fulfil their plans. In the first half of 1961 the dredgers and Paris Commune Ship Repair Yards also fell behind. (BR. 4.7.61) There are frequent complaints of delays in the turn-round of ships; one instance was quoted of a large tanker lying idle for several days in full view of the main offices of Kaspar. (BR. 3.11.60) Other complaints are of delays in installing automatic steering on ships (Br. 3.11.60) and changing over to liquid gas as fuel. (BR. 4.7.61)

At the XXVth Azerbaydzhan Communist Party Congress in September 1961, Akhundov stated that the plan for the transport of freight by sea was being fulfilled with the assistance of the new additions to Kaspar's fleet. But Kaspar must see that every ship fulfils its plan, wage a resolute campaign against ships lying idle and eliminate losses on the cargo ships. It must also see to the ship repair yards whose work had gone down in 1961. (BR. 8.9.61)

### Abolition of Caspian Roads Steamship Agency

In 1960 three times as many goods were transported from Baku to the Volga and vice versa without transshipment in the roads outside Astrakhan' as in 1959 (BR. 1.12.60), and in 1961 one-third of the oil and oil products transported from the Caspian to the Volga or in the reverse direction were not transhipped. (BR. 24.9.61) Eventually all goods will go direct between the Caspian and Volga ports which will mean a saving of 1,100,000 rubles a year. (BR. 31.3.61) On 1 February 1961 it was announced that the USSR Ministry of Marine had abolished the Caspian Roads Steamship Agency. Henceforth all shipping on the Caspian will come under Kaspar which will have an Astrakhan' Directorate for the northern part of the sea. (BR. 1.2.61)

### Baku port

There have been a number of criticisms of the work of Baku port, mostly in connexion with the handling of grain shipments from Krasnovodsk. On the eve of the Kazakhstan harvest, both in 1960 and in 1961, complaints were made of insufficient preparation. There was a lack of liaison between the port workers and the railways, port installations were not in full working order and work on the weighing machines which had been dismantled for overhaul was proceeding very slowly. In 1960 a lot of the grain was transferred direct from the ships to the railway trucks, but the application of this efficient method of unloading was threatened in 1961 by the lack of a joint plan of action between the railways and the port, and the port's reluctance to do its own wagon shunting. (BR. 23.7.60, 20.6.61) As a result of a letter to PRAVDA in which the writer complained that there were huge piles of grain on the edge of the quay at Baku being eaten by the birds, carried away by the wind and lashed by the rain, and that he had personally seen the grain being used as ballast in the trials of a new cargo ship, a PRAVDA correspondent investigated the situation. His main conclusion was that the port, the railways and the Directorate of Grain Products were all partly responsible for the deplorable state of affairs which could be largely overcome if only they would coordinate their work instead of blaming each other. (P. 29.1.61) In August 1961 there were further complaints of goods lying around Baku port although it appeared to be a hive of activity. There were piles of salt and

timber on the wharves, and machinery waiting to be loaded was being ruined, while not less than 50 per cent of the ships were leaving empty. Baku port is largely dependent on the activity of Ashkhabad and the Azerbaydzhan railways. Ships were being held up in Krasnovodsk because of the irregular arrival of railway wagons, and to speed their turn-round Kaspar had decided not to load them in Baku. Kaspar tried to prove that this saved time but meanwhile the situation in the port was getting steadily worse and some goods had been lying there for months. Unloading was also badly organized. For show, the first grain ship of the season had been unloaded twice as fast as usual but the same day other large ships had been held up for over 13 hours. (BR.24.8.61) One project to relieve pressure on Baku port and the railways is the construction of a special wharf at Mill No.1 in Baku for which a large part of the grain is destined. Plans for constructing it were made in 1958, but for the first two years nothing was done and in the first half of 1960 only 3.7 per cent of the annual plan was fulfilled. (BR. 23.7.60) Construction is still proceeding extremely slowly and meanwhile the cost of transporting the grain from ships to the mill by rail in the last three years has exceeded the cost of the wharf. (BR.4.10.61)

In August 1960 it was announced that the first section of Baku timber harbour, the first timber harbour in the Caspian, had been completed a month ahead of schedule despite bad weather. (BR. 16.8.60) Later there was a complaint that the cranes there had been badly placed. (BR. 3.11.60)

### Ship repair yards

Mechanization has considerably increased productivity at the ship repair yards but there is still a lot to be done. Mechanization of the cleaning of oil tankers' tanks at the Zakfederatsiya yards has reduced heavy work by 80 per cent with an annual saving of 400,000 rubles. (BR. 31.3.61) The Paris Commune yards have been working on the replacement of bronze by kapron and polyethylene for all parts from valves, screws and taps to propellers. A polyethylene propeller has undergone successful trials on a tug. It is much cheaper and lighter than a metal propeller and incorrosible. Experiments are to be carried out on larger ships with a propeller with a metal shaft and plastic blades. (BR. 6.4.60, 10.5.61)

Because the Caspian is becoming shallower the dry docks at the ship repair yards are often partly out of use and unable to repair big tankers and other ships. Two large ferro-concrete floating docks have therefore been built in Kherson for Baku, one of 6,000 tons for the Zakfederatsiya yards and a slightly smaller one for the Paris Commune yards. They have the latest machinery with push-button control and a restaurant and showers for the workers. The one at the Zakfederatsiya yards went

into operation in the spring of 1960 and it was hoped that the assembly of the other (they were towed from the Black Sea in four sections) would be completed in November 1960. (BR. 4.6.60, 25.11.60)

#### IV. River Transport

The first four river buses arrived on the Kura in October 1959 and regular passenger services were started between Khilly and Severno-Vostochnyy Bank, Zardob and Otmanovaly, and Zardob and Pichakhchi. More than 70,000 passengers had been carried by September 1960 and more than 800,000 miles covered. Two new motor-driven river buses from Kherson arrived in the summer of 1960. These were the "Zardabi" and "Shirvani" with 92 soft and 47 hard places each. New routes were being opened from Yevlakh to Klyshdy, and Sal'yany to Khashimkhanly. At the same time four new cargo ships for the Kura River Fleet were ready at Baku to carry timber, stone, grain and other goods to Yevlakh. They carry 300 tons each at an average speed of 13.5 km. (BR. 17.9.60)

The Directorate of the River Fleet of Kaspar in Baku was abolished on 1 August 1961 and the same day a newly organized rayon directorate of Kaspar for river transport started work in Ali-Bayramly. (BR.28.7.61)

The only other reference to the work of river transport was in the Resolution of the XXVth Congress of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party which criticized Kaspar for not paying enough attention to the development of transport on the river Kura. (BR. 13.9.61)

#### V. Road Transport

##### Road construction and maintenance

Very little has appeared in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY concerning the construction of new roads or the condition of those in existence. From the fact that a considerable number of inter-urban bus services operate one can infer that the main roads at least are in tolerable condition, although one report stated that the service between Yevlakh and Isti-Su is frequently interrupted for several days by landslides. (BR. 5.7.60) At the Party Conference in February 1960 the First Secretary, Akhundov, said that in the last three or four years the construction of new roads had noticeably speeded up but that road construction was still a bottleneck in the republic's economy. Road maintenance was in a particularly bad way, he added. Kolkhozes should play a large part in the construction of local roads. (BR. 17.2.60) At the Vith Session of the Azerbaydzhan Supreme Soviet in December 1960 the Chairman of Gosplan said

that the 1961 plan provided for major repairs to local roads and for their extension. (BR. 30.12.60)

### Organization of road transport

One of the main faults of road transport in Azerbaydzhan is its excessive dispersal. In addition to the services run by the Ministry of Road Transport, nearly every organization had its own transport section. Frequent demands have been made to combine them into bigger, more economic, units but little has been done, and in July 1961 three quarters of all the haulage bases which came under the Sovnarkhoz still had only from one to 10 vehicles. Because of inadequate repair facilities such small bases drive their vehicles to death with consequent danger to traffic. (BR. 16.7.61) At the Party Congress in September, Akhundov announced that a decree had been drawn up which would hand over to the Ministry of Road Transport some of the vehicles and haulage bases of other ministries. (BR. 8.9.61)

### The Ministry of Road Transport

The work of the Ministry of Road Transport came under constant criticism in 1960 and 1961 and in September 1961 Akhundov announced that the Minister had been replaced. (BR. 8.9.61) The freight plan for 1960 was slightly overfulfilled but the plan for freight turnover in the first half of 1961 was not fulfilled and in neither period was the plan for the transport of passengers by bus fulfilled. (BR.2.2.61, 27.7.61) At the Vith Session of the Supreme Soviet in December 1960 the Minister of Finance was very critical of the work of the Ministry. He said that 28 of its 36 haulage bases had not fulfilled their plans and a large number of vehicles were idle for long periods. As a result the Ministry failed to carry out its financial obligations. The 1961 plan called for the transport of 88,100,000 tons of freight compared with 79,700,000 tons in 1960 and increases in the transport of passengers of 17.4 per cent by bus and 21.6 per cent by taxi. (BR. 30.12.60)

Complaints have been made of the delays in repairs at the Ministry of Road Transport's vehicle repair workshops and the poor quality of the repairs. (BR. 30.10.60) The Ministry has also been accused of consistently not paying enough attention to tyre repairs. According to the regulations, new tyres can only be provided if old tyres to a total of at least 25 per cent of the new ones issued are sent for re-treading at the tyre repair factory. However, this regulation is ignored and the tyre repair factory is working at almost half capacity while hundreds of old tyres rot and there is an acute tyre shortage. In the Ministry of Road Transport alone in the first half of 1960, 546 vehicles were idle daily because of the shortage of tyres. (BR. 2.4.61)

On 3 January 1961 the Ministry announced that public servicing stations for all vehicles had been opened in Sumgait, on the Baku-Kazakh main road 12 km. from Geokchay, and at Dollyar station. They are able to service vehicles (wash, grease, etc.) and do minor repairs. (BR. 3.1.61)

### Accidents, discipline and misuse of vehicles

Concern at the high accident rate has been expressed more than once. In December 1960 a Traffic Safety Week was held and in July 1961 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Road Transport held a road safety conference. The head of the State Vehicle Inspectorate attributed the accidents to the lack of discipline of some drivers (excessive speed, ignoring traffic signs, breaking the rules for overtaking, and driving while drunk), and the poor condition of both vehicles and some sections of the roads. A large number of accidents occurred in the countryside at the time of agricultural campaigns when vehicles unsuitable for passengers were driven by inexperienced and undisciplined drivers. Many vehicles were in a shocking state of repair and the repair workshops could not cope with all the work. Control commissions had been set up at various haulage bases and where they were active did valuable work in averting accidents by timely repairs. The Baku voluntary traffic wardens had discovered hundreds of infringements of the traffic regulations in the first six months of 1961 and reported them to the culprit's place of work. However, in several haulage bases discipline was not enforced. A "typical example" was that of a lorry-driver from the Kuba haulage base who disappeared with his lorry for three months during which time he used it for his own mercenary purposes and on his return was given another lorry which he also proceeded to use to make an easy profit. (BR. 11.12.60, 16.7.61)

At the Party Congress in February 1960 Akhundov complained of the misuse of official vehicles (BR. 17.2.60) and an investigation in Baku one day brought to light many examples. Directors were using their organizations' buses as their private cars or else the drivers were using them to carry passengers at a profit; lorries, cars and ambulances were being used on purely private errands. (BR. 4.12.60) There were also complaints of irregularities in the working of the car hire base of the Ministry of Road Transport in Baku. Only those who "greased the palms" of officials received cars, accidents were not reported and employees were using the vehicles as their private cars. (BR. 29.5.60, 21.8.60)

### Baku city transport

A number of new tram, trolleybus and bus routes have been opened in Baku in the last two years (BR. 31.12.60, 14.4.61, 20.5.61, 9.7.61,

20.7.61), and in March 1960 there were 170 buses running in the city against the planned figure of 137. (BR.22.3.60) In January 1961 Baku was reported to have received 45 new trams and trailer wagons, and 35 new buses were expected. (BR. 1.1.61) There is now a unified four kopeck fare on the town's trolleybuses and buses (BR. 14.8.60) and monthly and three-monthly tickets for trams, trolleybuses and buses have been on sale since 1.9.61. (BR. 30.8.61) Some conductors have started to sell newspapers on the morning trams. (BR. 17.12.60) On 2 June 1960 a funicular was opened. It runs from the Hotel Inturist to the Central Park of Culture and Rest im. S.M. Kirova. The cars have 28 seats and cover the 455 metres in 3.5 minutes for five kopecks. A quarter of the line passes through tunnels and there is a station half way where the cars pass.

There have been many complaints about the working of the city transport. Passengers complain that time-tables are not observed, that there are long intervals between buses, that late buses don't run, that there are no buses to connect with the early morning suburban trains and that the vehicles are dirty. (BR. 22.3.60, 25.6.60, 7.7.60, 20.5.61) Another frequent complaint is that the conductors appropriate the receipts by not issuing tickets or by selling old tickets. Moreover, many passengers consider this quite legitimate and "generously" excuse the conductor from giving them a ticket. Some conductors have made up to 12 rubles a day in this way. This practice was said to be largely responsible for the fact that transport receipts were 1,017,000 rubles short of the plan in 1959 and that tram receipts alone were 174,200 rubles short in the first two months of 1960. The Party and other authorities do nothing about it, no doubt because they are involved. (BR. 29.3.60, 1.6.60, 2.10.60, 16.8.61) In January 1961 taxi-drivers complained that since instructions from the city council that passengers could only be picked up at ranks they had been unable to fulfil their plan. Taxi ranks were few and far between and passengers had been forced to turn to private car owners. (BR. 27.1.61)

At the XXXVIth Baku Party Conference in August 1961 it was stated that after harsh criticism of the city's transport system at the previous conference, measures had been taken to improve it; new routes had been opened and additional vehicles received. However, the work of the city transport was still not in order, service to passengers was poor and not one depot was fulfilling its transport or financial plans. (BR. 25.8.61)

#### Public transport in other towns and inter-urban services

There are various long distance bus services in Azerbaydzhan including ones from Baku to Tbilisi and Yerevan. More than 20 bus routes pass through Yevlakh and dozens of buses leave daily for Stepanakert,

Fizuli, Goradiz, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Baku, Kirovabad, Mingechaur and other places. The bus depot has 72 ZIL and 42 PAZ buses, 29 Volgas and Pobedas, 20 taxi lorries and 148 drivers. One driver has done 600,000 kilometres without needing a major repair. There are garages and repair workshops and in March 1960 a new coach station was being erected at a cost of 70,000 rubles. (BR. 16.3.60) In the summer of 1960 Agdam bus depot received some extra buses and was able to start regular services between Agdam and Isti-Su, Agdam and Tbilisi, and Khachinskiy poselok and Makhryzly. (BR. 27.7.60) Nukha bus depot has 22 buses and 35 Volga and Pobeda taxis. (BR. 14.10.60) New trolleybus lines were to be opened in Kirovabad in 1961 (BR. 4.2.61) and in the summer of 1961 new daily bus services were started from Kirovabad to Kislovodsk, Isti-Su, Naftalan and other health resorts. (BR. 2.7.61) The first trolleybus service in Sumgait started running on 28.4.61. (BR. 30.4.61)

There are plans to build coach stations in a number of towns including Baku, Kirovabad, Yevlakh, Stepanakert and Fizuli. The Baku coach station will be a large modern two-storey building with every facility including hotel rooms, and the one in Kirovabad will be similar. The construction of those in Yevlakh, Stepanakert and Fizuli was to be finished in 1960. New motor vehicle depots are planned in Geokchay, Kuba, Nukha and Kirovabad and a model one has been opened in Kazakh. (BR. 10.1.60) A new coach station in Sumgait was opened in May 1960. (BR. 24.5.60) In March 1961 the Ministry of Road Transport complained that they had been trying to build the coach station in Baku for two years but the town council would not clear the land. (BR.23.3.61)

From 1 January 1961 a new unified tariff for taxis was introduced in Azerbaydzhan giving an average reduction of 20 per cent in fares. It was also announced that the Ministry of Road Transport was to receive 550 new taxis in 1961. (BR. 15.10.60)

## VI. Civil Aviation

### Passenger and freight services

According to the summer 1961 time-table for Baku airport there are flights from Baku to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Khar'kov, Simferopol', Adler, Donetsk (formerly Stalino), Sverdlovsk, Kuybyshev, Saratov, Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), Astrakhan', Minvody, Makhachkala, Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Tashauz, Ashkhabad, Cheleken and Yerevan, and inside the republic to Yevlakh, Kirovabad, Nukha, Zakataly and Belokany. To Krasnovodsk alone there are six flights daily. (BR. 22.7.61) Since 1959, IL-18s (95-seater turbo-props) have been introduced on the longer flights. They appeared on the Baku-Moscow and Baku-Tashkent routes in 1959, on the Baku-Rostov-Kiev and Baku-Moscow-Leningrad routes in 1960,

on the Baku-Kuybyshev-Sverdlovsk and Baku-Adler-Simferopol' routes from 1.6.61 and on flights to Yerevan and Ashkhabad in September 1961. Air fares, particularly on long-distance flights, were reduced from 1 January 1961. (BR. 31.12.60) Yevlakh airport operates passenger services to Zakataly, Nukha and Agdzhabedi. (BR. 2.6.60)

Helicopter passenger services were started in 1960 with MI-4s. The first trial flight from Baku to Neftyanyye Kamni was made on 1 March 1960 covering the distance in 39 minutes compared with over six hours by sea. (BR. 2.3.60) By August 1960 helicopters were carrying up to three or four hundred passengers on some days on this route as well as supplies for the oil workers. (BR. 18.8.60) A regular helicopter service from Baku to Sumgait was opened on 18.5.60. Flying time was 10-12 minutes and the service operated from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. (BR. 20.5.60) This service apparently ceased at some stage, since in May 1961 it was reported that a helicopter service from Baku to Sumgait would start in a few days. A service between Baku city and Baku airport started in May 1961. (BR. 11.5.61) A helicopter station of glass, metal and concrete on the Ploshchad' im. Lenina in Baku was opened in March 1961. (BR. 29.1.61, 29.3.61) Plans for helicopter passenger services include flights from Yevlakh to the health resort of Isti-Su. (BR. 14.2.60)

Air freight can be accepted for carriage from Baku to any town with air communications. Reductions of up to 50 per cent in the tariffs are given for bulk consignments and there are special planes at cheap rates for seasonal and perishable goods. Arrangements can be made at customers' warehouses and the goods taken to the airport in airport transport. (BR. 10.1.60, 28.7.61) Freight rates were reduced on 1 January 1961. (BR. 31.12.60)

#### Agricultural and medical services

In the last four or five years the use of planes and helicopters for agricultural purposes has increased considerably. According to the 1960 plan aerial methods of cultivation were to be applied to 1,250,000 hectares of crops and plantations. By April 1960 several thousand hectares of winter crops in the Astrakhan'-Bazar, Nukha, Kyudamir and Kasum-Ismailov rayons and in various sovkhoses had been fertilized from the air. It had not been possible, however, to do this in the Barda, Mir-Bashir, Agdzhabedi and Agdash rayons since the kolkhoses had not laid in the necessary supplies of fertilizer. (BR. 8.4.60) Aircraft are used to spread insecticides on the cotton fields (BR. 28.7.61), and a helicopter has been used to cultivate 800 hectares of orchard in a mountainous area of the Kuba rayon inaccessible to tractors. (BR. 7.6.60) For three years the "Azerbaydzhan" sovkhos at Kara-Yeri has been using low-flying helicopters to create a wind so as to artificially pollinate the vines. If this is done

three or four times the harvest increases by dozens of centners a hectare. (BR. 18.6.60, 28.5.61) Planes and helicopters are also used on medical missions to remote areas and ships at sea.

### Plans and plan fulfilment

There are few details in the press about the work of the Azerbaydzhan section of Aeroflot. According to the Seven Year Plan, kilometre-tonnage is to increase 6.2 times compared with 1958, and 5.2 times more passengers and 4.5 times more freight are to be carried in 1965 than in 1958. The 1959 plan called for the carriage of 264,000 passengers, substantially more than in the previous year. (BR. 23.8.59) In the first seven months of 1960 considerably more passengers were carried than in the whole of 1957 and 400-500 passengers a day were leaving Baku. In the second quarter of 1960 more than 750,000 ton-kilometres had been flown in excess of the plan and about 4,000 additional passengers carried. (BR. 18.8.60)

---

### Documenting Bukharan history

New and interesting material on the cultural history of the Bukhara region between the 13th and 18th century was shown for the first time at a recent exhibition of the Bukhara Regional Studies Museum. This period has so far been rather scarcely documented, but now visitors to the museum can see newly-discovered and restored pottery, silver coins, and manuscripts from the time of Timur, architectural ceramics, and a miniature, "Construction of a Building", among other finds.

VOPROSY ISTORII, 1961, No.3

P R I V A T E   P R O P E R T Y   T E N D E N C I E S   I N  
C E N T R A L   A S I A   A N D   K A Z A K H S T A N

"Private property tendencies are radically alien to socialist society. From the point of view of Communist morals they are immoral. That is why a relentless fight is waged with manifestations of these tendencies." (KP. 22.9.60)

Introduction

The perennial problem of the continuing existence in the Soviet Union of "private property tendencies" has received increased attention recently as part of the general campaign against "parasites, hooligans and idlers". It should be explained at the start that a distinction is made between private (chastnaya) and personal (lichnaya) property. A Soviet citizen is entitled to have as personal property articles for his personal use which may include a house of modest size and, if he lives outside the towns, a small number of livestock to keep him and his family supplied with milk, eggs, etc. Land cannot be privately owned but the State may allocate small plots to individuals on which to build a house or grow fruit and vegetables for their own needs.\* Citizens who show a desire to own more than they need or try to make money from their property or the land they have been allocated are said to manifest private property tendencies. "Any excess accumulation of personal property harms society, lowers interestedness in collective production and leads to a rebirth of private property tendencies, parasitism and sponging." (SK. 29.9.61)

Central Asia and Kazakhstan seem to have their fair share of people who wish to live better than their neighbours or prefer to devote their energies to their more profitable personal affairs rather than to working for the common good. Some manage to do this without

---

\* See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.2, "Domestic Housing", which gives the regulations concerning private ownership in the USSR. Already in 1956 there was official concern over the rate at which privately owned property was expanding in some areas.

breaking the letter of the law but the press abounds in accounts of those who disregard the laws or resort to dishonest means and get away with it. This liberal attitude on the part of those in authority is hardly surprising since some of them are among the worst offenders.

## I. Private Housing

### A house of one's own

To ease the housing shortage the Government encouraged private building by granting loans and giving assistance in the provision of building materials, but it now seems to have got out of hand. "A house of one's own. This dream haunts some people in our days. The worm of obsession with private property (sobstvennichestvo), the worm of philistinism and narrow-mindedness lives and flourishes in them." (PV. 26.2.61) Indeed, it seems that many citizens, already provided with what is considered perfectly adequate housing by the State, stop at nothing to realize this dream. In Chirchik, for example, the head of the electrotechnical laboratory of the chemical kombinat was not satisfied with his three-room flat and has built his own house with a large garage for his Pobeda, running water and a complicated signal system connecting various parts of the house. The kombinat is short of building materials but he did not hesitate to appropriate bricks, cement and paint from its supplies and acquired the timber, radiators, cables and water pipes cheaply by getting the factory officials to write them off as scrap when they were perfectly sound. Other prominent figures in the town who already had flats and have built themselves luxurious villas in the same way include the public prosecutor ("drivers point his house out as one of the sights to those arriving in Chirchik for the first time"), the judge, the deputy head of the Khimstroy Trust, the deputy head of the Militia and the director of the bakery. (PV. 18.8.60 and 26.2.61) Similarly officials of Gosplan and Uzglavmestsnaabsyt in Tashkent with ready access to supplies of building materials have acquired them cheap to build unnecessary luxury houses for themselves while public buildings such as schools and hospitals are unfinished because of a shortage of building materials. (PV. 12.5.61) In Samarkand too in the last two or three years "miracles have been performed in the field of individual housing" by highly placed officials such as the chairman of the executive committee of the Town Council and the manager of the Torgodezhda Base. They have built themselves mansions large enough for kindergartens or schools. One villa was built by the secretary of the Bukhara Oblast Party Committee 300 km. away. The Chairman of the Executive Committee was so busy handing out plots of land for private building that he did not notice that he was carving up a site destined for a big worsted factory.

(IZV.11.6.61) As a result of these disclosures a number of officials have been expelled from the Party and their houses taken over by the communal housing fund. (IZV. 4.8.61) The situation in Leninabad was described by the Head of Leninabad Building Trust No.5 when he was questioned about the four villas he had had built at the Trust's expense for members of his family: "Why pick on me as if I was the only one building such houses? Have a wider look round. How many officials of my rank have splendid private residences! Our town is small but you can't count them all on your fingers. A good half of the prominent figures in the trade network live in palaces. Do you think they built them on their salaries? . . . Ba!" (P. 22.11.61) In Krasnovodsk in the last five years more than four hundred individual houses have been built. The vast majority of the owners are connected with trade or transport organizations, some being no more than stall-holders or lorry drivers. (TI. 26.8.61)

Even after individuals have been attacked in the press for abusing their positions to build themselves villas the consequences do not seem to be very drastic. Thus the Chirchik Town Party Committee only took action after the second feuilleton. The public prosecutor was dismissed after some delay but "is still doing something in the town prosecutor's office", and the head of the electrotechnical laboratory "was very slightly reduced in status". Some others were dismissed from their jobs but two months later the local Party reviewed the case and it was decided that they could remain in their jobs since they had admitted their mistakes and promised to hand over their houses to the communal fund. Further enquiries revealed that they had agreed to sell, not hand over, their houses to the housing fund and that the Chirchik Party Committee had decided on their more lenient attitude after a visit by two departmental heads of the Tashkent Oblast Party Committee. (PV. 27.6.61) The dismissal of a number of leading militia workers in Tashkent in 1958 over abuses in private housing did not prevent further abuses occurring in 1960 when several militia workers and senior officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were found to have two private houses and a Government flat each. The head of the Ministry's finance and planning section had used the Ministry's building materials, transport and labour force to erect his private house. (PV. 4.9.60) IZVESTIYA suggests that in Dushanbe,\* where the Minister of Finance, the public prosecutor, the deputy chairman of the Sovnarkhoz, the chairman of the Legal Commission and others have built themselves luxurious private residences with State money, a Party reprimand is positively sought. "A reprimand is a kind of indulgence for the remission of sins." The Party is satisfied that measures have been

---

\* Formerly Stalinabad. Was renamed in November 1961.

taken and the guilty official can enjoy his house with a clear conscience and even add to it. (IZV. 5.9.61)

### Speculation in housing

There are also numerous cases of houses being built with the specific idea of making a sale at a good profit or letting out rooms at inflated prices. To get more than one building plot, sites are applied for in the name of different members of the family. An example of this was a part-time mathematics teacher in Ashkhabad who built a four-room house in 1958-9 which he sold for 5,000\* rubles. He then got a second plot of land in his wife's name, and built house No. 3 on a third plot which he got in the name of his sister-in-law by giving her a 500 rubles bribe. In anticipation of building a fourth house he filled the yard with "a mountain" of illegally acquired building materials, some of which he sold to other private builders. (TI. 9.6.61) In Krasnovodsk a man who opened his own photographic workshop made enough capital in four years to buy a large house in the centre of the town and to build another three, one of which was sold at a speculative price. Some people there with large private houses are making 200 or more rubles a month by letting rooms. (TI. 26.8.61) In Frunze a number of people have been building houses to sell at a profit. One old man has built three houses. One he lets to the Frunze City Fruit and Vegetable Trading Organization for 90 rubles a month and another to the director of the Design Institute Kirgizgiprostroy for the same amount. (SK. 17.7.60 and 14.7.61) In Chirchik one official built himself a house but continues to live in his Government flat. The house is let for 40 rubles a month but he has kept control of the garden and could be seen selling apples and pears in the market in the autumn. (PV. 26.2.61)

### The kolkhoz chairman's five houses

Kolkhoz workers, the majority of whom in any case have their own houses, do not seem to have the desire or the opportunities to build themselves luxury residences, but a "passion for housebuilding" did affect the chairman of the Moscow kolkhoz at Charshanga. In 1952 he got the kolkhozniks to build him a house, but soon decided it was not good enough, sold it to the kolkhoz for 800 rubles and got them to build him another. He sold this to the kolkhoz for 4,500 rubles when he was transferred to the Stalin kolkhoz. There he soon found that the first house built for him at kolkhoz expense was "behind the times and didn't satisfy his ideas of comfort" and had a second built. He

---

\* All sums of money throughout this article are expressed in new rubles which were introduced on 1.1.61 at the rate of 10 old rubles = 1 new ruble.

pocketed 6,000 rubles from the sale of this when he returned to the Moscow kolkhoz, where he had a fifth house built at a cost to the kolkhoz of 10,000 rubles. (TI. 12.4.61)

### New measures to prevent abuses

In September 1961 the Central Committee of the Tadzhik Communist Party issued a statement on shortcomings in housing in Dushanbe, a large part of which was concerned with abuses in private housing. It spoke of "gross violations" in the distribution of housing sites in the last five years and of houses being built for profit while the owners lived in communal flats. There was such chaos in the offices concerned that "a favourable situation was created for speculation in plots of land" and some organizations even gave plots to private builders from sites assigned to government buildings. To prevent further abuses all vacant plots are to be listed and can be withdrawn by the Town Executive Committee, communal and other official flats are to be taken from those who have their own houses, and "in future individual building in Dushanbe, with the exception of blocks of flats on a cooperative basis, is forbidden". (KT. 3.9.61)

A decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR dated 3.12.61, "On Increasing Responsibility for the Infringement of Legislation on Individual Dwelling Construction", increases the penalties for various infringements from six months to three years in prison or one year's corrective labour. The infringements covered are wrongful distribution of plots by officials, deceit in acquiring plots, illegal acquisition of building materials, concealed form of sale of land by selling foundations, walls or other parts of a house, and building a house larger than the prescribed standards. (PV. 4.12.61)

## II. Private Vegetable Gardens

### Kolkhoz markets

A letter to IZVESTIYA from the director of the biggest kolkhoz market in Ashkhabad gives a typical picture of kolkhoz shortcomings which have always made it only too easy for private growers to make money. "The kolkhozes as a rule take no account of consumer demands" and in 1960 private growers were able to sell tomatoes at high prices for a month before the first kolkhoz tomatoes arrived and brought prices down. Individuals with tiny plots have a monopoly in the sale of spring onions, garlic, parsley, radishes and other vegetables. Sometimes the private growers even sell cheaper than the kolkhozes which cannot adjust their prices quickly to the market. Moreover, the private growers make their produce look attractive while kolkhoz vegetables are caked

with mud. (IZV. 11.10.60) In these circumstances many kolkhozniks have always succumbed to the temptation of making more money by devoting themselves to their private plots rather than working in the kolkhoz and it is a frequent complaint in the Central Asian press that the kolkhozes have to recruit labour in the towns at harvest time while the kolkhozniks are busy selling the produce from their private plots in the market.

Town dwellers are also ready to use their gardens or allotments for profit and numerous examples could be quoted from the press. One family in Chirchik, for example, made 700 rubles in a season from the sale of tomatoes and cucumbers. (PV. 26.2.61) Certain retired army officers in Alma-Ata have been attacked as "having private property tendencies" for growing fruit for sale on their excessively large allotments. They answered the charges by saying that they had served the State well and had acquired the allotments legally. Furthermore, the orchards were an ornament to the city and "growing fruit and selling it does not prevent them from being active public workers and lecturing to the workers". KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA comments that such depraved people have no "moral right to carry out political and educational work among the population". (KP. 12.10.60)

#### Kolkhoz and sovkhov land leased to market gardeners

Around Alma-Ata and Dzhambul and in Kirgizia some kolkhozes and sovkhoves even encourage private property tendencies by leasing out their land to private growers. From the Chinese sounding names of the lessees it may be surmised that they are generally Dungans, who have been famed for their skill as market gardeners since they arrived in those parts in the last century. (See CAR, 1961, No.2, pp.115-16) The kolkhozes make an agreement with the private growers, who are normally resident in the towns, under which the latter are assigned a number of hectares on which to grow fruit and vegetables in return for part of the crop or a fixed sum of money. In addition, the private growers are given large private plots from which they take all the profits. Since objections were raised to this practice many of the private growers have been enrolled as kolkhoz members for form's sake, although they continue to live in the towns, or are taken on in some other legal way. In the "30 Years of Kazakhstan" kolkhoz in Taldy-Kurgan rayon, for example, in 1960 three new vegetable and melon brigades under Il'ya Kim, Man Guan-fa and Lin In-fu were enrolled as kolkhoz members. Their contracts with the kolkhoz allotted them respectively 11, three and four hectares of kolkhoz land for growing onions in return for a fixed payment of 4,700 rubles a hectare, as well as large private plots. It was calculated that Il'ya Kim's brigade would receive a minimum profit of 80,000 rubles for the season, or more than 3,000 rubles for each member, and that would be

from a less than average yield and at the State price for onions which fetch six or seven times as much in some markets. Altogether 880 private growers were established on the best kolkhoz lands in Alma-Ata oblast and the situation was similar in Dzhabul oblast. (KP. 8.12.60) Usually the kolkhoz or sovkhoz agrees to plough the land and provide seed and water for the private growers who build temporary huts in the fields and move in with their families. Sometimes the private growers do not tend the fields themselves but hire day labourers. Two out of every three of the maize-growers on the Way to Communism kolkhoz have their own cars and return to Frunze at night. (SK. 14.5.61) The success of the private growers has a "corrupting effect" on "the unstable section of the kolkhozniks" who in the 30 Years of Kazakhstan kolkhoz have already asked for their own personal market gardens (KP. 8.12.60), and 11 kolkhoz families from the village of Milyanfan have moved to the neighbouring Friendship kolkhoz after hearing that it was distributing plots for market gardening. (SK. 14.5.61)

The kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers obviously consider that it is in their interests to lease land to skilled market gardeners and are reluctant to give up the practice even when they have been told to by the rayon Party Committee. In fact the Party Secretary of the Kant rayon, in which the Way to Communism kolkhoz is situated, said: "Did you want us to clear these hucksters (shabashnik) from the fields? The kolkhozes will lose everything that has been gained. Without the hucksters we didn't have enough vegetables to fulfil the plan. . . Now it's another matter. We've been overfulfilling the plan for many years. We're not the only ones to have such market gardeners. They have them in other rayons too." SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA says that on the contrary private growers hinder production and the mechanization of vegetable growing (SK. 6.9.61), and the biggest vegetable-growing sovkhoz in Kirgizia, the Suburban, fails to fulfil its plan precisely because it lets in about 300 private growers as "seasonal workers", though the sovkhoz managers offer other explanations. An example of how these "speculators" repay the kindness of the sovkhoz was given by one of them who told those sent to help with the harvest to put the small onions in a bag for the sovkhoz and the big ones in another for him. The sovkhoz got 12 of the 42 sackfuls he grew. (SK. 9.12.60)

### III. Private Livestock

In his address to the Central Committee Plenum on Agriculture in January 1961, Khrushchev criticized certain republics where the head of the livestock in private ownership was increasing very much faster than in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Ovezov, First Secretary of the Turkmen Party, promised Khrushchev that a law would be passed to limit

private ownership of livestock in Turkmenistan (P. 15.1.61), and a report on the situation there was made by one of the deputies to the 5th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet in the same month. He said the number of privately owned livestock was increasing. New kolkhoz charters adopted in 1960 made provision for a substantial reduction in the numbers but "certain kolkhozniks grossly violated" these charters and used kolkhoz pastures and public water supplies for their animals. In the Kalinin kolkhoz in Kizyl-Arvat rayon, for example, where a household was permitted to own up to 50 sheep and goats, two kolkhozniks owned 205 and 190 respectively. In the Leninism kolkhoz in Gasan Kuli rayon where the limit was 25 sheep and goats, the chairman had 25 sheep and a horse, the head of the sheep farm 158 sheep, and the chief accountant 30 sheep and goats and a horse. More than 20 families in the kolkhoz had not worked one work-day (trudoden') in the last three years but had grown rich tending their private flocks. The situation was particularly intolerable in kolkhozes in Nukhur Bakharden rayon where the Tel'man kolkhoz had 560 sheep and goats while 10,470 were privately owned by the kolkhozniks. Sovkhoz workers also infringed the rule of one cow or goat plus one pig or three sheep per household. For instance, one family in Saradzha sovkhov had 87 sheep and goats and four camels. People living outside the towns who were not kolkhozniks or sovkhov workers were not subject to any limits on livestock ownership and more than one employee of a State undertaking drew a much bigger income from his flocks than from his job. Thus a worker at Kala-i-Mor railway station had 195 sheep and goats, an employee of the Nebit-Dag Livestock Base (skotobaza) 77 sheep and goats and one camel, and the station-master at Kazandzhik 60 sheep and goats and six camels. Investigations had shown that some citizens who owned livestock had no jobs or had one only for appearance's sake. They pastured their livestock on kolkhoz and sovkhov lands, fed them grain and other products bought in State and cooperative shops, resorted to hiring labour to tend their flocks and sold livestock produce at market prices pursuing aims of personal profit and enrichment. Thus inhabitants of Adzhi-Kuyya and Duvinci in Kazandzhik rayon were listed as employees of various organizations "but in reality engage in individual animal husbandry and lead a nomadic life". (TI. 28.1.61) A similar state of affairs exists in parts of Kazakhstan (KOM.P. 12.1.61, KP. 12.1.61), and Kirgizia (SK. 29.9.61).

The privately owned animals usually fare better than those belonging to the kolkhoz. Thus in two kolkhozes in Karaganda oblast in the winter of 1960 about 3,000 head of public livestock died through lack of fodder because the fodder produced by the kolkhozes went to the private livestock of which not a single one perished. (KP. 28.1.61)

Many rayispolkoms (rayon executive committees) do nothing to prevent large private flocks using sovkhos and kolkhoz lands. The chief vet of the XXth Party Congress sovkhos in Krasnovodsk rayon complained that people with no jobs, many of them living in Krasnovodsk and Urfa, were pasturing their flocks on the best sovkhos pastures, while in the summers of 1958 and 1959 the sovkhos flocks had to be driven 500 km. into Kazakhstan. The rayispolkom had taken several decisions to clear the sovkhos land of the private owners, who were established there when the sovkhos was set up in 1956, but nothing had been done. Indeed the numbers of private livestock had increased, the wells they used were falling into disrepair and their owners were even cutting hay and making a good profit on it in Krasnovodsk market. (TI. 9.6.61)

In Gur'yev oblast the rayispolkom has even supported a private livestock owner against the kolkhoz. The owner is a former oil-worker, now on pension, who feeds his flock of 222 sheep and 13 camels on State lands adjoining the Kazakhstan kolkhoz. Attempts to turn him off these excellent pastures by the kolkhoz chairman and the chairman of the aul soviet have come to naught and he has even lodged complaints with the rayispolkom and oblispolkom (oblast executive committee) against the kolkhoz chairman for not supplying him with hay. "Kind uncles" in these committees instructed the kolkhoz to help the "poor" man who "came to them on a donkey in a very sorry plight". His "plight" became clear when it was calculated that his livestock were worth 25,000 rubles. KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA suggests that the "liberalism and unconcern" of local leaders towards the "brazen" private livestock breeders in the oblast is accounted for by the fact that it is easier to conceal livestock losses where a large number of livestock are virtually left out of account, and by the fact that the gap in fulfilling the plan "can be made up if you have an illegal 'reserve' in the form of an excessively inflated 'private sector'." The rayispolkom deputy chairman concerned with these matters knows that private livestock breeding harms the public sector and that "there are several hundred large private flocks in the rayon. He knows but does not wish to spoil relations with the aksakals." (KOM.P. 12.1.61)

#### New laws limiting personal ownership of livestock

The Supreme Soviets of Kirgizia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have enacted new decrees limiting the number of livestock in personal ownership. For the first time a limit has been placed on those who do not reside in towns and are not members of kolkhozes or sovkhos workers. This limit is the same as that for sovkhos workers which in Kirgizia, for example, is one cow or one milk mare plus three sheep or goats, or one pig for fattening per family. Dates were fixed for the surrender of all surplus livestock, including that belonging to kolkhozniks, which was to be purchased by kolkhozes, sovkhos and State organizations at

current prices. The Turkmen decree stressed that "extensive explanatory work" must be carried out among the people "to prevent the slaughter of surplus livestock". (TI. 13.7.61, SK. 1.10.61 and KP. 5.8.61)

#### IV. Beekeeping

In Tadzhikistan certain able-bodied persons have not been engaging in socially useful work but have been breeding bees in an unlimited quantity for profit. They have been selling the honey at high prices in Tadzhikistan and other republics and buying up large quantities of sugar, intended for the population, to feed the bees in winter. A decree of the Supreme Soviet of Tadzhikistan dated 13 October 1961 has now made it illegal for a family to have more than five, seven or 10 hives according to their place of residence. (KT. 15.11.61)

---

#### Tadzhik girls fail to complete education

Speaking about the shortcomings in the educational system in Tadzhikistan at the 15th Congress of the Komsomol of Tadzhikistan, G. Bobosadykova said that in the Gissar rayon out of 2,000 girls entering the first grade of their secondary school, only six completed the course. KT. 26.1.62

## N E W S   D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1961. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

## ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Territorial changesAzerbaijdzhan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 25 December 1961, the town-type settlement Divichi, Divichinskiy rayon, has been given the status of town of rayon subordination and the village soviet of Divichi has been made a town soviet. VVS. 12.1.62

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 22 January 1962, the town of Khodzhent, Leninabad oblast, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlements and renamed Kayrakkum. VVS. 2.2.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 22 January 1962, the town-type settlement of Sovetabad has been given the status of town of oblast subordination and renamed Khodzhent. VVS. 2.2.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 29 March 1962, the Leninabad oblast has been abolished, and all rayons in the oblast as well as the town Leninabad have been put under the authority of the republican organs. KT. 29.3.62

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 December 1961, the centre of the Dzhangalinskiy rayon, West-Kazakhstan oblast, has been transferred from the village Novaya Kazanka to the village Mashteksay and the latter has been renamed Leninskoye. VVS. 5.1.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 December 1961, the town settlement Stalinskiy, Leninskiy rayon, Tselinograd oblast, has been renamed Aksu. VVS. 5.1.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 17 January 1962, the centre of the Dzhabul rayon, Dzhabul oblast, has been transferred from the town Dzhabul to the village Assa. VVS. 2.2.62

## CONFERENCES

### The Afro-Asian Writers' Conference

The Second Conference of Afro-Asian Writers, held in Cairo from 12-15 February 1962, was given considerable publicity in the Soviet press, and particularly in that of the Central Asian republics. It was constantly emphasized that the conference was the successor to that held in Tashkent in 1958, and much was said about the "spirit of Tashkent" (see CAR, 1958, No.4, pp.426-9 and 1959, No.1, pp.55-57).

The Uzbek writers Kamil Yashen and Konstantin Chugulov and the Kazakh writer Gabit Musrepov took part in the work of the preparatory committee of the conference (PV. 18.1.62). The Soviet Union of Writers prepared an exhibition of Soviet books - by writers of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics - for showing in Cairo (PV. 9.2.62). PRAVDA reported on 10 February that a delegation of Soviet poets, prose writers and dramatists of the Central Asian republics, Transcaucasia and the RSFSR, led by the Tadzhik poet Mirzo Tursun-Zade, had left for Cairo.

Khrushchev sent a message of greetings to the conference, wishing its members "every success in their fruitful endeavours to strengthen further the unity and solidarity of the peoples of Asia and Africa in their heroic struggle against all forms of colonial oppression for the freedom and happiness of their peoples" (PR.13.2.62).

In an article in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (8.2.62) the poetess Zul'fiya, of Tashkent, explained why the first question on the Cairo agenda was the struggle against colonialism for independence and peace, and the second item was "the role of translation in promoting solidarity and cultural exchange between the Afro-Asian peoples." Referring to the Tashkent conference, she said that many unfriendly persons had spoken of it as "Communist"; she cited the names of Afro-Asian writers who had attended it who, she said, were far from being Communists.

PRAVDA (9.2.62) published a full page of articles, greetings and poems in honour of the conference. The Iraqi poet Abd al-Wahhab al-

Bayati spoke of the profound influence of the October Revolution "in all fields of human activity, including literature". He regretted that socialist realism was not the only trend in contemporary eastern literature, and condemned those who made millionaires and gangsters their heroes rather than the sons of the people. The progressive writers of Asia and Africa, he said, were living through difficult days; in some countries they were persecuted and arrested, no publishers would accept their writings, and even persons found in possession of them were arrested.

The proceedings of the conference were fairly fully reported in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, by a special correspondent, N. Razgovorov. Parts of the speech of the Chinese representative Mao Run were reported (PV. 15.2.62), although of course his definition of the Chinese conception of peaceful co-existence was omitted. The resolutions of the conference were reported in PRAVDA (18.2.62).

In an article summing up the results of the conference, Anatoliy Sofronov, Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, said that in some literary circles the Cairo conference had been criticized as being not simply a gathering of writers but a forum for the expression of political ideas. This might be so, said Sofronov, but the fact was that the writers of Asia and Africa felt deeply on political issues - "on the struggle for peace, for disarmament, for the co-existence of peoples". [The mention of the last two issues is perhaps of some significance, in view of reported Soviet-Chinese differences on these. Disarmament did not figure in the conference resolutions. - Ed.] The Soviet delegate Mirzo Tursun-Zade, said Sofronov, had been heard with close attention when he declared:

"We must not confuse, when we speak of peaceful co-existence, the struggle of the classes, the struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors, the struggle of the colonial peoples against the modern barbarians, the colonialists. We are for destroying colonialism and imperialism once and for all! This is our stand and no one will be able to distort it!"

Soviet writers had taken an active part in the conference, said Sofronov; "they were always surrounded by the writers of Asia and Africa, and these were lively, impassioned discussions of brothers in arms."

---

The IIIrd Congress of the Intelligentsia of Uzbekistan was held in Tashkent on the 26-28 January 1962. The Congress discussed the new

tasks for the intelligentsia in the light of the decisions of the XXIIInd Congress of the CPSU. In his report Sh.R. Rashidov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Uzbekistan, pointed out that during the "period of the personality cult" wholesale and illegal repression of many Party workers, writers, artists, composers, scientists and military specialists went on in Uzbekistan and that this atmosphere provided a suitable ground for slanderers, careerists and demagogues. He went on to say that "the all-round criticism at the XXth and XXIInd Congresses of the mistakes and distortions that occurred during the period of the personality cult showed convincingly that the cult of personality is profoundly alien to our Marxist-Leninist party, to the nature of socialist society and to the entire structure of our life."

After a detailed survey of the achievements and tasks of the republic, Rashidov made an attack on the survivals of nationalism. He said that during the period of the personality cult many teachers, writers and journalists who had formerly been dzhadidists (Jadidis) or had had strong dzhadidist tendencies were repressed. Now they had been rehabilitated, but that did not mean that dzhadidism was rehabilitated; the ideological foundations of that movement: panislamism and panturkism, were hostile to the Soviet regime. In formulating what he called the right attitude towards relations between nations Rashidov said:

"In the destiny of all the nations of our country, the Russian people occupies such a place as no nation has ever occupied during the history of humanity. For thanks to its lucid mind and generous heart, thanks to its staunchness and readiness for self-sacrifice for the happiness of all working people, the peoples of our country have stepped onto the broad road of independent development and attained outstanding achievements in the growth of our economy and culture."

PV. 26.1.62

#### IRRIGATION

A new irrigation canal is being built in north-west Azerbaydzhan. Starting from the Dzhandar-gel', it will be 34 km. long and run well into the Dzheyranchel'skiy steppe. It is due to be completed by the end of 1962 and will make possible the irrigation of a thousand hectares of land.

BR. 2.2.62

Work on a large pumping station has begun on the Irtysh river near the village of Chernoyark. The pumping station will provide water for an area of over 100 km., and the work will take about four years.

P. 23.3.62

Construction of the Irtysh-Karaganda canal has begun. The canal will be 490 km. long and will be the first in the country to work with pumping stations. [Details of the projected canal were given in CAR, 1960, No.4, pp.399-400. - Ed.] SK. 13.2.62

## PUBLIC WORKS

This year will be very important in the development of Kirovabad, Azerbaydzhan. An area of 40,000 square metres is to be devoted to new housing, two new schools for general evening courses are to be opened and also a boarding school and three kindergartens. Five hundred thousand rubles have been allocated for a sewerage system in the town. New trolleybus lines are to be introduced and trees planted along several streets. BR. 9.2.62

In Aktyubinsk they are now building the first mikrorayon, a small, self-contained district of dwelling houses, shops, cinemas, etc., a type of "living unit" which is becoming popular in the cities. It will consist of 20 four- and five-storey houses, "a centre of domestic services", a cinema, seven shops, 2 four-storey hostels and a school with facilities for sports, and a stadium. KP. 17.2.62

One of the most rapidly growing towns in Azerbaydzhan is Sumgait near Baku. During the last four years an area of 220,000 square metres has been built up with houses; the population has increased by 16,000. BR. 2.2.62

A new and completely modern town is planned near the Nurek hydro-electric station (S.E. of Dushanbe). The new town of Nurek will be on the river Vakhsh, surrounded by hills rising 4-500 metres. The town will be divided into six mikrorayons, each of which will have its own shopping centre, cultural institutions and facilities for sports. Plans for the central part of the town have already been made and the model shows modern streamlined buildings which bear no trace of the hybrid "socialist-realistic" style with its classical columns and pediments and national "decorative elements", a style which is found in most post-Revolution buildings in Central Asia. There will be large parks and squares among the buildings. The first citizens of Nurek have already moved into the first completed houses. PR. 31.1.62

## PUBLISHING

The 1962 plans of the Publishing House of Oriental Literature, Moscow, are described in NOVYYE KNIGI, 1962, No.5. It has decided to devote increased attention to books dealing with more actual problems of the countries of the East. The main fields of study will be the relations of the USSR with countries in Asia and Africa, the policy of "proletarian internationalism" and peaceful coexistence (Soviet policy in the East), socialist construction in the "popular democracies" of Asia, economic and political development of independent, non-socialist countries of the East, the national liberation movements of the peoples of Asia and Africa, and the crisis and fall of colonialism.

In addition, the series "Languages of Asia and Africa" will continue, new travel books on the countries of Asia and Africa will appear, and monographs as well as translations of works of eastern literature will also be published.

## RELIGION

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA of 31 January 1962 gives an account of the trial of Pentecostalists in Karaganda. In recent years this illegal sect gained about 200 more members in the town. In spite of the fact that they were prosecuted by law, they held meetings and went round houses to win people over to their beliefs. Eventually the leaders were arrested and brought to court; Afansiy Drobkov, the presbyter, and Geronim Domanskiy were sentenced to five years and Fedor Borovikov to three years deprivation of freedom. According to the article both Drobkov and Domanskiy were traitors during the last war, working for the Germans by disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda. However, this did not prevent them from having a fair number of followers.

Another article, in KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA 20 January 1962, discusses the activities of the same sect from a different point of view. It is about the vicissitudes of a young worker, Mikhail Shchegol', who, on returning from the Army, found that his wife and neighbours were all under the influence of the Pentecostalists. Though he did his best to fight against their propaganda the Pentecostalists ruined his family life, and he could not do much alone. In the end he wrote a letter to the rayon deputy asking for his help: "I have been leading a struggle against the sectarians for a long time. . . They drew my wife into their sect, they mutilate the lives of children and young people; they force them to pray if they want sweets and threaten them with horrible things. . . The wives of sectarians do not do any useful work, but they inflict themselves on other people, spreading propaganda in favour of their beliefs."

A. Anan'ev's article in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, 1962, No.3, is again about the activities of various sects in Kazakhstan, both in the towns and in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. He describes how at the time the leader of the Shakers was tried in Kustanay he was travelling in the Taranovskiy rayon, where nobody seemed to know anything about the successful move of the Government in unmasking these subversive activities. Yet there were many sectarians in most parts of the rayon, mainly Baptists and Adventists. In the Taranovskiy poultry sovkhos, for instance, the Baptists were organized not long ago by a mechanic of the electric station, K. Fel'vok. Sectarians seem to be everywhere. Even in the villages, for example in Marinovka, where although according to the chairman of the rayon executive committee there were no sectarians, the Baptists were almost ruling the place. [See CAR, 1961, No.4, p.387 for further accounts of the activities of religious sects in Kazakhstan. - Ed.]

There are Baptists in Kirgizia too. An article in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIA of 10 January 1962 attacks the "hypocrisy" of Viktor Konstantinovich Zarov who is a Baptist and at the same time a useful member of the community who earns a good living. The main problem in Kirgizia is, however, the Muslims. Yu. Petrash, a research student, complains in an article in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIA (5 January 1962), that there are still a great number of people visiting the "holy shrines" in Kirgizia: Suleyman-gor, Idris-paygamber, Arslan-bob, Khazret Ayyub and Shah Fazil for instance. Petrash went to Suleyman-gor and counted that between 7 and 10 a.m. about 400 people visited the shrine; later on there were considerably more. As a result of these visits, the shaykhs at these places receive a considerable amount of money; two shaykhs received 13 and 20 rubles respectively between 7 and 10 a.m. Petrash complains that these things go on with the full knowledge of the Party organizations.

## COMMUNICATIONS

### Karaganda-Aktogay railway

In spite of difficult winter weather conditions, work on the section Karaganda-Karkaralinsk of the projected Karaganda-Aktogay railway has continued. Thirty kilometres of track have been completed. From the new station Solonichka the line will follow the valley of the river Nura. The next station the line will reach is Chernoye Ozero. (See also CAR, 1961, No.2, p.190.)

KP. 24.1.62

T H E   B O R D E R L A N D S   O F   S O V I E T  
C E N T R A L   A S I A

"PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE" AND REVOLUTIONARY WAR

It is perhaps not widely enough understood that "peaceful co-existence" is not merely a Soviet slogan designed to calm Western anxieties - a slogan which, according to a widespread Western view, is used to camouflage the Soviet Union's attempts to gain its ends by all means short of war. It is in fact, as Soviet writers are now busy explaining, a philosophy of militant action which sets out to justify the Soviet activities of which the West has most to complain.

Soviet writers claim that Lenin first formulated the principle of peaceful co-existence. They seem unable to find any passage in which he used the term as such, but they quote statements in which he defined the business-like relations which should exist between the capitalist countries and the (then) only socialist republic, engaged in a struggle for survival. A new stage of peaceful co-existence, according to Soviet writers, emerged after the Second World War when, socialism being now a world system, it was a matter of peaceful co-existence not between one country and the rest, but between two world systems, the socialist and the capitalist. "It is only natural that in the new environment the principle of peaceful co-existence has become more versatile than ever before." (A. Sovetov, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.1, 1962, p.14)

The "objective laws" governing this second stage of peaceful co-existence, according to Sovetov (loc.cit.), were first "scientifically analysed" at the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February 1956). Peaceful co-existence came to be referred to as "the bedrock of Soviet foreign policy" (Editorial, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.3, 1957). However, Soviet writers soon found themselves defending peaceful co-existence against critics of it within the Party. One of the principal charges against "the anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov", who were denounced at a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee in June 1957, was that they opposed the policy of peaceful co-existence in Soviet foreign policy. The principle consequently had to be made watertight against left-wing charges that it amounted to acquiescence in the existence and continuance of the

capitalist system. It was therefore "developed and elaborated" (to use Sovetov's phrase) at the XXIInd Party Congress of October 1961, which defended the principle of peaceful co-existence against the attacks not only of the "anti-Party group" but also of the Albanian leadership (and, indirectly, the Chinese). The Party Congress line on this subject has now been expounded in a number of articles which seek to show the inherent militancy of the "peaceful co-existence" slogan (D. Aleksandrov and O. Nakropin, "Peaceful Co-Existence in Our Times", MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZH DUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No.12, 1961; A. Sovetov, "Co-existence and Progress", INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.1, 1962; G. Starushenko, "Peaceful Co-existence and Revolution", KOMMUNIST, No.2, 1962; "Peaceful Co-existence, the Most Important Present-Day Problem", editorial in PRAVDA, 17.1.62).

The essence of the "peaceful co-existence" thesis is that the socialist system is unchallengeably superior to the capitalist, that it is strong enough to keep the latter's alleged warlike propensities in check, and that its eventual triumph is to be achieved by peaceful means. "Left-wing dogmatists" who call for "revolutionary war" are denounced for their "lack" of faith in the "strength of the ideas of socialism and Communism" (D. Aleksandrov, pp.30-31). But peaceful co-existence does not merely mean an absence of war; it "is not exactly synonymous with an idyllic life" (Editorial, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.3, 1957). It is "not a state of tranquillity, but a state of development and struggle"; it "does not preclude revolutionary transformation of society, but presumes them, and does not retard but accelerates the disintegration of imperialism" (D. Aleksandrov, p.32). Capitalism will eventually be swept away by revolution, "peaceful or non-peaceful"; the "world revolutionary process" cannot be stopped. "Class struggle between the capitalist and socialist systems" is part of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, which calls for political, economic and ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism (G. Starushenko, pp.81-86).

### Support for revolution

According to Starushenko (p.85), it is precisely because peaceful co-existence is "a specific form of class struggle" that it creates favourable conditions for "the development of socialist and national liberation revolutions". It is in conditions of peaceful co-existence, says Sovetov (p.16), that revolutionary wars of national liberation "have the best chance of reaching their logical conclusion". According to Starushenko again (p.85), "the great revolutionary possibilities opened up by peaceful co-existence are obvious to every literate Communist," who knows the value of "bourgeois" claims about the "illegality" of revolution (p.87):

"The very meaning of socialist revolution is that it breaks down the obsolete and anti-popular bourgeois code of laws and on its ruins establishes a new code of laws conforming to the new altered conditions of life of society and the fundamental interests of the people. Revolution, both peaceful and non-peaceful, is the most complete and objective expression of the will of the absolute majority of the people - a hundred times more objective than the most democratic elections in any bourgeois country."

The point that peaceful co-existence does not mean lack of support for "national liberation wars" is driven home in an article by Y. Dolgoplov, "National Liberation Wars in the Present Epoch" (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.2, 1962). "Recognition of the justness and lawfulness of national liberation uprisings and wars", says Dolgoplov, "does not in any way contradict the principle of peaceful co-existence, which relates to the field of reciprocal relations between states with different social systems." Lenin had emphasized that as a general rule war was lawful on the part of an oppressed nation "no matter whether it is offensive or defensive in the military sense." Dolgoplov goes on to criticize African and Asian adherents of non-violence:

"Some African and Asian politicians reject armed struggle in principle and maintain that only non-violent, peaceful forms of struggle against colonialism are permissible. . . Marxists do not doubt the sincerity of those who favour non-violent methods; they know that many of them are frequently subjected to repressions by the colonial authorities. Still they do not and cannot agree with this rejection in principle of armed struggle. The theory of non-violence does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of what should be done if peaceful means do not bring the desired results, if the colonialists themselves do not refrain from using force. To uphold this point of view means objectively to play into the hands of the colonialists who are striving to get the peoples to refrain from a determined fight for their liberation."

Thus "national liberation wars", whether offensive or defensive, are justified and made possible by "peaceful co-existence", which ensures their successful conclusion. Indeed, the peoples concerned are assured that disarmament, as part of the peaceful co-existence programme, is not intended to apply to them; it will in fact, by removing "occupation armies", facilitate their liberation (Starushenko, p.85).

However, on the subject of support for revolution, Soviet writers make an important reservation (the whole thesis of peaceful co-existence, indeed, is hedged with qualifications, since it has to be defended both against Western "bourgeois" critics and also against "dogmatists" - among whom the Albanians, but not the Chinese, are mentioned). This reservation is that the Soviet Communist Party, while giving "wide moral and political support" to revolution in other countries, does not in fact, "export revolution". Socialist revolution, Starushenko explains (p.86), is the aim of Communists in any country, but they only put this aim forward when the people themselves demand it; to "give a push" to revolution (podtalkivaniye) is anti-Marxist "adventurism" which can only damage the cause of the working-class.

Having thus absolved the Soviet Union of responsibility for "the export of revolution", Starushenko proceeds to accuse "the imperialists" of "exporting counter-revolution" - and to suggest counter-measures by the Communist countries. The Soviet Communist Party, he says, cannot "look on with indifference while the imperialists, flouting the principles of peaceful co-existence, try to drown revolutionary movements in blood." He points out that the Party is enjoined by its Programme to repulse "imperialist interference" with any people which has risen in revolt, and "not to allow imperialist export of counter-revolution". "Struggle against the export of counter-revolution", he says, is "one of the highest expressions of the proletarian internationalism of the Soviet Communist Party," and is extremely important for peaceful co-existence.

Here, if any were needed, is the ideological justification for Soviet intervention in any conflict involving a Western power in Asia or Africa. Peaceful co-existence is evidently, as Sovetov remarks, a "versatile" principle, if not indeed an elastic one.

## S O V I E T   V I E W S   O N   C O L O N I A L I S M

There has recently been a considerable increase in the amount of Soviet writing on the subject of colonialism. In addition to much familiar material about the evils of colonialism as practised by the Western powers and the contrasting Soviet attitude of altruism and respect for the rights of all nations, a new and shrill note is now being struck in an attempt to defend the Soviet Union against charges of colonialism brought against it by the West. In the past, Soviet writers have not troubled to reply to these charges so long as they were confined to specialized writing on Soviet affairs. But during the last two years there have been occasional references to the facts of Soviet colonialism by prominent Western spokesmen in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Soviet Government and the Communist Party have always regarded the making of such charges as their special prerogative and realization that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander has evidently come as something of a shock to them. This was particularly apparent at the meeting held on March 26 of the General Assembly of the United Nations' special committee on colonialism when Mr. Crowe, the British delegate, answered in kind charges by Mr. Oberemko of British "exploitation" in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet delegate objected strenuously to Mr. Crowe's statements about the facts of Soviet colonialism in Central Asia and claimed that they were slanderous of his country. There were similar exchanges at the end of 1960 when Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Diefenbaker indulged in some plain speaking about Soviet colonialism, and it was no doubt this which made the authorities feel that increased denigration of the West and exoneration of themselves was necessary. It is significant that in addition to the ordinary propaganda writers, serious and relatively objective historians like M.A. Khalifin are now being used to counter Western charges.

- 
- I. Colonialism and the New States of Asia and Africa -
  - II. Colonialism and Imperialism - III. Soviet Policies on Colonialism - IV. Russian Sensitivity to Western Criticism.

## I. Colonialism and the New States of Asia and Africa

A prominent feature of recent Soviet writing on colonialism is the association of the principal Western countries with a new kind of colonialism said to result from changing international relations following the freeing of many states from former colonial rule. G. Mirskiy and V. Tyagunenکو, in an article on "Tendencies and Prospects of National Liberation Movements" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYE, 1961, No.11), discuss, among other things, the relation of the newly-formed independent states to colonialism. Previously, they say, the world was divided into two types of countries: those owning colonies, and the colonies themselves. Many were countries which, though politically and formally independent, were "shackled" by economic, military and diplomatic agreements. But, there can no longer be any type of unified international colonial policy, because "financial capital" is no longer in a position to exercise undivided rule. Former dependent countries and semi-colonies, which Lenin considered as being in a transitional state of dependence, are now politically independent. Now, also, the young sovereign states are forming a group of neutralist countries, which the authors regard as a great loss for the "imperialist system" which formerly ruled them.

Economically most of these young states are still within the world capitalist economy, but their position differs significantly from what it was. Previously they could not develop their own national industry, while now, within limited fields, they can do so, and can trade with those countries with whom such trade is most advantageous for them. They still supply raw materials for industrially developed countries and receive ready-made manufactured goods in exchange, and Mirskiy and Tyagunenکو maintain that imperialist monopolies are still exploiting them by their ownership of oil concerns, mines, plantations, and communal, trade and financial enterprises, and are extracting huge profits from them. The authors divide these countries into two groups, those which do not enter foreign military blocs and conduct an independent foreign policy, and those like Persia and Pakistan which tie themselves to the West. In addition, some countries like India, the United Arab Republic and the Philippines, have more highly-developed capitalist relations and their own national industry, while others, especially in Africa, are still dominated by pre-capitalist productive conditions.

Mirskiy and Tyagunenکو approve of the limitations imposed on foreign capital by the nationalization of some branches of the national economy in countries such as India and Indonesia. However, in India, they assert, the laws limiting the activity of foreign capital contain so many reservations that they are partially ineffective. The bourgeoisie in some countries consider the struggle against imperialism to

be over, and these countries go out of their way to attract foreign capital. The national bourgeoisie everywhere tends to be neutral in foreign policy, but this neutralism is evoked primarily by their desire to stand aside from the conflict between the two world camps, and to reduce to a minimum the potential risk of involvement in a possible world war. The authors admit that this neutralism is used by the bourgeoisie to carry on trade with both West and East and to gain more favourable terms from the West, but they also regard it as anti-imperialist and progressive. The progressive side of the national bourgeoisie is also seen in the development of state capitalism, as the second stage of the national liberation movement after political independence has been attained. This state capitalism is a means of mobilizing a country's resources in the national interest and of developing industry and liquidating the influence of foreign monopolies. Once again the authors qualify their approval by stressing that this mobilization of resources is carried out fundamentally at the expense of the working-classes, whose standard of living has not risen at all in most of the new states. In these countries, the authors continue, there is still an unjust distribution of national income, since landowners, money-lenders and trade middlemen still control much of it. Nor have radical land reforms been carried out in most of these countries. India comes in for special attack in all these matters.

Mirskiy and Tyagunenکو claim that present-day colonialists use the "need for a struggle against the Communist threat" in their creation of "military-colonial blocs", and they see the question of anti-Communism itself as a serious threat to the independence of the new states. They also link this with the persecution of Communist parties in some countries. There is, moreover, a reprehensible tendency in many under-developed countries to declare their intention of building their own national variant of socialism - "Arab", "Indian", "African", etc. The authors complain that reactionary elements of the national bourgeoisie are using the "popular demand" for socialism for demagogic purposes, and use the name of socialism to cover up a more rapid development of capitalism.

The authors advocate the formation of "national democracies" in which all national elements, including the anti-imperialist section of the national bourgeoisie would be united. They feel that such states could insist more successfully on political and economic independence, fight against imperialism, military bases and new forms of colonialism, and carry out democratic and agrarian reforms. One of the main benefits from such a state, the authors claim, would be the creation of conditions for the change-over of under-developed countries to non-capitalist development and for a larger part to be taken by the workers in administration. They say that there are two

irreconcilable forces: imperialism and the masses. The campaign of the national bourgeoisie against imperialism needs the support of the masses, and its struggle against the masses needs the support of imperialism. Thus, the national bourgeoisie is divided within itself. Only with the participation of the masses in the administration of the state, the authors conclude, can the "historical task of liquidating imperialist rule" be carried out, and colonialism finally ended.

Soviet writers, furthermore, attack past colonial policies which they claim have kept millions of people in Africa and Asia in darkness and ignorance. One such attack is I. Samylovskiy's article, "A Renaissance of National Culture" (ASIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1961, No. 11), in which the low level of literacy in most of the new countries of Asia and Africa is blamed on past colonial regimes. According to Samylovskiy, the colonial powers deliberately suppressed the development of national cultures, and imbued the people with a feeling of national inferiority. The main problem facing these new countries is to end illiteracy, create their own national literature, art and cinema, build libraries, museums and schools and, most important of all, to form their own national intelligentsia. Much progress has been made in these countries in recent years, and the author rejects statements by former "colonialists" that they had prepared the way for these achievements.

The author applauds the way Afro-Asian countries are trying to help themselves and one another by expanding cultural links and by developing solidarity and mutual aid. He also claims that only the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, can give them aid to solve quickly problems arising from this cultural revolution. It is claimed that Western countries only give aid to these newly-liberated countries for their own ends, especially to try to persuade them to conduct a policy favourable to them. An attack is made, for example, on the new American Peace Corps programme as an attempt at a new form of colonialism. Samylovskiy claims, however, that many independent states are now refusing specialists from the old colonial powers, even when they are offered without cost. Because former colonial policies have failed, the colonialists are accused of trying to direct the further development of neutral countries of Asia and Africa through international organizations (UNESCO is especially attacked in this respect), as well as by sending technical specialists and volunteers. The author boasts of the "disinterested" aid given by the socialist countries to Asian and African states, and claims that all economic agreements between them are mutually useful, respect each other's sovereignty, and promise non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

## II. Colonialism and Imperialism

In many cases colonialism and imperialism are used by Soviet writers synonymously, and colonialism is described as a primary cause of past wars. According to Ye.I. Dolgopolov in an article entitled "Colonialism and Wars" (NAR. AZ. I AFR., 1961, No.5), the problem of the final liquidation of "the disgraceful colonial system of imperialism" is closely linked with the whole question of war and peace. All through history, he says, colonialism and militarism have walked hand in hand, and the colonial system itself developed through uninterrupted plundering wars, punitive expeditions and the slave trade. Wars for the acquisition of colonies (he claims that Britain alone has had 230 such wars in four centuries) have resulted in the loss of many millions of lives. There have also been acquisitive wars between the colonial powers themselves. The author goes on to say that in the most recent development of imperialist capitalism, there is a special danger of a collision between the colonial powers. The striving for world power, he claims, has become the basis of imperialist policy, and drawn to its logical conclusion, would result in an imperialist war. Such competition, he says, was one of the fundamental causes of the two world wars of this century.

Dolgopolov also attacks the use made by "imperialist powers" of colonial troops for starting wars against other peoples. He especially cites the conquest of India, claiming that "it is known that the conquest of India was carried out by troops recruited from peoples of territories which had formerly been conquered, and that later the British used Indian troops for the further expansion of her colonial empire." After the Second World War, the author continues, the "imperialist powers" tried to prevent the development of national liberation revolutions, or to preserve, where possible, the colonial system. Although at this point America becomes the focus of Dolgopolov's attack, all the Western powers are included among "present-day colonialists" who, "like their predecessors, made wide use of violence to suppress the down-trodden peoples striving for freedom and independence." He mentions wars in Indonesia, Indo-China, Algeria and Egypt, "intervention" in the Lebanon and Jordan, and "attempts to crush independence in the Congo, Laos and Cuba by force." Sometimes, he claims, the colonialists support open military intervention, other times they use the flag of the United Nations to cover their actions, and sometimes they support separatists, as in Indonesia and the Congo. These colonial wars and conflicts threaten to develop into a world war. The use of small, limited or local wars, Dolgopolov asserts, are part of the official military policy of America and Britain, while France is accused of using the variant of a "counter-revolutionary" war.

The author also attacks as preparations for small wars to suppress national liberation movements the location of military bases all over the world. He says that these bases of the imperialist powers, directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist states, are at the same time an instrument of colonial policy. They disrupt normal political and economic life and create a permanent threat to the national independence and security of the peoples of nearby areas. NATO, SEATO and CENTO are also seen in the light of an alleged struggle against national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. Dolgoplov claims that these pacts are a means of coordinating and uniting the efforts of the colonialists to suppress national liberation movements.

Dolgoplov continues that it is impossible to identify wars for national liberation with wars between states or local wars which are "unleashed by the imperialists for predatory purposes". National liberation wars are seen as uprisings of colonial peoples against their oppressors, and "the recognition of the correctness, the legality of such uprisings and wars does not contradict the principle of peaceful co-existence!" Thus, the author sees the liquidation of colonialism as being vital for an improvement in the international situation and the prevention of wars. An independent foreign policy by the new nations is seen as a means of preventing the imperialists from getting material resources and manpower for the conduct of wars.

### III. Soviet Policies on Colonialism

The greater part of G.Z. Sorkin's article on "The National-Colonial Question in Documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (NAR. AZ. I AFR., 1961, No.5), deals with the history of Soviet treatment of this question, and the author protests Soviet respect for the equality of all nations within the Union. He boasts that the making of the Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasia into "sovereign Soviet Republics" (soon after the October Revolution) showed that a new type of state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, could ensure both recognition of the sovereignty of these republics and also their cooperation within a single framework. Sorkin claims that the USSR also believes in the equality of all nations outside her own borders, and cites her role in her relations with liberation and anti-imperialist movements in Afghanistan, Mongolia, Turkey and China.

Sorkin goes into some detail about the help given to underdeveloped countries after the Second World War to free themselves from the "relics" of colonialism, to end their economic backwardness, and to achieve social progress. He mentions the reference in the third programme of the CPSU, published in July 1961, to the national and

colonial questions, and emphasizes that the existence of the world-wide system of socialism and the weakening of imperialism give hope to the new sovereign states for a national renaissance, the end of poverty and the achievement of economic independence. Sorkin also mentions Lenin's distinction between the nationalism of oppressed nations and that of oppressor states, and quotes the new draft programme as stressing that "there is a 'common-democratic substance' in the nationalism of an oppressed people directed against oppression, which Communists support and consider historically justified at a certain stage." However, at the same time the belief is expressed that there is another side to the nationalism of an oppressed nation, which expresses the ideology and interests of a "reactionary exploiting hierarchy". The peoples which have been freed from "the colonial yoke" have the choice of two paths to follow for further development: that of capitalism, which is described as the "path of suffering for the people", and the path of socialism, depicted as the "path of freedom and happiness of peoples". It is up to the people to choose which path they prefer to follow, and this choice depends on the alignment of class forces in each country. The author asserts that nationalist prejudices and reminders of past national differences may cause resistance to the social process which can be long-lasting and cruel. Workers must be educated, he continues, to "the spirit of internationalism and socialist patriotism", and to this goal the Communist Party is conducting a struggle to overcome "survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism" which cause harm both to the general interests of the "socialist community" and to the particular people of the country where they appear. In this sense, the Communists "come out against nationalism and national egoism".

#### IV. Russian Sensitivity to Western Criticisms

It is of particular interest to note that both in the article just mentioned and in other articles, recent Soviet writings have displayed a special sensitivity to criticisms raised in the United Nations and in the West in general, to the effect that the Soviet Union herself conducts a colonial policy toward peoples under her control or influence. In the present article, Sorkin boasts of the "freedom" of the various peoples within the Soviet Union. In several other articles an attack is made on alleged "fabrications" by Western historians and writers about Soviet policies.

A particularly violent article of this kind is N.A. Khalfin's "Bourgeois Historiography on Some Questions of Mutual Relations of the Soviet Union with Countries of Asia and Africa" (NAR. AZ. I AFR., 1961, No.5). Western writings, including those published in CENTRAL

ASIAN REVIEW, are accused of conducting active anti-Soviet propaganda and falsely accusing the Soviet Union of colonialist intentions in relation to these new sovereign states. Khalfin accuses the Western countries and their "ruling circles" of striving to prevent the development of friendly links and cooperation between the USSR and Asian and African countries. He claims that "reactionary bourgeois historiographers" have taken upon themselves the task of "substantiating the slanderous thesis of 'Soviet colonialism'". Many books and writers are attacked by name, and it would appear that the Soviet Union is apprehensive about the effect of such writings as well as of recent statements made at the United Nations in discussions on the colonial question, on the leaders of the new states.

The same subject is treated in Ye.B. Chernyak's article, "The Most Recent Reactionary Historiography of Colonialism" (NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, 1961, No.5). Chernyak says that the imperialist powers are trying to head off the total collapse of colonialism and to preserve their position in the economy of the countries which have recently "thrown off the colonial yoke", by the use of "so-called aid" and by not allowing them to strengthen their economic independence. He claims that the "ideologists of imperialism" recognize that one of the chief obstacles to the realization of these plans is the hatred of the newly liberated peoples for colonialism, which they identify with capitalism. A "refutation" of this, in Chernyak's opinion, has become the task of bourgeois ideologists, and especially of "reactionary historians". The latter, he claims, talk of the beneficial role of colonialism, saying that the hatred of the peoples for colonialism should not be linked with the bourgeois classes, especially in contemporary capitalism, because the policy of granting freedom and economic aid to under-developed countries is a modern characteristic of it. The author goes into some detail on what he calls these "false theses", examining the origin of the colonies and their association with capitalism.

After this "exposé", Chernyak attacks Western historiographers for "falsifying" the policies of the USSR and the position of the international revolutionary movement in relation to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. He claims they do this in order to try to justify Western colonial policy and to substantiate the "need" for neo-colonialism. As in Khalfin's article, Chernyak protests that the October Revolution has freed many peoples who were enslaved under the Tsars and has had a permanent revolutionary influence on the workers of the countries of the East. Over the course of history, Chernyak asserts, the Soviet Union has supported the struggle of peoples for their independence. He claims that during Khrushchev's trips to India, Indonesia, Burma and other Asian countries, Soviet journalists perceived that the peoples of the East felt a "great trust

and sympathy" for the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, and saw in her a "comrade and ally in the struggle against the imperialists, for peace and cooperation of all peoples." The author cites the Soviet proposal in the United Nations in 1960 advocating the full and immediate liquidation of colonialism. It would appear once again that remarks made by Western representatives in the discussions following this proposal, on colonialism practised by the Soviet Union and the motives for Soviet aid to the new countries have brought anguished Soviet protests. They comment on Western accusations that the Communists support the national liberation struggle only in the state interests of "Moscow", and on the naming of many people as willing or unwilling "agents of Bolshevism". They denounce Western identification of the liberation movements in oppressed countries with "bourgeois-democratic" revolutions which took place in America and France in the 18th century, rather than with the October Revolution in the Soviet Union. Chernyak protests that the Communists are working for the highest interests of each country, for the accomplishment of a real "democratic revolution", the formation of a state of national democracy, and a genuine improvement in the life of the working masses.

---

It should be noted that all the articles analysed above were written before the XXIInd Party Congress with its final condemnation of Stalin. If, as seems most probable, the discrediting of Stalin is now complete, some further modification in the Soviet attitude towards colonialism, and particularly on the subject of Tsarist colonialism, may be expected. The various vicissitudes which the Soviet attitude towards Tsarist colonialism has undergone are worth recapitulating. Pokrovskiy, the first Marxist historian, maintained that the Tsarist conquest and administration of Central Asia was wholly bad. In 1937, after his death, his theory was repudiated and the conquests were seen as "a lesser evil" by comparison with the possible alternative of a British conquest. After the upsurge of Russian patriotism during the Second World War and Stalin's strongly pro-Great Russian attitude manifested in 1945, the "lesser evil" theory gave way to the "positive good" theory. This resulted, among other things, in the re-writing of the official HISTORY OF THE KAZAKH SSR (1943), which had spoken unmistakably of Russian colonialism, and in a steady rehabilitation of the Tsarist imperial policy, and to some extent of Tsarist policy towards the adjoining countries of Persia and Afghanistan. During this period the word zavoyevaniye (conquest) was replaced by prisoyedineniye (annexation) or by dobrovol'noye prisoyedineniye (voluntary incorporation). In contrast to the first edition of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, the article on Colonies in the second edition contained no

reference to the fact that the Tsarist regime had had any colonies or had practised colonialism. After Stalin's death in 1953, and particularly after the XXth Party Congress of 1956 which marked the beginning of Stalin's repudiation, derogatory references to the Tsarist regime increased. Later, Stalin seemed to undergo a slight partial rehabilitation: the revised history of the Kazakh SSR which appeared in 1957 seemed to conform more or less to the theories prevailing in 1950.

It is interesting that public statements by Western spokesmen do not so far seem to have contained any references to the two subjects on which there is likely to be the greatest Soviet sensitivity: the precise coincidence of the frontiers of the Tsarist Asian empire and Soviet Asia, and the 1944 deportations from the Volga Region, the North Caucasus and the Crimea.

## P A K I S T A N   S I N C E   1 9 4 7

A recent issue of the USSR Academy of Science's publication, KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA NARODOV AZII (No.42, 1961), was devoted to India and Pakistan. The present article reviews the three articles on Pakistan, which describe the working-class movement, the economic relations between East and West Pakistan, and the youth movement since the formation of the new State in 1947. It is hoped to review the articles on India in a future number of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. The underlying theme of all these articles, as, indeed, of all recent Soviet writing on Pakistan, is what the authors consider the extremely difficult economic and living conditions of the people of Pakistan, and the failure of successive governments to live up to their promises. Much of the blame for these conditions is laid on Pakistan's participation in military pacts with western countries, and the continued British and American influence in the country. The authors also attack the discrimination which they claim is exercised by the Central Government against East Pakistan in favour of West Pakistan.

These articles are a good example of the Soviet technique of suppressio veri amounting to suggestio falsi: they are based on facts which cannot easily be controverted and are so arranged that facts on the credit side which could be cited would - in the context of the articles - appear largely irrelevant.

Both the first two articles greatly exaggerate the influence of the Pakistan Communist Party (now defunct), the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions and the Pakistan Federation of Workers. To what extent the last two organizations are still operative is not known, but all that any of the three ever succeeded in doing was to stir up disturbances and strikes which were dealt with with ease. They never succeeded in organizing a "mass movement".

## I. THE WORKING-CLASS IN WEST PAKISTAN

In the first article, "The Situation of the Working-Class and the Workers' Movement in West Pakistan (1947-1957)", T. Ruziyev regrets that little work has yet been done by Soviet writers on this subject, though Soviet Indian specialists have studied the working-class and movement in India up to the time of the partition of the country in 1947. The introduction to the article mentions the main sources used,

including publications of the Communist organs of Pakistan and Great Britain, as well as official Pakistani Government year-books.

Ruziyev maintains that much of Pakistan's economic difficulties is due to the terms of the partition of India, which was guided by religious and communal principles, without taking into consideration national composition, territorial integrity, or historical, economic and cultural links. Pakistan received the mainly agricultural areas, which were very weakly developed industrially. Of the two parts of Pakistan, West Pakistan is the more highly developed industrial area, with the greater part of the food and textile enterprises, and almost all of the few chemical and cement factories. In addition, West Pakistan has the higher concentration of workers, with a higher degree of organization. Immediately after the partition, "as a result of the Hindu-Muslim massacres in 1947, which were provoked by the imperialists," the large industrial centres of West Pakistan, Karachi, Lahore and others, were destroyed. Nearly 12 million people, according to Ruziyev, were left without homes or property. From the moment of partition, Pakistan accepted nearly eight million destitute Muslim refugees, and the sudden and unprecedented resettlement created additional, and almost insurmountable, economic difficulties, linked with the need to provide housing, food, work and transportation. In addition, the emigration of non-Muslims from Pakistan had an adverse effect on the economic situation of the workers, because in West Pakistan, and especially in the Punjab, almost all the skilled workers and many tradesmen were Sikhs and Hindus, who were moved to India as a result of the partition. The emigration of a third of the workers of Pakistan seriously weakened the workers' movement. Many trade unions were disbanded, and the leaders of many of the Punjab trade unions emigrated to India.

Ruziyev also blames the effects of colonial rule for Pakistan's difficulties. He says that the preservation of the position held by foreign capital and the "survivals of feudalism in the countryside" have led to a crisis in agricultural production and to serious economic difficulties. The policies of the new Pakistani Government are also blamed for the failure of the workers to obtain any improvement in their way of life, "although the ending of the colonial status created more favourable conditions for this." Before they came to power, the leaders of the Muslim League promised the working masses that an end would be put to exploitation, and that equal rights and freedom would be given to Muslim workers. However, according to the author, the period of Muslim League rule (1947-56) did not help the workers at all. He claims that there are still few organized workers in West Pakistan; their wages are the lowest in the world. In private firms wages are said to depend on the age of the worker or the number of his children. Few of the workers are skilled or educated. The

majority of workers are engaged in private industry. As of April 1956, 3,542 of the 4,397 enterprises in Pakistan were privately owned. Although there has been an increase in wages in the past few years, this has not kept pace with the rise in prices, resulting, in effect, in a decreasing real wage. Textile workers are in the worst position, and those in small industries are paid less than those in large. In most families the wife and children are forced to work, because it is impossible for the head of the family to earn enough to support them. Ruziyev claims that babies are often thrown into the streets. In 1955 only 11.2 per cent of Pakistanis could read or write, and in 1957 there were four million people in West Pakistan who had no roof over their heads. Safety precautions for Pakistani workers, especially the miners, are depicted as being extremely bad. According to the author, there are very few doctors in the country, and Ruziyev takes this opportunity to compare the situation with Soviet Central Asia.

Ruziyev paints a black picture of the number of unemployed in Pakistan, and he says the official figures do not include the seasonal workers, who only work about 125 days a year. He admits that there were even more without jobs in 1947, and only because so many Hindus were forced to leave was there any improvement in this respect. By 1959 there were 10 million displaced persons in Pakistan, with 60 per cent of them living in the countryside. Many landless peasants were moving to the cities. In West Pakistan many agricultural workers work for six months during the year, and then go to large industrial centres, thus obscuring the number of "hidden jobless" in the country. This constant migration also affects those fortunate enough to have jobs, because with the vast size of the available labour force there is no job security. Ruziyev asserts that the only solution for Pakistan is to nationalize the land, develop industry and trade, and "liquidate their economic dependence on the imperialist powers."

#### The trade union movement

Ruziyev says that in 1948, the newly-organized Communist Party played a leading role in the reorganization of old and the formation of new trade unions. The "democratic" forces of the country were faced with the task of the creation of a national united front, the basis of which had to be the union of the working-class with the peasantry and the petty urban bourgeoisie, "with the working-class in the leading role." In 1948 the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions was formed in Lahore under the leadership of the Communist Party, and it became a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The Government of the Muslim League, according to Ruziyev, tried to weaken these revolutionary trade unions, and encouraged the formation of a new All-Pakistani Confederation of Labour, which divided the trade union movement. The Government refused to recognize the Pakistan

Federation of Trade Unions, "despite its wide popularity", and arrested its leaders. After many protests and a strike, early in 1948, many "progressive" leaders were arrested, and the Government claimed the existence of an "anti-Government" plot. Though the Government did succeed in weakening the trade union movement by dividing it, the number of trade unions grew between 1951 and 1957 from 309 to 611. However, the total number of members decreased from 393,000 to 366,000 in this period as a result of the creation of new "reformist" trade union organizations existing "only on paper", and of splits in the old trade unions. About two-thirds of the trade unions were in West Pakistan, and the strongest organizations were in the Punjab and Karachi, while the weakest was in Baluchistan. Although, however, the more highly-organized trade unions were in West Pakistan, many of them were reformist rather than revolutionary, and their leadership had "reactionary elements".

In 1952 the Pakistan Federation of Workers was formed because of a split in the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions. This new organization, states the author, enjoyed great influence among the industrial workers of West Pakistan. Its demands include the recognition of the right to work, the end of dismissals from work, subsidies for those out of work, cost of living rises, better housing, free study for children, the assurance of medical aid, the development of local industry, aid to domestic trades, recognition of the unions, the repeal of the law on the "maintenance of public security" and the freeing of the imprisoned leaders of the trade unions. According to Ruziyev the Federation did have some successes, especially in the formation of professional and technical schools. However, it was seen to be under the influence of reformists and the ideological propaganda of Muslim organizations.

The economic strike is seen by the author to be the main weapon of the workers. The basic demands of the workers, for the time being, were economic: a rise in wages, the establishment of a guaranteed minimum wage, an eight-hour day, an improvement of working conditions, etc. From 1951, the economic and political aims of the workers started to merge. Ruziyev claims that "progressive" trade union organizations began to demand the withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth, the annulling of foreign military treaties, the abolition of the profits of foreign companies and their use for national development.

In summarizing, Ruziyev says that "reactionary forces are using all possible means for splitting the workers' movement". They are accused of acting through various religious societies to conduct propaganda among the workers, affirming that demands against the Government and business enterprises are a sin, since the latter are by way of

being the representatives of God on earth." The main problem facing the workers is that of the unity of the workers' movement and organizations. Over the past 10 years there has been no real material change for the workers, and the Pakistan Federation of Workers is engaged in a bitter struggle with the reformist All-Pakistan Confederation of Labour, as well as with various "reactionary Muslim organizations". All this tends to weaken the workers' movement, and slows up progress towards the alleviation of their plight.

## II. ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN

S.S. Baranov is the author of the second article, "Economic Inter-relationships of Eastern and Western Pakistan". The main theme is the alleged aim of the Muslim hierarchy at increasing the power of the Punjab in relation to the other parts of the country. The Muslim League is depicted as being against class equality, especially in Bengal. In 1957 the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly passed a resolution demanding provincial autonomy. This is seen by the author not simply as a clear manifestation of Bengali nationalism, but the culmination of a ten-year struggle of the Bengali people for equal rights in the country.

Baranov claims that in 1947 because of British rule and the partition, East Pakistan was in a very serious economic situation. The division of the country along religious and communal lines hit Bengal, one of the most developed areas, especially hard. The partition of the country separated the raw materials from the areas where they had been processed, and few enterprises were left in East Pakistan. The author maintains that hunger existed in the area even before partition, as a result of the "colonial yoke" and the control exercised by land-owners. Whatever the causes of the serious economic hardships, Baranov says that the economic links between Eastern and Western Pakistan constitute the most important problem facing the country, in the sense that it concerns the best use of the material and human resources of Pakistan. In the first years after partition, the tendency was to see East Bengal simply as one of several provinces without taking into account the peculiarities of its geographical situation, its distance from the rest of the country, the language and cultural differences, peculiarities of its economic development and the "generally recognized" need for a higher tempo of economic development. In effect, the Pakistani State had two economies, each with its own problems.

East Pakistan makes up only 15 per cent of the total area of the whole state, but this area contains 56 per cent of the country's population. However, the State Planning Committee in 1948-51 allotted less than one-third of the planned economic construction to the eastern part

of the country. A leading position was, it is true, given to the creation of a national jute industry in East Pakistan. During that period the interests of the West Pakistan bourgeoisie and the Bengal peasant producers of jute coincided. The development of jute plants was carried out mainly through the State sector, because the Bengal bourgeoisie could not afford to finance it. On the whole, however, the Central Government favoured the development of West Pakistan. By the end of 1959, the Corporation of Industrial Development of Pakistan, with the help of private capital, had participated in the creation of 65 industrial enterprises. Of this, West Pakistan received 51 per cent of the total sum allotted, East Pakistan 38.75 per cent and Karachi 10.25 per cent. The Central Government continued to strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie of West Pakistan, while private capital was mainly responsible for what construction took place in East Pakistan. The Central Government is accused by the author of using the State and its organizations for the expansion of private capitalist enterprises in the country. As a result of this policy, East Pakistan is now forced to import everything it needs, even including such domestic goods as soap.

In addition, the economic trade policy carried out by the Central Government is held by Baranov to be one of the most important means of the redistribution of the national income for the benefit of West Pakistan. The foreign trade operations of Pakistan for 1947-58, in thousands of Pakistani rupees, were as follows:

	<u>West Pakistan</u>	<u>East Pakistan</u>
Exports	8,030,030	9,958,922
Imports	12,106,476	5,270,407

East Pakistan has been forced to buy grain and other necessary consumer goods, while little in the way of industrial goods or capital equipment has come into the area. This reflects the desire of the West Pakistan bourgeoisie, according to Baranov, to use any means, including the State Trading Corporation, to use the territory of Bengal as a market for its goods, and to cover the yearly foreign trade deficit of West Pakistan by using the favourable balance of trade of East Pakistan and the great export potentialities of this province. Thus, in the period 1948-58, East Pakistan imported 3,675m. rupees worth of goods from West Pakistan, while exports from East Pakistan to West Pakistan were only 1,614m. rupees. In addition, West Pakistan's export of textiles to East Pakistan did not help the Bengal hand weaving industry. At the same time West Pakistan's traders were trying to increase their share of goods of foreign origin by re-importing from East Pakistan many goods which the latter had imported from abroad. This policy has aroused many protests in East Pakistan.

Baranov says that the development of mutually advantageous trade is hampered not only by the policy of the Central Government of restricting the issue to Bengal entrepreneurs of export licenses for many goods, but also to the lack of sufficient tonnage for the shipping of goods between the two parts of the country. The Central Government was forced, however, under pressure of criticism of its trade policy, to agree to a separate controller for exports and imports for East Pakistan. Baranov stresses that East Pakistan needs very much more financial aid from the Central Government than does West Pakistan. Yet the amount allotted by the Central Government to the East Pakistan provincial budget for 1947-58 was just 972m. rupees, only a little more than the 859.5m. rupees allotted to West Pakistan. At the same time, East Pakistan received very much less than West Pakistan for the general budget, for the maintenance of the State apparatus. Direct expenses of the Government for the needs of economic development were four times as large for West Pakistan as for East. The same discrepancy is noted in the allotment of "so-called development loans" for economic development. Foreign aid received by Pakistan is also balanced greatly in favour of West Pakistan.

According to Baranov, this policy of the Central Government of Pakistan towards the eastern part of the country has caused great dissatisfaction, and has been the major cause of the demand for provincial autonomy. He claims that the history of events in recent years has shown the failure of the policy of the Government to consolidate the country solely on the basis of Muslim ideology, without taking into account the economic, national and cultural peculiarities of the different areas and provinces. As a result, the problem of economic relations between East and West Pakistan remains unsolved.

### III. THE PAKISTANI YOUTH MOVEMENT

In the final article, "The Youth Movement in Pakistan (1947-58)", V.N. Moskalenko repeats some of the material that appears in the first article, particularly about the conditions of life in present-day Pakistan. Moskalenko declares that because of these conditions, and because the children receive much less than the 3,000 minimum calories considered necessary, the Pakistani is already old at the age of 25 or 26. Every year, he says, 30 per cent of the population go down with malaria, and approximately 30 people per thousand die. Child mortality is eight times higher than that of Great Britain.

According to the author, child labour is a common thing in Pakistan. Although there is a domestic industrial law by which no one under twelve is supposed to work, this law is not observed. When children work in factories, they are paid only a quarter to half of

the rate for adults. Only one out of fifteen can read and write, and half of those in the 6 to 11 age group never go to a primary school. Girls number only one-tenth of the pupils in the schools, and school buildings are often very bad. Moskalenko says that the young children of workers have to go begging, and the older ones are sent to work.

However, the major part of this article, as acknowledged in a footnote, is about the position of students in Pakistan, rather than of youth in general. Moskalenko examines the situation of the students within the context of what he calls the general economic and political backwardness of the country, the difficult living conditions of the people and the low cultural level. There is very little organization of young people and very few of them take part in workers' movements. Some of the leaders are in gaol. The "ruling circles" are accused of having suppressed the least manifestation of dissatisfaction, and also of trying to influence the ideology of the rising generation and to "poison their minds with the poison of nationalism, and panislamism", as well as splitting the organization of young people and weakening any democratic tendencies.

The panislamic movement is described by Moskalenko as one of the most serious dangers to Pakistani youth. The Government is seen as dividing the young people along religious lines, resulting in religious communal youth organizations. This is alleged to create the illusion that there are no class or national differences among the Muslims, but a united Muslim society. The Government seeks to educate youth in the principles of Islam, and encourages religious fanaticism. The author decries the amount of military education given to youth and the existence of many military schools. He also attacks the scout movement and the presence of British and American "specialists" among them. Nevertheless, he does see the youth movement as a whole as part of the general democratic movement. While fighting for their own interests, youth is at the same time shown as calling for a solution of the nationalities question, for agrarian reform, the democratization of the internal life of the country and for an independent foreign policy.

This identification of the students with political aims is seen by the author as particularly noticeable in East Pakistan. The students are said to be joining in the struggle of the Bengal people against economic and political discrimination. They have been seeking autonomy, and have come out against the Government's attempt to declare Urdu the State language. There was a student demonstration in February 1952, following which the main University in Bengal province was closed. The students demanded Bengali as a State language, and participated in the forming of an opposition United Front. In this battle the students won, for the Government recognized Bengali as one of the State languages. The province was given some autonomous rights with equal

representation in Parliament and Government service being established for Bengalis and for the inhabitants of West Pakistan. According to the author the youth of East and West Pakistan support each other in their demands, and this was especially true in a demonstration occurring in 1953.

Student conditions in the universities are described by Moskalenko as being wholly inadequate. Higher education is said to be very expensive, with special fees for laboratories, libraries and textbooks. Only one-tenth of the students are housed in hostels, while the others have to "cut corners". Few women manage to get into the hostels, and stipends for most students are very low. Many students have to work in the ports and on the railways in order to make ends meet. Many cannot find any skilled work when they finish their studies.

### Student organizations

The author outlines the progress of student organizations since the partition of India. After the formation of the new State, two student organizations were formed in East Pakistan. The first, the East Pakistan Student Federation, included students independent of their religion, while the second, the East Pakistan Muslim Students League, included only Muslims and, according to Moskalenko, sought to disrupt the unity of the students. This latter organization, he claims, was fully discredited because it refused to participate in the campaign against Urdu as the official State language. In November 1948 the East Pakistan Student Federation organized a general strike of students of the province, and for the first time Muslim girls took part in street demonstrations. In January 1949 both student groups organized a joint "day of struggle against repressions", and later in the same year the Student Federation was banned and many of its leaders arrested. In March 1951 a League of Youth was formed in East Pakistan, which sought to unite the whole youth of the province under the leadership of leftist leaders of the National League. According to Moskalenko, in 1952 the League of Youth was active in the creation of a United Front of all opposition parties, and it also favoured an independent foreign policy, including friendship with India. However, the League failed, because, the author believes, it did not become a mass organization. It existed only in the larger cities, and was poorly supported by both workers and rural youth.

The presence of many nationalities in West Pakistan has made it more difficult to unite the youth in any single movement. Moskalenko writes that young people here have been interested primarily in the problems and interests of their own nationality. For example, those in the North-West Frontier Province have actively supported the movement for greater rights for the Pushtuns. In both West and East

Pakistan students have also been in the front rank of "militant youth". In both areas this is explained not only by their higher degree of cultural development, but also because students form a compact group. Several student groups have been formed, but the student movement has suffered from its disunity. A student demonstration in Karachi in January 1953, in which a number of people were killed by the police, resulted in demonstrations all over Pakistan. The Government was finally forced to give in, and improve the situation of the students.

The author stresses the influence that the political parties of Pakistan have on the young. Thus, the struggle between youth organizations reflects that between the parties themselves. The great need, he says, is for an all-Pakistani youth organization. Such an attempt was made in 1952-3, when an All-Pakistani Organization of Youth was formed, seeking a higher standard of living for the people, an end to illiteracy, improvement in medical services, etc. The first Congress of Pakistani students took place in December 1953 in Karachi, with delegates participating from both parts of Pakistan and from 16 student organizations. After the Congress an All-Pakistani Student Union was formed calling for better conditions for students and teachers. However, this Student Union failed to unite all the institutions of learning in the country. By 1956 student unions had been formed in all Pakistani universities, creating a firmer foundation for uniting the students. In June 1956 representatives of some universities and colleges met in Karachi to consider the problem of uniting student organizations. It created a special commission to begin preliminary work for a national union of students. A congress met in August 1957, with representatives of all six universities of Pakistan. It worked out a programme for a new National Union of Students. This new group received an invitation from the Coordinating Secretariat of International Student Conferences to attend the Seventh International Conference of Students in Nigeria. In September 1958, in Peking, the National Union of Students was accepted into the International Union of Students. However, Moskalenko accuses the Government of seeking to hinder links between Pakistani youth and those of other countries, and refusing to give them permission to attend a youth festival in Bucharest. Some students went to Bucharest despite this official opposition. In January 1959 the new Government of Ayub Khan banned the National Union of Students. Thus, according to Moskalenko, there is now no national student organization in Pakistan, though he claims that the youth of the country continues "to struggle for peace", "national independence, democracy and progress".

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
SITUATION IN PERSIA :

THE SOVIET VIEW

In recent months Soviet magazine and newspaper articles about the present Persian Government have grown increasingly virulent. (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1962, No.1, p.98.) In a recent article by M. Ivanov, "Aggravation of the Crisis in Persia" (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No.11, 1961, pp.115-24), a strong attack is made not only on the present economic and political situation in Persia and her membership in CENTO, but also on Premier Amini personally, who, Ivanov claims, was appointed mainly on American insistence. Persia is described as being in a state of economic collapse, and this is blamed on Persian subordination to foreign capital, the refusal of her Government to follow a neutral policy, and huge sums laid out for military purposes.

Persia's military policy

The Prime Minister himself is quoted as having declared in May 1961 that the country was threatened with economic ruin, and as acknowledging that the financial and economic system was falling apart, and prices rising. Ivanov says that the chief cause of this situation is the "huge non-productive military expenditure which is a result of Persia's participation in CENTO." He quotes statistics which he claims indicate that from 1953 to the beginning of 1961 Persian expenditure on armaments and military installations was 65 milliard rials, or more than four times greater than the total expenditure up to March 1959 on agriculture, melioration, industry and mining during the first and second seven-year plans. The Americans are accused of seeking to frighten Persian Government officials with the "danger of Communism", and by the use of loans and "so-called aid", "converting the country into their main base in the Middle East." In this connexion the author notes that the Americans are transferring their military base in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) to Persia. Ivanov quotes the new American Ambassador in Persia, Holmes, as saying that President Kennedy has stressed that Persia will become the chief centre of the struggle against "the Communist danger in the Middle East", and

that "within the framework of such a policy the United States is ready to give Persia new aid."

Ivanov keeps up the steady "revelation" of alleged top-secret CENTO documents (published in the Soviet press in August 1961), which it is claimed, show that CENTO bases in Persia, Turkey and Pakistan were to be used for an attack against the Soviet Union, and that this would involve the creation of a nuclear "zone of death" along the borders of these countries with the Soviet Union, involving the killing of millions of people and the destruction of many cities.

The Persian Army, according to the author, is controlled by American military missions which, he says, became especially active after the conclusion of the bilateral American-Persian military agreement signed in March 1959. Besides directing the construction of military bases and the utilization of American military aid, it is alleged that the American missions are also preparing the Persian Army for suppression of the "national liberation movement". American officers are accused of claiming seniority rights when in contact with Persian officers of equal rank and of "playing a deciding role in the carrying out of 'purges' of 'unreliable' elements in the Persian Army, interfering in the internal affairs of the country, and participating in the suppression of popular demonstrations." Such alleged actions of the Americans are said to have "outraged the national pride of the Persian people."

#### Western influence in Persia

These American advisers are also accused of being one of the causes of the disruption of the Persian economy and non-fulfilment of the second seven-year plan. Ivanov says that American "advisers" and experts receive high rates of pay from Persian funds, and by comparing the high rate of pay for American soldiers with that of Persian teachers and State employees, he also implies that these soldiers are paid from Persian sources. [This, of course, is quite untrue.]

Ivanov also attacks the large number of foreign companies active in Persia which, he claims, have taken control of the most important economic enterprises. American and British oil monopolies are accused of acting through the international oil consortium to gain control of Persia's chief natural resource. These oil companies, he goes on to say, sell Persian oil at 10 to 13 times more than the cost of the oil, thus receiving over 600 million dollars profit a year.

Since Persia entered CENTO, according to Ivanov, the former system of foreign trade has been upset, and replaced by an "open door" policy for the import of goods from "imperialist countries". This, in

turn, has led to a highly unfavourable trade balance, with the excess of imports over exports increasing every year. The author alleges this is a result of the development of Persian economic links only with capitalist countries, especially West Germany, America and Britain, to the near exclusion of the socialist countries. This competition of foreign goods he also blames as having had a bad effect on Persian industry. Many textile, leather and other enterprises are alleged to have closed down. The owners of such factories are said to have demanded without success that the Government take measures to preserve the native industries, to ban the export of cotton and the import of such goods as are produced in Persian factories. There have been a growing number of bankrupt Persian firms, with an increasingly large flow of capital to foreign banks. Tehran newspapers are quoted as saying that the deposits of leading Persian citizens in foreign banks exceeds the yearly budget of the country.

According to Ivanov, this dependence on capitalist countries prevents the use of national capital in the development of Persian industry. Vice-Chancellor Erhardt of West Germany is quoted as having said in 1960 that Persia did not need heavy industry, and ought to remain an agricultural country. However, Ivanov goes on to say that the state of Persian agriculture is also "chaotic". The Prime Minister, Amini, is reported as having said in May 1961 that not enough food is being produced to meet internal demands, including bread and meat. As an agrarian country more than three-fourths of the Persian people are engaged in agriculture, and yet the country is still forced to import foodstuffs. The main cause of the failure of agriculture is seen in the control exercised by large landowners and in "feudal survivals".

### The economic crisis

Steps which have been taken by the Government to meet the growing economic crisis are seen by Ivanov as making the position of the people even worse. In the 1960-1 budget, for example, the railway tariff was increased by 10 per cent, while the prices for petrol, sugar and other goods which are a State monopoly have been raised. In the 1961-2 budget, three new kinds of taxes have been proposed: on health, education and study in State schools. However, despite these new taxes, a deficit still exists. Ivanov cites figures to show how inflation is growing. In spite of income from oil of nearly 285 million dollars a year, Persia is getting more and more into debt and has been forced to ask America for more money.

Ivanov also attacks "corruption in the ruling hierarchy", including ministers, generals and deputies of the majles. This is alleged to have reached such proportions that the Amini Government has been forced to arrest several prominent people, accusing them of pilfering

and bribery. Ivanov mentions a number of such officials. But he claims that the Government is still not fighting these abuses.

Persia's refusal to follow a neutral policy, her participation in CENTO and the militarization of the country, the control of foreign capital, the domination of "American advisers", the continuance of feudal survivals, all these are found by the author to have resulted in poverty and hunger for the Persian masses. According to Ivanov, the national per capita income in 1959 was \$130, or 2.5 times less than that of Turkey, while the income of the great majority was many times less than this. The Shah is quoted as having declared in 1959 that the average life expectancy of a Persian is only 27 years. Persia is alleged to have one of the highest suicide rates in the world because of hunger and poverty. Discussing public health, Ivanov states there is only one doctor for each 10,000 inhabitants, and as nearly three-fourths of the doctors work in the large cities, the great majority of the people have no medical help. Four million people a year contract malaria, as well as many other illnesses, and 85 per cent of the population are illiterate. The author says that the rural population, as well as urban workers, live in unsanitary conditions, and that many do not have clean drinking water.

The cost of food and rent are described by Ivanov as being very high, while wages are very low. He also says that Persian youth are exploited in industry, and that the great majority of them cannot receive any education. Nearly 20,000 young Persians have had to go abroad for a higher education. Because of the large number of foreigners in leading positions in Persia, many of these Persians educated abroad cannot get work when they return. Those who do get work, he claims, are paid much less than skilled foreign specialists.

### Popular unrest

What has been the effect of the worsening situation on the Persian people? According to Ivanov, a wave of dissatisfaction has spread through the country, among the peasants, workers, employees, soldiers and intelligentsia. The People's Party [i.e. the Tudeh Party], now underground, has been reported as trying to create a united front to fight "against imperialists and internal reactionaries". There has been an outbreak of strikes, with the workers not only demanding an improvement in their economic situation, but supporting the desire of all the people for democratic rights and freedoms. He mentions in detail a number of strikes, including those of teachers and State employees. In May 1961, 30,000 people gathered at the majles and demanded the resignation of Imami's Government and the punishment of the chief of the police section which had killed one teacher. The Government was accused of using troops to suppress these strikes. A number of the

incidents mentioned by Ivanov took place under previous governments. The Government in 1960 and 1961 was accused of using the State apparatus and the gendarmerie to defend the interests of landowners. Demonstrations by students both in Persia and of Persian students abroad are cited. Ivanov says that the National Front, which had been driven underground after "the reactionary revolution of Zahedi" (1953), resumed its activities in mid-1960. Its leaders (including one close to Mosaddeq) support an "independent neutral foreign policy", a re-examination of the agreement with the international oil consortium and a refusal to take part in military blocs, as well as the restoration of personal and public liberties and the holding of universal elections

The alleged popularity of the National Front, according to Ivanov, is due in large part to the "great influence among the people of Dr. Mosaddeq, who is considered the spiritual father of the Front." The author claims that the national bourgeoisie, merchants, traders, intelligentsia, students and State employees all support the National Front.

This "popular reaction" is seen by the author as having caused "confusion and disarray" among Persian ruling circles. They are accused of trying to manoeuvre to get out of this "powerful wave of universal dissatisfaction". He links these "manoeuvres" with the resignation of the Eqlal Government, the annulment of the majles elections in August 1960, and also the resignation of the Imami Government and dissolution of the majles in May 1961. Any attempts by the Shah and the present Persian Government at reforms are seen by Ivanov as "demagogic measures" aimed at saving a "corrupt regime". The American Central Intelligence Agency is said to be seeking to put into power a strong government that would base its policies on participation in CENTO. The Amini Government is accused of arresting anyone who criticizes it or who makes accusation against the Americans.

### Subservience to America

The new Prime Minister, who was appointed on 6 May 1961, Ivanov asserts was nominated to this post on the insistence of the Americans. He quotes "foreign press" sources as saying that the Americans have had him in mind ever since 1958-9, when he was Persian Ambassador to the United States. Ivanov quotes a Cairo newspaper as saying in March 1958 that Amini had established contact with the American secret service and with representatives of American oil companies, "promising to present the United States with many concessions, including the creation of atomic bases on Persian territories, if he should come to power." Ivanov seeks to "prove" this fantastic charge by saying that Amini became Minister of Finance in the "reactionary" Zahedi Government in 1953, following the "plot against the Mosaddeq Government". In 1954

he headed the Persian delegation to conduct conversation with the international oil consortium, and signed a treaty "which handed over Persian oil to American and British oil monopolies." Immediate American promises of aid to the new Amini Government in 1961 are cited.

### Land reform

Ivanov also comments on the "land reform" programme announced by the new Government. He says this reform contains so many reservations that no essential improvement for the peasants could result. The programme, he goes on to say, is only meant to deceive the peasants and public opinion.

The author concludes his article with an appeal to Persia to return to an "independent national policy". He says that only by the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union can Persia escape her present situation, restore her economy and end hunger and poverty. He cites the policy of Afghanistan in this regard. Ivanov says that the Soviet Union is prepared to give Persia "disinterested economic aid without any political or other conditions incompatible with her sovereignty". He claims that all Persian patriots want to end the present policy of participation in "military imperialistic blocs" and to return to a neutral policy and the establishment of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

## C O A L - M I N I N G I N P E R S I A

In a recent study of one phase of the Persian economy, N.M. Agasi writes on "The State of the Coal-Mining Industry in Persia" (IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK Azb. SSR, No.4, 1961). The author states that Persia has many valuable mineral deposits which have not been developed, and he blames this primarily on the maintenance of "feudal relations" and "the dominance of the imperialists in the Persian economy." He points out that neither in Soviet nor Persian literature is there sufficient reliable statistical or general information on the state of the mining industry in Persia, and that his article is written on the basis of material gathered from Persian newspapers and magazines.

The development of Persian mineral resources is governed by a law of 24 December 1952, which establishes three categories of minerals. The first includes minerals necessary for construction purposes for which licences for prospecting are not needed. The owners of land containing such minerals can exploit them as long as they observe the decree's provisions on exploitation. The second category includes deposits of metals and solid fuel. These are rented to private enterprises and firms, and require special licences for prospecting purposes. The final category includes oil products, natural gases and radio-active elements, of which only the State is allowed to conduct prospecting and exploitation.

Agasi says that according to Persian statistical data, only 80 out of 179 known deposits of the first category are regularly exploited. With the exception of one, which is exploited by the State, all the remaining deposits in this category are worked by private persons or firms. The article includes a list of the locations of declared deposits in the second category, which include lead, copper, coal, salt, sulphur, zinc and turquoise. However, the author stresses that because of the absence of heavy industry in Persia, the main exploitation of these second category resources is for export. In the period 1940-50, the Ministry of Industry and Minerals granted 184 licences to private persons for developing these minerals, while from 1950 to 1958 alone 6,677 such licences were issued. This large increase is explained by the author by the extreme lucrativeness of this comparatively young Persian industry. He accuses American, British, West German and Japanese "monopolists" of attempting to seize Persia's riches by creating a series of mixed joint-stock companies.

Coal occupies second place in the estimated reserves of Persia's resources, and it is believed that there are nearly two milliard tons waiting to be exploited. The industrial extraction of coal in Persia began in the 1930s with the start of industrial development in factories and plants. The article indicates in a chart the principal known coal deposits in Persia. Only in the last ten years has any significant extraction of coal been noted, and though there has been a cut in the rate of growth recently, there has been a fairly large increase in the amount mined. Compared with its potentialities, however, coal-mining in Persia is insignificant, mainly because of the absence in Persia itself of a proper demand for coal due to industrial backwardness. Coal comprises only five per cent of the fuel consumed in the country.

One of the main causes for the lack of growth of the internal demand for coal is the competition of a cheaper fuel, oil. In addition, production costs per ton of coal remain very high and transport costs for the consumers are considerable. However, the cheapness of labour in Persia means that production costs per ton of coal are still less than the international price. It is this situation which stimulates the attraction of foreign capital for the exploitation of the country's minerals, including coal. Many foreign companies have taken advantage of the Persian law of 1952 to do this. The author says that German specialists, after studying the useful minerals of one area, presented a report to the Ministry of Industry and Mining which has been used as the basis of conversations between Persian authorities and foreign states, especially on the exploitation by the latter of coal deposits.

The article includes a very detailed description of the principal mines in Persia, indicating their location, the amount of primary capital investment, yearly extraction, number of workers employed, main customers, the potential of the mine, transport facilities and the quality of the coal. The author is especially critical of the use of out-dated and dangerous equipment and the high internal transport expenses, as well as the low wages of the workers. Over 90 per cent of coal-mining in Persia is carried out by eight State mines, details of six of which are given in Agasi's article. In addition to these, there are a number of mines belonging to private persons, but their average yearly production is only 10-15,000 tons, or approximately 5-6 per cent of the country's total extraction.

The author also notes that coal processing in Persia is hardly developed at all. The first attempts at coke firing took place 20 years ago, but because of the absence of heavy industry, the quantity of coking coal is insignificant. In Persia's factories about 8,000 tons of coke are used annually. What coke firing does take place is

done in primitive open stoves. Agasi also comments that coal is only extracted from seams near the surface, the coal being raised by primitive hand gates. As a result of "incorrect exploitation, the average productiveness of labour in the Persian coal industry is lower than in any other country." Thus, the average labour productivity in Persian coal-mines is 0.5 tons per shift, against 10 tons in European countries and 13.9 tons in the United States. It is interesting to note that Agasi makes no comparison with productivity in the Soviet Union. He points out that though coal is the only kind of solid fuel for railway transport, hydroelectric stations and industrial enterprises, internal consumption is still growing very slowly. Out of 138,000 tons of coal and coke consumed in a recent year, 94,000 tons were used by textile, cement, brick, sugar and copper factories; 17,000 by tea enterprises and blacksmiths; 12,000 for fuel in coal-mines; 6,000 in State institutions; 2,000 for military needs; and only 7,000 as domestic fuel. At the present time, according to Agasi, only five per cent of the energy and domestic needs of the country are met by coal. Although many Persian economists probably believe that some industrial enterprises would lower their production costs considerably if they used coal, they continue to use expensive liquid fuels. Agasi claims that this is because they are under State jurisdiction, and the people in control are not directly interested in lowering production costs.

Agasi asserts that miners in Persia are cruelly exploited. He claims they are forced to travel great distances to work, and must pay for this journey from very low wages which, he says, in some cases are lower than those stipulated by the "Labour Law" which was passed in 1946. He also decries the extensive use of child labour in the mines. Another criticism is the "antediluvian methods" used to get the coal to the surface and the absence of any technique of purifying the mines from dust and gases; the miners not even being supplied with masks.

The author sees the dependence of the national economy on foreign capital as one of the main causes of the under-development of the coal industry. On the one hand, this prevents Persia from independently developing a necessary branch of industry, and on the other, important strategic and other resources are used for the development of the industry of other countries. Agasi believes that it would be much cheaper for Pakistan to import coal from Persia than from the United States. However, a whole series of measures, including the supply of adequate transport, modern techniques, and the creation of enterprises to manufacture coal briquettes would be necessary.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE  
SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 January - 31 March 1962. The only items on India which have been included are those relating to the death of the General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party and to Soviet reporting of the Indian general elections, with a brief note on the general subject of Soviet-Indian relations. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet press has continued to stress the friendly relations existing between the USSR and Afghanistan. IZ (27.1.62) and some of the Central Asian press reported the ratification of the agreement between the two Governments on economic and technical cooperation during the second Afghan Five-Year Plan. The agreement had been signed in Moscow in October 1961. Under it, the Soviet Union promised aid to Afghanistan for oil prospecting, the construction of oil and chemical enterprises, and the development of roads and agriculture. PR on 14.2.62 mentioned the signing of a protocol on cultural cooperation between the two countries during 1962. There was extensive coverage in the metropolitan press on the 41st anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship between the RSFSR and Afghanistan on 28 February 1921.

TI on 4.3.62 reviewed a number of books which have recently been published in the USSR on Afghanistan, stressing the interest of Soviet orientalists in Afghanistan's economic and cultural progress and the development of good relations between the two countries. PR and IZ on 30.3.62 displayed prominently the messages sent to Afghanistan by Khrushchev and President Brezhnev on the occasion of the Afghan New Year, as well as the answering messages by the King and Prime Minister of Afghanistan. No mention was made in the Soviet press of the temporary re-opening of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan at the end of January to admit American aid which had accumulated in Pakistan.

## INDIA

The death of Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, General Secretary of the Indian Communist Party, received fairly extensive coverage in the central Soviet press, but little comment in the republican newspapers. PR on 14.1.62 carried the official message of condolence of the Central Committee of the CPSU, emphasizing Ghosh's efforts towards strengthening friendly relations between the Soviet Union and India. On 15.1.62 PR carried a long obituary of Ghosh, giving details of his early life and his activities in the Indian Communist Party. It was noted especially that Ghosh headed the Indian Communist Party delegation to the XXIIInd Congress of the CPSU, and had supported the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On 17.1.62 PR claimed that the death of Ghosh had caused deep sorrow among the proletariat of Bombay. It was reported that a meeting had taken place of the 16 leading members of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party in Delhi, and that they had decided that they would exercise collective control of the Party until new elections for the Secretariat were completed. On 18.1.62 PR, KT and PV carried a report of an official memorial meeting held in Delhi in honour of Ghosh, and opened by the Mayor of Delhi.

The Soviet press carried many articles on the Indian parliamentary elections which took place in mid-February. As early as 12.1.62 PR had a long article by its special correspondent in Delhi, N. Pastukhov, which reviewed the positions of the Indian political parties. Pastukhov acknowledged that the ruling Congress Party would retain control, and he expressed his hope that the Party would follow a more progressive policy, and would fight against those elements in the Party seeking a move to the right. In discussing the pre-election manifesto of the Congress Party, Pastukhov noted that the Party admits that there have been shortcomings which have resulted in a growth of unemployment and a slow tempo of economic development. The Communist Party manifesto is also discussed in detail. It is claimed that the Party has supported the "more progressive" aspects of the economic programme of the Congress Party, but it criticizes the latter for not having fulfilled all its promises and for having sought foreign capital. The Communist Party also complains of the neglect of the conditions of the workers, and for having allowed the private sector of the economy to accumulate wealth. On 16.2.62 PR carried a strong attack on right-wing elements in India, especially the Swatantra Party. It accused this Party of demanding the liquidation of the State sector, and the end of a planned national economy. It also claims that this Party seeks to end cooperation with the Soviet Union, and the signing of a military pact of "mutual defence" with Pakistan. On 4.3.62 IZ greeted the results of the elections as a defeat for those united right-wing forces which opposed Nehru's foreign policy and who were against the industrialization and planning of the country's economy.

All of the Soviet press carried extensive reports of celebrations marking the 12th anniversary of the proclamation of the Indian Republic. PR and most other newspapers on 27.1.62 carried long reports stressing the friendship of the peoples of the USSR and India and reporting celebrations in the Soviet Union marking the occasion. The Soviet press has continued to give detailed coverage to the exchange of cultural and other delegations between the Soviet Union and India, as well as to Soviet economic aid.

#### NEPAL

Only two very brief items in PR and BR on 25.1.62 mentioned the bomb attack on the King of Nepal which was extensively covered in the Western press, and no further mention was made of recent clashes occurring in Nepal in the past few months. A number of items appeared in many Soviet newspapers on 18.2.62 on Nepal's National Day. Soviet treatment of the King of Nepal continues favourable, despite the continued imprisonment of the leaders of some of the political parties. IZ on the same date congratulated Nepal on her development of relations with the socialist countries, and described Soviet policy towards Nepal as one of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in her affairs. I. Red'ko in PR and A. Leonov in BR both describe Soviet economic aid to Nepal in detail. Both articles note economic and cultural progress in Nepal, but avoid any mention of the country's precarious political situation.

#### PAKISTAN

Once again press coverage of events in Pakistan has been scanty, and what there is is critical of Pakistan's foreign policy, and unfavourable as regards the country's internal situation. KZ on 24.1.62 reported a meeting of representatives of Pushtun tribes, which accused the Pakistani Government of having intensified its oppression of the Pushtun people. The report, quoted from an Afghan newspaper, accused Pakistani troops of bombing Pushtun settlements. On 31.1.62 BR quoted a report from THE TIMES OF INDIA, accusing Pakistan of having carried out provocation on the Indian-Pakistani border, especially along the cease-fire line in Kashmir. KT on 9.2.62 mentioned another incident between the two countries in the State of Assam. In these reports of incidents between Pakistan and her neighbours, the Soviet press invariably supports the complainant against Pakistan, though it should be noted that the reports have been confined to the republican press. A longer report in IZ on 20.1.62, however, quoted Pakistani newspapers as supporting efforts to get Pakistan to leave SEATO and CENTO. This

article claims that there is an increasing demand within the country for Pakistan to follow an independent foreign policy. KOM.P. on 16.2.62 carried a report on student agitation in the eastern part of Pakistan. The report asserts that mass anti-Government meetings and demonstrations took place. It is claimed that the immediate cause of the disorders was the arrest of the former Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardi, who was leader of the banned "National League" Party. However, it is further claimed by the author of this article that the real cause of these demonstrations was the "deep dissatisfaction of the masses with the policy of the military regime", along with the increase in prices of consumer goods, in taxes, and the general worsening of the material situation of the masses and the suppression of democratic freedoms.

#### PERSIA

The students' demonstrations in Tehran were reported in the Soviet press, but without particular prominence. A report in BR on 31.1.62 remarked that in attributing the demonstrations to Soviet broadcasts "the rulers of Persia have not for the first time resorted to deception in order to conceal the true state of affairs in the country." The rest of this same article, which was the only substantial newspaper comment on Persia affairs in January, emphasized the extent of discontent in Persia, which it attributed to Persia's links with the United States and with CENTO. BR on 17.2.62 recalled the students' demonstrations and satirized features of the present Persian Government. On 27.2.62 PV published a two-page feature contrasting the cities of Tashkent and Tehran, "Flourishing Tashkent - Grim Tehran", comparing a thriving Tashkent with a Tehran with insanitary slums, narrow streets without electricity, telephones or postal services. KOM.P. on 8.3.62 carried Tass dispatches from Tehran, reporting anti-Western comments in Persian newspapers. "The Agrarian Problem in Persia" is the subject of an article in PV on 20.3.62. It comments on Persian press reports concerning recent steps taken towards land reform in Persia, indicating its belief that it is an attempt to divert the attention of the masses from the programme of the CPSU for building a Communist society. The author of the article claims that the proposed land reforms will do nothing to alleviate the difficult situation of the Persian peasants.


#### TIBET

Albert Pelevin is the author of a long article in TI on 16.2.62, a shorter version of which was in KP on 14.2.62, extolling progress in agricultural development and in the creation of domestic industries in

Tibet. The author claims that for many centuries the monks controlled both the economy and the education of Tibet. Now, however, according to Pelevin, many Tibetans are studying, doctors are being sent to Tibet from "other parts of China", and the cultural development of the country is progressing happily. He asserts that Tibet is now "constructing a happy life in the great family of the people of the new China".



Vol. X No. 3. 1962.



# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in  
the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with  
St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.



*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus Sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents :

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,  
46, Great Russell Street,  
LONDON, W.C. 1.

Price : Seven Shillings & Sixpence

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## CONTENTS

	Page
Editorial	202
<b>Soviet Central Asia</b>	
The Fishermen of the Southern Aral	206
The Samarland Treaty of 712	214
Some Statistics on Higher Education in the Muslim Republics	229
The Tenth Anniversary of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences	242
Barymta. By M. O. Auezov	249
Books Received : The Land of the Great Sophy by Roger Stevens ; A Modern History of Georgia by David Marshall Lang	260
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Affairs ; Archæology ; Communications ; Conferences ; Education ; Irrigation ; Oriental Studies ; Town Planning	262
<b>Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia</b>	
Tsin Administration in Sinkiang in the First Half of the 19th Century	271
American Policy in India	285
The Soviet Union and Nepal	294
Afghanistan : A Soviet Assessment	297
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	308

## Maps

Fisher settlements of the Southern Aral	facing page 207
West- and South-Kazakhstan Krays	„ 263
Arys-Turkestan Canal	„ 267
Afghanistan	„ „ 299
The Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaydzhan	at end

## Illustrations

Taylakdzhigen Island : Plan of Kazakh homesteads	facing page 211
Tasbeskum Island : Plan of Kara-Kalpak homestead	„ „ 211
On Akpetki Island	„ „ 212
A Kazakh homestead on Karabayly Island	„ „ 212

---

---

## Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL.X, NO.3

---

EDITORIAL

The announcement made recently by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR that at long last a definitive edition of the works of V.V. Bartol'd is to be published in nine volumes will have been received with satisfaction by all those familiar with his work. The number of these is unfortunately rather small, partly because little of his work has been translated out of Russian, a language whose importance as a vehicle for oriental studies most Western orientalists prefer to ignore, and partly because even the Russian editions of most of his work are exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.

Although usually described as an "orientalist" - a musty-sounding term which the Russians have done well to abandon, Bartol'd was in fact a great historian of the Muslim East, probably the greatest that ever lived. Born in St.Petersburg in 1869 of German origin, he studied at St.Petersburg University and began lecturing there in 1896. In 1912 he was appointed a member of the Academy of Sciences, and this he remained until his death in 1930. The range of his scholarship was vast and unlike many historians who have undertaken to write the history of the Muslim East, he was a scholar in all three of its principal languages - Arabic, Persian and Turkish, and was thus able to study primary source material at first hand. His works include over 400 items of varying length, and there is hardly any subject of importance relating to the history of Muslim Asia which escaped his attention. Most of his published work dates from before the Revolution. Although he was the first editor of the journal MIR ISLAMA (The World of Islam) published by the semi-official Imperial Oriental Institute, he was not looked upon with favour by the authorities, who regarded his work as too academic and as taking too little account of political problems. Bartol'd was no time-server and after the Revolution, as before it, he refused to adjust his views to suit political and ideological requirements. Nevertheless he continued to enjoy the respect of all Soviet

scholars worthy of the name: his views were frequently deferred to and his conclusions often accepted without his name being mentioned. After his death his scholarship received greater official recognition, but always with the reservation that "he remained a scholar of the bourgeois oriental school". To quote from N.A. Smirnov's AN OUTLINE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES IN THE USSR, "Bartol'd perceived that peasant movements in the East often had a religious tinge; but he did not take into account the fact that this tinge was not at all due to the religious requirements of the peasants, for whom Islam served in the event merely as an emblem of their struggle against their task masters. Far removed as he was from the materialist conception of history, Bartol'd did not regard Islam as a form of ideology and he did not depict it in the light of definite social relationships. He was thus unable to distinguish the class character of Islam, or the fact that it always and everywhere serves as an instrument of exploitation and coercion of the toiling masses. He did not attribute any importance to the fact that the ruling classes of eastern feudal society in all its historical phases, and also the ruling classes of Tsarist Russia, consistently supported Islam and the Muslim clerical element, and used them as an instrument with which to enslave the masses."

By a happy coincidence the final volume of V. and T. Minorsky's English translation of Bartol'd's FOUR STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL ASIA appeared a few weeks after the announcement of the forthcoming complete edition of his works in Russian. These studies together with his TURKESTAN AT THE EPOCH OF THE MONGOL INVASION (Gibb Memorial Series) are virtually the only works of Bartol'd which have been translated into English. The Central Asian Research Centre has recently undertaken the translation of his HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN TURKESTAN and it is hoped that this will appear in 1963.

. . .

No serious student of Soviet Muslim Asia will deny the vigour, persistence and reforming zeal with which the Soviet regime has pursued its aims, nor the striking material results which its efforts have achieved. The latest Party programme and the XXIInd Party Congress which confirmed it have thrown into prominence the most important and by far the most revolutionary of these aims - the final uprooting of all traces of nationalism. The ethical obliquity of "narrow nationalism" as compared with the wider loyalty owed by Soviet citizens to the Soviet regime as a whole is a distinction which is not readily grasped outside the confines of the USSR, and it seems likely that after the earlier emphasis placed on their national differences of language, culture and tradition, the Muslim peoples themselves will experience some difficulty in

adjusting themselves to the idea that the republics in which they have begun to take a real pride are eventually to disappear altogether.

The intermediate process of sblizheniye or coming together, by which the peoples of the national republics are to be prepared for eventual complete fusion, is now being heavily publicized, and the authorities are evidently aware of the passive opposition which it is encountering. As if to allay apprehension the Communist Party programme took care to emphasize that "the abolition of national differences, and in particular those of language, will be a very much longer process than the abolition of class distinction." This important reservation was quoted in a recent article\* but it was followed by the somewhat cryptic remark that "taking this circumstance into account the Party requires that even in the future all the conditions for the free development of languages should be assured, without allowing in this respect any privileges, limitations or restrictions." It is not at first sight easy to see how a campaign for the abolition of linguistic differences could proceed at the same time as one for the preservation of national languages; perhaps this will become clearer at the forthcoming Second Inter-Republican Conference on the Study of the Russian Language in the National Schools.

The main instrument for the inculcation of the idea of "coming together" is internatsional'noye vospitaniye, which can be literally translated as "international education". It is interesting to note the difference which has developed over the years between the words internatsional'nyy and mezhdunarodnyy. At one time the two words were more or less synonymous and currency was given to the notion that the nationalities of the USSR were on a par with the nationalities of the whole world. Now, however, the word internatsional'nyy seems to refer almost exclusively to the nations of the Soviet Union alone, while mezhdunarodnyy is reserved for the nations, or rather the states, of the whole world, including the USSR as a whole. Although the Soviet Government has been careful not to commit itself to the outright support of nationalist movements outside the USSR (the 1958 edition of the POLITICAL DICTIONARY differs markedly from the 1956 edition in its description of the Party attitude towards nationalism), it evidently wishes to avoid giving the impression that it is extending its campaign for the uprooting of nationalism outside the Soviet Union. This is in marked contrast to the earlier Soviet policy of trying to persuade the Turkmen, Tadjik and Uzbek minorities in Persia and Afghanistan to throw in their lot with the Soviet National Republics bearing these names. More

---

\* LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, "Nashe Bogatstvo", 15 May 1962, reprinted in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 20 May 1962.

and more the impression is gained that the object in uprooting nationalism is simply to create a new, composite nationalism closely corresponding to the old idea of 'Greater Russia'.

. . .

A recent article in TRUD objected strongly to two photographs of Uzbekistan appearing in the Russian edition of the United States magazine AMERIKA. One of these showed a string of horse-drawn carts carrying hay and the other a wagon being loaded by hand with cotton. One of the labourers in the second picture was wearing a torn pullover. The author's objection was twofold: since all harvesting in Uzbekistan had for a long time been entirely mechanized, the photographs must have been extracted from a museum or from some "mouldy archives"; and the portrayal of a worker with a torn pullover was simply "a lie".

Even if Uzbekistan is one of the very few countries in the world where animal transport plays no part in harvesting operations and the only country in the world where workers never have torn pullovers, it is still hard to understand why the Soviet authorities are so sensitive about what is after all the very recent past. Strange as it may seem, outbursts of this kind are intended more for home than for foreign consumption; Soviet irritation at the "idealistic" and reactionary attitude of Western tourists who are more interested in the romantic and picturesque past of Central Asia than in what is for them a dreary repetition of the modernization of which they have ample experience in their own countries is perhaps understandable. But while they strongly resent foreigners photographing evidences of a simpler, though for some reason despised, way of life, Soviet publicists usually concentrate on such reactionary objects as the donkey and the horse-drawn plough when they wish to portray life in the adjoining countries of the Middle East and South Asia. One can sympathize with the Middle Eastern journalist who, when visiting Uzbekistan recently, provided himself with a number of squalid representations of his country which he had cut out from Soviet magazines, and promptly produced them when a militiaman wished to stop him from photographing a modest dwelling in the old city of Tashkent.

T H E F I S H E R M E N O F T H E S O U T H E R N A R A L

The following is a summary of an article entitled "Byt kolkhoznikov rybolovetskikh arteley na ostravakh yuzhnogo Arala" (The Life of the Kolkhozniks of the Fishing Artels on the Islands of the Southern Aral) by T.A. Zhdanko which appeared in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, No.5 of 1961.

---

Introduction - Before the Revolution - Present organization  
of the fisheries - Living conditions - Family relations.

Introduction

The northern coastal territory of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, embracing the whole of Muynak and the western part of Takhta-Kupyr rayons, is notable for its distinctive natural, historial and cultural features. It includes the lower part of the delta of the Amu-Dar'ya with the southern shore of the Aral Sea and the islands off its coast. In the extensive delta region of the great Central Asian river with its mass of shifting channels, lakes, and low banks and islands grown with reeds and bushes, the population has, from the very ancient times, engaged in a multiple economy combining livestock raising with primitive land cultivation and fishing. This type of economy, which took shape in the delta regions round the Aral Sea, was until recently the specific ethnographic feature of the local population and, together with its concomitant semi-nomadic way of life, was preserved by the Kara-Kalpaks living on the coastal strip of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

The Kara-Kalpak ethnographic unit of the Khorezm Archaeological and Ethnographical Expedition of the Soviet Academy of Sciences began field researches among the population of northern Kara-Kalpakia in 1946. In 1958, together with ethnographers from the Kara-Kalpak branch of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, it carried out a systematic study of the population, first in two fishing kolkhozes, im. Marata and 40 Years of October, on the Muynak peninsula, and then on five islands of the southern Aral. These islands come under the Akpetki aul soviet of

Muynak rayon. A large part of their population are members of the Red Fisherman fishing kolkhoz formed in 1931 and the rest work at the islands' fish reception points of the Muynak Fish Cannery. The total population of Akpetki aul soviet on 1 May 1958 was 1,153.

The biggest settlement is on Karabayly island where the centre of the aul soviet is. It has a population of 337 - 312 Kazakhs and 25 Kara-Kalpaks. On Taylakdzhigen there are 302 people of whom 296 are Kazakhs. On Akpetki the entire population of 164 is Kazakh while on Tasbeskum the 124 inhabitants are all Kara-Kalpaks. On the fifth island, Mergenatau, there are seven Kazakhs and 202 Kara-Kalpaks. The Red Fisherman kolkhoz also has a livestock farm on the mainland in Chimbay rayon where 35 people, mostly Kazakh, work.


The Kara-Kalpaks of this region belonged ethnically to the Kongrat branch of the Kara-Kalpaks with the Koldauly and Kiyat tribal groups predominating in the im. Marata and 40 Years of October kolkhozes and almost all the island Kara-Kalpaks belonging to the Myuyten group. The Kazakhs belong to the Alim tribal group which from olden times lived side by side with the Myuytens in the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya.

### Before the Revolution

The pursuit of fishing has deep historical traditions among the Kara-Kalpaks living on the shores of the Aral. The clan brand of the Myuytens even depicted a fish-spear (shanyshky), their ancient fishing implement. At the same time they tilled the land and kept livestock.

In the 19th century the Myuytens lived on the shores of the big Daukara lakes in the basin of the Kokuksu river and on the channel of the Kok-Uzyak. There in summer, on artificially irrigated land, they grew rice, millet and melons. They also kept livestock, mainly cattle, and went fishing in the lakes and channels and near the sea coast. Their boats (kayyk) were too small and fragile for fishing in the open sea. They had no rudders and the Kara-Kalpaks only knew the rectangular sail which does not permit manoeuvring at sea.

While fishing the Kara-Kalpaks reached the islands near the shore. Small, sandy and waterless, they are subjected to constant north-east winds and gales with the waves often submerging their low-lying parts. In winter the torrid heat gives way to cold and blizzards and the sea freezes. Despite their inhospitable nature the inhabitants of the coast, both Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak, mostly moved to the islands in winter. This was because their livestock and agricultural produce did not suffice for the winter, so whole families, and sometimes, whole auls, went off to the sea where they could always get plenty of food by





fishing under the ice. Using sleds and boats on runners they crossed the ice and set up their yurts on the islands at the foot of sandy hillocks. They used zhangyl and saksaul for fuel and got fresh water by melting snow and ice. In the spring the Kara-Kalpaks returned to the mainland to grow their crops.

It was only as a result of the drying up of the lakes and rivers and the flooding by the Aral of certain coastal stretches at the turn of the century that the Kara-Kalpaks began to settle permanently on the islands and switch to fishing as their main occupation, finally abandoning land cultivation.

The Kazakh population, which was less concerned with tilling the land, more often migrated to the islands for a more or less prolonged period. Some grew melons, millet and dzhugara (kind of maize) on Kyrgysh when it was joined to the mainland, but they mostly engaged in fishing and animal husbandry.

Both the Kara-Kalpaks and the Kazakhs of the Aral coast used many different fishing tackles and implements specially adapted for the different fishing grounds, but they were all pretty primitive. They were particularly adept with the fish-spear. In winter they fished through holes in the ice. During the summer fishing season the Kara-Kalpaks lived among the reeds in huts on rafts or on artificial reed islands.

After the southern shores of the Aral became Russian territory in 1873 the exiled Ural Cossacks who were settled in the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya introduced several technical improvements in fishing. The Kara-Kalpaks adopted from them the big seines and other nets and learnt to build solid fishing boats and use the triangular sail. However, these advantages were largely outweighed by the enslavement of the Kara-Kalpak fishermen by Russian fish traders, Ural kulaks and local bays who grew rich on the trade in fish with Russia.

The fisheries on the Aral shore grew particularly after the construction in 1905 of the railway linking Tashkent with Orenburg. The fish, which had earlier been sent no farther than the bazaars of the Khiva oasis, was now sent in large consignments by rail to Orenburg, Bukhara, Chardzhou and other distant towns. Most of the workers at the fisheries were Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs. They received less than a living wage and were driven out to fish in bitter weather. To engage in fishing independently became more and more difficult as the fish traders seized the best fishing grounds and the poor fishermen had to hire seines and boats from rich owners, giving half their catch in exchange. The fish traders set up cold stores (shulen) on the islands which provided fresh water in the summer from ice laid in the winter. The population lived in yurts as before or in barracks built by the

traders. The inhabitants of the islands remember the Russian owners of the fisheries and also the rich Kara-Kalpak Lepes-bay who had 18 cold-stores on Termenbes, employed 300 workers and owned large herds.

### Present organization of the fisheries

In the first years of the Revolution all the privately-owned fisheries were confiscated. In 1928 the Aralgosrybtrest (The Aral State Fishing Trust) was formed and in 1930-1 the majority of the fishermen became members of kolkhozes. This concentrated all fishing in the hands of the State and the kolkhozes. The latter were given material assistance in acquiring boats and fishing gear by the Rybakkolkhozsoyuz (Fishermen's Kolkhoz Union). The State Fishery was immediately equipped with a flotilla of motor transport and fishing boats and large well-equipped refrigerators were constructed at the fisheries.

At the present time the Muynak rayon of Kara-Kalpakia supplies 63 per cent of all the fish caught in the Aral Sea and 96.3 per cent of the fish caught in Uzbekistan. The catch is mostly bream, sazan (carp family), vobla (Caspian roach), sheat-fish, pike, barbel and pike-perch. The most valuable species are ship (a large fish of the sturgeon family) and salmon.

The State Fishery manages five fish factories (rybozavody) on the coast and the islands, and the Kolkhoz Fishery - nine fishing kolkhozes. There have been big changes since the kolkhozes were organized. The emphasis is more and more on mechanized deep-sea fishing with seiners and kapron fixed nets and sweep-nets. By 1958 more than 100 motorized vessels were operating in Muynak rayon. In 1959 the Motor-Fishing Station [the equivalent of the MTS - Ed.] was reorganized as a Ship Repair and Technical Station and the kolkhozes began to acquire the ships as their property. Now each artel has its own fleet of three or four seiners, several fast cutters, motor-feluccas and dozens of motor- and rowing-boats. Some of the work has been mechanized, such as the lowering and raising of nets, and the number of large refrigerator ships for transporting the fish is increasing.

Fishing under the ice in winter is still one of the most trying tasks for the Aral fishermen. They harness the horses to the sledges and set off with their tackle and food supplies for the distant camps. There they hew out thousands of sockets and holes up to 40 metres long to set up the nets. For spring and autumn they have boats with runners fixed to the bottom which can be used as sledges if there is ice. Sometimes the fishermen are carried far out to sea on ice-floes, in which case they are rescued by plane. The cutting of holes in the ice is now being mechanized.

These technical improvements have increased the size of the catch and the incomes of the kolkhozes. Thus in the Kolkhoz im. Marata the catch per fisherman rose from 71 centners in 1940 to 157 centners in 1959 and the average annual income of one fisherman reached 13,443 rubles in 1959. Some kolkhozniks averaged 2,000 rubles a month. This kolkhoz, which was transferred to Muynak in 1955 when its former village in the delta of the Amu-Dar'ya was flooded, now has a large new settlement of the town type with electricity and various other amenities. The Red Fisherman kolkhoz on the islands catches 20,000 centners of fish a year and many women take part in the catch.

The fishermen's skill and knowledge of the Aral are still very important and the best fishermen enjoy enormous respect. Soviet fishermen "relate with an ironical smile" how once the Kara-Kalpak fishermen always addressed a prayer for assistance to their protector, holy Mardan-ata, when they went out fishing, and how they believed in good and evil fish.

In Muynak a training school for the fish industry has been organized, and annually the kolkhozes and the undertakings of the State Fishery are reinforced with qualified specialists. Many captains, brigade leaders and individual outstanding fishermen have high Government awards for their bravery and success in fulfilling State obligations.

### Living conditions

Despite the State's efforts, living and working conditions in the fishing settlements are still fairly harsh, mainly owing to the severe natural conditions. Fresh water remains a problem. In all the settlements there are State and kolkhoz cold stores filled with ice, but they cannot always ensure fresh water for the population and livestock. There are warm winters when the sea does not freeze and it is impossible to lay in ice. Sometimes storms ruin the cold stores, and sea-water gets into them as in the winter of 1957-8. Fresh water is brought from the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya in pontoons. The construction of artesian wells on the islands is contemplated, which should not only provide drinking water for humans and animals but also allow the planting of trees and growing of vegetables.

Housing is another problem. Until the 1930s the population of the islands lived in yurts throughout the year. They were very cold in winter although they were covered with reed matting. First barracks were built for the workers at the fish reception points with State funds, and then in 1936 the kolkhozniks began to build themselves houses.


The present Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak settlements are similar. Protected by sand-dunes the small houses and yurts stretch in a narrow belt along the sandy shore. Among them towers the massive building of the fishing station with its refrigerated cold store and landing-stage. There is no regular planning. Houses are built wherever there is a flat area among the sands. In each homestead there is a house, a yurt and a number of outbuildings such as kitchen, cowhouse, chicken house and shed for fishing tackle. The main construction material for the houses is reeds which are coated with clay. On the majority of islands there is no clay, which has to be dug up from shallow deposits in the sea. The plan of the kolkhozniks' houses is fairly standard - two rooms with a large stove between. In the homestead yards and on the shore there are drying nets, boats being caulked, and instruments for making holes in the ice, boat-hooks, oars and sledges lying around. In the homesteads are looms on which the women make reed matting and patterned cloth. The domestic animals - donkeys, goats, sheep and a few cows - wander round and there are many chickens, geese and ducks as well as cats.

Yurts are very common in both Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak villages as they are very comfortable in summer. The wooden framework is obtained from the mainland and a special base for the yurts is made edged with reeds and covered with clay. The framework of the yurts among the Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks preserve the traditional national peculiarities. The roofs of both are covered with felt, but following normal practice in Kara-Kalpakia the walls are covered with reed matting which is drawn apart in the heat of the day to let in the cool sea breezes. In some respects the interiors and doorways of the yurts show that the Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks each cling to their own traditions, but in others there is an extensive intermingling of national forms. The art of carpet weaving is highly developed, particularly among the Kazakhs, and all the yurts are very sumptuous. Narrow woven strips are stitched together to make large carpets. They are made of wool and cotton but kapron is being tried too. An unusual ornamental motif is the "fish's eye" (koz balyk).


The expedition was disappointed in its hopes of finding many ancient forms of national dress among the Kara-Kalpaks inhabiting the islands. This was because the people were too poor in the past to pay kalym for a bride and therefore abducted the girls without the customary trousseau consisting largely of marriage clothing. According to the Myuytens there were three types of male shirt differing in the cut of the collar. One they consider purely Kara-Kalpak, another shows definite links with the eastern Europe and the third possibly Mongol or Dzhungarian influence.

The new material on the Myuytens shows once more that they are far from being an isolated alien tribe as certain ethnographers suggest, but

- 1, 3, 5. houses
- 2, 4, 6. yurts of families living in these houses
7. outbuildings
8. house with adjacent outbuildings
9. yurt of family in house 8
10. looms
11. boats



Taylakdzhigen Island : Plan of a group of Kazakh homesteads



Tasbeskum Island : Plan of Kara-Kalpak homestead

1. 2-room house with ante-room (*daliz*) serving as outhouse ; 2. yurt ; 3. floor for setting up yurt, made on the sand and surrounded with barrier of reeds ; 4. cattlesheds ; 5. cold store ; 6. yard with supplies of reeds for fuel and fodder.



On Akpetki Island



A Kazakh homestead with house, yurt and outbuildings on Karabayly Island  
Reproduced from *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, 1961, No. 5

are a local indigenous one whose traditions and culture are close to those of the other Kara-Kalpaks of the Amu-Dar'ya delta.

The provision of educational and welfare services for the islanders is complicated by the natural conditions. The four brigades of the Red Fisherman kolkhoz live on four islands which are mostly 20-25 km. apart. The kolkhoz has only one club and one secondary school on Karabayly island. On the other islands there are only primary schools. It is difficult to provide regular medical attention. These difficulties can only be overcome if the kolkhoz brigades all move into one big settlement, or the individual settlements grow in size.

The situation over the supply of foodstuffs and consumer goods is better, with well-stocked shops on all the islands and floating stalls visiting the settlements and the fishermen's camps on the coast and uninhabited islands. The farm on the mainland belonging to the Red Fisherman kolkhoz keeps cattle, sheep and goats, and also horses for drawing the sledges over the frozen sea in winter. It grows dzhugary, maize, millet, melons, potatoes and onions but not in sufficient quantities for the islands. The old men are therefore sent on regular trips in summer to their kinsfolk in Takhta-Kupry rayon for melons and vegetables. Even with a fairly wide choice of food the Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks continue to eat their national dishes. These include various tasty fish dishes and also small dried fish (kakpash) which they take on journeys. The bread oven (tandyr), found all over Kara-Kalpakia, is not found on the islands, possibly because of a lack of suitable fuel. Instead the Kara-Kalpaks, like the Kazakhs, use a kazan (cauldron) or iron slab fitted to the hearth.

### Family relations

A study of family relations revealed the extremely interesting fact of the widespread nature of mixed marriages between Kazakhs and Kara-Kalpaks. Sometimes there have been mixed marriages for several generations running so that it is difficult to determine what a descendant's nationality is.

The Myuytens and Alims have lived side by side for so long that the idea that these two ethnographic groups of different nationalities "have become related" is reflected in folk traditions of a common ancestor. One old woman remembers how at the games held at popular festivals the Myuytens took the side not of their kinsmen but of the Kazakh Alims with whom they were connected by marriage.

From the above it is safe to conclude that the present conditions of life and the ethnic processes in this region, where the Kazakhs and

Kara-Kalpaks have been in close contact from time immemorial, will lead to their drawing ever closer together, continuing the traditions of friendly economic, cultural and family ties formed in the course of a lengthy historical period.

---

### The Tadzhik people of China

The Tadzhik people, one of China's smallest minority nationalities, who live in the Pamirs, have bred more than 20,000 lambs, calves and other young animals since last winter. The eight communes there now have 112,000 head of livestock, 50 per cent more than in 1957, the year before the communes were set up; since 1949 the number has gone up fourfold.

There are 8,000 Tadzhiks in China, the majority of whom live in the Tashkurghan autonomous hsien in the Pamirs. In addition to their main occupation of livestock breeding, they farm on land from 3-4,000 metres above sea level, irrigated by melted snow from the higher slopes of the Pamirs. There are only 80 frost-free days in the year.

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 27.5.62

## THE SAMARKAND TREATY OF 712

Appended below is a translation of an article by O.I. Smirnova which appeared in KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDIYA No.XXXVIII, 1960. This is a good example of the work now being produced by Soviet scholars, of which the West takes little or no cognizance since Russian seldom forms part of the linguistic equipment of Western orientalists.

An additional reason for publishing this scholarly study is that it demonstrates the distressing compartmentalism of Islamic studies. Nine years after Professor Kurat\* had brought to light Ibn al A'tham's text of the Treaty, Dr. Smirnova was still unaware of it, although she was working in exactly the same field. On his side, Professor Kurat appears strangely unfamiliar with the range of MSS of Bal'ami available for inspection. It seems a fair assumption that a considerable amount of research in Islamic studies is taking place along parallel lines which never meet.

---

 THE SAMARKAND TREATY OF 712

By O.I. Smirnova

In 1957 I published the text of the Treaty of Samarkand concluded by the Arab army commander Qutayba with the Sogdian King Ghurak.(1) According to some indications this treaty was drawn up in 93 A.H. (712 A.D.), or in 94 A.H. (712-713 A.D.) according to others. Its text in Persian is to be found in the Central Asian version of the Annals of al-Tabari, compiled by Bal'ami - the so-called TARIKH-I-TABARI.

---

\* Professor of Language and History, Ankara University

The publication of the Treaty has been attended by certain conclusions in respect both of the actual text of the Treaty (its genuineness, value etc.) and of its contents.

Even at the time the document was published the question arose from where Bal'ami could have borrowed this text. That it is taken from some reliable source there could be no doubt whatever. In al-Tabari and in the works of other authors accessible to me, it did not occur.

Unhappily I did not at that time have at my disposition the labours of the Turkish scholar A.N. Kurat who in 1948 edited the Arabic text of the Treaty, extracted from the work of Ibn al-A'tham al-Kufi, together with other material on Central Asia, dealing in particular with the campaigns of Qutayba against Khorezm and Sogd. In his essay A.N. Kurat defined the importance of the document he had brought to light; he cited as a parallel extracts from the writings of al-Yaqubi, al-Baladhuri, al-Tabari and Bal'ami; and after comparing all the material collected by him he arrived at the conclusion that the sources are not at one in their interpretation of the articles of the Treaty. (2) However, A.N. Kurat gave no detailed analysis of the contents of the articles of the Treaty but limited himself to mere description. Nor did he compare the text of the Treaty as found in Ibn al-A'tham with its Persian variant (translation) as reproduced by Bal'ami. In spite of the fact that Kurat quotes the whole narrative of Bal'ami about the siege of Samarkand, the Persian variant of the Treaty remained unknown to him. One can only suppose that in the MSS of Bal'ami to which A.N. Kurat had recourse no such variant existed.

Let us compare the Arabic text of the Samarkand Treaty as reproduced in Ibn al-A'tham with the Persian variant of Bal'ami, clause by clause:

## IBN AL-A' THAM

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم هذا ما  
 صالح قتيبة بن مسلم بن عمرو الباهلي  
 غورك بن اخشيد افشين السغد  
 انه صالحه و شرط له بذلك عهد الله  
 و ميثاقه و ذمته و ذمة رسول  
 محمد صلى الله عليه و سلم و آله  
 و ذمة امير المؤمنين الوليد بن  
 عبد الملك بن مروان و ذمة الامير  
 العجاج بن يوسف ابن الحكم و ذمة  
 المؤمنين و ذمة قتيبة بن مسلم

فصالحه من سمرقند و رساقيلاها كش  
 و نسف و اراضيها و مزارعها و جميع  
 حدودها

على الف الف درهم عاجلة و مائتي  
 الف درهم في كل عام و ثلاثة الاف  
 رأس من الرقيق ليس فيهم صبي  
 و لا شيخ

على ان يسمعوا و يطهروا لعبد الله  
 الوليد بن عبد الملك بن مروان  
 و للامير العجاج بن يوسف و للامير  
 قتيبة بن مسلم

و على ان يؤدى غورك بن اخشيد  
 افشين السغد ما صالحه عليه قتيبة  
 ابن مسلم من مال و رقيق

فما اطى من ذلك في جزية ارضه  
 من السبي بحسب له كل رأس بجائتي  
 درهم و ما كان من الثياب الكبار كل  
 ثوب بجائتي درهم و الصغار بستين  
 درهما و ما كان من حرير كل شاة

## BAL' AMI

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم هذا ما  
 اصلح عليه قتيبة بن مسلم الباهلي  
 مع فورك بن اخشيد افشين السغد  
 صالحه و شرط له بذلك عهد الله  
 و ميثاقه و ان صلح ذامه اسمت كه  
 قتيبه بن مسلم نونشت غورك را  
 و شرط كرد با او بدان و بداد اورا  
 عهد و ميثاق و زنهار خلدای تهالی  
 و محمد مصطفی صلى الله عليه  
 و آله و زنهار وليد بن عبد الملك  
 و زنهار عجاج و زنهار مسلمانان و  
 زنهار قتيبة

كه صلح كرد با او بسمرقند و  
 رساقيش و كش و نغشمن و زمينها و  
 كشتزارها

هر ده بار هزار هزار درم بدو اندر  
 منمل را دو دست هزار اندر هر سالی و سه  
 هزار برده كه اندر ميان ايشان كودك  
 و پير نمود

و ايشان طاعت دارند وليدرا و  
 و عجاجرا و قتيبه را

و [غورك] اين بپذيرفت از مال  
 كه بدهد

و هر چه نهد اگر برده بود هر  
 سري بدو دست درم و هر جامه ديبا  
 كه بزرگ بود صد درم و هر چه  
 زر سرخ بود هر مثقالی بيست درم

بشمانیة و مشرین درهما و الذهب  
 الاحمر كل مثقال بعشرين درهما  
 و الفضة البيضاء مثقال بمثقال  
 و على قتیمة بن مسلم العهد و الميثاق

انه لا يعمل على غورك بن اخشيد  
 افشين بشق و لا يهدر به و لا يأخذ  
 منه اكثر مما صالحه عليه  
 فان خرج على غورك بن اخشيد عدو  
 من الامراء فعلى قتیمة بن مسلم ان  
 ينصره و يعاونه على عدوه

و يقول قتیمة بن مسلم بانى قد  
 ملكتك يا غورك بن اخشيد سمرقند و ارضها  
 وحدودها و كش و نسف و بلادها  
 و حصونها و فوصيت اليك امرها  
 و اخذت خاتمك عليها لا يعترض عليك  
 معترض و ان الملك من بعدك  
 لولدك ابدأ ما دامت لى ولاية خراسان

شهد على ذلك الحصن بن المنذر  
 البكرى و ضرار بن حصن التميمى  
 و علجا بن حبيب العبقرى و معوية  
 ابن عامر الكندى و كبيح بن ابى سور  
 الفهظلى و اياس بن نهان  
 و الاشجع بن عبد الرحمن و المعمر بن

حمران و المجسر ابن مزاحم و عبد  
 الله بن الازور و الفضيل بن عبد الله  
 و عثمان بن رجاه و الحسن بن  
 معوية و الفضيل بن هشام و كتب  
 ثابت بن ابى ثابت كلاب قتیمة  
 ابن مسلم

فى سنة اربع و تسعين  
 قال و ختم قتیمة بن مسلم و الشهود  
 بجوانبيهم على هذا العهد و دفع  
 العهد الى غورك بن اخشيد

و عقد ميثاق خدای بر قتیمة بن  
 مسلم  
 كه غورك را بد نیندیشد و با او قدر  
 نکند بعد از ان كه با او صلح کرد  
 برین

و اگر دشمنی بر غورك بیرون آید  
 بر قتیمة است كه او را یاری کند

و من كه قتیمة ام غورك را پادشاه  
 كردم بر سمرقند و بر حدود [آن] و بر  
 كش و نخشب و شهرها [و حصارها] بتو  
 تسلیم كردم و مهر انگشترى ترا روان  
 كردم برین همه و هیچ كس بر تو اعتراض  
 نکند و پادشاهى از پس تو فرزندان  
 قراست و همیشه تا ولایت خراسان  
 براست

و گواهی دهد برین حضین  
 بن مهلب ابن المنذر و ابن دیگران  
 كه یاد کرده آمد اندرین  
 صلح نامه فلان و فلان

اندر سال نود و سه  
 و قتیمة و ابن گواهان مهرهای  
 خویش بر عهدنامه نهادند و بهورک  
 دادند

## IBN AL-A'THAM

In the name of Allah, the  
Compassionate, the Merciful!

This is how Qutayba, son of  
Muslim, son of 'Amr, Bahili,  
concluded peace with Ghurak son  
of the ikhshid, afshin of Sogd.

He concluded peace with him and  
pledged him in return therefor  
the shelter of Allah and His  
patronage and His protection;  
and the protection of His mes-  
senger Muhammad (May Allah be  
gracious unto him and preserve  
him and his family); and the  
protection of the Emir of the  
Faithful al-Walid, son of 'Abdal  
Malik, son of Marwan; and the  
protection of Emir al-Hajjaj,  
son of Yusuf, son of Hakam; and  
(the protection) of the Faithful;  
and the protection of Qutayba,  
son of Muslim.

And he concluded with him  
(Ghurak) peace in respect of  
Samarkand and its environs,  
Kash and Nasaf, and its lands,  
and of the cultivable areas,  
and of the whole union of its  
district;

for 2,000,000 dirhems forth-  
with, and 200,000 dirhems  
annually and three thousand  
head of slaves to include  
neither children nor aged  
persons;

## BAL'AMI

In the name of Allah, the  
Compassionate, the Merciful!

This is how Qutayba, son of  
Muslim, Bahili, concluded peace  
with Ghurak, son of the ikhshid,  
afshin, the Sogdian.

He concluded peace with him and  
pledged him in return the shelter  
of Allah and His patronage.  
And this is the covenant of peace  
which Qutayba wrote for Ghurak  
and in the terms of which he con-  
cluded a treaty with him therefor  
and granted him the shelter,  
patronage and protection of the  
Lord on High and of Muhammad His  
elected (May Allah be gracious  
unto him and preserve him and his  
family) and the protection of  
Valid, son of 'Abdal Malik; and  
the protection of the Faithful;  
and the protection of Qutayba;

in consideration that he con-  
cluded with him (Ghurak) peace in  
respect of Samarkand and its  
environs (i.e. the rural district),  
and of Kash and Nakhshab, and of  
the lands and cultivable areas;

for ten times a thousand thousand  
dirhems, and, thereunder two  
hundred thousand annually to the  
Amil, and three thousand slaves  
among whom there shall be neither  
children nor aged persons;

on the understanding that they (the Sogdians) shall be obedient and submissive to the servant of God, al-Walid, son of 'Abdal Malik, son of Marwan, and to the emir al-Hajjaj, son of Yusuf, and to the emir Qutayba, son of Muslim;

and that Ghurak son of the ikhshid, afshin of Sogd shall pay that for which Qutayba son of Muslim concluded peace with him in goods and slaves.

And whatsoever hereof shall be given as jizya on his property in slaves, shall be reckoned to him at (the rate of) two hundred dirhems per head; and whatever in large (pieces) of raiment at one hundred dirhems each piece of raiment, but a small one at sixty dirhems; and whatever in silk at twenty-eight dirhems for each cut piece; and whatever in fine coined gold at twenty dirhems per misqal; and in ready silver, misqal for misqal.

And upon Qutayba son of Muslim rest the obligation and the engagement not to attempt anything against Ghurak son of the ikhshid and afshin, or betray him, or take from him more than the terms of peace provide. And if any enemy come forth against Ghurak, son of the ikhshid, then upon Qutayba shall rest the obligation to offer him assistance and to support him against his foe.

and they (the Sogdians) shall be obedient to Valid, and to Hajjaj, and to Qutayba;

and Ghurak has agreed in respect of the goods which he shall give.

And whatsoever he shall give, if it be slaves, then each head (he shall reckon) at two hundred dirhems, and each large (piece) of raiment diba at one hundred dirhems; and whatsoever there be of fine coined gold at twenty dirhems per misqal.

And upon Qutayba son of Muslim rest the obligation and the engagement not to plot evil against Ghurak or betray him after having concluded peace with him on these terms.

And if any enemy come forth against Ghurak, then upon Qutayba shall rest the duty to offer him assistance.

And Qutayba son of Muslim takes oath: Verily I make thee, O Ghurak, son of the ikhshid, King of Samarkand and its territories and confines, and of Kash and of Nasaf and its cities and fortresses. And I have entrusted to thee their governance. And I have accepted the seal of thy finger-ring over them. And none shall set himself in opposition to thee.

And verily the rule after thee shall belong to thy son for such time as my vice-royalty of Khorasan endures.

In witness whereof are: al-Hasan son of al-Munzir al-Bakri; and Darar son of Hasan al-Tamimi; and Ulaba son of Habib al-'Abqashi; and Mu'awiya son of 'Amir al-Kindi; and Waki son of Abu Sur al-Khanzali;(3) and Ayyas son of Banhan; and al-Ashja' son of 'Abdal Rahman; and al-Muharrir son of Humran; and al-Mujassir son of Muzahim; and 'Abdallah son of al-Azwar; and al-Fazil son of 'Abdallah; and 'Uthman son of Raja; and al-Hasan son of Mu'awiya; and al-Fazil son of Bashsham.

Written by Thabit son of Abu Thabit, scribe of Qutayba son of Muslim in the year 94. Said, and sealed by Qutayba son of Muslim and his witnesses to these agreements.

And the Treaty delivered to Ghurak son of the ikhshid.

And I, Qutayba, do make Ghurak ruler over Samarkand and over its district, and over Kash and Nakhshab. And I have transferred to thee the cities and fortresses. And I have made valid the seal of thy finger-ring over all these.

And none shall set himself in opposition to thee.

And the rule after thee shall belong to thy children, and this for such time as the vice-royalty of Khorasan shall belong to me.

In witness whereof are: Huzayn son of Muhallab son of al-Munzir, and those others whose names are mentioned in this Treaty, so-and-so and so-and-so.

In the year 93.

And Qutayba and these witnesses have put their seals to the Treaty and delivered it to Ghurak.

The first lines of the Treaty in Bal'ami are reproduced in the Arabic language and coincide verbatim with the beginning of the document in Ibn al-A'tham. As regards general contents, the two texts are identical in substance; the Arabic text, however - as was only to be expected - turns out to be fuller than its later Persian translation.

The divergence in the texts really boils down to a simplification of individual sentences and the omission, probably by copyists, of several details. Thus, in the Persian text the list of the persons who signed the Treaty is missing. This list is to us particularly important, if only because it provides proof of the principal dramatis personae on the Arab side, and consequently also of the composition of the Arab forces which took a direct part in the siege of Samarkand. The names of 10 out of the 14 Arab witnesses are met with in al-Tabari and Ibn al-Athir, a circumstance which dispels all doubts as to the authenticity of the signatures in spite of certain of the names being mutilated. Another point of importance is that the Arabic variant communicates complete data as to the value of silver in the country which permit one to conclude that there was no disparity, at all events officially, between the monetary drachma and the weight. The prices of raiment are intimated with precision. In the Arabic text the price of a small piece of tissue (according to the Persian text diba) is explicitly stated to be 60 dirhems; and the price of a length of silk (harir) 28 dirhems.(4) The quantity of slaves in the Arabic as in the Persian text is 3,000. Consequently one must regard as hasty a correction(30,000 instead of 3,000) which was imported into the Persian text.(5)

Without dealing in greater detail with the discrepancies in the copies, we shall concentrate on what has a direct bearing upon the subject of the present article: that is, on the history of the conclusion and drawing up of the Treaty.

All who have done any research into this, A.N. Kurat among them, note that there is no unity in the sources as regards the conditions of the Treaty, and this indeed is the first impression gained.

Such important sources as al-Tabari and al-Baladhuri comment here in the light of two traditions. Al-Tabari intimates that according to one tradition Qutayba, having named his conditions for the handing over of the city, concluded peace with the Sogdians in return for sums of 2,000,000 and 200,000 dirhems and 30,000 slaves; according to the other, the Arab commander exacted 100,000 slaves and the treasure of the fire-temples and of the idol-temples. In al-Baladhuri's first version, Qutayba concluded peace with Ghurak for 2,000,000 and 200,000 dirhems; but in the other, in return for 700,000 dirhems, the entertainment of his warriors every three days, and the treasures of the idol-temples and fire-temples. The author of an anonymous history of the Caliphs

written between 402 and 422 A.H. (1011-1031 A.D.) reports that peace was concluded for 2,000,000 dirhems, and 200,000 dirhems and 30,000 slaves (mamluk) annually.

Al-Yaqubi cites the opening lines of the Treaty as reproduced in Ibn al-A'tham and Bal'ami, but the rest of his text is so corrupt that it cannot be made use of for our purposes. Ibn al-A'tham and Bal'ami, where they are narrating what immediately precedes the Treaty, set out the events that took place at the time of the siege and capture of Samarkand, and tell of the conditions on which peace was concluded without, at that stage, concerning themselves with the document which is before us. These conditions amount to the following items:

1. Prompt payment by Ghurak to Qutayba of a contribution in the sum of 2,000,000 dirhems (in Bal'ami 10,000,000) and annual offering of 200,000 dirhems.
2. Delivery by Ghurak of 3,000 slaves (annually in Bal'ami) to include no old people and no boys.
3. The handing over to the Arabs of the adornments of the idols, and the setting up of a mosque.
4. The clearing of Samarkand of Sogdian soldiery (in Bal'ami this item has been omitted by the copyists).
5. Qutayba with his retinue rides into the city, recites namaz, reads the khutba and tastes the table.
6. Arabs enter the city by the Kash Gate and leave by the China Gate

Part of the items enumerated are noticed in some of the sources and the rest in others, corresponding to the different versions. Certain of these items - and this is especially important - are absent from the Treaty whether in the Arabic text or in its Persian translation. These particular items are concerned with: conditions about surrendering to the Arabs the temple treasures; the setting up of a mosque; the clearing of Samarkand of Sogdian troops; conditions of the entry of Qutayba into conquered Samarkand, and conditions of his sojourn in that city. Where can we find the reason for the said discrepancies?

We must turn again to the accounts of the siege and capture of Samarkand in Ibn al-A'tham and Bal'ami, that is, to those sources in which the text of the Treaty is introduced. Ibn al-A'tham's account makes it appear that the Arab forces after reaching the stage of

negotiations got themselves ready to enter Samarkand. (We may remark, following A.N. Kurat, that the same sequence of events occurs in al-Tabari's narrative too.)

Qutayba, surrounded by a retinue of 4,000 persons, in accordance with the preliminary parley rode into the city through the Kash Gate. On Qutayba's entry Ghurak met him at the city gate and went ahead of him on foot. He led the Arabs to the idol-temple. There Ghurak halted and stood before Qutayba; during which time, as the source emphasizes, the first was without his sword. Meanwhile Qutayba had observed two ghulams of Ghurak girdled with golden belts, ornamented and costly, and was so enraged that he wanted to violate the agreement and slay Ghurak; but he controlled himself. Then Qutayba with his entourage said namaz and proceeded to the table. After food the Arabs washed their hands. Qutayba stood up and performed two rakats of the namaz. Then he summoned his scribe and ordered him to write the Treaty which was also handed over to Ghurak. The author goes on to reproduce the text of the Treaty document.

Bal'ami furnishes a practically identical account. In his words, after the acceptance by the Sogdians of the conditions of the parley, Ghurak ordered food to be prepared for Qutayba and his entourage. What time Qutayba with an escort of 400 bodyguards entered Samarkand, Ghurak came out to the city gate to meet him and bowed down before him; he then betook himself ahead of Qutayba, and so went on foot to the entrance to the idol-temple. Qutayba went in and sat down; Ghurak went in after him and stood before him. After this, Qutayba went into the mosque and performed two rakats. (6) People brought him the idols, from which at Qutayba's command the ornaments were then and there stripped. (7) Then Qutayba approached the table; Ghurak ordered food to be brought and the board made ready. When Qutayba with his associates had finished the fare he called scribes to write a Treaty in keeping with the preliminary parley. The Treaty was written and handed to Ghurak. Then comes the text of the Treaty document.

From the excerpts quoted it is clear that the conclusion of the Samarkand Treaty between Qutayba and Ghurak went through two stages: the first was the preliminary, oral discussion of the articles of agreement and of the circumstances in which the city would be surrendered to the Arab troops; the second was the memorandum of the articles of agreement, the confirmation of this with signatures, and the delivery of the signed Treaty to Ghurak.

From the same extracts it is apparent that by the time the written Treaty was drawn up and confirmed by the signatures of the witnesses, some conditions of the preliminary negotiations had already been ful-

filled. It was for this reason that the point did not come into the Treaty about the handing over to the Arabs of the temple treasures, the tissues etc. It was only necessary to stipulate the value of the latter since this would come under the overall total of contribution. In keeping with this an article was introduced into the Treaty about the value in dirhems of pieces of expensive tissues of various measurements, as also of gold and silver. Nor was there any necessity, either, to fix in the Treaty the point about setting up a mosque, into which one of the local temples had hurriedly been converted. It thus came about that the articles of the Treaty varied in one and the same source. And this divergence was conditioned not so much by any conflict in the material at the disposal of the authors as by that difference which really existed between the articles of the preliminary (oral) parley and the articles of the written Treaty. This difference was the actual determinant of the discrepancy in information about the articles of the Treaty in various works. In these last, two basic traditions have found their reflection - the one traceable to an oral transmission of events which had several variants and was the most popular in Arab circles; the second to a written transmission, going back to the Treaty document. Hesitations over the numerical data are another question; however, these too are chiefly tied to the oral tradition.

We have now enough to convince us that all the items of the preliminary parley were fulfilled by Ghurak, but not all were reduced to writing. Meanwhile the Arab side, as is shown by the fact that they kept to the oral tradition and only afterwards turned to the written sources, attached particular importance to these items. One may judge of this from certain touches, insignificant at first glance, in the accounts of Ibn al-A'tham and Bal'ami.

Thus Ibn al-A'tham notices the anger of Qutayba at the sight of two ghumams of Ghurak in golden waistbands decorated with precious stones; the source emphasizes that Qutayba's anger at this was so fierce that he almost broke the Treaty. The two authors and al-Tabari relate that Ghurak went before Qutayba's horse from the city gate to the entrance to the idol-temples and stood before Qutayba, having taken off his sword.

Thanks to information available in various sources we are well acquainted with the splendour of the Central Asian courts and the luxurious panoplies of the Sogdian aristocracy. The Sogdian princes wore raiment of coloured silks, and brocades embroidered with pearls and jewels, gold tiaras and scarves ornamented with precious stones. The sumptuous golden belt, on which was worn a weapon, played a special role, belonging as it did to the three basic marks of distinction (coronet or kulah, finger-ring and belt). Not less rich was the

caparison of their horses. Princes and knights were never to be seen in the street except on horseback and with the escort of a glittering suite. A clear picture of the courts of the Sogdian aristocracy is given us by the Pendzhikent (Panjikant) murals, contemporaneous with the Samarkand events, where alongside mythological subjects, banquets and battles, princely receptions and the ritual of temple sacrifices are depicted. Only by keeping in view this side of the Sogdian nobility can one comprehend the insistence of the Arab commanders that the vanquished should appear in their presence not merely without military accoutrements but without any splendid raiment at all, and without their distinctions of rank (coronets and belts). In pursuance of the same aim, namely that of humiliating the opponent, was the stipulation that the Arabs should enter Samarkand through the Kash Gate and leave by the China Gate - should, in other words, traverse the whole city as victors.

Whether conditions announced by the Arabs when concluding peace treaties with other domains, as also the setting in which those treaties were signed, were of the same order we do not know. The sources say nothing about this. But we do know that the conquerors, especially in the period in question, strove so far as possible not to provoke that aristocracy with which they were entering into agreement of peace and on whose support they could to some extent count. Here there was a particular reason.

The written Treaty as it finds place in Ibn al-A'tham and Bal'ami begins with the following words: "In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful! This is how Qutayba son of Muslim, son of 'Amr, Bahili, concluded peace with Ghurak, son of the ikhshid, afshin of Sogd." The title of Ghurak was known to us only from al-Yaqubi: "ikhshid of Sogd, afshin of Samarkand", with which the title of Divash-tich in the Mt. Mugh documents coincided. In this connexion it was natural to suppose that in the Treaty the word "ibn", i.e. "son", in Ghurak's description (Ghurak ibn ikhshid) is either a later gloss on the text or the simple mistake of a copyist, each of them by analogy with and under the influence of the preceding name in the Treaty (Qutayba ibn Muslim). Similarly it was presumed that the title in question should be read in accordance with its Sogdian form and the Arabic rendering of the latter in al-Yaqubi, not "Ghurak bin ikhshid afshin al-Sogd", but "Ghurak ikhshid afshin al-Sogd" omitting the word "ibn", "son". The fact is, Ghurak is mentioned three times more in the document, again as son of the ikhshid (king); but so far as I am aware nobody until now has called attention to this detail. Noting therefore that Ghurak occurs three times in the Arabic text of the Treaty under the style "son of the ikhshid" (king), and it should also be noted that even in the story of the siege of Samarkand, Ibn al-A'tham names him "son of the ikhshid" and not "ikhshid". In view of this we

can only arrive at the conclusion that we are dealing here with no mere corruption of the text, but with the definite evidence of a source which it is incumbent on us to uncover. With this aim we turn to a few features in the historical mise en scène in Sogd directly before the Samarkand events that resulted in the signing of the document in which we are interested.

Predecessor of Ghurak was the well known Tarkhun who played a prominent role in the story of the Arab conquest of Central Asia. In Arab sources he is called now King of Sogd, now King of Samarkand. It is known that he was overthrown by his courtiers for his yielding to the Arabs. According to one version he took his own life in despair; according to another he was done to death by his successor Ghurak. As I.Yu. Krachkovskiy has put it: "Tarkhun perished an ally of the Arabs." Ghurak, who occupied the throne of Samarkand after Tarkhun, for the first time pursued an anti-Arab policy and stubbornly reacted against the conquerors. I.Yu. Krachkovskiy quotes the evidence of al-Tabari (which is extremely important to us) that Qutayba, in the year of the capture of Samarkand and the conclusion of the Treaty, "proclaiming himself avenger of the blood of Tarkhun, called him his client who was under his protection." (8) Consequently Qutayba and in his person the Arabs, could hardly acknowledge Ghurak as King (ikhshid) of Sogd, but were obliged to see in him a rebel and an enemy of the Arabs. That being so, it can be understood why, in the Treaty officially concluded in the name of the Umayyad Caliph al-Walid, they called Ghurak not ikhshid of Sogd, but son of the ikhshid of Sogd.

We do not know who was the father of Ghurak any more than we know who was the father of Tarkhun. The information given by al-Nasafi, author of THE HISTORY OF SAMARKAND, an Arabic composition which has come down to us in a Persian recension edited in the 12th century, stands uncorroborated. In this work Tarkhun is spoken of as elder brother of Ghurak, and in the same source there is also mentioned a younger brother of Ghurak, Afarun. (9) The fact is, the information in this particular portion of THE HISTORY OF SAMARKAND bears a legendary stamp, and we have no analogous evidence at all. But in our present context this does not matter so much. In calling Ghurak son of the King of Sogd, the conquerors had a twofold aim: to announce officially that up to the conclusion of the Treaty they were not recognizing him as King of Sogd, but nevertheless did recognize his legal right, and the right of his heirs, to the Samarkand throne. The last article of the Treaty is in keeping with such an assumption: "And Qutayba son of Muslim takes oath: Verily I make thee, O Ghurak, son of the ikhshid, King of Samarkand and its territories and confines, and of Kash and of Nasaf and its cities and fortresses. And I have entrusted to thee their governance. And I have accepted the seal of thy finger-ring over them.

And none shall set himself in opposition to thee. And verily the rule after thee shall belong to thy son for such time as my vice-royalty of Khorasan endures."

In the light of the above argument this clause in the Treaty acquires a special significance. On the construction now given, the dishonour to which the conquerors subjected Ghurak and his associates is understandable. R.N. Frye having compared all the evidence in the sources, reached the conclusion that after the death of Tarkhun (709-710) the prince of Panjikant, Divashtich (executed by the Arabs in 722) being at that time a partisan of the Arabs and possibly enjoying their support, declared himself King of Sogd in counterpoise to Ghurak.(10)

If the assumption made above be correct, then the time between the downfall of Tarkhun and the conclusion of the Samarkand Treaty must be regarded as an interregnum, a period of confusion. The moment is one of importance for the chronology of the Kings of Sogd, since it accurately determines two facts: the year of Ghurak's accession to the throne of Samarkand after the overthrow of Tarkhun, and the year when he was acknowledged and confirmed King of Sogd by the Arabs and in his turn acknowledged himself to be their vassal.

#### Author's Notes

- (1) O.I. Smirnova, "Iz istorii arabskikh zavoyevanii v Sredney Azii", SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDIYE, 1957, No.2, pp.119-34.
- (2) A.N. Kurat dwells on these same questions in his other work: ABU MUHAMMAD AHMAD BIN A'THAM AL-KUFI'NIN KITAB AL-FUTUH'U (VII, 2, 1949, pp.255-82). For my knowledge of the articles of Prof. A.N. Kurat I am indebted to the kindness of the Turkologist S.G. Klyashtorskiy who placed them at my disposal and made me a translation from the Turkish text.
- (3) Leader of the tribe and one of the principal participants in the Samarkand and later Fergana episodes (killing of Qutayba).
- (4) In the Sogdian documents (Mt. Mugh collection) are to be found interesting data about prices to which we shall attend later in connexion with the publication of the documents.

- (5) However, this circumstance does not definitely settle the question as to which figure, 3,000 or 30,000, should be regarded as authentic, although the first is the more probable and in the Treaty the wording is 3,000 slaves annually. The conclusions about the historical knowledge of the Treaty, formed on the basis of its Persian variant, retain their force.  
(O.I. Smirnova, "Iz istorii. . . Azii", pp.126-7.)
- (6) There follows in Bal'ami an anecdote which is missing in Ibn al-A'tham but told in al-Tabari with reference to the Bahilite legend.
- (7) Then follow details, omitted in the article, about the circumstances obtaining at this time and the quantity of gold and silver seized by the Arabs.
- (8) "I purpose to avenge the blood of Tarkhun who was my protégé and was of those enjoying my protection." (al-Tabari)
- (9) "Ghurak ruled over Samarkand; and he had brothers, one called Tarkhun and the other Afarun. The latter was younger and poorer."  
(Vide V.L. Vyatkin, "Kandiya Malaya" SPRAVOCHNAYA KNIZHKA SAMARKANDSKOY OBLASTI, Vol.VIII, 1906, p.241.)
- (10) In the opinion of R.N. Frye, Ghurak became the generally-acknowledged ruler of Sogd only after Qutayba perished, i.e. in 715. (R.N. Frye, TARXŪN, TŪRKŪN AND CENTRAL ASIAN HISTORY - HJAS, Vol.14, 1951, No.1-2, p.133.) The date 715 is in any case inadmissible. The dual authority could not have lasted more than two years after the death of Tarkhun, that is, beyond 712 - the year of the conclusion of the Samarkand Treaty.

### Glossary

Amil	agent charged with collection of dues.
Diba	brocade.
Ghulam	attendant, servant.
Jizya	tribute, tax; especially that payable by non-Muslims.
Misqal	weight: in present day Persia equals one-sixteenth of a <u>sir</u> .
Namaz	prayers.
Rakat	inclination or posture in (Muhammadan) praying.

S O M E   S T A T I S T I C S   O N   H I G H E R   E D U C A T I O N  
I N   T H E   M U S L I M   R E P U B L I C S

Some useful statistics on higher education in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union have appeared in a recent book, VYSSHEYE OBRAZOVANIYE V SSSR (Higher Education in the USSR), Moscow, 1961, published by the Central Statistical Directorate attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The statistics cover the number of the population of the USSR with higher and secondary education, the number of specialists with higher and special secondary education employed in the economy, the number of students in VUZ\* in the USSR as a whole and in the union republics, universities, research personnel, post-graduate students, expenditure on higher education, publication of textbooks, tekhnicum and other special secondary educational institutions, as well as a comparison of the state of higher education in the socialist and capitalist countries. The most detailed statistics are given for specialists and students in VUZ and they are broken down by republics and nationalities as well as by such categories as sex and speciality. Where the statistics are broken down by nationality, this is only by the nationalities of the 15 union republics or by the nationalities of the 15 union and 19 autonomous republics together with the Jews. The latter are presumably singled out from the remaining nationalities because they are by far the most highly educated nationality in the Soviet Union and come third, after the Russians and Ukrainians, for the number of specialists with higher and special secondary education.

The most interesting statistics concerning the Muslim republics and nationalities are reproduced below, together with some population figures which allow one to gain a clearer overall picture of what they mean. In general the statistics confirm the enormous strides that have been made in higher education among the Muslim nationalities, particularly in the years since 1940. At present the Russians have a relatively greater number of specialists working in the Muslim republics than their percentage in the population but this disparity should disappear in the near future with the increased number of students of the Muslim nationalities now attending a VUZ.

---

\* Vyssheye Uchebnoye Zavedeniye (higher educational institution)

The figures in Table A are drawn from pages 31-32 and give the number per thousand population in each republic with higher and secondary education in 1939 and 1959 according to the census.

TABLE A

	No. of persons with higher education per 1,000 population		No. of persons with secondary or incomplete secondary education per 1,000 population	
	1939	1959	1939	1959
<u>Both Sexes</u>				
USSR as a whole	6	18	77	263
Uzbekistan	3	13	39	234
Kazakhstan	5	12	60	239
Azerbaydzhan	7	21	73	261
Kirgizia	2	13	32	227
Tadzhikistan	2	10	27	214
Turkmenistan	3	13	46	256
<u>Men</u>				
USSR as a whole	9	21	88	273
Uzbekistan	4	16	48	264
Kazakhstan	7	15	80	258
Azerbaydzhan	10	26	92	295
Kirgizia	3	16	41	254
Tadzhikistan	3	13	36	246
Turkmenistan	5	16	58	276
<u>Women</u>				
USSR as a whole	4	16	67	255
Uzbekistan	2	10	29	206
Kazakhstan	2	10	38	219
Azerbaydzhan	3	16	53	231
Kirgizia	1	11	24	205
Tadzhikistan	1	8	17	186
Turkmenistan	2	10	34	237

Of the Muslim republics only Azerbaydzhan has a greater proportion of persons with higher education than the national average, but not as high as neighbouring Georgia and Armenia which have 38 and 28 per 1,000 population respectively. All the other Muslim republics have figures lower than the national average but no worse than some of the European republics, i.e. Belorussia (12 per 1,000), Moldavia (10 per 1,000) and Lithuania (13 per 1,000). As regards secondary education, their figures are closer to the national average and even Tadzhikistan, which has the lowest figure of 214 per 1,000, is in a better position than Lithuania with 175 and Moldavia with 186.

Table B gives the national composition of the specialists with higher and specialized secondary education employed in the economy of the USSR on 1 December 1960. The figures in the first four columns come from page 49. The figures in the last column, which give the percentage of each nationality in the population of the USSR in 1959, have been taken from NASELENIYE SSSR (Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1961).

TABLE B

	No. of specialists with higher and specialized secondary education in thousands	With higher education	With specializ. secondary education	% of specs. with higher & specializ. secondary education in economy	% of given nationality in population
	1960	1960	1960	1960	1959
Russians	5509.3	2070.3	3439.0	62.7	54.65
Ukrainians	1338.4	517.7	820.7	15.2	17.84
Jews	427.1	290.7	136.4	4.9	1.08
Azerbaydzhanis	97.4	47.9	49.5	1.1	1.41
Uzbeks	95.7	46.5	49.2	1.1	2.88
Kazakhs	76.1	34.8	41.3	0.9	1.73
Tadzhiks	23.7	10.9	12.8	0.3	0.67
Turkmens	20.4	10.4	10.0	0.2	0.48
Kirgiz	19.1	9.4	9.7	0.2	0.46
Kara-Kalpaks	3.9	2.0	1.9	0.04	0.08

These figures show that the Muslim nationalities still account for less than their fair share of specialists in the economy (as also do the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians and Moldavians). However, their position has improved immeasurably since 1941. Between 1 January 1941 and 1 December 1960 the number of specialists with higher education among the Muslim nationalities increased as follows (p.69):

Uzbeks	16.0	times
Kazakhs	19.3	"
Azerbaydzhanis	6.0	"
Kirgiz	94.5	"
Tadzhiks	36.2	"
Turkmens	51.8	"

The only non-Muslim republican nationality which showed a comparable increase was the Moldavians (16.2 times). All the others showed increases of only between 4.7 and 3.4 times.

Of the republican nationalities the Muslim nationalities have the lowest percentages of women among the specialists with higher education. As at 1 December 1960 these were:

Azerbaydzhanis	31.4	per cent
Kirgiz	29.3	"
Kazakhs	28.9	"
Uzbeks	23.1	"
Tadzhiks	18.0	"
Turkmens	14.9	"

This is also true of the Muslim nationalities of the autonomous republics with the exception of the Tatars with 55.5 per cent and the Bashkirs with 44.2. (Pp.67-68)

Table C has been extracted from pages 70-71 and gives the national composition of specialists with higher education employed in the economy of the union republics on 1 December 1960.

TABLE C

	USSR	UZB.	KAZ.	AZ.	KIR.	TAD.	TUR.
<u>In all</u>	3,545,234	108,936	124,818	73,213	29,776	23,356	22,506
Russians	2,070,333	32,820	66,434	11,458	13,864	8,386	7,383
Ukrainians	517,729	2,984	10,984	615	2,201	1,108	787
Belorussians	95,116	486	1,262	76	106	123	83
Uzbeks	46,526	40,121	1,318	10	1,391	2,500	873
Kazakhs	34,760	3,269	29,950	2	278	112	442
Georgians	88,631	152	139	328	15	45	30
Azerbaydzhanis	47,859	268	149	43,785	47	98	342
Lithuanians	30,004	15	47	11	2	7	2
Moldavians	11,331	17	40	1	5	2	3
Latvians	24,914	25	86	11	16	20	8
Kirgiz	9,451	290	43	2	8,991	78	-
Tadzhiks	10,857	2,427	26	9	93	7,955	15
Armenians	74,122	2,241	306	10,621	100	207	822
Turkmens	10,356	249	7	-	2	17	9,960
Estonians	19,272	20	44	10	11	8	10
Abkhaz	916	3	3	1	-	-	-
Balkars	294	28	21	-	7	4	5
Bashkirs	6,420	526	73	4	51	85	38
Buryats	4,021	7	34	-	4	1	1
Ingush	189	-	8	2	2	-	-
Kabardins	2,336	4	-	7	-	-	6
Kalmyks	532	5	9	1	32	1	-
Kara-Kalpaks	2,043	1,997	5	-	1	3	14
Karelians	1,534	33	25	1	10	8	5
Komi	4,352	13	32	3	6	1	1
Mari	2,577	7	17	-	3	6	2
Mordvins	6,328	78	230	7	33	37	15
Peoples of Dagestan	7,342	32	19	1,166	16	7	30
Ossetians	8,889	103	96	120	26	138	46
Tatars	51,164	8,428	3,097	430	1,122	881	744
Udmurts	4,249	8	24	-	7	5	4
Chechens	303	4	14	-	4	1	1
Chuvash	13,324	143	259	-	22	28	18
Yakuts	3,176	2	6	-	1	-	-
Jews	290,707	8,161	4,148	4,110	1,073	1,169	486

Table D gives the national composition of students in VUZ at the beginning of the 1960-1 academic year, as given on page 85.

TABLE D

	Total no. of students	No. of women	Percentage of women among students:			
			In all VUZ	On day courses	On evening courses	On corres- pondence courses
<u>In all</u>	2,395,545	1,041,645	43	45	39	43
Uzbeks	53,530	13,219	25	28	30	19
Kazakhs	40,787	12,900	32	35	19	27
Azerbaydzhanis	28,493	7,856	28	34	22	20
Kirgiz	9,905	2,878	29	35	11	18
Tadzhiks	11,928	1,900	16	20	11	10
Turkmens	9,480	1,947	21	26	7	11
Kara-Kalpaks	1,810	344	19	23	20	13

Table E compares the percentage of the Muslim nationalities in the population with their percentage among the students of VUZ. The second column has been calculated from the figures in Table D and the third from figures given on pages 128-57.

TABLE E

	Percentage of population	Percentage of students in V U Z	Percentage of day students in VUZ
	1959	1960-1	1960-1
Uzbeks	2.88	2.23	2.68
Kazakhs	1.73	1.70	2.11
Azerbaydzhanis	1.41	1.19	1.36
Kirgiz	0.46	0.41	0.58
Tadzhiks	0.67	0.50	0.62
Turkmens	0.48	0.39	0.51
Kara-Kalpaks	0.08	0.08	0.09

This table shows that the proportion of these nationalities undergoing full-time higher education is invariably higher than their proportion among students in VUZ as a whole and that this proportion is close to or exceeds their percentage in the population.

Pages 128-57 give the national composition of students in VUZ in each republic at the beginning of the 1960-1 academic year broken down into day, evening and correspondence students as well as by sex. The figures for all students in VUZ and for full-time day students are reproduced in Table F.

TABLE F

		Total no. of students	Day students
<u>UZBEK SSR</u>	In all	101,271	51,337
	Russians	26,280	10,656
	Ukrainians	2,492	888
	Belorussians	418	83
	Uzbeks	47,758	27,732
	Kazakhs	4,962	2,944
	Georgians	196	24
	Azerbaydzhanis	596	201
	Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians	54	10
	Moldavians	30	10
	Kirgiz	702	354
	Tadzhiks	1,828	881
	Armenians	1,214	554
	Turkmens	1,003	487
	Bashkirs	376	112
	Peoples of Dagestan	32	22
	Mordvins	88	34
	Ossetians	99	53
	Tatars	5,967	2,621
	Chuvash	62	21
	Kara-Kalpaks	1,745	1,107
	Jews	2,902	1,238
	Others	2,467	1,305

Table F (continued)

<u>KAZAKH SSR</u>	In all	77,135	42,750
Russians		34,039	17,181
Ukrainians		3,891	1,797
Belorussians		481	239
Uzbeks		240	114
Kazakhs		31,351	19,362
Georgians		40	29
Azerbaydzhanis		91	50
Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians		44	27
Moldavians		27	10
Kirgiz		99	80
Armenians		159	88
Bashkirs		69	43
Balkars		30	9
Mordvins		62	23
Ossetians		37	30
Tatars		1,702	943
Chechen		112	57
Ingush		106	82
Chuvash		41	16
Kalmyks		22	14
Jews		837	495
Others		3,655	2,061
 <u>AZERBAYDZHAN SSR</u>	 In all	 36,017	 18,515
Russians		5,311	1,803
Ukrainians		279	72
Belorussians		22	6
Georgians		166	68
Azerbaydzhanis		25,509	14,378
Tadzhiks		20	20
Armenians		2,915	1,225
Turkmens		164	160
Peoples of Dagestan		395	226
Ossetians		40	14
Tatars		185	73
Jews		906	417
Others		105	53

Table F (continued)

<u>KIRGIZ SSR</u>	In all	17,379	10,836
Russians		6,345	3,415
Ukrainians		899	405
Belorussians		37	24
Uzbeks		313	243
Kazakhs		233	139
Azerbaydzhanis		35	27
Kirgiz		8,182	5,750
Armenians		20	13
Bashkirs		31	18
Tatars		448	242
Jews		263	180
Others		573	380

<u>TADZHIK SSR</u>	In all	19,959	11,424
Russians		4,680	2,240
Ukrainians		511	229
Belorussians		43	16
Uzbeks		3,436	1,990
Kazakhs		128	67
Azerbaydzhanis		35	26
Kirgiz		71	53
Tadzhiks		9,473	5,955
Armenians		78	53
Turkmens		40	18
Bashkirs		52	14
Mordvins		30	7
Ossetians		98	44
Tatars		609	299
Jews		391	219
Others		284	194

Table F (continued)

<u>TURKMEN SSR</u>	In all	13,151	8,031
Russians		3,915	1,971
Ukrainians		278	142
Belorussians		27	16
Uzbeks		346	239
Kazakhs		195	96
Azerbaydzhanis		120	84
Armenians		346	219
Turkmens		7,285	4,925
Peoples of Dagestan		38	24
Tatars		278	185
Jews		104	53
Others		119	77

Table G gives the national composition of research personnel in the Muslim republics (p.215). In all except Azerbaydzhani non-natives continue to dominate in this field as they did in 1955 (see CAR, Vol.V, No.2, p.125):

TABLE G

	1947		1960		Women of titular nationality	1960 as percentage of 1947	
	In all	Of titular nationality	In all	Of titular nationality		In all	Of titular nationality
Uzbekistan	4,806	568	10,329	3,552	757	253	6.3 times
Kazakhstan	2,885	487	9,623	2,064	570	3.3 times	4.2 times
Azerbaydzhani	3,282	1,596	7,226	4,669	1,294	220	293
Kirgizia	751	48	2,315	573	131	3.1 times	11.9 times
Tadzhikistan	665	89	2,154	727	122	3.2 times	8.2 times
Turkmenistan	660	91	1,836	677	106	278	7.4 times

In order to gain a clearer picture of the position held by the main nationalities in each of the Muslim republics among the specialists, students, and research personnel, the percentage of each nationality in these categories has been worked out and is compared in Table H with the percentage of each nationality in the republic's population as given in CHISLENNOST', SOSTAV I RAZMESHCHENIYE NASELENIYA SSSR (Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1961), which gives a short summary of the 1959 census results.

TABLE H

	Percentage of						
	Popu- lation	Specialists in economy	Research personnel	VUZ students	Day	Even- ing	Corres- pondence
	1959	1960	1960	1960-1			
<u>Uzbekistan</u>							
Uzbeks	62.2	36.9	34.4	47.2	54.0	31.3	41.3
Russians	13.5	30.2	-	26.0	20.8	45.4	28.9
<u>Kazakhstan</u>							
Kazakhs	30.0	24.0	21.4	40.6	45.3	16.1	36.9
Russians	42.7	53.2	-	44.0	40.2	56.4	48.3
<u>Azerbaijdzhan</u>							
Azerbaijdzhanis	67.5	60.0	64.6	70.8	77.6	54.1	65.9
Russians	13.6	15.7	-	14.7	9.7	25.4	18.7
Armenians	12.0	14.0	-	8.1	6.6	11.9	9.1
<u>Kirgizia</u>							
Kirgiz	40.5	30.0	24.7	47.1	53.1	15.7	40.8
Russians	30.2	46.0	-	36.5	31.5	63.9	41.5
Uzbeks	10.6	4.6	-	1.8	2.2	0.2	1.2
<u>Tadzhikistan</u>							
Tadzhiks	53.1	34.0	33.8	47.5	52.1	21.0	44.3
Uzbeks	23.0	10.7	-	17.2	17.4	6.0	18.6
Russians	13.3	35.9	-	23.4	19.6	50.3	25.2
<u>Turkmenistan</u>							
Turkmens	60.9	44.0	36.9	55.4	61.3	30.1	48.4
Russians	17.3	32.7	-	29.8	24.5	51.4	36.0

From this table it is clear that in all the republics concerned except Azerbaydzhan the Russians at present account for considerably more than their quota of specialists in the economy. The same is probably also true for research personnel, though figures are not available. The position as regards students, however, is much more favourable to the titular nationality, particularly for full-time day students. In Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan, in fact, the Russians account for less than their share of day students, and in Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan and Kirgizia the percentage of day students of the titular nationality is considerably higher than their percentage in the population. It is only in Uzbekistan that the titular nationality appears to be at an appreciable disadvantage. However, the low percentage of Uzbeks is no doubt accounted for, to some extent at least, by the fact that Tashkent is the educational Mecca of Central Asia, and Uzbekistan has a substantially higher student density (63 day students in VUZ per 10,000 population in 1959) than the other Muslim republics (between 54 and 44 per 10,000) and in the Soviet Union as a whole comes second only to Georgia (64 per 10,000) in this respect. The proportion of Russians among correspondence and evening students is noticeably higher than among day students. This is particularly marked in the case of evening students, presumably because the Russian population is concentrated in the towns and thus has greater opportunities to attend evening courses.

Two further minor points are worth noting. Firstly, if the statistics for higher education can be taken as any guide, the majority of the Chechens, Ingush and Balkars who were deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan during the war have apparently now returned to their homelands. Thus, out of the totals of 303 Chechen, 189 Ingush and 294 Balkar specialists, 272, 175 and 212 respectively are listed as being in the RSFSR, and for students the figures are 1,315 out of 1,470 Chechens, 631 out of 759 Ingush and 597 out of 697 Balkars in the RSFSR. There are still a certain number, however, in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan, the biggest concentrations being of Chechens (14 specialists and 112 students) and Ingush (8 specialists and 106 students) in Kazakhstan. A comparison of the number of specialists and students in VUZ of these nationalities with those of neighbouring Caucasian peoples such as the Ossetians and Kabardins, shows how the former suffered educationally during their years of exile, particularly the Chechens. (The figures for the population are taken from NASELENIYE SSSR, p.103.)

Nationality	No. in population	No. of specialists	No. of VUZ students
	1959	1960	1960-1
Chechens	418,800	303	1,470
Ossetians	410,000	8,889	5,494
Kabardins	203,600	2,336	2,065
Ingush	106,000	189	759
Balkars	42,400	294	697

The second point is that in three instances, on p.48 (number of women specialists in the economy), pp.106-7 (number of VUZ and students in different years from 1914-15 to 1960-1), and pp.242-3 (number of tekhniums etc. and students in them for different years) figures are given for Tselinnyy Kray as well as for Kazakhstan as a whole. Elsewhere, throughout the book, statistics are given for union republics only. Since, except perhaps in the second case, the figures alone do not seem to warrant separate treatment for Tselinnyy Kray, one is left wondering why it should have been singled out.

#### Tadzhik cyclists retain championship

For the second year running the Tadzhikistan team won the traditional "Friendship of the Peoples" cycle race for the Prize of the Uzbek Council of Ministers. The race was held from 5-15 April 1962 and the course of over 1,500 km. was from Tashkent round the Fergana Valley and back. There were more than 110 competitors representing 18 teams.

KT. 7-17.4.62

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE  
TURKMEN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

On 29 July 1961 the Academy of Sciences of the Turkmen SSR celebrated its 10th anniversary. Its activities during its ten years of existence and its plans for the future, particularly in the field of social sciences, were described by T.B. Berdyev in "Nekotoryye itogi razvitiya obshchestvennykh nauk za desyat' let (1951-1961 gg.)" (Some Results of the Development of the Social Sciences in Ten Years (1951-1961)), IZV.AN/Turk.SSR, Seriya obshchestvennykh nauk, No.4 of 1961. The following is a summary of the article.

### Introduction

The setting up of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences only became possible as a result of the enormous advances in the republic in the years of Soviet power. It was a sign of the "cultural maturity" of the Turkmen people. In the ten years of its existence the Academy has made substantial contributions in many fields of study. It has trained physicists, geologists, historians, economists, philologists, archaeologists, philosophers and other specialists. The number of Doctors of Sciences has increased from nine in 1951 to 20 in 1961 and of Candidates of Sciences from 49 to 115. When it was set up the Academy consisted of ten research institutions, but the number has now grown to 22. Those newly set up include the Institute of Soil Science and Reclamation of the Sands, the Institute of Chemistry, the Institute of Economics, the Makhtumkuli Institute of Literature, the Department of Exploratory Geophysics (razvedochnaya geofizika) and the Department of Philosophy and Law.

The subjects of study are closely connected with the republic's needs. In the scientific field they include the full use of the oil, gas and mineral wealth of Karabogazgol, and other salt resources; a study of the geological structure of the republic and clarification of the laws of formation of useful minerals in the earth's core; earthquake resistant construction; the use of solar energy in the economy with the application of semiconductor techniques; research into the upper layers of the atmosphere; study of the biological bases of raising the yield of agricultural plants and reclamation of sandy territories; and the rational use and reconstruction of the republic's flora and fauna.

## The Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography

The Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography is the Academy's biggest research institution in the field of social sciences. The historians, in particular, have many achievements to their credit. In 1957 the two-volume HISTORY OF THE TURKMEN SSR was published. This fundamental work, covering the history of the Turkmen people from the earliest times to the present day, was the result of many years of labour by scholars of the republic together with specialists from Moscow, Leningrad and Tashkent. In 1960 it was translated into Turkmen. From the material gathered in writing this history it has been possible to draw up valuable collections of documents on certain important questions such as the joining of Turkmenistan to Russia.

The institute has done a good deal of work on individual aspects of Turkmenistan's ancient and medieval history. The archaeologists have established that the beginnings of local land cultivation, the ancient towns and the formation of the first states date back much earlier than was supposed. In 1956-9 the Sector of Archaeology published two volumes on its work devoted to the Anau culture and antique and medieval monuments.

The Sector of Pre-Soviet History has done research into the ethnogenesis of the Turkmens and has established that they are a more ancient people than was thought and that the term Turkmen was first used in sources not in the 8-10th centuries but in the 5-6th.

A number of works have been published on the period between unification with Russia and the Revolution, on the Revolution and civil war in Turkmenistan, on local Bolshevik organizations, on culture, press and education, and on the formation of the Turkmen socialist nation.

The Sector of Ethnography, set up in 1957, has done research into the socialist culture and way of life of the workers and peasants.

As a result of the development of historical studies in the last ten years there are no important questions of the past of the Turkmen people which have not been "interpreted from Marxist-Leninist positions". But there is still much to be done and new tasks constantly arise. Many aspects of the ancient and medieval history of Turkmenistan require further study, as do agrarian relations and culture. The history of Turkmen relations with contiguous countries and peoples will have to be written again almost from scratch.

In accordance with its current tasks the institute is doing research on the following main problems:

1. The history of the primitive-communal, slave-owning and feudal systems on the territory of Turkmenistan and the formation of the Turkmen people.
2. The joining of Turkmenistan to Russia and its progressive consequences.
3. The Revolution and socialist construction in Turkmenistan.

The last named has pride of place and its study is aimed at showing how the formerly backward nations of the USSR made the transition to socialism. Fundamental works will be prepared on the working-class, its alliance with the peasantry, agrarian relations, and cultural development from 1917-65.

Mention must be made of the work of the South Turkmenistan Archaeological Combined Expedition (YuTAKE) which has made a systematic study of monuments of the past in southern Turkmenistan. It has discovered monuments of great artistic and cultural value. Near Krasnovodsk a Paleolithic camp has been found and brilliant results have been achieved by the large-scale excavations at Nisa, the capital of Parthia. These have made it possible to fill in a number of gaps in the history of the ancient world. In ten years YuTAKE has prepared 13 volumes devoted to its work, of which ten have been published, and has published two volumes of original material besides. It is now working in the area of the Karakum canal. Some new inscriptions of the 10-15th centuries have been discovered, and the so-called potters' quarter in Bayram-Ali rayon and many monuments of the Neolithic period have been investigated.

### Linguistics

The Academy's philologists have accomplished much in ten years. In the field of Turkmen linguistics the emphasis has been on a study of the grammatical structure and vocabulary of Turkmen, dialects, and the history of the Turkmen language. A number of monographs have been written on grammar and vocabulary which are satisfactory in the main. The two most interesting are THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE and THE SYNTAX OF THE SIMPLE SENTENCE IN TURKMEN which are very valuable as textbooks for students, post-graduates and others. Work is being completed on the first qualitative description of long vowel sounds in Turkmen based on experimental data. A new subject which has been under study recently is a comparative analysis of Russian and Turkmen grammar. On the subject of dialects a number of important monographs have been published.

In 1956 a RUSSIAN-TURKMEN DICTIONARY was published containing 50,000 words. It was the first important work on the vocabulary of Turkmen and was a great advance on the smaller earlier dictionaries. In 1959 the first DICTIONARY OF THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE containing 25,000 words was completed.

In the field of the history of the Turkmen language, two outline histories, covering respectively the 8-17th and 18-19th centuries, have been or are being completed.

In the next five years Turkmen grammar and vocabulary will be the main lines of research. It is hoped to publish a Turkmen grammar in Russian, a Turkmen-Russian dictionary, a comparative grammar of Russian and Turkmen, works on the language of the destan (fable) "Leyli and Majnun" by Andalib, and on long vowels, and a number of technical dictionaries.

### Literature

Literary studies have been conducted along four main lines - the history of Turkmen literature, folk literature, the study and publication of literary memorials, and theoretical questions and literary criticism.

On the first subject an important collective work has been written entitled AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF TURKMEN LITERATURE OF THE 18TH-19TH CENTURIES. This is the first time that a connected account of the literary processes and lives and works of the poets has been given against the historical background. A second major work is the OUTLINE HISTORY OF TURKMEN SOVIET LITERATURE in two parts in Turkmen. The first part deals with literature in general and the second with individual writers; it will soon be published in Russian. In 1957 an ANTHOLOGY OF TURKMEN POETRY was drawn up which includes folk poetry, poetry of the 18-19th centuries and of the Soviet period. In addition a number of monographs have been written about Turkmen Soviet writers and a number of others are in preparation as well as monographs on the pre-Revolutionary classic poets.

Work has been completed on AN OUTLINE OF FOLK LITERATURE, of which the first part deals with pre-Soviet folklore genres and the second with the Soviet period.

After a great deal of work on the texts, selected works of Makhtumkuli, Seidi, Kemine and others, several well known fables, and books of folk tales and proverbs have been published. An important event in this connexion was the publication of the heroic epic GEROGLY (Kör Ogly), which will soon be issued in Russian as well.

Literary theory and criticism have been studied since 1959 under the headings "The Birth and Development of Literary Criticism in Turkmenistan" and "Satire in Turkmen Literature (1941-1958)".

The celebration of the 225th anniversary of the birth of the great Turkmen poet Makhtumkuli was marked by sending expeditions into various areas which came back with many divans by Makhtumkuli and legends about him which have been incorporated in new editions of the poet's works.

In recent years the quality of literary research has improved greatly and most of the work is being carried out by groups of authors. One of the most important subjects on which the Academy's experts are working is the multi-volume HISTORY OF TURKMEN LITERATURE which will form part of the HISTORY OF THE LITERATURES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR. Plans include work on fables, variants of the epic Gerogly, and the works of Turkmen writers and poets before the 18th century, and publication of further selected works of classic writers of the 18-19th centuries and oral folk literature.

#### The Institute of Economics

The Institute of Economics, set up in 1958, has as its main subjects of study ways of raising productivity and lowering costs in Turkmenistan, the development and distribution of production, and the division of Turkmenistan into economic regions. The Oil and Gas Industry Sector has worked out a new improved method of calculating the time spent on drilling operations. The Industrial Sector has discovered reserves in the cotton ginning industry which will make it possible to deal with two and a half times as much cotton as at present, raise productivity 32-35 per cent in seven years and lower the cost of cotton fibre by more than 100,000,000 rubles. It will be unnecessary to build three new cotton ginneries provided for in the Seven-Year Plan. The sector has also worked out that, if in future small ginneries are built in the kolkhozes, there will be an annual saving of 35 million rubles. The Agricultural Sector has been making studies in kolkhozes and sovkhoses in the Karakum canal zone. Other suggestions have been made for improving cotton growing and livestock breeding. Members of the institute have published a number of works on various branches of the economy.

"However, economic sciences in the republic is lagging considerably behind the demands of the development of the economy, and the Institute of Economics has still not become the centre of researches carried out on the territory of the Turkmen SSR."

## Philosophy

Philosophical studies have developed along three main lines in the republic - the history of philosophy, historical materialism, and dialectical materialism. Under the first heading research is going on into the development of the philosophical and sociological thought of the Turkmen people and the views of prominent Turkmen writers of the past, and democratically minded members of the intelligentsia. The free-thinking and atheism of the Turkmen people and their fight against the reactionary clergy is also an important subject of study. It is hoped with the assistance of philosophers from other institutions to prepare for publication an outline history of the philosophic and sociological thought of the Turkmen people.

A lot of work has been done in the republic in the field of historical materialism on generalizing the experience of socialist and Communist construction in Turkmenistan. Attention has been devoted mainly to such questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, classes and the class war, the role of the popular masses in history, the solution of the national question, and the basis and superstructure of socialist society. A number of brochures and articles have been published on the national question and on the Communist education of the workers, in particular the fight with survivals of the past in Turkmenistan. Other valuable works include one on classes and the class struggle, another on Lenin's views on the popular masses as the creators of history, and an article on the formation of the Soviet patriotism of the Turkmen people. In the future research will also be done into such subjects as brigades of Communist labour, the relations between socialist nations, the non-capitalist path of development of Soviet Turkmenistan, the growing role of the masses and further increase in the leading role of the Communist Party during the full-scale building of Communism, and questions of ethics and aesthetics.

Some work has been done in the field of dialectical materialism but the republic is backward in this respect. Future plans provide for a further study of Lenin's philosophical heritage and the treatment of questions connected with the latest achievements of the natural sciences.

## Law

Since the Department of Philosophy and Law was set up in 1959, legal studies have developed systematically. The department's research workers are engaged in studying such general questions as the legal, state and social system in Turkmenistan as well as concrete legal questions such as the regulation of the activity of inter-kolkhoz organizations and the role of the soviets in the emancipation of women. A number of works were published in 1959-60.

### Conclusion

From the above it can be seen that much has already been done in the republic in the field of social sciences, but much more remains to be done and new problems will arise and have to be solved. Scholars in the humanitarian sciences must show the advances of world-wide significance in the life of the Turkmen people, unmask the slanderous fabrications of the right wing social-democrats and modern revisionists and defend the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory.

---

### Caravans for Kazakh shepherds?

About a year ago PRAVDA reported the invention of a new-type yurt in synthetic rot- and weather-proof materials for shepherds tending their herds in the remote pastures of Kazakhstan (CAR, 1961, No.4, p.388). The only task which now remained, the report said, was to organize large-scale production of these modern yurts.

"Unfortunately", states an article in the same paper of 24 May 1962, "mass production of yurts has not yet been organized" and the toilers in the remote pastures want to know when they will live in these yurts. Detailing the hard life these shepherds lead and their poor living conditions, the article suggests that the practice of foreign countries should be followed where, in similar conditions, "mobile dwellings on wheels" have been provided. "Whether they mount a synthetic-material frame on an ordinary automobile chassis with a motor, or on some other kind of self-propelled chassis is unimportant. The main thing is to have mobile and easily moved dwellings." The article goes on to recommend the mass production of portable gas stoves, warm sleeping bags and other articles for camping, in order to alleviate the harsh living conditions of the shepherds.

## B A R Y M T A

BY M.O. AUEZOV

Mukhtar Omarkhanovich Auezov, the well known Kazakh writer and scholar, was born in 1897 of nomad parents and died on 27 June 1961. He went to school in Semipalatinsk and started his literary career in 1917. Auezov began by writing plays and poetry and soon turned to short stories as well. His work immediately attracted attention, though in the 1920s he was accused of expressing bourgeois nationalist ideas and had to re-write his first play YENLIK AND KEBEK several times. According to Auezov himself "in 1932, having resolutely condemned my ideological and creative errors, I began to work in a new way, as a Soviet writer and dramatist, as a researcher into the history of Kazakh literature and as a teacher and lecturer in Kazakh higher education establishments". Auezov wrote many short stories and more than 20 plays, of which a large number were on contemporary themes. Among the best known are the stories SHOULDER TO SHOULDER, TRACES and THE STEEP ASCENT, and the plays ON THE FRONTIER, IN THE HOUR OF TRIAL, GUARD OF HONOUR and NOCTURNAL RUMBLINGS. Auezov devoted the last 20 years of his life to work on his immense historical novel about the Kazakh poet Abay Kunanbayev. For the first part ABAY he was awarded a Stalin Prize in 1949 although he was criticized for idealizing the feudal system and glossing over the class struggle. The second part, PUT' ABAYA, received a Lenin Prize in 1959, and the whole work is regarded as one of the outstanding achievements of Kazakh Soviet literature. Auezov was also an authority on Kazakh literature and folklore, and was responsible for the translation into Kazakh of OTHELLO and Gogol's THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR and many other works.

In a recent article in PROSTOR (No.1 of 1962) Mukhamedzhan Karatayev, discussing the effects of "the cult of personality" on Kazakh literature, wrote: "We know how the atmosphere of the cult of personality hindered and prevented from working the classic writer. . . Auezov who, because of slander and persecution, failed to write many a brilliant page". It is not clear whether this refers to any specific period in Auezov's life. At all events in recent years there has been a reappraisal of his writings of the 1920s\* and it is now stated that

---

\* See also CAR, 1959, No.3, p.254

though some of these works were "written from ideological positions alien to us. . . there are no grounds for concluding that not one realistic work came from Auezov's pen in the first years of his creative activity". (AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF KAZAKH SOVIET LITERATURE, Alma-Ata, 1958.)

The story BARYMTA written in 1925 and translated below, belongs to this early period and only recently appeared in Russia for the first time. It was published in PROSTOR, 1961, No.8, from which the following English translation was made. Barymta is a vengeance raid in which the enemy's livestock is driven away by the raiders. Barymta, together with other Kazakh customs touched on in the story, were discussed fully in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1957, No.1 "The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs" and No.2, "Kazakh Customary Law". In a recent number of PROSTOR (No.4 of 1962, p.91), the critic D. Nikolich gives a Soviet view to the significance of the story. He says that BARYMTA without its hero, the poor man Kalbagay, would have been no more than an interesting picture of a savage old Kazakh custom, but in fact "the reader is completely engrossed not by the war between the auls but by the fate of Kalbagay; Auezov's favourite idea was that people of desperate courage and honest mind usually came from the popular masses and in times past they perished tragically."

---

It was a quiet moonlit night. In the cloudless sky, thousands of stars twinkled like distant fires. The constellations were clearly defined, and their positions showed that August was approaching. This is the time when the auls come back from the distant summer pastures and gradually approach the autumn camp. In the last two days, five or six auls had already been set up in the Kenozek valley, and by the end of the migration season there would be up to twenty of them.

The Kenozek valley is one of the best pastures there are. It is wide, richly covered in grass, and has many watering places, for a little river flows through the middle of the valley. The air is marvellously fresh. Even on the hottest days a cool breeze blows softly from the tall, ice-capped mountains of the north. The grass on the hillsides never fades; it looks eternally green, as if it will never lose its youth.

Now, in the silence of the moonlit night, the valley cloaked in a light mist, is like a beautiful girl sleeping behind softly transparent curtains. By the river, the auls are dimly visible and from a distance look like a flock of geese which has alighted to rest; they are huddled together and form an almost perfect circle. The yurts of the rich stand

out, shining white in the moonlight, but the sad black yurts of the poor try to hide and patch their torn walls with pieces of the night's darkness.

All the yurts have their flaps shut. Everything slumbers. The sheep are asleep in their pens; the silence is broken only occasionally by the guards shouting to each other, and the echo of their voices lingers in the valley. These drawn out cries lull Kenozek, invite sleep and forgetfulness, and it seems as though even the mist, gently rising and falling, wants to lie down and sleep.

This peaceful night had not yet entered the yurts of the rich, where life always went on late. Fires flickered in their hearths, glowing red through the opening at the top of the yurts. In each aul saddled horses were tethered in a line outside the white yurts, the prize steeds among them distinguished by their taut bellies and bound tails. That night, all the finest thoroughbreds were being kept in readiness. At the slightest sound, as if they were oppressed by the silence, they would neigh, look round them nervously, prick up their sharp ears, and paw the ground with their hooves; they had been tied up outside the yurts still steaming from a whole day's ride.

There was a good reason for this state of alertness, and this was that the aul feared a barymta raid. Every year the Kazakhs of Tersakkan came into contact with the Kazakhs of Karaganda, who spent the autumn not far from the Kenozek valley. In each of these districts, which were a long way apart, lived two clans, brought together each year by the summer migration. Both were large, rich in cattle, and warlike; because of the intrigues of their leaders, their treachery and constant fighting among themselves there was a persistent enmity between the two clans. Each kept a steady eye on the movements of the other and in the summer, when they finally came together, they resorted to direct attack. They would go on barymta raids, and sometimes gather together a small force, to try and pillage an enemy aul. All year round they were engaged in disputes about the remarriage of widows\*, summer pastures and fines, so that the Kenozek was in a constant state of agitation. All this had been going on now for several years.

In the previous year the hatred between the two clans had flared up so violently that there could be no question of a reconciliation. Their leaders hired advocates and sent petitions to the governor, but this did not help either side. The balance swayed, but there was no

---

\* The practice of inheriting the wife of a deceased relative (usually brother), known as amengeri.

definitive victory. Finally, the governor stopped taking part in their quarrels. Their countless petitions and complaints received no answer. But even in the winter, when both sides were far apart, complaints continued to flow into the town.

All this accumulated hatred had to find an outlet, and now both sides were preparing for a decisive encounter. There had already been a few odd raids and skirmishes. The jigits (armed horsemen) rarely left the saddle. Every day there were rumours of recent barymta raids and of people losing whole herds. This talk excited the aul even more, so that Kenozek was like a hornet's nest.

There was always a certain order to the conduct of this feud. At the beginning of the summer, both sides simply kept a watchful eye on each other, but avoided serious encounters. The conflict became more open towards autumn, when hardly a night went by without a fight of some kind. On this particular night the auls in the Kenozek found themselves right at the centre of the field of battle, for among them was the aul of Dosbol, the strongest aul of Tersakkan. The Tersakkans always took orders from Dosbol in everything: quarrels, legal disputes, or barymta raids. And now that the aul of both clans were coming back from the summer pastures, each night the old men would whisper with a sigh: "What will happen now, what misfortunes will befall us?" while the hot-blooded jigits and all the men who had experience of fighting would check the horses and the weapons and keep watch on the surroundings of the aul.

Two weeks before, Dosbol had decided to frighten the enemy and had undertaken a barymta raid on the main aul of Aydar and had seized a herd of thirty horses. A week later, some messengers had come from Aydar, but Dosbol had refused to speak to them. This was why all the Tersakkans, and especially the people of Dosbol's aul, were anxious, expecting to be attacked in return at any moment. Dosbol's followers, whose loyalty to him was absolute, took charge of the poorer men and never let them out of their sight, training them to be obedient soldiers and preparing them for battle. The rich young men from other auls were keen to show their loyalty to Dosbol and kept close to his aul. Dosbol himself, an old grey wolf who had spent all his life fighting and had learnt how to come out victorious and unharmed every time, once more showed his experience and cunning. Dosbol made all his neighbours, sons of poor men, mount horses with a soyl (stick with leather noose) in their hands. Day and night his jigits galloped over the steppe, trying to seek out the enemy in advance, and when they did find an enemy rider on his own, they would drag him off his horse and make fun of their prisoner. The most trustworthy jigits of all were in charge of Dosbol's huge herds. And so the small detachments sent by Aydar always returned with nothing to show for their efforts and having left one or other of

their comrades in the hands of Dosbol's men. Dosbol gave his best jigits the finest horses, armed them with soyl and shokpar (clubs with steel spikes), and even secretly gave some of them rifles.

But of all his men, Dosbol relied most on Kalbagay. This was a jigit of about thirty, a poor man and the only son of a widowed mother. He had a small black beard, and his hawk's eyes, wide shoulders and powerful chest singled him out from his companions; there was no-one to equal his daring, his cool courage or his skill in battle and among his comrades he had earned the title of the "Terror of the Karagandis". On stormy winter nights, when you couldn't even see as far as your horse's ears, Kalbagay would not leave his master's herds for an instant, astonishing everyone by his powers of endurance. The Kazakhs would say that he slept on ice and covered himself with snow. He never closed his eyes for a minute he guarded Dosbol against wolves, raiders and thieves alike. He knew his art well; it was as if it had always been in his blood. When he chased a wilful stray on his great, light-maned horse, the fugitive would always stop, trembling with fear. The untamed, wild four-year olds who had never known a bridle would fall to their knees neighing when they felt the noose of his lasso round their necks, or when he caught them by the ears with his iron fingers. And when he mounted one of them, no amount of furious bucking and rearing could budge him from the saddle, and after the vain struggle, the horse, rolling its bloodshot eyes and covered in flecks of foam, would finally quieten down.

It was Kalbagay who was guarding the herds on that particular night, for there had been reports of danger: a scout had seen a large number of riders away in the distance moving towards Kenozek. As it was late, Kalbagay decided to put up a defence in the aul itself rather than go chasing about the steppe in the dark looking for the enemy. If there was to be an attack, it would not be till dawn. The jigits agreed with him, and when they had herded the horses together, they gathered in the aul to eat.

Many of the old men feared that this battle would be a serious one. Dosbol and Kalbagay themselves knew that this time they would not shake off the enemy easily. Dosbol's scouts had told him that Aydar was enraged by defeat, had raised a strong force of hardened bandits, and was determined that whatever it cost him, he was not going to be beaten. It was also said that he had with him the two brothers Konakay and Zholaman, a notorious pair of horse-thieves who had spent their whole lives galloping over the steppe, like wolves in search of prey. Their exploits had angered many a rich aul, and even the bailiff was after them. Everyone knew them as "the fugitives". Several times armed riders had been sent to catch them and hand them over to the authorities,

but they invariably managed to get away and would hide up in the mountains, or in the deep rush forests by some remote lake in the steppe until all was quiet again. Then they would return to their banditry even more fiercely than before, and the aul would tremble. The Kazakhs would tell each other with awe that the brothers slept fully armed, and that each of them had a rifle, a shokpar and a dagger. And now it was rumoured that Aydar was sending these two against Dosbol, promising to shield them from the authorities in return for their services.

The jigits in Dosbol's yurt had finished eating and were talking about Kalbagay's strength and courage, and about the exploits of the fearless Konakay, when suddenly there was a loud cry of alarm from the other end of the aul. The jigits started up, and some of them rushed out of the yurt. Again there was a cry, this time the ominous "Attan!" (to horse) and now all the jigits ran outside.

It was as though the silence of that night had never been. Now there were the muffled sounds of blows, the cries of the wounded, the frequent thundering rush of the frightened herds. Dosbol's jigits jostled each other as they hurriedly snatched their soyls and shouting to each other they leapt onto their horses. The horses, excited by the sounds of battle, kept turning round on the spot. Above the frenzied shouts of the jigits rose the sad, chanting voices of the old men with their prayer of: "Allah, preserve them, Allah, save them from misfortune." But others angrily cut short these gloomy cries and encouraged the jigits with shouts of: "There's nothing to wail about, jigits, just you show them who you are!" Among the watching grown-ups, young girls and children were trying to hide behind each others' backs, their hearts beating with fear for their brothers and fathers and at the same time completely fascinated by all that was going on.

The jigits leapt into the saddle, each one trying to be the first to do so, and the horses galloped off; their harsh cries could be heard in the distance, as Dosbol and his men dashed into the night.

Among the women who stayed behind in a frightened, huddled bunch, was Umsyn, Kalbagay's mother. As though sensing disaster, she kept murmuring through pale lips: "Oh God, don't let my only son die! Oh God, protect him, an orphan, my only son. . ." The old woman had none but Kalbagay. Although he was almost thirty, he had never had enough money to get married and this was an added cause of unhappiness for the old woman.

All those who were left behind in the aul were in a torment of anxiety listening to the cries of the jigits. After a while, there was another cry of "Attan!" This came from Dosbol's men, rushing to the

field of battle. Altogether, about eight hundred men had gathered from the various auls. Now the whole valley resounded with the thud of horses' hooves, shouts, and the cracking of the soyls. Women ran from aul to aul, trying to find out what was happening, and the old men turned to them crossly with: "Stop chattering! Be quiet!" At last there were a couple of rifle shots, and then all was silent, for the raiders and their pursuers had moved to the south, away from the aul, and were riding away in the wild steppe.

. . .

When Kalbagay had heard that day that there was to be a barymta raid, he took good care to be prepared for it. All evening and all night he had kept the other herdsman awake by telling them funny stories. He kept constant watch on the horses, and when any of them tried to wander off, he would chase after it and bring it back to the herd. From time to time he rode off into the steppe, looking for danger spots - the hollows and hidden slopes of the hills. Taking off his tymak (Kazakh headdress with ear-flaps) he would hold his breath and together with his horse freeze into immobility, merging with the darkness for a moment while he listened for the slightest warning sound.

All was quiet. In the aul everybody had lain down to rest. Kalbagay went round the tightly packed herd once more, and was about to turn his horse round, when suddenly he stopped in his tracks. . . On the big hill, clearly outlined in the moonlight, a group of riders appeared. They swept down the hillside, looking like a black cloud, cracking their whips to frighten the herds. Kalbagay calmly estimated the enemy's strength. There were at least forty of them, and not as many as fifteen, together with Kalbagay, to guard the herds.

The riders were approaching in a wild dash, whooping and shouting at the tops of their voices. The frightened horses started galloping in a dense mass towards the aul. One or two of the herdsman dashed after them in alarm. Only twelve men, with Kalbagay at their head, were left to face the raiders, and together they boldly rode out to meet them with loud shouts of "Attan! Attan!" It was this which had aroused Dosbol's aul.

The black cloud of riders rapidly drew nearer, and then spread out in order to surround Kalbagay's little band of men; their raised soyls gleamed in the moonlight. The next moment, the two sides clashed; soyls lashed out and some of them broke under the strength of the blow, horses neighed angrily, rearing and biting each other. Men called out the names of their ancestors in order to raise the spirits of their comrades, and through the tumult came the occasional thud of blows dealt by the treacherous shokpar.

There were not many herdsmen, and only half of Aydar's men stayed to keep them back and try to prevent them from realizing what was happening; the other half rounded up the horses, shouting to keep them moving. Kalbagay tried hard to stop them, but this time the enemy was too strong, and their plans were well calculated and bold. The herds of horses chased by Aydar's men, left the valley, snorting and neighing, crossed the hill and galloped away in the vast steppe. Now that the herds were in their hands, the rest of the raiders galloped off to join their comrades.

Although this first skirmish had clearly proved the superiority of Aydar's force, the herdsmen did not give up. In a long, straggling line they set off to follow the enemy and carry on the fight.

There were two riders among Aydar's men who stood out from the rest. They fought bravely and skilfully, every one of their blows reaching its target. Three of Kalbagay's comrades had been knocked out of the saddle by them and lay unconscious on the ground. One of the two rode a dappled stallion, the other a huge horse with a star on its forehead and a thick tail which flowed right down to the ground. As they galloped along after the herd, they would let their pursuers catch up with them and bravely take them on in single combat. If they were attacked by several men at once, they would use their soyls with astonishing dexterity to ward off the blows. The herdsmen knew them for the famous Konakay and Zholaman. Now, once more they stayed behind and fiercely attacking the herdsmen, kept them from reaching the horses. There was the sound of repeated blows from the soyls and sharp, angry cries as the two sides shouted insults at each other.

Both sides were galloping along as they fought, and finally they reached the first stolen herd of about a hundred horses. Fifteen or so of Aydar's men were chasing it, mercilessly beating any horse that lagged behind.

Kalbagay, at the head of his tiny force, had no intention of giving in, and his jigits after the first attack, were becoming bolder. The enemy realized that the horses would not be given up lightly. Suddenly, Kalbagay burst into their midst, and with one accurate blow of his soyl knocked one of Aydar's men onto his horse's neck, his head smashed. As another fell from his horse, Kalbagay turned in his saddle and called out to his men: "Keep close together, we'll split up the herd!" He flicked his horse's flank with his whip, and he and his jigits broke into the middle of the herd. The frightened animals scattered in all directions and many of them galloped, neighing and snorting, back towards the aul. After several more of these bold onslaughts, Kalbagay had scattered most of the herds. The raiders were left with only about thirty horses, and their soyls were no longer helping them to keep their

booty, for up till now, Kalbagay had not tried to fight them, but concentrated only on getting the horses back. He charged once more, and the raiders had only fifteen horses, which they surrounded in a tight circle, determined at all costs not to lose them. There was no question now of rounding up the horses that Kalbagay had frightened away and taking them with them.

From the aul came the sound of riders rushing to Kalbagay's aid. Aydar's jigits were being forced to flee, but suddenly enraged by the way things were going for them, they decided to show their strength once and for all. While a few of them stayed to guard what was left of the herds, the rest turned round to meet their pursuers and avenge themselves for their losses. There were less than thirty of them now, as Kalbagay had knocked five of them out of the saddle, and his jigits another two. They had been tied up by some of the herdsmen who had taken them and their horses back to the aul. Kalbagay too had lost some of his men, for Konakay and Zholaman had knocked six of them off their horses without even engaging them in a serious fight. But Kalbagay, knowing that help was coming, was not alarmed by the unequal numbers, and he shouted to his men to gather round; after a few words of encouragement, he broke once more into the enemy ranks.

This was true battle. Before the clash, Zholaman fired his revolver twice and shouted: "Get back! Get away from here! I'll kill you all!" But the jigits, flushed with success, galloped on. Once again, columns of dust rose and darkened the bright night. Blows showered down, and the jigits fell on each other with the fury of dogs fighting for a bone. . . With every moment the fighting became more violent and cruel; soyl and shokpar flashed down through the air onto enemy heads. Six horses broke out of the turmoil leaving their riders on the ground, and galloped off into the steppe.

Kalbagay did not at once make out the figures of Zholaman and Konakay. But suddenly Konakay proclaimed himself, and knocking yet another rider out of the saddle, broke into the thick of the battle with cries of: "I am Konakay! Konakay, I tell you!" Hearing his voice, Kalbagay took no notice of anyone else. Urging his horse on with his whip, he cried out: "And I am Kalbagay!" and galloped up to Konakay. They faced each other like sworn enemies and raised their soyl threateningly. But neither of them moved - for a moment they froze before the fatal combat. Then they both moved back, and standing up in their stirrups, lashed out at each other, showering each other with blows. For every two blows he received, Kalbagay managed to give back four. Soon there were no other riders around them. Aydar's men had seen a threatening mass of swiftly approaching riders coming from the aul to help Kalbagay, and abandoning the fight, they took to their heels, with Kalbagay's men relentlessly pursuing them. Suddenly, Konakay was afraid, and turning his dappled horse, dashed off in headlong flight. Behind him the sound of hooves grew louder, the shouts of the approaching riders clearer.

Kalbagay was pressing close on his heels. Konakay tried to shake him off. He hit out at him, and missed, so that Kalbagay was able to hit him over the head. Konakay felt he could not fight any longer; his head spun, everything was going black, and he could hardly keep in the saddle and lay leaning forward, holding on to his horse's mane. His one hope lay in his horse's speed. But Kalbagay's grey stallion did not fall back, and Konakay knew that he would not escape. He looked over his shoulder and saw the riders from the aul sweeping down the hill like an avalanche. He suddenly panicked, and started digging both legs into his horse's sides. Kalbagay guessed that he was frightened to death. Before, he joined boldly in every skirmish, throwing back his broad shoulders, his proud chest forward, but now he was hunched up over his horse's neck and seemed to be trying to hide in its fluttering mane. Kalbagay cracked his whip once more, drew level with Konakay, and caught him with a blow of his soyl. "Get off your horse," he ordered, "get down, while you're still alive!"

Konakay, at the last blow, had slipped sideways and was clutching his horse's mane to stop himself falling to the ground.

Now Zholaman, who had seen that Konakay had fallen behind and could not get away from Kalbagay, came to his brother's rescue. This did not alarm Kalbagay. He decided to knock Konakay, now beaten and weak, to the ground with one last blow, and took hold of his shokpar. Konakay saw his brother through the blood that clouded his eyes and called out in a faint voice: "I'm dying. No strength left. . . shan't escape. Shoot." He tried to shift over to the other side of his horse to get away from Kalbagay's shokpar, but was too weak and it crashed onto his temple, the spikes tearing his cheek and smashing his cheekbone. He lurched violently, and lay hanging down the side of his horse. When, with an almost unconscious movement, he tried to sit up, he received yet another blow. With a groan Konakay fell to the dry grass. His arms stretched out on either side of him, he lay motionless, and only a little bubble of blood which appeared at the corner of his mouth at each breath showed that he was not dead.

Kalbagay raised his shokpar once more and turned to face Zholaman. Zholaman pulled out his revolver from inside his jacket, and aimed at the forehead of Kalbagay's light grey stallion. But the horse, startled by the body of Konakay falling at his feet, shied. At that moment, the pistol shot rang out. The bullet hit Kalbagay in the chest. When the smoke cleared, Kalbagay was no longer in the saddle; with a pale cold face, he lay beside Konakay.

Zholaman took Konakay's horse and the light grey stallion by the bridle and with one last glance at the two motionless bodies, he turned and galloped off, for the riders from the aul were by now very close.

Leaving his dying brother to the enemy, he rode away at a fierce gallop and escaped with the two horses. Meanwhile, the herdsmen abandoned their chase and turned back. They met the rest of Dosbol's riders, and together they surrounded Kalbagay's body. There was the sound of weeping.

Only fifteen horses had been lost, and Kalbagay, who had saved almost the entire herd, lay dead.

Blood had flowed on that light, moonlit night. Two dark steppe riders, who would not see the rising dawn, had gone to their deaths for the sake of their masters' herds, and now both of them lay like the heroes of olden times, shedding their blood. Their mothers would wait for them in vain that day, and it would grow still darker inside their poor, threadbare yurts.

#### Private enterprise in Kazakhstan

There are many instances of people building private houses "illegally" in Kazakhstan. In Ust'-Kamenogorsk, for example, 600 houses have recently been built without authorization; none of those involved have been prosecuted for their unlawful activities. KP. 4.5.62

#### Dushanbe airport regulations

The administration of Dushanbe published a notice in KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 15 June 1962 confirming and emphasizing the airport regulations which prohibit unauthorized persons from entering the "territory of the airport" either on foot or by vehicle; neither may cattle be grazed there. KT. 15.6.62

#### Uygur philologist honoured

Aisha Shamleve, an Uygur philologist working at the Kazakh Institute of Education, has recently had conferred on her by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR the title of Distinguished Scientific Worker. She is the first Uygur to have been awarded this title. SU, 1962, No.147

## B O O K S   R E C E I V E D

THE LAND OF THE GREAT SOPHY. By Roger Stevens.  
Methuen. 291pp. Illus. 42/-.

A MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA. By David Marshall Lang.  
Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 298pp. Illus.; Maps.

Being primarily concerned with Soviet publications on the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union and the other Muslim countries adjoining them, CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW does not normally contain reviews of books published in non-Soviet countries, except when they have a direct bearing on the subject of the Centre's research. The above two books, however, deserve special attention partly because of their intrinsic merit, and partly because of the remarkable way in which they differ from current Soviet writing on two countries - Persia and Georgia - lying adjacent to the Muslim republics.

THE LAND OF THE GREAT SOPHY is a straightforward description of Persia's geography, history, religion and art, written in the belief that these things "tell more perhaps about the Persian character and the nature of the country than any account of her modern economy or form of government." Sir Roger Stevens is, of course, precluded by his past and present official position, from discussing the last two matters and his book is therefore in welcome contrast to those would-be comprehensive surveys of Persia which claim to probe the complexities of Persia's domestic problems and foreign relations. The author's approach is at once sympathetic and practical: after a brief geographical description, he deals concisely and objectively with history, religion and art, and then takes his readers on a series of tours throughout the length and breadth of the country. There are useful notes on travelling as well as on travellers and other authorities about Persia, and a wealth of excellent photographs. The failure to adhere to any known system of transliterating Persian names will perhaps be irksome only to the experts, for whom Sir Roger states clearly he is not writing; but it is a defect which could easily have been remedied without any disadvantage.

Dr. Lang's MODERN HISTORY OF GEORGIA is a notable achievement. A trouble spot for both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, Georgia's "spirit of defiant, romantic patriotism, tinged at times with morbid gloom, and at others with radiant hope in a better future" has never been completely quenched; it lingers on today with the result that by comparison with the Muslim republics, Soviet treatment of Georgia has been gingerly, and the russianization and sovietization of Georgian culture much less marked. All this has been well and most readably brought out by Dr. Lang who with the aid of some really remarkable illustrations, has contrived to give a graphic and engaging picture of one of the most un-Russian of all the 15 Soviet republics. In his concluding note on Russian Nationalities Policy today, he does well to emphasize the positive material achievements of the regime, but he is perhaps over-optimistic when he speaks of the day coming when Georgia will "enjoy a larger measure of free speech, genuine democracy and wider self-determination". The first two are certainly possible, but the last, in view of the Party's declared resolve to uproot all traces of nationalism, seems most unlikely to materialize.

## NEWS DIGEST

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1962. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

## ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Territorial changesAzerbaijdzhan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 June 1962, the town-type settlement Agdzhabedi, centre of the Agdzhabedi rayon has been transferred to the category of towns of rayon subordination. VVS. 29.6.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 23 June 1962, the villages Kubatly and Lerik, centres of the Kubatlynskiy and Lerinskiy rayons respectively, have been transferred to the category of town-type settlements. VVS. 29.6.62

Turkmenistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 2 June 1962, the settlement Khauz-Khan, Tedzhen rayon, Mary oblast has been transferred to the category of town-type settlements. VVS. 22.6.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 2 June 1962, the town-type settlement of Samsonovo, Kerkinskiy rayon, Chardzhou oblast has been renamed Amu-Dar'ya. VVS. 22.6.62

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 2 June 1962, in connexion with the abolishment of the Leninabad oblast, the towns Isfara, Kanibadam, Pendzhikent, Ura-Tyube and Khodzhent have been transferred to the category of towns of republic subordination. VVS. 22.6.62

## Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 3 May 1962, two new krais have been formed in south and west Kazakhstan "for the further improvement of economic and cultural work".

The West-Kazakhstan Kraiy includes the Aktyubinsk, Gur'yev and West-Kazakhstan oblasts and its administrative centre is Aktyubinsk. The West-Kazakhstan oblast has been renamed Ural'sk oblast.

The South-Kazakhstan Kraiy includes the Dzhambul, Kzyl-Orda and South-Kazakhstan oblasts and its administrative centre is Chimkent. The South-Kazakhstan oblast has been renamed Chimkent oblast.



By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 31 March 1962, the town-type settlement Taincha, Krasnoarmeyskiy rayon, Kokchetav oblast, Tselinny Kraiy, has been transferred to the category of towns of rayon subordination, and it has been renamed Krasnoarmeysk. VVS. 4.5.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 24 May 1962, the Dzhangalinskiy rayon, Ural oblast has been abolished and its territory has been placed under the authority of the Kaztalovski and Furmanovski rayons. VVS. 8.6.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 29 May 1962, the Novoshul'binskiy and Borodulikhinskiy rayons, Semipalatinsk oblast have been united to form the Novoshul'binskiy rayon. VVS. 22.6.62

## ARCHAEOLOGY

Ruins of an ancient settlement have been unearthed by chance near the village Ibragingadzili, Tauz rayon, Azerbaydzhan SSR. According to archaeologists, these are remains of a town which stood on that site up to the 9-10th centuries A.D. Excavations near the site have revealed fragments of ceramics and various bronze objects which indicate that there must have been a settlement in the area for about three thousand years. P. 26.6.62

Archaeologists of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences have recently conducted an expedition to the Alay valley in south Kirgizia. They have discovered twenty ancient burial grounds there although the area used to be regarded as one offering no archaeological interest whatever. The mummified head of a woman was found in one of the graves at a height of 3,800 metres. The head dating from the 5-3rd centuries B.C. is covered with a head-gear and ornaments clearly showing the influence of Chinese civilization on the peoples who lived there at that time. VOP.IST. 1962, No.5

## COMMUNICATIONS

Second airport for Tashkent

As the present Tashkent airport can no longer handle the growing volume of air traffic, a second airport has been handed over for public use. This is the airport in the Sergeli rayon which used to belong to the aviation club and which, since last April, has been used as a relief airport for Tashkent. PV. 10.4.62

## CONFERENCES

The republican conference of workers of social sciences was held in Baku on the 8-9 June 1962. The introductory report was given by V.Yu. Akhundov, First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party. Akhundov discussed the setbacks caused by the "period of personality cult" in Azerbaydzhan where it was aggravated by the activities of political adventurers such as Beriya and Bagirov. The various branches of social sciences, he said, were especially strongly affected by that misguided trend. From 1945 to 1955 the Institute of History of the AN/Az. SSR published only 18 works amounting to 285 printed sheets (1 sheet equals approximately four pages of Medium Quarto), whereas in the two years 1960-1, 71 works were published by the Institute totalling 1,300 printed sheets. Since the middle 1950s research work has been revitalized.

In the period 1956-61 the Azerbaydzhan State Publishing House brought out 333 works on diverse subjects of the social sciences and from 1954-62, 18 doctoral theses and 200 candidates' theses were accepted. Akhundov went on to say that in spite of these achievements several fields are still lagging behind. Research in philosophy, social philosophy, history, economics, theory of government and law, contemporary history of the Near and Middle East and the fine arts leave much to be desired. No serious work has so far appeared on the historical grammar of Azeri and almost no attention has been paid to practical problems of the modern literary language. BR. 12.6.62

An all-union conference of orientologists was held in Tashkent from the 22-26 May 1962, devoted to economic and historical problems of Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey. Delegates from Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Baku, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Ashkhabad and Dushanbe were present. Sixty papers were read, mostly on contemporary problems. At the conference much attention was paid to the projects and working plans of monographs to be written by groups of authors. These large scale plans of collective work were presented by the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. After a detailed discussion of projects, those present at the conference came to the conclusion that such collective monographs will be the most important future contributions to the study of the recent history and present economic and political problems of the countries of the East, since they will attract specialists from every field and thus make it possible to produce comprehensive studies of the various countries. BR. 27.5.62

## EDUCATION

An article in PRAVDA of 25 May 1962 shows concern at the apparently widespread "backward views and sentiments" still shown by educational authorities and parents in some areas of Turkmenistan. Two pupils who had completed the eighth grade appealed to the Iolatan' District Education Committee to be allowed to go back to school as their parents wanted to marry them off to men they did not know and had refused to allow them to continue their studies. In this case the girls were helped and are now back at school, but it appears that more and more girls of the indigenous nationality drop out of school every year. The article goes on to give the following facts:

When the current school year opened more than 5,000 pupils in the republic failed to show up. The highest number of dropouts occur in the Mary and Tashauz oblasts and in Kuybyshev and Ashkhabad rayons. Ten years ago more than 8,000 Turkmen girls entered the first grade in Turkmenistan's schools; only 1,600 of them are now completing secondary school. More than 6,000 girls left school before finishing the seventh grade.

There are at present more than 54,000 Turkmen girls in grades 1-4; there are only half as many in grades 5-7 and only 9,000 in grades 8-11. (See CAR, 1960, No.4, p.386 for earlier figures.)

There is, states the article, no broad explanatory work among the population in the republic. The Party organizations have lost sight of those of the population who, because of their backwardness, adhere to survivals of the past. Work among old people, whose influence on the young is still strong, is poorly conducted. A number of districts and collective farms undeservedly neglect that new form of public organization, the council of elders, which, as experience has shown, can be an active force in the struggle against manifestations of reactionary attitudes toward women. Parents, too, do not give wholehearted support to the teachers' collectives in the struggle for universal education. But fundamentally, it is that the Ministry of National Education and its local agencies do not show true concern for ensuring that all children of school age go to school.

"The Party organizations and the Ministry of National Education of the republic must, with the active participation of trade unions and the Komsomol organization and of the whole public, carry out great organizational and indoctrinational work toward ending once and for all the disgraceful survivals. . ."

P. 25.5.62

At the second plenary session of the Trade Union Committee of Cultural Workers of Turkmenistan the Chairman of the Committee, Abramov, told the assembly about recent achievements in the field of cultural development. At present there are 11 universities of culture and five popular theatres in Turkmenistan. The theatres give frequent performances: the Kaakhkinskiy Popular Theatre, for instance, gave 80 shows and concerts during the past year watched by a total of 30,000 kolkhoz workers and by those building the Karakum canal. In many republican and local papers certain columns are run by outside contributors taking part in this cultural work done by "semi-spontaneous" organizations. There are also radio programmes organized and prepared by professional men or workers interested in doing cultural work in their spare time.

TI. 10.6.62


In Tadzhikistan the Ministry of National Education was formed by a decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 3 May 1962. The new Ministry was formed from the Ministry of Education of the Tadzhik SSR, and the State Committee for Higher and Secondary Special Education under the Council of Ministers of the Tadzhik SSR. All buildings and equipment has been put under the authority of the new Ministry.

KT. 4.5.62

## IRRIGATION

Arys-Turkestan canal

Work on the first stage of the canal was begun in May. The construction of the Bugun' reservoir is nearing completion; it will hold 370m. cubic metres of water and is a very important link in the canal. The canal starts at the village of Karaspaya on the river Arys in the Chimkent oblast (until recently South-Kazakhstan oblast), and will flow through the lands of the Arys, Shaul'der, Chayanovskiy and Turkestan rayons. Its total length will be about 200 km., and it will make possible the irrigation of 120,000 hectares of good quality soil. [Work on the Bugun' reservoir was begun in 1954, and preparatory work on the canal, allegedly, also in 1954. Since then there has been little mention of progress in the Central Asian Press. See CAR, 1955, No.3, pp.225-8 and 1960, No.2, p.150. Ed. - CAR.]



Muminabad reservoir

The construction of the Muminabad reservoir near Kulyab in Tadzhikistan is completed. The capacity of this new reservoir is 25m. cubic metres. The reservoir makes it possible to irrigate more than 6,000 hectares of cotton plantations. (See also CAR, 1960, No.2, pp. 141-2.)

KT. 1.6.62

Karakum canal

The third and last section of the Karakum canal, which flows 260 km. from the Tedzhen river to Ashkhabad, has been completed. This section was built in the record time of eight months. (See CAR, 1961, No.3, pp.386-7 for map and details of alignment.) The entire 800 km. canal has been dug in six years.

The waters of the Amu-Dar'ya via the Karakum canal are already irrigating 165,000 hectares of land in the Mary and Chardzhou oblasts. New settlements and state farms have sprung up on the "Karakum virgin lands" and the first crops have been harvested. The canal has made possible the cultivation of an additional 120,000 tons of cotton already, and the first section had paid for itself in less than two years.

Much work still lies ahead for the builders of the canal. Preparations are in hand for a further, southern canal which will be 70 km. in length and join the Khauz-Khan reservoir with the third section. This southern canal will permit the irrigation of new lands in the Tedzhen oasis and improve the regulation of the level of the reservoir and the third section of the Karakum canal.

The canal opens up wonderful prospects for Turkmenistan: when the planned irrigation capacity has been achieved the output of the more valuable sorts of fine-fibred cotton will be doubled. By 1965 Turkmenistan should bring the gross yield of cotton to 600,000 tons, and after that to 1,150,000 tons a year.

There are about 4,000,000 hectares of land suitable for irrigation in Turkmenistan; that is why the Turkmen peasants now speak of starting work on a fourth section of the canal and bringing the waters of the Amu-Dar'ya to the Caspian Sea. (For full account of the Karakum canal project see CAR, 1954, No.3, pp.255-62; 1959, No.1. pp.44-46; 1960, No. 2, pp.133-40.)

P. 30.4.62

## ORIENTAL STUDIES

The Publishing House for Oriental Literature in collaboration with the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, AN/SSSR is preparing an edition of the complete works of V.V. Bartol'd. Up to now not even a complete bibliography of his works has been published, and many of his articles are scattered throughout a variety of periodicals which are sometimes hard to get even in libraries. His complete works comprise about 550 monographs, articles and reviews. Those of his works which appeared in foreign languages will now be translated into Russian. The edition will consist of nine volumes each of which will include an index, notes, and a bibliography of the literature on the relevant subjects published since. The contents of the nine volumes will be:

1. Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion;
2. General works on the history of Central Asia; Works on the history of the Caucasus and Eastern Europe; Works on specific problems of the history of Central Asia;
3. Works on historical geography;
4. Works on archaeology, epigraphy and ethnography of Central Asia and the bordering countries;
5. Works on the history and philology of the Turkic and Mongolian peoples;
6. Works on the history of Islam and the Arab caliphate;
7. Works on the history and philology of Iran and Afghanistan;
8. Works on the study of source materials;
9. Works on the history of oriental studies.

The first volume of this edition will come out at the end of 1962, and the series is planned to be completed by the end of 1966.

O/N V UZB. 1962, No.5

## TOWN PLANNING

In an article in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA of 14 June 1962, P. Volodin, member of the Academy of Architecture and Construction of the USSR, discusses problems faced by town planners in Frunze and presents the solutions. Because of the rapidly increasing population, plans concerning the development of the town have had to be revised time and again. Since 1956 the population has increased from 190,000 to 313,000, whereas the plans made in 1958 allowed for 300,000 inhabitants only by 1970. Because of this discrepancy of the planned and actual growth, thousands of houses were built as the necessity arose, most of them (80 per cent in 1960) one-storey houses. Consequently the town now covers an area of more than 13,000 hectares. In view of further rapid development, architects and town planners have to work out new and more flexible plans which will be capable of regulating further construction. The northern part of the town is not very suitable for

building, so several more concentrated residential areas should be built in the south where much more can be achieved with less work and money. Instead of haphazard construction, districts should now be built up one after the other. In the next two or three years a district (rayon) of 300-350,000 square metres planned to accommodate 25-30,000 people, could be built in the south-east. This rayon will then be subdivided into three or four mikrorayons, each with its own shops, services and cultural establishments.

P. Volodin goes on to say that in order to fulfil these plans it is first of all necessary to acquire good quality material; so far, however, neither the Frunzegorstroy (Frunze Town Building Trust) nor the Kirgizgiiprostroy (Kirgiz State Institute for Building Design) have done anything about it. SK. 14.6.62

Naftalan is a rapidly developing health resort in central Azerbadyzhan, in the north-eastern foothills of the Murovdagskiy range. The main attraction of this resort is the "curative petroleum" which is unique in the world for its physical and chemical effects, beneficial for diverse complaints. There are also various mineral springs in Naftalan, which together with the very pleasant climate have made it into a very popular resort.

Owing to the ever increasing number of visitors, new hotels and sanatoria are to be built. At present six new sanatoria with 500 beds each are being built, a swimming-bath with 50 cabins, a hospital and medical centre, restaurants, six hotels each with 150 places, a public hall holding 400 people, etc. A special residential area is to be built for the staff of the resort. In 1961 the town could take only 300 patients at the same time during the summer season, and 150 in the winter season; but in the next two or three years four times as many are expected. Much has already been done to provide new accommodation and to improve the amenities. BR. 14.4.62

The number of inhabitants in Tashkent has reached the one million mark. The whole town is growing rapidly. Entire streets are being built and new squares formed. In the south-east of the town the new residential area of Chilanzar is under construction using the most up to date methods. IZ. 24.4.62

T H E   B O R D E R L A N D S   O F   S O V I E T  
C E N T R A L   A S I A

T S I N   A D M I N I S T R A T I O N   I N   S I N K I A N G   I N  
T H E   F I R S T   H A L F   O F   T H E   1 9 T H   C E N T U R Y

In 1961 the official journal of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences published a series of articles by V.S. Kuznetsov on the policies of the Chinese Tsin Government in Sinkiang in the first half of the 19th century. One article was limited to the Jangir uprising of 1820-8, but the other two dealt with the political and economic policies of the Chinese in this area. The author notes that very little has been written by Russian or Western sources on this period in Sinkiang, and he bases most of his information on Chinese official sources. In each article he seeks to blame British colonial ambitions for many of the difficulties encountered in this part of Turkestan and for the general economic crisis in China. Kuznetsov follows a fairly consistent line in "admitting" that China did follow a colonial policy in Sinkiang during this period, but he also goes out of his way to show that this policy was not quite as harsh as some westerners have suggested in the past. At the same time it appears that Kuznetsov is seeking to show that Sinkiang is not historically or ethnically a constituent part of China, and he uses every opportunity to emphasize her close relations with neighbouring Muslim peoples, many of whom, although he does not say so directly, are now part of the Soviet Union.

---

I. The Jangir Uprising of 1820-8 - II. Tsin Government in East Turkestan - III. Economic Policy in Sinkiang - IV. Trade Policy

I. The Jangir Uprising of 1820-8

In the first of his articles, "The Reactionary Nature of the Jangir Movement" (IZV.AN/KAZ. SSR, 1961, vyp.1(15)), Kuznetsov limits himself to an analysis of one of the principal uprisings in the early 19th

century in southern Sinkiang. He points out that this period has not previously been the object of special research by Soviet historians, except for one attempt by Kh. Ziyayev in 1952. Kuznetsov asserts that the whole first half of the 19th century in China was a period of sharp and frequent social upheavals. Exploitation of the peasants and the trading elements of the community was aggravated by the deepening crisis of the Chinese feudal system under the Tsin dynasty, as well as the further penetration of foreign capital. This was true throughout the Chinese Empire, as well as in remote East Turkestan. A number of national movements arose in this area which varied both in the participants and in the aims to which they aspired. In the present article the author uses primarily Chinese official sources, and seeks to draw out the internal and foreign political causes of the Jangir uprising.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Kuznetsov reports, East Turkestan presented a picture of "unbridled arbitrary rule and extortion" carried out by the Manchu Chinese officials and the local begs. A formal annual tax assessed at one-tenth of the people's income, both in kind and money, was not at all representative of the true demands on the population. The funds which were supposed to go to maintain the needs of the court stayed in the pockets of official embezzlers, while all the expenses for the maintenance of the inflated staff of the Manchu Chinese officials, including their families, were taken from the people. This was done in a number of ways. For example, prices established for the nobility were, as a rule, much lower than the market prices. In the four principal cities, Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Yarkend and Khotan, a free allowance was presented to the yamyn, or office of the ruler. However, this allowance was not limited to free offerings of food and clothing, but also included special taxes paid by the peasants. Even horse owners had to pay special taxes. Unruly Manchu soldiers often arbitrarily seized the orchards of the peasants, depriving them of their harvest. The begs, the local rulers, arbitrarily enslaved independent peasant landowners, and were not controlled by the Manchu authorities. According to Tsin legislation the begs shared the land together with the peasants, and the extent of their land depended on their rank. The remaining peasants were forced to perform many feudal duties for the begs, including working their land. The irrigation system was placed at the full disposition of the begs, and their land received the vital, and scarce, water before the peasants. The begs also exercised the "monopolistic right" to sell their bread first, and to establish their own price.

As a result of this double oppression by the Manchu officials and the local begs, the Turkestan peasantry became impoverished, and usury became widespread. High rates were established, and after one year, the land and property of the debtor went to the usurer for payment of his debt. The people, especially in the four cities, began to complain.

Even the privileged begs and clergy joined in the complaints, for they themselves became objects of extortion. In addition, the begs, as representatives of the native administration, often depended on feudal lords for their own protection. The immoral behaviour of several high Manchu officials insulted the national feelings of the Uygurs. The Andizhan and Kirgiz peasants both had reasons for personal hatred of the Manchu officials.

Against this background in East Turkestan Jangir appeared in the political arena. He claimed to be a descendant of the Kashgar khojas who ruled this territory before the Manchus came to East Turkestan and claimed descent from Muhammad himself. The khojas were at the head of the Muslim clergy, while at the same time they were representatives of the local feudal nobility. They used their alleged relation with the Prophet to increase their authority over the people, and according to Kuznetsov, to suppress the exploited masses. They played on the religious feelings of the people, and used them as a weapon for their own ends. Jangir himself came from the family of the khoja Appak, who was the leader of the religious and political party known as the White Mountaineers, in opposition to whom were the Black Mountaineers. Not only the Muslim clergy, but the whole population of East Turkestan were divided into these inimical groups. Their origin was in two religious sects which had engaged in a bloody struggle in the middle of the 17th century. The White and Black khojas had fought for political authority, and in order to make better use of the masses for their inter-feudal squabbles, their political disagreements took on a religious form. Eventually the White khojas seized power in East Turkestan. The Black khojas soon became identified with the Manchus, and by the first half of the 19th century the leaders of the Whites allied themselves with the neighbouring Muslim countries, and became opponents of the Tsin monarchy. They used their religious quarrel to cover up their real motives.

When East Turkestan was finally incorporated with China, only one of the White khojas, Sarymsak, escaped, and found refuge first in Kokand and then in Bukhara. According to Kuznetsov, Sarymsak's envoys wandered throughout East Turkestan, gathering donations and planting provocative rumours. Peking had good reason to regard him as a potential opponent, and the Chinese Government was especially disturbed by the prospect of his appearance in Kashgaria. The Manchu court came to an agreement with Kokand under which the Tsin Government would pay a yearly sum of silver and tea to the Kokand khanate, if the latter would undertake not to allow Sarymsak and his descendants out of the area, and not to give him aid.

At the beginning of the 1820s one such descendant, Jangir, did finally attack the Tsin authorities in East Turkestan. Kuznetsov reports that Jangir even promised the territory of Kashgaria to Kokand in

return for the help of her troops. Such aid did actually arrive, and when Kashgaria was seized, the uprising spread. Kuznetsov claims that these White khojas used their religious faith as a means to their own political ends. He asserts that Jangir did not despise help given by the British "Kafirs" (infidels) and adds that their active participation in the Jangir uprising was not by chance, but was in fact determined by the general course of British colonial policy. The British are accused of having sought to expand their trade route from India into East Turkestan and of seeking to gain control over Central Asia. Kuznetsov makes the further claim that in the 1820s British agents appeared in Kashgaria under the guise of merchants. He asserts that "British advisers were in general control of military operations against the Tsin troops, and aided in the training and equipping of the khojas troops." However, after the four major western cities of Sinkiang were conquered by Jangir, the successful development of the uprising ended. The efforts of Jangir to spread the revolt to the eastern areas of Sinkiang ended in failure. The Manchu authorities succeeded here thanks mainly to the support of the local feudal lords.

According to Kuznetsov, the only "reform" that could be attributed to Jangir in the conquered territory was the forcing of the authorities to substitute Muslim clothing for Chinese. Jangir, he further asserts, used this uprising exclusively in the interests of "those adventurers and small groups of feudal lords who attached themselves to him". The position of the masses became even worse, and feudal exploitation increased. Kuznetsov cites a Chinese source as saying that "the Jangir and British [sic] officials oppressed and exploited the people to a greater degree than the Tsin officials."

In the spring of 1827 the Tsin authorities launched an attack on Kashgaria, where the main forces of the insurgents were concentrated, and Kashgar itself fell in March of that year. The efforts of the White khojas to regain control in East Turkestan thus ended in failure, and Jangir's reign lasted less than a year. He came to power as a result of an uprising whose fundamental strength was the people. However, he did nothing to alleviate their situation, and the people simply exchanged one set of exploiters for another which was even more cruel. As a result, Kuznetsov claims, the peasants and urban population withdrew their support from the khoja.

In summarizing, Kuznetsov says that however diverse the causes which gave rise to the Jangir uprising, it is impossible to recognize it as "anti-feudal". Though the masses did participate in it as a reflection of their protest against feudal exploitation, this did not in any way determine the character of the movement as a whole. Since the leader of the revolt was a feudal lord by origin and conviction, he never intended the liquidation of the feudal order. His only goal was

to regain the power and privileges which his ancestors had possessed before East Turkestan was united with China. He used his "imaginary relation with the Prophet", playing on religious fanaticism, as a means of attracting the masses. The people did not join the uprising as an independent force with concrete demands, though they did hope Jangir would alleviate their difficult situation. The Jangir movement bore a national character, but cannot possibly be considered a national liberation movement. The Uygur population, divided among White and Black elements, did not present a united front against the Tsin Government. Moreover, in the course of increasing antagonism between these two groups, a fratricidal slaughter resulted.

In the author's opinion, the creation of a feudal theocratic state following Jangir's temporary victory contradicted the progress of social development. During this period feudalism throughout China was becoming even more corrupt, and goods and money relationships were being developed. Sinkiang was an economic part of the Tsin Empire, and any upset to the "inevitable" development of capitalist relations was equivalent to a step backwards and stagnation in the development of society. Kuznetsov says that the Jangir regime increased the feudal yoke "in the most aggravated asiatic form". He claims that at least the Tsin Government had restricted the arbitrary role of the native nobility. In this light, he sees the re-establishment of Tsin authority in the four western cities as having a "positive significance". He concludes with the claim that the failure of the Jangir uprising also "ended the plans of the British colonialists to separate East Turkestan from China. The Uygur people therefore avoided enslavement by Britain, whose colonial yoke was so cruel. . ."

## II. Tsin Government Policy in East Turkestan

Kuznetsov's second article, "The Policy of the Tsin Government in East Turkestan in the Second Quarter of the 19th Century" (IZV.AN/KAZ. SSR, 1961, vyp.2 (16)), describes the development of the Tsin Government's policy in Kashgaria during a period of general crisis in the Chinese Empire. The author introduces his article by commenting that the first half of the 19th century was a period of crisis in the whole Chinese feudal system, and that one of the characteristics of this period was Britain's efforts towards political and economic expansion in the country. During these years, he continues, the peasantry and artisans were increasingly exploited. The peasantry became poorer and poorer, and domestic production was disrupted because of the penetration of foreign goods. The masses became dissatisfied and class contradictions sharpened. Peasant risings occurred throughout China, as well as in Sinkiang which had recently been annexed. In the southern part of Sinkiang the khojas, descendants of the former rulers of the area, were

using the dissatisfaction of the oppressed Uygur masses for their own separatist purposes.

Early in his article Kuznetsov mentions that little has been written of this period. He does say that in the works of some pre-revolutionary Russian orientalists on the history of East Turkestan, the policy of the Tsin Government in this area was depicted only as "an uninterrupted campaign of repression and suppression". However, he declares that he does not accept this evaluation, especially in the light of reforms which took place after the Jangir uprising of 1820-8, discussed in the preceding article. Chinese sources, despite their official character, are considered by the author to be sufficiently informative on the situation in East Turkestan, and form the basis of his information.

Four uprisings took place in Kashgaria, the southern part of Sinkiang in 1815, 1820-8, 1830 and 1847. The last three were organized and headed by the khojas, who used the dissatisfaction of the local population with the plundering policy of the Manchu officials and begs, and for a time succeeded in rallying the people behind them. Despite the participation of the people, however, the last three uprisings were reactionary and had a feudal and clerical separatist character. As Kuznetsov noted in his first article, the Uygur people themselves were divided on religious and political grounds into antagonistic groups, the White and Black Mountaineers. Each uprising further weakened the power of the Tsin authorities in Kashgaria, and helped to cause a breakdown in the area's economy. The Jangir uprising of 1820-8 showed the Tsin Government that it was impossible to continue to rule the area in the old way and that it would have to work out new political, administrative and economic measures to "liquidate vestiges" of the past. From the time of the "union of East Turkestan with China", all plenary power in Kashgaria was concentrated in the hands of the Manchu Chinese rulers, the dacheni, but at the same time the begs retained local administrative powers. Before the Tsin Empire took possession of the area, the beg posts were hereditary. Legislation introduced by the Manchus gave the Uygur begs the legal position of Chinese officials. They were appointed and removed at the discretion of the Manchu authorities. The senior begs in the larger cities (Kashgar, Yarkend, etc.) were as a rule selected from the families of the Uygur princes of Turfan and Hami, and these enjoyed the greatest confidence of the Peking court. The aristocratic begs from these families represented themselves as zealous defenders of the interests of the Tsins in Kashgaria.

However, the preference shown to the Hami and Turfan families, who belonged to the Black group of Uygurs, angered the White nobility. This was the fundamental cause of the enmity of the White hierarchy for the

Tsin regime, and this enmity became open during the Jangir uprising. The Whites claimed that the Hami and Turfan aristocrats were "foreigners" not only on religious and political grounds, but also because they personified the plundering and cruelty of the Manchu regime. The Jangir uprising uncovered the weakness of the political system which formed the basis of Manchu rule in Kashgaria. This was especially true in the four largest cities, Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Yarkend and Khotan, which were furthest from the main forces of the army, and where the main part of the Uygur people lived.

Under the immediate pressure of events the Emperor recognized that changes in the administrative system could not be postponed. He supported the introduction of the same system of tusy, or inherited posts, as already existed in Turfan and Hami and in the areas of China which were settled by certain national minorities. Such a system in the four western districts of Sinkiang would change them into self-administering territories within the Tsin Empire. This plan was advanced by Chan Lin, the Vice-Regent of Sinkiang, and it provided for the liquidation of direct Manchu administration in the area. The nominal ruler of the area would be a representative of the local nobility, but actually he would be a puppet of the Peking court. The object of this was to eliminate undisguised political rule by a foreign people, which was one of the causes of tension in the area. Such a ruler who shared the religion and nationality of the local people would enjoy the respect of the people. By making concessions to some elements who were Whites in origin, Chan Lin tried to neutralize the claims of the White khojas who lived in Kokand, and at the same time to weaken their influence in Kashgaria.

Chan Lin's plan did not change the situation in the area in any real or effective sense. The four western areas were to remain as formerly within the Tsin Empire. The new khoja, Abdulkhalik, using his name as a descendant of the Prophet, was to insure the internal calm of the area. However, Chan Lin's project evoked dissatisfaction in the Government, many of whom deemed it stupid to free a descendant of the former rulers of the area. They felt there was no guarantee of his future behaviour.

Chan Lin was recalled to take charge of reforms in East Turkestan. Na Yan'-chen, Governor-General of the province of Chzhili, was entrusted with the task of planning changes which would affect all aspects of the region's social life. He differed from Chan Lin on the principle of Kashgaria's administration, and decided to preserve the framework of the former system. To do this, he thought it best to support only the Black hierarchy, and then to carry out a purge of the local Manchu administration. After the Jangir uprising, no White nobles were taken into the local administration; this was a penalty for their support for

the uprising. The Tsin Government excused some of the Black clergy from paying part of their taxes. The policy of encouraging the Black feudal lords and suppressing the Whites determined the Tsin policy in Kashgaria from the end of the 1820s. The Tsin Government strengthened the native administration and simplified the bureaucratic Tsin apparatus in Kashgaria, though this only allowed the partial consolidation of the whole administrative system. Na Yan'-chen also sought to clean up the Manchu Chinese bureaucratic apparatus. He ordered an improvement in the selection of officials for service, using a system of attestation. A set term of service was to be established to replace the former system which was essentially one of inheritance. Regular reports were to be submitted by the new officials, and strict punishment was to be inflicted for extortion and graft.

Another feature of the new administration was the placing of all aspects of social life of East Turkestan under the control of the Manchu authorities. Previously the authorities did not interfere in the daily life of the Uygur population, but from the end of the 1820s the Manchu Chinese administrators took upon themselves the control of purely internal matters of Muslim communal life. An effort was also made to control the activities of the akhunds who, according to the shariat, were the bearers of judicial power. As partisans of the secular nobility the akhunds, together with the local begs, had used their position to exploit the Muslim population. Under the new regulations, they were obliged to consider the opinions of the masses, and twice a month they had to file reports and have them verified. A number of police measures were also undertaken. Limitations were imposed on those who sought to leave China for East Turkestan and abroad. Previously many people had left the internal provinces of China to seek out the best lands in Kashgaria, and some of these had taken part in anti-Tsin demonstrations. The authorities looked upon them as a threat to the internal calm of the area. Under new special legislation, emigrants from China had to have certification from their former place of habitation. Even local inhabitants in Kashgaria had to get special permission to go abroad. The length of absence was limited, depending on distance, to a maximum of one year.

The authorities realized that administrative measures and limitations alone could not introduce calm and restore order in the region. After 1828 the Government passed a series of laws to limit the plundering of the peasants by the begs. By this, they hoped to alleviate the "sharpness of social contradictions", which Kuznetsov says were the source of unpleasantness in the area. The begs were forbidden to exercise control over irrigation or to use free peasants and their draft animals to work their own lands. The begs were also deprived of their former right to sell their grain on the market before the peasants. A law was passed limiting the practice of usury. According to a law

passed in the late 1820s, the interest on a loan could not exceed 30 per cent, and it was illegal for a money-lender to take a debtor's home and land as payment for a debt.

Na Yan'-chen also reported that one of the main causes of the Jangir uprising was the scandalous abuse of power on the part of the Manchu officials and the begs. Under a special order, inhabitants were given the right to make formal complaints on the encroachments of officials and begs right up to Peking itself. Kuznetsov hastens to explain that these laws were not dictated by philanthropic feelings of the ruling hierarchy, but rather from fear of what might happen in the future. The campaign had more of a political than practical goal, as it hoped to demonstrate the care of the boddykhan for his Turkestan citizens.

On the whole, the new political procedure promulgated in 1828 did provide for a real strengthening of the administrative system in Kashgaria, and steps were taken to ease the situation of the masses. However, it was not possible to change traditions of long standing by edicts alone. When in 1830 a khoja named Yusuf came within the borders of Kashgaria with an army from Kokand, some of the people supported him from the outset. When this uprising was put down, Peking once again had to face the question of how to assure calm in the area. The possibility of the introduction of the tusy system in the four western areas came up again, within a wider context. Not only would the administration of these four areas be given over to the Uygur nobility, with all the rights of inheritance, but the defence of the territory would also lie with local troops. One argument in favour of this was that during Yusuf's uprising, the masses, including the White nobility, were convinced that nothing more could be expected from the khojas except plundering and oppression. Another important point was that the inhabitants of Yarkend went out to combat Yusuf's troops with weapons in their hands. This gave rise to the hope that future sallies from Kokand would be repulsed by Uygur troops. The substitution of Manchu Chinese garrisons by local troops would also give Peking economic as well as political advantages, by the simple economy of reducing government troops.

However, the local population was tired of the burden of war, and it was necessary to give them a respite before considering the establishment of native contingents in Turkestan. In addition, a number of courtiers felt that it would be a dangerous policy to create local forces. From another point of view, they stressed that Kashgaria, Yarkend and Khotan possessed some of the richest areas of East Turkestan, and that it would be ridiculous for the Tsin Government to relinquish their control over fertile land, while retaining the barren land. The net result of all this was a new rejection of the tusy system.

Once having rejected radical changes in political administration, the Tsins did not introduce any new methods of administration in Kashgaria after 1830. They began more and more to rely on force of arms in the exercise of control. They sent an additional 7,000 men to strengthen their garrisons, and at the same time the residence of the ruler of Kashgaria was transferred to Yarkend, which was considered a less dangerous place. In order to assure calm in the country Na Yan'-chen even proposed to send some of the Whites from Kashgaria and Yarkend to China proper. As long as the White khojas remained in Kokand, there was no guarantee that on occasion the White masses would not support their own clerical lords. But this proposal was rejected by the Tsin Government.

Kuznetsov stresses that it would be incorrect to claim that the Tsin Government sought to consolidate their rule only through the use of naked force. They also tried to use the clergy to influence the minds of the people. The initiation of a policy of careful selection of the akhunds, started in 1828, did justify itself in some part. Thus, when Yusuf's troops appeared in Yarkend, the akhunds called the people to arms, asserting that killing the insurgents would be well received by Allah. As a result, the Tsin authorities gave these akhunds leading positions in all the cities.

However, in spite of all the steps taken by the Tsin authorities to improve the situation in the country, new outrages took place in Khotan in 1832. In 1837 disorders occurred among Chinese settlers in Kashgaria as a result of oppression by the administration. The Emperor was forced to recognize the failure of his campaign to correct the earlier abuses existing in the region. The Tsin Government was forced to admit that the measures they had taken to "liquidate vestiges" did not affect the very foundations of the ruling authorities, and that the exploitation of the people by the officials continued unabated. Thus, the real source of political disorder remained and led to new eruptions which could not be repressed by arms.

### III. Economic Policy in Sinkiang

Kuznetsov's final article in this series is on "The Economic Policy of the Tsin Government in Sinkiang in the First Half of the 19th Century" (IZV.AN/KAZ. SSR, 1961, vyp.3 (17)). This policy is seen by the author in the context of a country whose economy was on the verge of disintegration. British opium trade is blamed for having drained China's silver reserve, which was the basis of the country's currency. Under "the onslaught of foreign capital" industrial production had fallen sharply. Agriculture was in a catastrophic state, and the peasants had fallen victim to the feudal yoke and the usurers. Under

these conditions, the ruling military feudal hierarchy sought to preserve, if not to strengthen, the foundations of their rule. They tried to do this primarily by making better use of Sinkiang, their most recent territorial acquisition.

Kuznetsov asserts that the economic policy of the Tsin Government in Sinkiang in the first half of the 19th century was exercised on the principle of meeting all expenses by local receipts. However, this was clearly impossible, because local receipts represented only a small fraction of the expenses incurred by the maintenance of the huge military bureaucratic state apparatus in Sinkiang, and the remainder had to come from the central Treasury. An additional expense was caused by the need to suppress the four uprisings in Kashgaria (1815, 1820-8, 1830 and 1847). It became clear that Sinkiang was a very expensive acquisition for China and not only did it not compensate the Central Government for its upkeep, but it added to the Government's expenses. As a result, the Government had to take measures to make the region more profitable, at least to insure the local maintenance of the army and State apparatus.

The main point of the Tsin Government's agrarian policy was to obtain the maximum use possible of all arable land in Sinkiang, especially waste land and lands that had long been unused. Migrants from China and the local population received plots of these lands. The Government intended to tax these new areas and to increase both the in-kind and monetary receipts from the area. Previously the land tax had been based on the harvest, but now it was based on the land itself. Using this method to try to solve its greatest problem - the growth of the Treasury's receipts - the Government also hoped to use it to solve the problem of agrarian overpopulation, both in China itself and in East Turkestan. The virgin lands of Sinkiang represented a safety-valve for the Government, and they hoped to send here the surplus of poor Chinese peasants. The Tsin Government thus hoped to gain both economic and political advantages from this policy.

For the first few years after the conquest of East Turkestan only military villages were established, and these in limited numbers. Land was worked by the soldier settlers on military service, and they received a salary for it. This system, however, did not justify itself economically. First, the use of soldiers for agricultural work had a bad effect on their military capabilities. Second, receipts from the harvest did not cover expenses. The Treasury did not bear the expenses for maintaining them and, in fact, these settlers incurred additional expenses. By using Chinese civilian settlers, the Government hoped to solve this problem, and also to gain a potential military force as a reinforcement for the existing garrisons. This would help stabilize support in East Turkestan for the Tsin regime.

The realization of plans to make available large areas of land in Sinkiang required additional funds for irrigation works, and the establishment of the settlers together with the necessary cattle, implements and seed. Since the Treasury could not afford these expenses, it encouraged the practice of "donations" from officials and begs. With this goal in mind, they started appointing officials out of their normal turn, and also allowed the begs to exclude donations in calculating their estimated receipts. As a result, the official policy of the Tsin Government was to use every means to free land in Sinkiang, but not at the expense of the Treasury.

It was important for the Government to gain additional manpower to work the land from outside East Turkestan. One of the first measures was to allow those coming out of China to settle with their families in Tarbagatay District (Jungaria) and in the districts of East Turkestan. However, no flood of settlers came, and the main reason is that the Chinese provincial authorities would not allot the necessary funds to send people to East Turkestan. The next measure was to seek to force the resettlement of this land by using soldiers whose term of service in Kashgaria had expired, and also criminals with families. The reason why criminals with families gained "preference" was that it was felt that they would be easier to control than bachelor criminals, and would not be inclined to run away. In the event, the utilization of soldiers and convicts did not solve the problem, for such forced resettlement from China could only be undertaken if the State were willing to organize and finance their migration to East Turkestan, especially that of the poor. What colonization did take place "reproduced feudal contradictions on a new, expanded basis, and increased the exploitation of the Turkestan peasants". The rank and file Chinese settlers really gained nothing from being allowed to share the land. They were not given the means of production, and as a result fell into the hands of usurers or prosperous nobles, and eventually had to abandon their land. The sending of new people to Turkestan served as an excuse for the local authorities to strengthen the exploitation of local production. The plots of land for the Turkestan communes were divided only on a large-scale basis rather than in individual plots, and as a result there was no possibility of fully working and seeding them. Nevertheless, the peasants were forced to pay a land tax on a high scale. While the Tsin Government had hoped that the Chinese colonists would help to expand the national basis of their rule in the region, it only increased oppression and extortion on the part of the Manchu officials, and in 1837 evoked agitation among the Chinese settlers in Kashgaria. Only the troops were able to restore an uneasy calm.

## IV. Trade Policy

A part of Sinkiang's revenues came from the merchants, and tea was the most important import, Kuznetsov writes. He goes on to declare that for a long time the Government did not gain very much from tea revenues, for only certain types of tea were taxed, and the tax was only collected in one area of the province. The Government realized that it would not be easy to establish a yearly value for collections. First, it was difficult, if not impossible, to know how much tea would pass through the customs, especially since the merchants themselves tried to minimize the amount declared. Second, the Government recognized that it was not in a position to suppress the embezzlement of State property by the local authorities.

As a result, the only step left to the Government was to increase revenue from foreign trade. At the end of 1828 Treasury stores were set up in Kashgaria. The direct cause for this was the need to increase the revenue for the maintenance of troops. With the establishment of these Treasury stores, foreign exchange came under stricter control. Every foreigner was obliged to put 40 per cent of his goods into the Treasury store. What remained could then be acquired by Chinese merchants and local inhabitants. The goods coming into the Treasury stores, especially tea and fabrics, were then sold to foreign traders at prices established by the authorities. These were higher than the market prices, and it made it possible for the administration to estimate their profits in advance. An increased emphasis was placed on barter, and the use of silver for purchasing foreign goods was prohibited. By this the Government hoped to halt the flow of silver abroad. But the use of these Treasury reserves was soon seen to threaten the whole normal development of trade, and the system was abolished in January 1830.

The Government hoped that it could at least assure a regular intake of levies from foreign goods. In the 1820s a practice had arisen whereby local authorities in Kashgaria lowered levies and even freed foreigners from all levies. This practice was ended in April 1829. However, just two years later Peking itself was forced to end levies on foreign trade in Kashgaria as a result of the uprising 1830. This revolt, like the Jangir movement in 1820-8, took place with the direct complicity of Kokand, under Yusuf, descendant of the former Kashgar rulers, the khojas. Kokand used the fact that many of the khojas who lived in Kokand were able to get trade concessions from China through their influence with the Muslim population of East Turkestan. The Kokand rulers were in a position to exercise a permanent threat to peace in Kashgaria, and they used this knowledge to their advantage. In January 1832 the Kokand merchants received the right to carry on trade in Kashgaria without paying any duties. Peking considered the loss of taxes from the Kokand merchants less calamitous than the possibility of a return of the khojas to Kashgaria.

The Tsin Government was afraid of what might happen to the prestige of the Empire if these trade concessions were given only to Kokand. As a result they also exempted the Kirgiz and the merchants of Bukhara, Badakhshan, Ladakh and Kashmir from all duties. This created the impression that Kokand was on a par with all others who were favoured by the "kind-heartedness" of the Chinese Emperor. By this, Peking was at least able to extract one advantage from Kokand to make up for the loss of revenue. This did not hide the fact that the Tsin government was deprived of an important source of revenue and, in addition, it demonstrated its inability to defend its own interests within its own territory.

The Government tried further to take steps to alter the weight and value of the coins used in Kashgaria, as they hoped thereby to reduce the expenditure of silver and to decrease outgoings from the central coffers. These attempts were not successful, and more and more silver left the country. The import of opium was also a drain on the silver resources of the country. At the Peking court many voices expressed disapproval of the expenditure of silver in Sinkiang, and felt that there was a need to change the system of paying the troops there. Some suggested that only 20 per cent of their salaries should be paid in silver, and the rest in other coins. However, the officials of the Sinkiang administration were against this plan, mainly because of the limited production of copper. In 1844 the Government once again turned to this plan, using different coins and values, but again it was rejected. The Government realized that the army was the only support of the Tsin regime in Sinkiang, and they could not afford to alienate it.

In summarizing, Kuznetsov points out that the economic policy of the Tsin regime in Sinkiang in the first half of the 19th century revolved mainly around the goal of getting the region to support itself financially. But Sinkiang was an economic organism of the Tsin Empire, and could not be isolated from the problems affecting the whole country. The symptoms of crisis which were corrupting the whole Chinese feudal system were reflected in East Turkestan also. The dying feudal state was not in a position to facilitate the growth of productive forces in their western territory. The economic effect of the measures which were undertaken was very small. The Manchu officials only increased their exploitation of the masses, and used any increased income for their own expenses. In the end the economic policy of the Government led to further aggravation of social conflict in the region, which logically ended in the anti-Tsin uprising in the second half of the 19th century. This uprising was to shake the very foundations of the Manchu rule in Sinkiang and hasten the crisis of the whole Tsin feudal empire.

## A M E R I C A N P O L I C Y I N I N D I A

The Institute of Asian Peoples of the USSR Academy of Sciences is in the process of publishing a series of books which, it claims, is seeking "to unmask the reactionary nature of American foreign policy in Asia and Africa." The first two of these books were on American policy in the Near and Middle East and in the Arab East(1). More recently a book has come out entitled AMERICAN POLICY IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH ASIA(2) under the general editorial direction of B.G. Gafurov, and the book is concerned with an "analysis" of American policies in India, Burma and Indonesia, which are described as "the largest of the peace-loving sovereign states of South Asia." These three states are depicted as having conducted a policy of "active neutrality" and of opposition to military blocs, and of advocating peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, and non-violent solutions to international disputes. It is claimed that these countries all enjoy friendly relations with the Soviet Union, based on "non-interference in each other's internal affairs" and that they all share a common point of view with the USSR on the world's main problems, such as "the struggle to maintain peace" and "the liquidation of the colonial system".

According to the preface, all these factors determine the forms and methods of American policies in this region of Asia. It is claimed that American "ruling circles" have been forced to give up trying to include these countries in military and political "aggressive groups" through the use of direct pressure, threats and words, and to recognize the neutral course of their foreign policy. The Americans are accused of seeking to achieve their "imperialist goals" through the use of "so-called aid", that is, in trying to maintain old advantages and seek new ones, getting the national bourgeoisie on their own side, and putting military regimes in power. The present review is on the part of this book concerned with American policies in India.

- 
- (1) POLITIKA SSHA NA BLIZHNEM I SREDNEM VOSTOKE and POLITIKA SSHA NA ARABSKOM VOSTOKE.
  - (2) POLITIKA SSHA V STRANAKH YUZHNOY AZII (Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow, 1961, 251pp.).

## American Policy In India Until 1955

The first part of this article is about American policies in India from the end of the war until 1955, and is concerned particularly with the alleged efforts of the United States to draw India into a military alliance. The authors of this part of the book, G.P. Kolykhalova and I.B. Red'ko, say that until India received her independence from Great Britain, the "other imperialist powers", including the United States, had little economic influence in India. However, during the Second World War, when Britain's trade relations with India were disrupted, the United States expanded her trade with India, though during the war itself it was mainly through lend-lease aid going to British troops in India and elsewhere. In return, the United States received textiles and other goods. In 1941 the American Government, it is claimed, received permission from Britain to establish direct diplomatic relations with India, and conversations with the "colonial government" on trade and navigation were used to secure "a roundabout way of avoiding imperial preferences", despite the fact that India's colonial position did not allow her to conclude international treaties. In 1942 an American technical mission visited India to study means of increasing production. Direct links were established between "American monopolies" and large Indian firms, and these led to the creation of joint Indian-American enterprises for the manufacture of cars and radio and electrical equipment. American "economic penetration" was also carried out through the conclusion of agreements on technical aid and patents between American and Indian firms. Americans also participated in special British-American commissions concerning mica, ships and steel, when these commissions met in India.

The Americans are accused of seeking to weaken the British position in India in order to increase their own influence. Prime Minister Nehru was invited to America in 1949, and it is claimed that the Americans tried to exert pressure on him to make India join a Western military union. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 widened an alleged split between the two countries on American policies. However, by mid-1951 there was a change in American policy to India, and American officials began to speak less of differences between the two countries and more of their common interests. Many Americans, the article maintains, felt that more room for manoeuvre was needed in American policy. In October of that year Chester Bowles was appointed Ambassador to India, and his task was to bring American and Indian points of view closer together, and to assure India of the need for closer links with America.

The authors say that India was becoming more and more disenchanted with American foreign policy, and spoke out more against colonial rule. They allege that American policy was directed towards the economic and political subordination of India and went counter to the interests of

the Indian people; Pakistan was being used by the Americans as a "weapon" against India. In November 1952 Washington declared its intention of giving military "aid" to Pakistan and of reorganizing the Pakistani army. American agents are accused of stirring up trouble in Kashmir, in the hope of achieving "the enslavement of Kashmir by American imperialists" and turning it into "a base of aggression against neighbouring countries, especially the USSR and China." After the "failure" of the "imperialist plot" against Kashmir, American "ruling circles" took new steps to exercise pressure on India. Senator Knowland and Vice-President Nixon had talks with members of the Indian Government, to persuade them to enter a union with America and abandon their policy of neutrality. However, the signing in May 1954 of an American-Pakistani agreement giving America the right to establish armed bases on Pakistani soil, and to provide American military specialists and officers for the Pakistani army, was mainly "directed against India", and served to strengthen the differences between Pakistan and India on important international questions. American policy during this period is described by the authors as one aimed at disrupting the unity of the peoples of Asia, and as reflecting America's policy of action from a "position of strength". The United States, during this period, was seeking to establish military bases throughout the Middle East and Asia.

In September 1954 the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) pact was signed in Manila, and came into force in February 1955. This group of nations, the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines, were accused of seeking to use the principle of anti-communism to reinforce "anti-democratic regimes" and deprive the countries of South-East Asia from an opportunity to carry out their policies in accordance with the national interests of their own peoples. It is claimed that within the framework of "aggressive military blocs" a strategic policy of working against the "socialist camp" and national liberation movements in Asia and Africa was worked out. India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon, however, refused to enter SEATO, and spoke out against it; they responded by "strengthening unity and solidarity" by calling the Bandoeng Conference of the Countries of Asia and Africa in April 1955. In June, Nehru visited the Soviet Union and signed a joint Declaration calling for peaceful co-existence. In November there was a return Soviet visit to India. Khrushchev expressed his interest in and concern for Indian internal economic problems and declared the readiness of the Soviet Union to give economic aid.

During this period, it is alleged, especially from 1951, America sought to gain her own object by a programme of economic "aid" to India. After a year of wrangling, it is said, Congress approved a grant of grain to help India, but this was considered advantageous to America, both because of America's grain surplus, and the high terms under which

it was allegedly sent. In 1951 India started her first five-year plan of economic development, and in January 1952 the United States and India signed a five-year agreement on technical cooperation. The authors claim that the purpose of such aid on the part of America was to try to influence India's foreign policy. They assert that India had to give the American Government periodic reports on the use made of the American equipment and materials and claim that American aid did not meet the basic task of that stage of India's development, that is, of achieving an independent national economy and economic independence. A large part (57 per cent) of American aid was spent on the despatch of American goods to India. The greater part of these shipments covered some of the current needs of India, but did nothing to aid the creation of native production and the foundations of Indian economic independence. The Indians, it is said, had to agree to the use of any American funds for projects agreeable to America. Less than 13 per cent of these appropriations were used for financing "communal" and "national" agricultural development, and the division of American aid for use in many smaller works ensured that no real economic benefit would be derived.

#### American Policy In India After 1955

According to the authors of this article, American policy in India after 1955 was conditioned mainly by the growing rapprochement between India and the Soviet Union. Because of the increasing friendship and co-operation between India and the "socialist system", it is alleged, the United States was forced to enter into competition with the USSR in giving aid to India and other underdeveloped countries. The "ruling circles" of the United States saw Soviet aid as the chief danger facing the country, and the new tasks of American diplomacy were directed towards "the conversion of Indian neutralism from a factor aiding the peaceful co-existence of two systems, into a factor aiding the consolidation of the imperialist camp." Thus, American policy was now directed towards efforts to get India to come closer to the Western powers, though without any formal military and political union.

In March 1956 the American Secretary of State Dulles visited India after the end of the SEATO Council session in Karachi, and promised that he would not allow Pakistan to use American arms against India. The purpose of his visit was "to weaken the negative impression experienced by Indian society because of American support for Pakistan's pretensions on Kashmir." By this time Dulles "admitted" that India and other Asian countries would never enter SEATO, and he acknowledged that American economic aid must be more flexible. He made it clear that America no longer demanded India's participation in SEATO. American Government leaders now sought other ways to discredit the idea of neutrality, particularly by using the "threat of communism". They publicly

spoke out against the policy of cutting American aid to India as a means for exerting pressure. In 1955-6 American appropriation for economic and technical aid had been cut to \$60 m., in comparison with the \$75 m. given the preceding financial year. Although some American senators demanded even further cuts, the "ruling circles" began to talk of the need to increase the scale of aid to help keep India independent. Vice-President Nixon defined this policy as one designed "not to allow an increase in the influence of the Soviet Union in Asia." In January 1957 President Eisenhower proposed a grant of \$4.9 milliard of aid to all countries, including \$2.9 milliard for the arming of America's allies.

At this time India had just worked out her second five-year plan, designed especially for the industrialization of the country. Such development envisaged a growing role by the State sector in the Indian economy, in order to aid the development of heavy industry and the growing economic independence of India and to weaken the position of "imperialist monopolies".

The financial aspects of the five-year plan, say the authors, were the weakest element, and the article goes on to allege that the United States now felt it could force India to make concessions to the West. The Indian Government wanted to attract financial aid from developed capitalist countries in order to develop the national economy, but "this did not meet the interests of the imperialist powers." America, asserts the article, did not want to use aid to help the growth of economic independence. On the other hand, it sought to use aid to force India to follow internal and foreign policies favourable to "American monopolies" especially directed towards the consolidation and expansion of the position of American private capital. India needed loans and credits for the direct financing of large capital State construction. More than half of the loans and credits received previously had been used by the private sector of the country and for payment of the shipment of food products, that is, for goals not concerned directly with the tasks of the five-year plan. Also, India did not like the practice of receiving aid on a yearly basis, subject to regular approval by the American Congress.

Therefore, the Indian Government requested large long-term loans, for periods of at least five years, and wanted this money to be used for direct financing of the five-year plan. She turned first to the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development; but, so it is claimed, the Bank demanded changes in the very principles of India's economic policy, and recommended a cut to the scale of State expenses for the five-year plan and unlimited scope of action to foreign private capital. Even the American grant of \$362 m. in August 1956 for help in solving India's food difficulties is seen by the authors as an added drain on the Indian economy since it increased the currency shortage.

Negotiations with the International Bank dragged on, and finally in September 1957 India turned directly to the American Government with a request for a large long-term loan of \$5-600 m. At this time American "monopolies", it is asserted, sought to force India to reject nationalization of foreign property, and "reactionary circles of the Indian bourgeoisie" tried to exert pressure on the Government to make concessions for American monopolies and thus to make it easier to persuade Congress to give aid to India. In January 1958 the decision was made to give India two loans totalling \$225 m., with \$150 m. coming from the Export-Import Bank and \$75 m. from the Fund for Development Loans. Credit from the former, at an interest rate of 5.25 per cent, was to be used for payment of equipment bought on the American market and was to be paid back in dollars over a 15-year period, starting in 1964. Seventy per cent of this sum was to go to the State sector and 30 per cent to private firms. According to this account, credits from the Fund for Development Loans required that 87 per cent be used for buying transport equipment and parts and components for the car industry, and 13 per cent for equipment for private cement firms and the jute industry. The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development also increased their loans to India, giving the State sector \$90 m. for the development of railway transport and \$5.6 m. for the aviation company "Air India International". According to the authors, the American Government was forced for the first time to give loans of some productive significance, and they claim that only the cooperation between India and the Soviet Union was responsible for this.

President (then Senator) Kennedy is quoted as saying that all this aid was in the defence of American interests, and that it was mainly important to show the people of Asia and Africa that India's example was preferable to that of China for purposes of improving the conditions of life for millions of people. Fundamentally, the authors continue, American economic policy to India remained unchanged: they were still trying to use aid in order to restrain India from further rapprochement with the socialist countries, and they still hoped to "sabotage" the Indian aim of achieving industrialization and economic independence. It is pointed out that a joint session of the two houses of the American Congress killed a resolution designed to give massive support to India in her economic plans, because it was felt that this would complicate relations between America and her allies in military and political groups. Thus, it is claimed, India still did not receive any significant aid.

In 1958 India underwent a particularly severe financial crisis, and the United States agreed to give additional credits. But the authors claim that this was done for commercial and political reasons only. First, the fear was expressed that the economic crisis would develop into a political one. Then it was feared that any upset to the Indian Government would affect American commercial interests, since Indian firms were

already in debt. In addition, the Americans are said to have feared that India would be forced to ask the Soviet Union for further aid. In August 1958 a conference of representatives of five interested countries, the United States, Britain, West Germany, Canada and Japan, met under the formal leadership of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to examine India's financial position and to work out measures to provide India with money to pay off her foreign obligations. They eventually reached agreement to provide loans of up to one milliard dollars to be used during the three remaining years of the five-year plan. The authors assert, however, that such aid was to assure the safety of these countries' own economic investments, to strengthen the position of foreign capital in India, to present themselves in the role of "saviour" of India from financial bankruptcy, and to forestall the possibility of a general economic crisis. Thus, America and the Western powers are accused of serving their own ends both when they grant aid to India and when they do not.

#### American Economic Aid to India in 1958-60

In the final section of this book about American policy to India, the authors acknowledge that it is now a definite part of America's intentions to give continued economic aid to India. Nevertheless, they see this as a recognition of the need to exert extra efforts to keep her influence in the countries now seeking to develop their own economies, and to prevent them from seeking too close relations with the socialist camp. American "propagandists" are accused of seeking to show how important they regard India without taking concrete steps to give her the massive aid that is needed. It is claimed that America is continuing to try to exert pressure to force the Indian Government to deviate from her plans to increase the role of the State sector and to make greater concessions to private foreign and local capital. It is further claimed that the Americans are seeking a decrease in capital investments in the Indian five-year plans, a reduction in the import of machines and equipment, a cut in the scale of capital works, and an increase in the attention paid to the development of raw material export branches. Thus, according to the authors, the chief object of the recommendations of the International Bank was to force India not to fulfil her third five-year plan without the preliminary agreement of the Western powers to give her the necessary loans or, in other words, to make the fate of the plan dependent on American wishes to back it. The representatives of "imperialist" countries are accused of saying that loans would be given for the construction of roads, the development of energy and the means of communication, but that the development of industry must be carried out only with the aid of foreign private capital. The purpose of this is allegedly to prepare the conditions for

the penetration of private capital, while reserving the development of the main industrial branches to private business firms.

The authors also say that nearly 73 per cent of the loans and subsidies received by India from America up to mid-1960, that is, 10.06 milliard rupees, consisted of food products. This is depicted as being doubly advantageous to America; it allowed her to off-load "superfluous" food products, and also to avoid giving any direct benefit to the Indian economy, since it had consumer rather than productive significance. Food shipments, it is said, do not give India any of the necessary currency needed to develop capital equipment and machines, though they do help alleviate the food shortage and ease the threat of inflation. It is asserted that the growing shipments of American agricultural goods are seen by "Indian progressive society" as a threat to the independent economic development of the country, since the United States has acquired the means to dispose of very large sums of Indian currency.

Furthermore, the authors state, India is increasingly worried by the fact that her economic development plans are being financed more and more by loans from Western countries obtained on hard conditions. The net result of this is to increase India's foreign debt obligations and worsen her general financial position. Objection is also made to the degree to which Western money has to be used on the creditor nation's market. The authors say that some businessmen in India have been coming to arrangements with American monopolies in order to gain concessions for both foreign and local private capital. It is alleged that even in the second five-year plan concessions had been gained by private foreign capital.

From time to time, it is further alleged, America continues to try to get India to join Western military pacts. Such efforts were supposed to have increased as a result of differences between China and India over their mutual border. Eisenhower's trip to India was seen as an effort to exert personal pressure on Nehru to change his policy of neutrality and turn to America for military aid.

In summarizing, the authors say that of 26.68 milliard rupees granted to India from foreign states up to the end of 1960, 18.9 milliard came from sources controlled by the United States. However, it is claimed that not a single important industrial enterprise has been constructed through this aid. Any American participation in irrigation or energy works is regarded as "insignificant". Therefore, they maintain, "ten years of American economic 'aid' has not aided in the liquidation or weakening of the most important forms of economic dependence of the country on the capitalist market: neither in the provision of equipment or machines, nor even in the supply of food." American aid is seen

mainly as a struggle for American "prestige" in India, and it is seen by the authors in the most unfavourable light as compared to "disinterested" Soviet aid.

---

#### China's efforts to popularize latinized Kazakh

A fortnightly journal in the new latinized language of the Kazakhs in China started publication recently in Kuldja (Ining) capital of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Area in the Sinkiang-Uygur A.R. One of the aims of the new journal is to popularize the new written language among the Kazakhs, one of the minority nationalities in China. The script uses Latin letters to replace the Arabic script previously used, and will help to eliminate illiteracy among the Kazakhs as it is easier to learn. Prior to liberation, an overwhelming majority of Kazakhs were illiterate. The new alphabet also facilitates cultural exchanges between the various nationalities of China.

Introduced on an experimental basis in 1960, the new script is now used for teaching first and second grade pupils in the primary schools of the autonomous area. (See also CAR, 1960, No.2, p.230.)

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, 21.4.62

## THE SOVIET UNION AND NEPAL

King Mahendra of Nepal's action in dismissing the first elected Nepalese Government in December 1960 met with Chinese approval; but Soviet comment at the time was confined to reporting the bare facts. In a recent article, however, ("Nepal's Difficult Roads", AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1962, No.1) Red'ko, the leading Soviet expert on Nepal, gives a reasoned account of the King's action and leaves Soviet support for it in no doubt.

In the introduction to his article, Red'ko first states the main facts of the dismissal of the Nepalese Government, the arrest of many of the party leaders, and the assumption by the King of all executive and legislative power. To explain the causes for the King's step, Red'ko reviews the steps leading to the overthrow of the Rana dynasty in Nepal in 1951, after a hundred years of "semi-colonial" status. After the Second World War a movement started against the rulers, and this was marked by anti-feudal and anti-imperialist features. However, not only did the working masses and the national bourgeoisie participate in this movement, but also the less privileged members of the landowning class, who were trying to liquidate the rule of a single feudal family. Since Nepal did not have many workers, and the national bourgeoisie was exceptionally weak, the democratic movement developed under the catchphrase the restoration of the prerogatives of the Crown; during the Rana administration, the King reigned but did not rule. Nevertheless, according to Red'ko, the social and economic basis of the movement was much wider. The Nepalese Communist Party, in supporting the abolition of the Rana regime, saw in this "only a prerequisite and a necessary condition for the further development and success of the mass movement for the final solution of the tasks of the bourgeois national democratic revolution." Through the creation of a united democratic front the Rana dynasty was overthrown, and the Nepalese people faced the huge task of carrying out social and economic reforms and democratizing the State.

After the regime was ousted, the united front and its "bourgeois-landowning" elements would not cooperate with the Communist Party and "other workers' organizations". The leadership of the Congress Party was inclined to compromise with the feudal landowning class, and the united front split and ended its existence. In the absence of unity in the ranks of the democratic forces Red'ko continues, and with the growing opposition of the feudal class, there could be no agrarian reforms,

no economic improvements, nor any reorganization of the administrative apparatus and the legal system.

Only in February 1959, eight years after the overthrow of the Rana dynasty, did the first elections in Nepal's history take place. The Nepalese Congress won the majority of seats in the new parliament. The Communist Party considered the victory of the Congress Party as a "progressive manifestation", because many of the candidates representing the feudal lords and Ranists were defeated. The Congress Party leadership promised to carry out agrarian reforms, to break the power of the landowners and to encourage the growth of domestic capital. An investigation carried out by the Government revealed the awful state of the peasantry, and the critical industrial situation. Because of excessive feudal rents, a land tax, the usurer's role, illegal requisitions, etc., it was not possible for agricultural production to expand. However, the Government of Prime Minister Koirala did not fulfil its election promises. Instead of changing the system of landownership, the Government introduced additional taxes which hit the peasants and the small landowners, the very groups which had supported the Nepalese Congress. Extreme right wing forces tried to discredit democratic institutions. Seeing that the Government's tax policy was not popular with the masses, the feudal lords tried to use their dissatisfaction for their own purposes.

A peasant movement developed in Nepal, and in 1960 the workers began to support them. These expressions of the dissatisfaction of the people were reflected, Red'ko asserts, in the municipal elections which took place. In Biratnagar the Congress and Communist Parties received an equal number of votes, and in other areas the Communists even won. Leaders of some of the parties started conversations with a view to the creation of a united organization with its own political platform. These events divided the Nepalese Congress members, and also caused dissension between the Government and the Crown, which was expressed in the "so-called policy of congressization of the State apparatus". There was even an attempt to work up discontent in the Nepalese Army.

Because of these events, King Mahendra decided to take the extreme measure of declaring a regime of "Direct Rule". According to Red'ko, this became necessary because the Nepalese Congress and its leadership had discredited themselves in the eyes of the public. Red'ko mentions that along with the leaders of the Nepalese Congress Party, the leaders of "the extreme right-wing pro-Ranist parties" and others were arrested, though he pointedly avoids mentioning that the Communist leaders were also arrested.

In order to avoid the formation of an opposition, the new Government banned the activity of all parties and organizations in January 1961. In his proclamation, the King promised to work out a new plan of

economic development for Nepal. A questionnaire was given to all political prisoners, and those who gave written assurance of loyalty to the new regime, and promised not to take part in anti-Government activities, were freed from custody.

A new Government was formed, and the King became both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. It was announced that Nepal would follow a policy of neutrality, international cooperation and non-participation in military blocs. Red'ko also mentions King Mahendra's state visit to China in September 1961, and cites the resulting treaty on the Chinese-Nepalese border. He ends his article by applauding recent increased cooperation between the Soviet Union and Nepal and the cultural cooperation between the two countries. Red'ko is also optimistic about the ability of all Nepalese to work together to carry through the necessary social and economic reforms.

## A F G H A N I S T A N : A S O V I E T A S S E S S M E N T

A volume entitled NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA STRAN ZARUBEZHNOGO VOSTOKO (Recent History of the Non-Soviet East) (Moscow, 1961) contains a section on Afghanistan of which the following is an abridged version. From the fact that the volume is published by Moscow University it can be assumed that it is a kind of textbook designed for university students. The main interest of the article lies in the picture of Afghanistan which the authorities wish to present, presumably with the object of justifying the friendly attention now being paid by the Soviet Government to Afghanistan by contrast, for instance, with the hostility displayed towards the present regime in Persia. The editors have clearly experienced some difficulty in giving a generally favourable impression of a country of such glaring inequalities as Afghanistan.

---

I. Economic Structure in Post-War Years - II. Activities of the "USA Monopolists" - III. Development of Capitalist Relations - IV. Development of Soviet-Afghan Relations - V. Afghanistan's Foreign Policy.

## I. Economic Structure in Post-War Years

Agriculture

Until the end of the Second World War, Afghanistan was an underdeveloped agrarian country whose main productive class, namely the peasantry, was exploited in semi-feudal fashion. In a countryside where three-quarters of the cultivated area belongs to big landlords who are not themselves engaged in farming, but lease their properties on terms of métayage, the peasantry itself is mostly landless. The rental payable in kind by this peasantry on land, water, stock etc. comes as a rule to more than four-fifths of the total produce. In these circumstances the big landowners have not bothered about improved methods of agriculture, preferring to utilize their capital in commerce and in money-lending to the peasantry at high interest.

In animal husbandry conditions are no better, the big owners of livestock holding not only the bulk of the animals but the pasture as well. In the districts, for instance, where the production of lambskin (karakul) is carried on, thousands of head belonging to the big land-owners will be tended by shepherds whose only payment is a share of the lambs born under their care. Animal husbandry, like agriculture, is conducted on primitive lines. It suffers heavy losses through the absence of a permanent reserve of fodder and of proper veterinary services.

Such an obsolete system of production puts the brake on the development of Afghanistan's rural economy. "Meanwhile it is on the level of agricultural productivity that the economic situation in the country directly depends. The export of agricultural produce and stock remains for Afghanistan her sole source of payment for imported foreign goods. Karakul, fresh and dried fruit, cotton, wool, hides are the most important articles of export constituting up to 90 per cent of the grand total. What this source means to Afghanistan can be gauged by the fact that she imports the overwhelming portion of the essential manufactured goods consumed within her borders. Among imported goods are cotton-threaded and woollen fabrics, petroleum products, sugar, motor-cars, hardware, drugs, miscellaneous machinery with corresponding spare parts etc. The chief foreign trading contractors of Afghanistan among the capitalist countries are the United States, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and also India and Pakistan. In the post-war years, competition between the imperialist monopolies for the dominant position in Afghan foreign trade has sharpened. Thus, American and British monopolists compete with each other for control over the trade in karakul."

### Finance and Industry

"The export-import trade, as hitherto, remained the principal sphere for the deployment of local large scale capital. Able as it was to lean upon the administrative and financial support of the Government, large scale commercial capital concentrated in joint-stock companies (shirkats) has cornered 80 per cent of the foreign trade operations of the country. The activities of these shirkats, as in the pre-war period, were supervised and directed by the most powerful joint-stock institution in the country, viz. the Afghan National Bank. The economic status of the shareholders of this bank - the most prominent businessmen and landowners in the country - can be realized from the fact that 25 per cent of the capital of the State Bank of Afghanistan which carried out money issues and is in charge of currency operations, belonged to them . . . With the help of State capital, as also against funds from the Afghan National Bank and a series of other powerful joint-stock societies, there was set up in 1946 a so-called Trade Base which received the right of sale of imported textiles. The large companies which managed the import of petroleum products, cars and spare parts for the same, enjoyed State subsidies and favourable currency crediting.

"Concentrated as it was in such companies the national capital found itself in a position where it could not radically alter the unsatisfactory character of Afghanistan's economic relations with the imperialist countries. The Government indeed attempted to introduce a policy of encouraging export with a simultaneous curtailment of imports; nevertheless the volume of imports went on growing, with adverse effect on Afghanistan's financial position."

Industrial production in the post-war years remained at a low level. "A few enterprises of exclusively light industry were able to satisfy consumption in fabrics, sugar, and footwear to the extent of 10-15 per cent; being even for that wholly dependent on the import of foreign equipment, components etc. The metal-work industry consisted of a single military factory (Machine Khana) belonging to the State. Notwithstanding the availability of natural reserves of water power, an adequate power basis for the development of industry was wanting. The combined capacity of a few minor power-stations in the country till 1945 consisted of 22,000 kw. There was also an annual procurement of up to 20,000 tons of coal. The figure of workers employed in the textile, food-flavouring, fuel and other branches of industry reached approximately 35,000 persons."

Handicraft production, which in the past supplied practically all articles of mass consumption, has felt the impact of capitalism in two ways. On the one hand it has suffered from the growing competition of imported goods, and on the other it has fallen more and more under the influence of the share-holding societies.

On the whole, the economic structure of Afghanistan is one of transition from feudalism to capitalism.

### "Social Contradictions"


In the post-war years Afghanistan experienced acute economic distress. The main cause of this was her overall backwardness resulting from the policy of Afghan isolation pursued by the British colonizers in the 19th and early 20th centuries, as also from the imperialist policy of converting Afghanistan into an appendage of the capitalist countries capable of supplying them with the raw materials of agriculture. In this climate of distress, class "contradictions" flourished. The mutual hostility between propertied and underprivileged, and the chronic unemployment, poverty, and misery of the latter set the tone of the Kabul press in this period.


The peasantry, which accounts for about 90 per cent of the population, is being ruined by the growth of commercial agriculture and stock-

# AFGHANISTAN

0 20 40 60 Miles

- International boundaries.
- International boundaries (Undemarcated)
- Provincial boundaries.
- Railways.
- Roads.







raising. What properties the peasants did possess they have been obliged to part with for next to nothing. In agriculture they now work for their masters on terms of worsening serfdom; and in animal husbandry pre-capitalistic "productive relations" are even more pronounced. Neither tenant nor herdsman, neither villager nor nomad, can pay his way; and ever increasing numbers turn to the towns where the chances of obtaining work are, however, extremely limited.

During the process "a thin layer of the well-to-do peasants is being transformed into a rural bourgeoisie, a kulak community. Like the landowners, these kulaks rent out their land on terms of métayage; like them, too, they are widely engaged in money-lending. The penetration of capitalist relations into the countryside is accompanied by the formation of a rural proletariat, this happening primarily in regions which produce agricultural raw materials for export or for the needs of local industry. Peasant organizations of any sort are lacking in Afghanistan."

"Labour conditions among the tiny industrial proletariat of Afghanistan are regulated by a Labour Law passed in 1946. The scope of this Act extends to workers occupied in factory and workshop or on the construction of such enterprises. Under it the hire of man-power is done through recruiting agents who simultaneously perform the function of overseers. Labour legislation does not apply to workers in small-scale handicraft workshops. There are no parties or trade unions; and the Department of Labour and Industrial Workers, which is a State bureau, supervises the implementation of the Law." Or should so. In fact, as the Press in 1951 charged, the captains of industry consistently ignored its provisions. In Afghanistan the working-class has not yet come into the arena of political, as distinct from economic, struggle.

Big scale capital operating in commerce and industry is bound to infringe the interests of a middle or petty urban bourgeoisie. "Thus in the post-war years in Afghanistan there have been social currents in motion by the dissatisfaction of the particular strata of the bourgeoisie which have suffered domination by the shirkats." Neither the form nor the social content of these currents, however, has been easy to define but it may be noted here that various sections of the intelligentsia were identified with them.

### Political development

"It was in 1947 that a movement called Active Youth was started, the participants in which stood for the liquidation of feudal survivals as well as against bribery, oppression, and other social abuses. Active Youth held the widest possible propagation of education and knowledge to be the principal means of attaining these ends. Later on,

individual members of the movement proceeded to publish their own newspapers; these becoming the first private periodicals to be published in Afghanistan. As the movement gradually gained momentum there began to appear in the pages of these journals substantial proof of the economic backwardness of Afghanistan and the wretched plight of her workers, and articles in which arbitrary acts on the part of specified representatives of State authority were criticized. In a series of articles the behaviour of the American monopolists in Afghanistan came in for censure."

In 1951 the public men who spoke through these organs were giving out a programme which implied a complete swing-over from earlier ideas of popular enlightenment. The movement now stood for political agitation. Its avowed aim was to end the monopolizing of political power by the landowners-big business bloc, and also the economic privileges enjoyed by industrial capital. In this bid by the middle and petty bourgeoisie for access to political influence, demands for the solution of the agrarian problem found no place, and there was no plan for social reform. But the very fact of such a bid argued a social movement in embryo.

To this period belong, too, the stirrings of political awareness among the deputies of the National Council who represented the interests of the middle urban elements. From the floor of the House these deputies came out with pointed criticism of the Afghan scene "The political struggle assumed open shape in 1952, throughout the preparation for, and conduct of the election of deputies to the National Council of the 8th Convocation. In May of that year the first political demonstration to occur in Afghanistan took place at Kabul. The demonstrators, who were part of the electorate itself, declared their dissatisfaction with the election arrangements which had been supervised by the authorities. The leaders of the demonstration were arrested and all participators subjected to various restrictions. A ban was placed on the opposition papers."

The course of the election campaigns in the post-war period demonstrated that the electorate was beginning to assert itself. The National Council, by definition a deliberative body representing the whole people, began to be true to its name. Social consciousness was taking root and enabling Afghanistan to overcome her feudal backwardness and live down the consequences of the phase of alien mastery.

It was, of course, inevitable that the transitional character of the economy should have its effect upon the socio-political structure. Semi-feudal productive relations meant the retention of certain feudal features alongside those typical of a capitalistic society. "This is seen, for instance, in the absence of any more or less clear-cut division between the tasks of the executive and those of the legislative authority,

and in the heterogeneous organization of the courts of justice." In legislation and legal procedure the shariat naturally plays a prominent role. "Afghanistan's type of government is a constitutional monarchy with elements of parliamentarism, but one which has, admittedly, retained significant marks of royal prerogative."

The endeavour of the ruling block of landowners and upper bourgeoisie was to consolidate its own political and economic position. Social contradictions flowed from this, which the Government at the end of the war deserves credit for attempting to ease. Before the war was over, indeed, thanks to the acute economic distress, an internal political crisis had come to a head which led to a change of cabinet. The Prime Minister, Muhammad Hashim, went into retirement to be replaced by his brother, Shah Mahmud, an uncle of the King. Although the social basis of this new government was no different from before, it did to some extent study the interests of the urban middle class. In 1947 the right (at any rate the theoretical right) of the shirkats to monopolize the export of agricultural raw materials and the import of foreign goods was withdrawn.

In the same year the election (instead of nomination) of municipal boards was made law. This was a substantial reform in the sphere of local government, and it is worth noticing that "in the section (of the Statute) dealing with the election of members, a secret ballot is provided for for the first time in the history of the country."

These measures, however, were uncoordinated. They were not part of a comprehensive programme of economic reform, and therefore could not solve the social problems of Afghanistan. Given the conditions of the countryside already described, a decline in agricultural production was inevitable, and a shortage of foodstuffs made itself felt to such an extent that the Government was twice obliged in the post-war years to apply to the Export-Import Bank of the USA for dollar loans for the purchase of American wheat.

## II. Activities of the "USA Monopolists"

In 1946 monopolists of the USA being well entrenched in foreign trade with Afghanistan, foisted on her a contract with an American construction company for an irrigation canal and roads in the south of the country. By 1949, which was the year stipulated for completion, progress had been poor. The Company demanded supplementary allocations, and the Afghans were compelled to approach the USA for a loan. In granting a loan of \$21m., the USA insisted on enlarging the scale of the project, and in the event the Company undertook not only to complete the canal but to build dams on the Helmand and Arghandab rivers.

Meanwhile, the discovery that it will require a decade or so to reclaim for agricultural use the salt lands in the region of the proposed irrigation scheme, involves enormous additional cost. The Export-Import Bank now granted a second loan of \$18.5m. to which the condition was attached that the sum should pay for the services of the Company and for such materials and equipment as it required. The tale unfolds to the accompaniment of bitter comment in parliament and press, and even the American publication MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL was strongly critical.

Then there was the case of karakul. Throughout the post-war years this was marketed in the USA without prior agreement on wholesale prices, with the result that these fell steadily. In 1946 the average price for a skin in the USA was \$14.4; in 1950 it was \$7.9, and in 1953 no more than \$5.5.

Nor could the agreements with the USA on technical co-operation in 1951 and 1953 fail to fasten a stranglehold on the country. It was a matter of deliberate calculation. The terms were of an unblushingly political character, the American "advisers" being given direct access to the files on agriculture, industry, exploitation of natural resources, transport, education and public health.

This penetration of American capital into Afghanistan's economy occurred just when she was counting upon being able to right herself. It damaged her own financial position, rendering her balance of payment with America permanently unfavourable, and became a positive drag on further development. It dashed her hopes of subsidizing factory construction or of raising the level of agricultural production.

### III. Development of Capitalist Relations

#### Credit facilities

In order to reduce the country's dependence on foreign capital it was imperative to accelerate the development of industry. "Understanding of the need for such a policy grew among ever widening sections of the public. Momentous events in the entire East, heralding the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism, contributed to this. The success of the anti-colonialist struggle of the Asian and African peoples, more and more convinced patriotic circles in Afghanistan of the genuine possibility of pursuing an independent policy alike in the international arena and on the issues of economic development at home." These circles correctly assessed the historic role of the states composing the Socialist camp, by whose formation the underdeveloped countries have been afforded ample opportunity of gaining the equitable and friendly cooperation of the socialist countries in their struggle against colonialism.

In the winter of 1953-4 a government of liberal outlook took office, headed by Muhammad Daud, first cousin of the King. It adopted an economic programme which contemplated "the protection of capital, the overcoming of inflation, currency control and expansion of credit. The concrete measures of the new Government showed that it was resolved to go further than its predecessors in changing the shape of the country's economy. Proclaiming a policy of so-called guided economy the Government of Muhammad Daud introduced important reforms of the state capitalist type. . . "

". . . Commercial and mortgage banks, founded on funds derived from the State Bank of Afghanistan and the most powerful among the joint-stock companies, proceeded to give credits to the merchant body and to entrepreneurs in the building line. Loans to farmers and livestock-breeders were from now on issued by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, 51 per cent of whose capital belongs to the Bank of Afghanistan and the remainder to the big shirkats or other owners of capital. The indispensable condition of getting credit from this bank is the guarantee of three persons of substance and the placing of lands as security. Apart, therefore, from the big landowners only a sprinkling of well-to-do peasants can enjoy its facilities. Nevertheless, the organization of semi-State credit-giving to kulak elements in the rural area has constituted an innovation in economic policy. In handicraft production likewise the owners can avail themselves of the services of this Agricultural and Industrial Bank. Most recently of all, with the help of the shirkats credit co-operatives of artisans have started to come into being."

#### Measures to improve agriculture

The increase in procurement prices introduced in 1955 on karakul skins and wool, and the arrangement for attractive terms of credit to landowners engaged in the cultivation of cotton and sugar-beet were two measures to strengthen the rural economy. There were other measures too: "Big procurement-export shirkats extended the issue of short term money loans to farmers and livestock-breeders." Branch credit organizations, the so-called co-operatives for karakul, sugar-beet etc., did much for the betterment of production; they gave credit, and they also concerned themselves with the watering of pastures and field irrigation, with pest control and with technical improvements. Shirkats, landlords and big livestock owners made up the bulk of the shareholders in these co-operatives, but well-to-do peasants were not excluded.

While determined to thwart "colonialist plans of imperialistic monopoly" the ruling classes were alive to the wisdom of attracting foreign capital. Two laws were passed in 1954 to regulate its admission

and on the morrow of these a quickening of activity in Afghanistan was observable among the representatives of American, British, West German, and Japanese firms. By the end of 1955 the total invested by these companies was \$2m.

### Social and educational advances

On socio-ideological questions, policy in recent years has been moulded by the bourgeois-landlord bloc. There was progress in publishing. By 1954 there were some 50 newspapers, even if their circulation was modest. A national bourgeois ideology, as commonly happens in the East during the period of the decay of colonialism, asserted itself. In the pages of the semi-official press, the growth of the nation, the sinister role of imperialist aggression, and the sanctity of the sovereign rights of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa were favourite themes. Historical studies, while not free of the bourgeois colouring of Western scholarship went some way towards an honest interpretation of the country's past. The Afghan Academy did important work on Pushtu language and literature. Imaginative literature attended more and more to social problems.

Headway in these directions postulated an improved educational system. "Thus the number of schools catering for general education between 1946 and 1954 rose from 359 to 685. In 1946 a university was founded in Kabul on the basis of already existing faculties. . . However, the problems still confronting the country in the field of education were formidable. It is sufficient to say that on the findings of a UNESCO mission which visited Afghanistan in 1949, about 98 per cent of school-age children were not receiving instruction of any sort."

It was characteristic of national-bourgeois ideology the world over that there should be elements of chauvinism in the anti-colonialist attitude. There were also, in Afghanistan's case, the stubborn feudal survivals, and the widely accepted authority of a clergy of the Sunni sect of Islam.

### IV. Development of Soviet-Afghan Relations

In its relation with Afghanistan the policy of the Soviet Union is summed up in one word, 'goodneighbourliness'. An illustration of this was the Frontier Treaty of 1946. "The previous border used, for a stretch of over 1,200 km., to run along the south bank of the Amu-Dar'ya and Panja rivers. With effect from 1946 the Soviet-Afghan frontier has been fixed on the thalweg (in the unnavigable section, on the centre of the stream) of these rivers. Hence the population of the northern districts of Afghanistan has been given a chance to utilize the waters of the Amu-Dar'ya and Panja for irrigation, transport of cargoes, fishing etc.

Commercial connexions between the two countries, disrupted by war, were gradually renewed, and the resultant "equitable trade with the USSR offered a sharp contrast to the economic relations established between Afghanistan and the imperialist monopolies." In particular, an agreement concluded in 1950 whereby prices were to hold goods for a year at a time, protected the Afghan merchant from those fluctuations of the market which habitually bedevilled his trade with capitalist countries. From the Soviet Union Afghanistan receives petroleum products, metals (including much rolled ferrous metal) motor-cars, machinery, sugar, drugs and cotton-thread fabrics; and from Afghanistan the Soviet Union gets wool, cotton, raw hides, dried fruit, and oil-seed.

There has been the closest practical co-operation both over agricultural matters and in industrial construction. In the first, the USSR has assisted in pest control and the treatment of blight and has trained Afghans for this work. In the second, the Soviet Union has extended credit for various enterprises, and has made available both technical staff and equipment to carry them out.

Economic relations with Czechoslovakia were cemented by agreements signed in 1954. In return for agricultural produce Czechoslovakia supplies Afghanistan with industrial commodities, agricultural machines, road-building machinery and so forth. Indeed by 1955 economic cooperation between Afghanistan and the Socialist states had progressed remarkably. "The share of the USSR and the people's democracies in the turnover of Afghanistan's foreign trade had risen to 29.4 per cent as against 21 per cent in 1954.

#### V. Afghanistan's Foreign Policy

The policy of neutrality to which Afghanistan adhered in the Second World War remained unchanged in the post-war period in spite of the best endeavours of the "imperialist warmongers" to draw her into their various alignments in Asia. In these endeavours the imperialist powers made the most of Afghanistan's differences with Pakistan over the Pakhtunistan issue. "In 1947 after the partition of India the Durand Line became the frontier between the Pakistan state and Afghanistan. The latter, however, had not recognized this, seeing that Pathan territory had been incorporated as an integral part of Pakistan on the strength of an inspired referendum by the colonialist authorities in which only about five per cent of the populace participated. The Pathans in these post-war years went on pressing tirelessly for the creation of a state of their own - Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan, which upholds the right of the Pathans to national self-determination and development, backs their claim."

The Americans and the British hoped that if they aggravated the situation sufficiently, the door to interference would presently open,

and enable them to drag Afghanistan out of her neutrality. But Afghanistan paid no heed to their importunities, refused to send troops to Korea, and declared her recognition of the People's Republic of China. "In these circumstances the anxiety awakened in Afghanistan by the ratification in 1954 of an American military agreement with Pakistan and the offer by USA of military assistance, was neither surprising nor unjustified; for this agreement constituted a direct threat to her peace and security. Simultaneously, the ruling clique in the USA, supported by Britain and France, made every effort to coerce Afghanistan into entering the aggressive SEATO bloc. But this, too, ran up against a flat refusal on the part of the Afghan public." In the same year the Western powers exerted pressure on her to join the newly concluded Turko-Pakistan Pact, but once again Afghanistan refused.

By her active participation in the Bandoeng Conference in 1955, Afghanistan revealed her determination to march in step with those 28 states of Asia and Africa which are committed to peace and international co-operation. It was therefore unthinkable that she would countenance the provocative Baghdad Pact of that same year. Nevertheless, the colonizers, counting as before on Pakistan, hoped to corner her. At that precise moment Pakistan, having turned down Afghanistan's proposals for the peaceful settlement of the Pakhtunistan question by referendum, decided to weld the Pathan frontier districts into a single administrative unit, to be called the United Province of West Pakistan. Over the whole of Afghanistan swept a wave of meetings and demonstrations of protest. Pakistan closed the frontier to Afghan merchandize, and made preparations along it which justified suspicion. Afghanistan introduced a state of emergency and mobilized the army.

In this anxious hour the benefits of Soviet friendship were once more shewn. A generous agreement on transit rights was signed at Moscow in June. Thanks to Soviet initiative, the designs of the colonizers to bring about the economic blockade of Afghanistan were frustrated.

T H E   B O R D E R L A N D S   I N   T H E  
S O V I E T   P R E S S

Below are reviewed reports on the borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 April - 30 June 1962. The only items on India which have been included are those relating to the Indian Communist Party and Soviet-Indian relations. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

AFGHANISTAN

Soviet press coverage on Afghanistan continues to be very heavy, with emphasis on Soviet aid to Afghanistan and Soviet-Afghan friendship. IZ on 13.4.62 noted that an agreement between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on cooperation in the development of housing and the general development plan of Kabul had been signed in the Afghan capital. On 29.4.62 IZ reported King Muhammad Zahir Shah's comments thanking the Soviet Union for her aid in constructing the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar highway. Both the central and republican press gave substantial coverage to the completion of this highway, as well as to a new hydro-electric station.

On 27.5.62 most of the Soviet press carried long articles on the 43rd anniversary of Afghan independence, stressing the aid given to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. All the articles praised Afghanistan's "neutral" foreign policy and her non-participation in military blocs, and cited her relations with the Soviet Union as an example of how two countries with different political systems can cooperate. PR on 8.6.62 published the messages sent by Brezhnev and Khrushchev to the Afghan King and Prime Minister on the occasion of the Afghan holiday, and the answering messages of thanks from the Afghan leaders.

Recent guests of the Soviet Union have included Dr. Muhammad Asif Soheyl, Chief of the Afghan Press Department (PR, 23.5.62); a delegation of the Society of Afghan-Soviet Friendship (PV, 25.5.62); and a delegation of Afghan women (KT, 29.5.62).

## INDIA

VESTNIK of the USSR Academy of Sciences (May 1962) reported on the joint Soviet-Indian Commission which worked out a plan of cultural and scientific cooperation for 1962-3. The Commission had met in Delhi from 25 January to 3 February. The Soviet delegation included representatives of the USSR State Committee of the Council of Ministers for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. Indian delegates included the Minister and members of the Ministry of Culture and Scientific Research. The meeting resulted in an agreement between the two countries on an expansion of scientific exchanges. In addition to short visits by Soviet and Indian scientists for participation in various scientific congresses and conferences in both countries, agreement was also reached on longer tours (up to one year) for specialized and scientific work, participation in scientific expeditions, and an exchange of scientific information and publications.

BR on 25.4.62 reported the opening of the Plenum of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party in Delhi. The agenda included organizational questions; elections of leading organs of the Party; the examination of results of the recent Indian general elections; and consideration of the decisions of the XXIInd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Sorrow was expressed at the recent death of Ajoy Ghosh, the late Secretary-General of the Indian Communist Party. In a short item appearing in PR on 1.5.62, note was made of the completion of the Plenum, and the election of Shripad Amrit Dange as Chairman of the Indian Communist Party and Ye.M. Shankaram Nambudiripad as Secretary-General.

## KASHMIR

A short item in PR on 30.5.62 noted that the Indian Minister of Defence sent a protest to the United Nations in connexion with Pakistan's construction of a military aerodrome "in the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan", and with the "technical and financial help of the United States".

On 12.6.62 PR reported the opening of an exhibition of Soviet literature and photographs in Srinagar, the capital of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

IZ on 24.6.62, in a report on the discussion of the "Kashmir question" in the United Nations Security Council, said that "thanks to the firm position taken by the Soviet Union, American efforts to intensify

enmity between India and Pakistan were thwarted." The TASS report claims that Pakistan was trying to put into doubt the "fact" that Kashmir is an integral part of India. The abstention of Ghana and the UAR on the final vote was interpreted in the Soviet report as "a refusal to take part in the political game initiated by the United States". Indian approval of the position of the Soviet delegation was noted in the report.

#### NEPAL

IZ on 1.6.62 briefly noted the arrival in Moscow of a group of Nepalese journalists. They had just completed a trip through the Soviet Union, visiting Tashkent, Baku, Sochi, Kiev, Minsk and Leningrad, on the invitation of the USSR Union of Journalists.

On 17.6.62 IZ reported an interview of King Mahendra with TASS correspondents in which he is said to have declared that the fundamental principles of Nepalese foreign policy "are peaceful co-existence between countries, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, neutrality, non-membership in military blocs, anti-colonialism, recognition of the dignity of man and the freedom of personality, and peaceful cooperation between countries in economic and cultural matters." The King is also quoted as saying that the existing situation in Berlin is unsatisfactory for all interested sides. He is reported as having urged all interested parties to take up such an attitude in their actions and declaration as would bring them closer together rather than divide them. According to the report, the King urged further expansion of economic and cultural relations between Nepal and the Soviet Union.

#### PAKISTAN

PR on 15.4.62 carried President Ayub Khan's message of thanks to President Brezhnev for the latter's greetings on Pakistan's national holiday. Ayub Khan expressed his hope that "good relations between our two countries will develop in the future in a spirit of durable peace and friendship between our peoples."

IZ and several other newspapers on 1.5.62 carried reports on the granting of the Lenin Prize to the Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz. IZ also noted that he was one of the organizers of the "Association of Progressive Writers", and he is described as an enemy of "reaction and imperialism". Faiz was elected Vice-President of the Congress of Pakistani Trade Unions.

On 16.5.62 PV noted the arrival of a delegation from Tashkent in Karachi, on the invitation of Karachi's municipal government. An account is given of their activities in the city.

Only TI on 10.6.62 carried a brief mention of the ending of martial law in Pakistan. No mention is made in the Soviet press of Chinese negotiations with Pakistan over their common border.

#### PERSIA

In an article signed "Observer" (21.4.62) IZ commented on the Shah's visit to the United States. IZ reports that Amini had long been pressing West European financiers for loans, but had not obtained from them anything more than promises to study his requests. Soon after Amini returned from his unsuccessful mission in search of aid, the Shah set out for Washington to try to obtain American economic and military assistance. The Shah's visit is described as being markedly "military" in character, as shown by his observation of US Army exercises and his declaration that today "an army is powerless without modern weapons of war." According to IZ, all sections of the Persian public were demanding peace and security, and the dissolution of CENTO, as well as an independent policy of neutrality and friendship with all countries.

KZ (17.5.62) published an article by L. Alekseyev, nominally about the recently published memoirs of the Shah, but in fact about Persian policy in general and the Shah's responsibility for it. Some pages of the Shah's memoirs, according to Alekseyev, were marked by obvious hostility towards the Soviet Union, while at the same time the Shah expressed his "regret concerning the unnecessary tension in the relations between two countries." The Soviet Union wanted good-neighbourly relations with Persia, Alekseyev asserts, and if Persia's leaders had wanted the same, such relations could have been established long ago.

PR (30.4.62) reported that in response to a request from the Persian Government, the Soviet Government had sent a team of specialists to fight locusts, with five aircraft. On 26.5.62 PR reported a statement by the leader of the Soviet team on the effectiveness of its work and the welcome given it by the Persian population. Another Tass dispatch (IZ, 19.5.62) reported that the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent had sent food and medical supplies to the value of 7,000 rubles to relieve distress caused by flood damage in Persia.

A Soviet-Persian trade protocol for 1962 was signed in Teheran on 11 June (PR, 12.6.62).

A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement (PR, 16.6.62) alleged that members of the Persian Embassy in Moscow had been speculating in foreign currency. The archivist of the Embassy had conducted illegal dealings in American dollars and gold with Soviet citizens who had now been arrested, and also on behalf of the Press Attaché and a former Counselor at the Embassy. The recall of the Press Attaché was requested, as well as measures to prevent a repetition of such activities.

IZ (13.5.62) published a biographical article by K. Nepomnyashchiy about Khosroy Ruzbeh, a late member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party.



*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W. 3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

*CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW* aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus Sixpence postage.

Distribution Agents :

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,  
46, Great Russell Street,  
LONDON, W.C. 1.

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

## CONTENTS

	Page
Editorial	313
<b>Soviet Central Asia</b>	
The Nationalities Policy of the Soviet Union : A New Phase	317
Archæology in Soviet Central Asia and its Ideological Background. By Grégoire Frumkin	334
The Living and Working Conditions of Kazakh Craftsmen Before the Revolution	343
Recent Literature in Central Asia and Kazakhstan	350
The Aral and Amu-Dar'ya Flotillas : A Recent Soviet Article	365
The Size of the German Population in Kazakhstan and Central Asia	372
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Changes ; Archæology ; Conferences ; Education ; Housing ; Irrigation ; Relations with Foreign Countries ; Social Conditions ; Transport and Communi- cations ; Obituaries	374
<b>Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia</b>	
The Ethnography of Tibet	383
The Dictatorship of Reza Shah	398
The Control of Oil in Pakistan	406
China Looks at Pakistan	412
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	415

## Maps

Distribution of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan	facing page 320
The Amu-Dar'ya and Syr-Dar'ya 1900	„ „ 366
Fergana Valley	„ „ 376
Toktogul Irrigation Scheme	„ 379
Distribution of the Tibetan People in China	„ „ 384
Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaydzhan	at end

---

---

## Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Tadjik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	„ „ „ „ „ „ „ Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadjikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
LG	Literaturnaya Gazeta
NT	New Times
PR	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

# CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL.X, NO.4

---

## EDITORIAL

The elaborate organization and wide ramifications of the Soviet propaganda machine are well known. Soviet propaganda often emanates from unexpected places and from the mouths of unexpected persons. It is, however, something of a surprise to find UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) being used as a vehicle and sponsor of one of the most obvious and unvarnished pieces of Soviet propaganda which has so far come our way. This is EQUALITY OF RIGHTS BETWEEN RACES AND NATIONALITIES IN THE USSR by I.P. Tsamerian and S.L. Ronin and is one of a series of studies on Race and Society being produced by UNESCO in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in 1951, "to undertake, in collaboration with member states concerned, a critical inventory of the methods and techniques employed for facilitating the social integration of groups which do not participate fully in the life of the national community by reason of their ethnical or cultural characteristics or their recent arrival in the country." It would have been reasonable to expect that since the Soviet Union does not want to admit the existence of any racial problems and claims that full social integration already exists, it would not regard itself or wish to be regarded as one of the member states concerned. Moreover, the non-Russian nationalities living in the USSR are not merely different ethnic groups who have for one reason or another entered Russian territory, but indigenous peoples living in their own territories which were seized from them by conquest and annexation. The problem with which the Soviet Government has had to cope, and has coped with a considerable degree of success, is not that of absorbing exotic peoples into the life of the Russian nation, but that of injecting Soviet Russian culture, work habits and know-how into backward and underdeveloped colonial territories.

The whole story of how the former Russian colonial empire was embodied in the Soviet Union, of how agricultural and industrial productivity in the Muslim colonies was greatly increased and of how

the standard of their economies, education and living was raised far above that of adjacent Muslim countries would undoubtedly contain valuable lessons for underdeveloped territories in other parts of the world. But this story cannot be told without disclosing the means by which various obstacles have been surmounted. These means include the campaigns against nationalism and religion, the collectivization of agriculture, the wholesale purges of the 1930s, the deportation in 1944 of nearly a million Muslims and the simultaneous "liquidation" of four whole Muslim nationalities, and the introduction into Central Asia and Kazakhstan of over five million Russian and other white settlers over and above the two million which existed there before the Revolution. Some of these steps may have been unavoidable and may even have proved beneficial in the long run, but they do not make good Soviet propaganda and are not therefore described in the study in question. Indeed, the only one which is referred to at all is the obliteration of the four Muslim nationalities in 1944. This is described as the consequence of "certain violations of Socialist legality resulting from the criminal malpractices of Beria and his accomplices." In reporting the re-establishment of the national autonomy of some of these peoples in 1957 no mention is made of the two hundred thousand Crimean Tatars who have never been rehabilitated as a nationality or allowed to return to their homes.

It is difficult to see how the publication of literature of this kind can contribute to the solution of racial problems; they are more likely to exacerbate them. It may even be wondered whether in this instance the Soviet Government has not overestimated the gullibility of the public to whom this study is presumably directed. In any event, the use of UNESCO for propaganda purposes of this kind can only be deplored.

. . .

From time to time Central Asian Review has tried to keep its readers in touch with current trends in the literary and pictorial arts as practised today in Central Asia under the Soviet regime. The task is clearly not an easy one, for its proper performance would require constant first-hand observation of the originals of all forms of pictorial art and the perusal in their original languages of all forms of literature. It is, however, possible by carefully scrutinizing the official reviews and comments which frequently appear in the Soviet press to form some appreciation of the artistic and other qualities of what is being produced. An appreciation on these lines of current Central Asian literature will be found in the present issue.

In their present form the literatures of the Central Asian republics are barely 30 years old. They are written in languages which

hardly had an established literary form 30 years ago and whose script has changed twice in the same period, and they have been made to adopt entirely new genres and styles which bear no relation whatever to their traditional and oral literatures. That their publication in Central Asian languages has increased in a short time to its present volume is a tribute to the determination of the Soviet authorities in pursuing their campaign of cultural regimentation, which has, of course, resulted in a vast increase in literacy and consequently in a demand for literature. In view of this demand, the literature published in the vernacular languages is probably widely read, although whether it is the kind of literature that the people would have produced of their own volition and really reflects their national cultures are quite other matters.

Literature in the modern Western sense with its strong tendency towards realism is a new phenomenon in Muslim Asia and is a direct result of the impact of Westernization. This Westernization took the form either of conquest and colonization or of increased association with the West, for example, in Turkey and Persia. In the Arab countries and in Persia what are considered by orientalists to be the only literatures worth troubling about virtually came to an end with the subjugation of the Arab world by Turkey by the beginning of the 16th century and with the final dismemberment of the Persian Empire after the death of Shah Abbas in 1629.

Except perhaps for Muslim India, no literature on what might be called the Western model appeared in Muslim Asia before the middle of the 19th century. Most prose literature written since then has been closely connected with the rise of nationalism, and since before the Revolution there was no nationalism, either real or synthetic, in Central Asia, there was no modern Central Asian literature apart from a few sporadic newspapers and pamphlets and a small amount of poetry written on classical models. The standard of contemporary literature produced in Turkey, Persia and the Arab countries is certainly not to be compared with the great literatures of the past, but it does serve as a mirror of modern living conditions in these countries and gives expression to a wide variety of ideas on political, sociological and artistic subjects. Moreover, a large part of the literature published in the Middle East consists of translations of foreign works selected without any regard to their ideological content, thus providing some insight into the progress of ideas in the outside world. There is very little of all this to be found in modern Central Asian literature: there are some good descriptions of the countryside and some information is to be gleaned about life in factories and collective farms; but there is no ventilation of controversial views and no translation from modern foreign literature, except from Russian. Even the "thaw" of the middle fifties produced no reaction in Central Asia and if there

do exist Central Asian Pasternaks and Dudintsevs, they have so far remained silent. It must reluctantly be admitted that the chances of worthwhile and representative literatures developing in such circumstances do not at present seem strong.

. . .

During the past five years there has been a very rapid rise in the number of subscribers to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, and their number is now more than double the maximum anticipated when the Review started publication in 1953. This increase, although gratifying, has resulted in many of the earlier issues going out of print, since new subscribers often ask for all back numbers. Arrangements have now been made to remedy this deficiency and it is hoped that all back issues of the Review will be available by the end of 1962.

The increase in the demand for the Review can be attributed to a number of causes. Chief among these is the growing realization of the importance of the Soviet attitude not only towards the twenty-five million Muslims under direct Soviet rule, but also towards the Muslims of the adjoining countries of the Middle East and South Asia. It seems also that there is an increasing demand for the objective approach to Soviet affairs which the Review has maintained from the beginning: while it is critical of some aspects of the Soviet regime it recognizes and endeavours to describe in as much detail as possible the many remarkable achievements of the regime in such fields as education, communications, irrigation, ethnography and philology. In future, by the way, we propose to devote rather more attention than previously to Asian studies (including archaeology) published in Russia both before and after the Revolution. These studies are of considerable importance and have hitherto been sadly neglected by Western scholars.

THE NATIONALITIES POLICY OF  
THE SOVIET UNION: A NEW PHASE

One of the proudest boasts of the Soviet Union is that it has solved the national question. It is claimed that under the socialist system the numerous nations of the USSR have achieved not only political but also economic and cultural equality. Their all-round development is expected to continue in the future but at the same time in the last few years increasing emphasis has been placed on their coming together (sblizheniye) leading up to the ultimate process of their merging (sliyaniye). The new Party Programme adopted at the XXIInd Party Congress in October 1961 (see CAR, No.1 of 1962, pp.51-56) proclaimed that "full-scale Communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved." The coming together of the nations of the Soviet Union has been the subject of several articles in journals and newspapers, one of the most important of which is "The Main Trends of the Ethnic Processes among the Peoples of the USSR"\* by V.K. Gardanov, B.O. Dolgykh and T.A. Zhdanko, which appeared in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, No.4 of 1961 shortly before the Party Congress. Before examining this article it will perhaps be helpful to give an outline of Soviet theory on the evolution of human communities, both because Soviet writers have to make the facts fit this theory and because it is impossible to understand their arguments fully without an understanding of what exactly they mean by certain terms. The outline is based on the entries under NATSIYA and NARODNOST' in the MALAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA published in 1959 and under NATSIYA in the KRATKIY FILOSOFSKIY SLOVAR', Moscow, 1955.

Briefly, Soviet theory is that the first communities of people were clan and tribal (ethnic) ones which were associated with the primitive and communal system. Later, with the development of the early class societies - slave-owning and feudal - a new type of community emerged which was no longer based on blood relationship. This was the narodnost'\*\* which has a certain linguistic, cultural

---

\* Russian title - "Osnovnyye napravleniya etnicheskikh protsessov u narodov SSSR".

\*\* There is no adequate English equivalent for this word.

and territorial unity as well as economic ties which are, however, much less developed and stable than those of a nation. The narodnost' precedes the formation of the nation (natsiya), the latter being defined as "a historically constituted stable community of people founded on community of language, territory, economic life and spiritual make-up, the last being contained in the idea of a community of national culture." All these characteristics of the nation are interconnected and "it is only when they exist together that they allow a human community to be called a nation." The nation differs from a race in being not a biological but a social category, and from a tribe in being not an ethnographic but a historical category. Nations first emerged during the rise of capitalism and those formed under the capitalist system are bourgeois nations. Under the socialist system bourgeois nations become socialist nations and the earlier forms of community also develop directly into socialist nations, by-passing the capitalist stage. Socialist nations are fundamentally different from bourgeois ones. The latter are characterized by hostility between the classes, seizure of other national territories to increase their own, distrust and hatred of other nations and oppression of national minorities. The socialist nations, on the other hand, are classless and stand for equality and friendship of the peoples. There is, of course, a good deal of overlapping and a state may contain communities at many different levels of development. Furthermore, one stage of development does not lead invariably to the next. Thus, even under socialism not all narodnost' will consolidate into nations. "It may happen that a narodnost' whose development has been retarded, or which is affected by some special conditions, is unable to establish a stable economic and territorial community. By adopting the language and the spiritual characteristics of the nation with which this narodnost' is in close economic and territorial relations it gradually merges with that nation."

As for the future, "being a historical category the nation has not only its beginning but also its end. In the future, after the victory of socialism on a world scale, when the nations will unite in a single system of world socialist economy, the real conditions necessary for the gradual merging of all nations into one whole will be created." But this will not happen immediately. First, the formerly oppressed nations and national languages will develop and prosper, mutual distrust will disappear and friendly ties will be established. Only at the second stage, with the emergence of a single world socialist economy, will the need for a common international language arise. Possibly there will first of all be zonal economic centres for groups of nations with a common zonal language for each group, leading to the final stage of the disappearance of nations and national languages altogether and the emergence of a single international language based on the best elements of national and zonal languages.

For the first 40 years of Soviet rule the main aim of the nationalities policy was the formation of socialist nations, in many cases from peoples like those of Central Asia who had previously no national consciousness. An objective account of how this policy was carried out among the Muslim peoples of the USSR and how far it may be said to have been successful, can be found in *THE EVOLUTION OF THE MUSLIM NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR AND THEIR LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS* by Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, an English translation of which was published by the Central Asian Research Centre in 1961. [On the other hand, the treatment of this subject in the recently published UNESCO book *EQUALITY OF RIGHTS BETWEEN RACES AND NATIONALITIES IN THE USSR* by I.P. Tsamerian and S.L. Ronin, discussed on p.313 above, could never be called objective.] While any manifestations of nationalism among the peoples of the USSR have been ruthlessly suppressed, a national consciousness and pride in "progressive" national traditions have been encouraged and it would be surprising if the nations of the Soviet Union did not show some reluctance to give them up. They are, therefore, being constantly reassured that the merging of nations is a very lengthy process which will be completed only sometime after the triumph of socialism on a world-wide scale. What is not clear is whether or not the socialist nations of the Soviet Union can be expected to merge in the meantime. Certainly articles like that by Gardanov, Dolgykh and Zhdanko summarized below, which show that the process of the coming together of the socialist nations is in full swing, give the impression that there will be no necessity to wait for the rest of the world.

---

Gardanov, Dolgykh and Zhdanko start by saying that the processes of ethnic development taking place currently in the Soviet Union urgently call for research into the complicated problem of national development and its future prospects. The Institute of Ethnography has therefore carried out field work in different parts of the USSR - in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Volga area, the Far North, etc. - and has used this field material as well as the data of the general censuses to analyse the state of every ethnic formation and to elucidate the paths of its future development. The authors distinguish two main trends in the present-day processes of ethnic development in the USSR:


"(1) the continuing consolidation and development of the socialist nations and narodnost'; (2) a general process of the ever greater coming together of the socialist nations and narodnost' of the USSR on the basis of the development of fraternal cooperation and friendly international contacts in the sphere of economy, culture and intellectual life, a process accompanied by the emergence of all-Union Soviet forms

of culture and way of life." The article continues by saying that, although these processes naturally take place in different ways and unevenly in various parts of the country, they have assumed a parallel course since the first years of Soviet rule. The first trend was particularly important in the earlier stages of the development of Soviet society, up to the final triumph of socialism in the country, but now the latter trend is coming to the fore and assuming ever greater scope and urgency in the present historical stage, that of the comprehensive building of Communist society.

### Before the Revolution

The article explains that the historical basis for the formation of socialist nations among the various peoples of the USSR was not identical and depended on the stage they had reached at the time of the establishment of Soviet rule. For the large and most developed peoples - Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Armenians and others - it was a question of transforming the old bourgeois nations into socialist nations. For the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the North Caucasus and Dagestan, the Ural-Volga Region, Siberia, the Far East and the Far North, who had not been through the capitalist stage and had not had time to become bourgeois nations, the process was different. A large number of them had already formed into narodnost' in the Middle Ages, but under the landlord and bourgeois system and the political and national yoke of tsarism and with the dominance in many areas of the country of pre-capitalist (feudal, semi-feudal and even in parts pre-feudal) relations, their ethnic development had been held up and a multitude of petty, isolated ethnographic groups were preserved in their midst. The article divides these ethnographic groups into three types. Some were fragments of other narodnost' cast up by turbulent political events in areas far from their homelands who adopted the language and many features of the culture of the people whose territory they started to inhabit and with whom they are now gradually merging (Arabs, Gypsies, Iranians, and Central Asian Jews in Central Asia). Of much greater importance and more widespread were local groups of population of the same ethnic root as the main narodnost' who were isolated as a result of historical, geographical or other causes and retained local dialects and certain original ethnographic features. Finally, very many of the ethnic groups were former tribes and clans, who, in spite of living for centuries adjacent to or in slave-owning and feudal societies, firmly kept their clan traditions and the features of tribal life. The article points out that, because of general backwardness, even among the bourgeois nations on the south western frontiers of the country remnants of ethnic sub-divisions of the pre-capitalist epoch were preserved at the time of the Revolution, for example, the Kartalins, Kakhétins, Adzhars and many others in the Georgian nation.

Distribution of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan



Central Asian Research Centre, 1962



Among the peoples of the Soviet East, the article goes on, survivals of clan and tribal divisions had a very negative effect on the national development of the peoples. Research has shown the extremely complicated nature of the clan and tribal structures among certain peoples of the USSR in the comparatively recent past. For example, at the beginning of the 20th century the Kara-Kalpaks were divided into 12 major tribes, more than 120 clan groups and a multitude of minor and minute sub-divisions. The mountain peoples of the Caucasus, in particular the Dagestanis, were remarkable for their extreme clan and tribal fragmentation.

### Consolidation since the Revolution

The article claims that a study of the ethnic development of the peoples of the USSR shows the enormous role in their national consolidation played by the formation of the corresponding national republics and oblasts. "The victory of socialism in the USSR and the resulting radical changes in the class structure of Soviet society and in the outlook of Soviet people, completed in the main the process of the formation of socialist nations and narodnost' . . . and also the process of the shaping of their national state organization which was consolidated in the new constitution of the USSR of 1936." However, the article explains, this does not mean that no further changes have taken place or are taking place in the development of the peoples of the USSR. The transition to the building of Communism opens a new stage in the national development of its peoples.

According to the authors, the essence of present-day ethnic processes is expressed above all in the disappearance of the isolation of the minor ethnographic groups, in their gradual merging with the socialist nations and in the growth of the monolithic character of these nations. Census figures and ethnographic material reflect this natural and voluntary process, which is radically different from the policy of forced assimilation practised in Tsarist Russia which often led to the dying out of whole narodnost'. The authors show that in the first years of Soviet rule many people were still more conscious of belonging to a tribe or ethnographic group than to a nation. For example, in the 1926 census such ethnographic (clan and tribal) groups of the Uzbek people as the Tyurks (60,000), Kypchaks (33,500) and Kuramas (50,000) listed themselves separately, although they were Uzbek-speaking. In the 1959 census the Kuramas do not figure at all - they have finally merged with the Uzbeks. Only about 100 of the Kypchaks of the Fergana Valley called themselves by this name in 1959 and slightly over 4,000 people called themselves Tyurks. Likewise, says the article, the drawing together and merging with the Uzbeks of the Kara-Kalpaks living among them in the Fergana Valley, and particularly in Samarkand oblast,

has made big strides forward, and the same kind of thing is happening among the Tadzhiks where the minor narodnost' living in the mountain areas, such as the Yagnobis and Pamiris, are merging with the Tadzhik nation. In the last census most of the Yagnobis and Pamiris called themselves Tadzhiks but named their own languages as their native tongue. The article maintains that the retention of local languages does not mean that merging with the Tadzhiks is not taking place. The Tadzhik language is widespread among these people, and the development of transport and industry, the growth of culture, and resettlement in the valleys have destroyed their age-old isolation.

The article turns next to the Caucasus. In Armenia, with the socialist transformation of the bourgeois nation, separate ethnographic groups of the Armenian people have consolidated and merged. It is roughly the same in Georgia, where internal sub-divisions have lost their former significance and almost completely disappeared. Although, says the article, the Svans, Mingrelians and Laz still to some extent preserve their languages (mainly in domestic life), their social and political life and culture develop on the basis of Georgian which is now their main means of intercourse. In the 1959 census about 720 people claimed Mingrelian, Svan and Laz as their native languages and about 340 called themselves Mingrelians, Svans or Laz. Likewise the Tsova-Tushins (Batsbiytsy) living in Georgia have almost completely merged with the Georgians. Batsbiyskiy, a North Caucasian language, has continued to experience the strong influence of Georgian, particularly in vocabulary, and of the very few people who now call themselves Tsova-Tushins none considers Batsbiyskiy his mother tongue. The article describes a similar situation in Azerbaydzhan, where the Azerbaydzhan socialist nation is also absorbing different ethnic groups living in the republic. The 1959 census showed that the Iranian-speaking Tats and Talysh, who were being assimilated long before the Revolution, have now to a substantial degree merged with the Azerbaydzhanis and so have the Udins.

The article then deals with the people of the North Caucasus, who right up to the Revolution had preserved many features of clan and tribal life. They have by-passed the capitalist stage, and the former divisions by tribes etc. have now disappeared. The article cites the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetes and others who have now consolidated into socialist nations and narodnost'. A big factor in this was the cultural revolution and in particular the creation of written languages which led to the gradual elimination of dialectal peculiarities and the strengthening of the idea of belonging to a single nation. The article goes into considerable detail about Dagestan whose population, even against the background of the multi-national Caucasus, is remarkable to this day for its extremely multi-lingual nature and great ethnic fragmentation. As a result the ethnic processes and national consolidation

take very complicated forms there. In the Dagestan ASSR at the present time there are about 30 peoples and ethnographic groups with independent languages (Caucasian, Iranian and Turkic) and more than 70 dialects. The major peoples speaking the Caucasian languages are the Avars, Lezgins and others, and naturally they have become the nuclei around which the smaller peoples consolidate. The ethnic group consolidating round the Avars is developing into the major nationality of Dagestan; in 1959 it constituted more than 22 per cent of the total population. The article states that the needs of the economic and cultural development of the peoples of Dagestan demand the rapid overcoming of their ethnic fragmentation and isolation. The progressive nature of the consolidation of the small narodnost' of Dagestan round a related narodnost' having its own written and literary language is therefore clear. At the same time, the article notes, there is an ever greater tendency towards the creation of an all-Dagestan national community. More and more people consider themselves Dagestanis as well as Avars etc. and because of the multilingual nature of Dagestan, Russian has naturally become the main language of communication between the nations. Certain small narodnost' prefer to have their children educated in Russian from the beginning rather than in the language of a larger neighbouring narodnost' which has a written language. "Thus the process of the further unification of the narodnost' of Dagestan is taking place on the basis of the Russian language."

The article concludes its description of the continuing consolidation of nations in the Soviet Union with the peoples of Siberia and the Far North. These were the most backward before the Revolution, but the major ones have now formed socialist nations and narodnost' with autonomous republics, oblasts and okrugs. But the article points out that in none of these autonomous districts do the indigenous peoples constitute a majority since many Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and others live there. The coming together and merging of certain small peoples of the Far North with the Yakuts, Komi and Russians has intensified, but the process is still far from completion. Analogous processes can be observed in other parts of the Soviet Union, for example the Volga region, where individual groups of Mordvins, Chuvash, Mariytsi and others, surrounded by Russians, are gradually merging with them.

### Obstacles to consolidation

The authors next examine briefly "phenomena which hinder the progressive process of the overcoming of the exclusiveness of small ethnographic groups." In some republics attempts have been made to speed up artificially the merging of small narodnost' with the main nation. The article maintains that this fundamentally contradicts the nationalities policy of the Communist Party and hinders the painless

inclusion of these ethnic groups in the nation in future. Other obstacles to consolidation are cases of tactless behaviour towards the national consciousness of members of small narodnost', and religious differences and prejudices. Finally, there is the preservation of archaic customs and rites which personified in the past the unity of the clan and the force of clan relations in the community. The article gives as examples in Central Asia and the Caucasus the traditional funeral feasts and other family celebrations which keep alive the idea of clan solidarity. Sometimes the sense of solidarity between members of the same clan leads to the covering up of crime, and unfortunately it is not unknown for the national intelligentsia to defend and actively take part in some of these old customs which they call 'national traditions'.

### The coming together of the nations on a regional scale

The article now turns to the process of the coming together of the socialist nations of the USSR which it says is taking place simultaneously in two ways: (a) between the socialist nations and narodnost' of the major historical and ethnographic areas, and (b) on an all-Union scale "which is accompanied by the formation of common Soviet traditions and features of living, and the highest Communist forms of collaboration, and by the growth of friendly fraternal ties between the peoples of the USSR who have common fundamental interests."

The article says that the coming together of the population on a regional scale can be seen in areas like Central Asia and the Caucasus whose peoples have been in close economic and cultural contact since ancient times, are linked by common historical fates and are sometimes related in origin. Such people have developed many similar methods of economic activity and common cultural features. In Central Asia, for instance, the most valuable of the traditional economic skills of the indigenous inhabitants of the oases - Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kara-Kalpaks - is land cultivation by irrigation. The labour skills of mountain livestock breeding among the Kirgiz and some of the Tadzhiks, steppe livestock breeding among the Kazakhs and Kirgiz, and desert livestock breeding among the Turkmen, are combined with an inherited fitness for living and working in harsh natural conditions. In the same way the peoples of the Far North all engage in pursuits like reindeer breeding and wear similar types of clothing, and the peoples of the Caucasus have their own way of tilling the land.

In addition to these common features of the economy closely connected with natural and historical conditions, the article continues, traditional common features of material and spiritual culture developed among the peoples inhabiting the major historical and ethnographic areas. Some of these (common religious beliefs, customs, rites)

have become obsolete or will become so in the socialist present day but others have retained their value and possibly will do so, creatively transformed, even in the Communist future when the nations merge. It is a question of the skilful and creative use of many valuable elements of folk experience - in the planning of housing to suit the local climate, in practical forms of clothing, diet, and the working day in definite natural conditions, and finally in artistic traditions in the field of folk decorative art etc.

"Under the socialist system. . . the regional ties of peoples inhabiting historical and ethnographic areas of the USSR, ties in the development of which, even earlier, differences of languages and state frontiers never played a substantial role, become stronger and develop on a new high socialist plane of economic collaboration and fraternal friendship." As examples of such friendly collaboration in Central Asia the authors give the construction of irrigation works, railways, power-stations etc. by the joint efforts of several republics. These inter-republican economic ties, they say, will be reinforced in the coming years with the realization of further grandiose plans for irrigating and developing the deserts and delta regions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The Transcaucasian republics have also collaborated in economic projects.

The article considers that an important role in the gradual coming together of the population is played by groups of the population of neighbouring republics living and working together in kolkhozes, sovkhoses, industrial undertakings and towns of mixed national composition. Sometimes in such kolkhozes, of which there are many in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, they have their own original division of labour, making use of the work skills of each nationality. Thus the Tadzhiks, Uzbeks or Turkmens form cotton-growing brigades, the Kirgiz or Kazakhs look after the livestock, the Koreans grow rice etc. "The resettlement of kolkhozniks and sovkhos workers from scattered. . . farms and tiny villages into large well-built socialist settlements and also the new forms of social, cultural and family life, in particular the increase in mixed marriages", all assist "the progressive coming together of the various nations and minor narodnost", both in rural localities and particularly in the towns."

#### On an all-Union scale

The article states that the coming together of the peoples on an "all-State" scale started before the Revolution but it was complicated on the one hand by the Russification policy of the Tsarist Government and on the other by the aggravation of local nationalism as a reaction to this policy. With the success of the Leninist nationalities policy

the process of coming together has lost its antagonistic features. "This was expressed most clearly in the selfless aid given by the more developed nations (Russian, Ukrainian and others) to those that were backward." The friendship and solidarity of all the peoples of the USSR were particularly apparent during the war and in the post-war period on Communist construction sites and in the opening up of the virgin lands.

The article maintains that the correct distribution of productive forces in the country being carried out in accordance with the Seven-Year Plan, will have an extremely important effect on the relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union, as they are the basis for the highest forms of economic collaboration and will also lead to more contacts and cultural ties between the republics. "Industrialization and the growth of the urban population are also important factors promoting the coming together of the representatives of different nationalities." This was shown by the 1959 census, according to which almost all the towns of Central Asia, the Baltic States and the Caucasus have a population of extremely mixed national composition which makes these towns important centres for the international (internatsional'nyy) consolidation of the working people. In industrial undertakings, government organizations, schools and VUZ in these towns, representatives of the indigenous nationality and of other peoples of the Soviet Union work hand in hand, and more and more frequently up to ten or more nationalities can be found in kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

### The role of the Russian language

The article also attributes a very important role in the coming together of the peoples of the USSR to the Russian language "which is gradually becoming their second mother tongue". According to the 1959 census, 59.5 per cent of the population consider Russian their native language, including about 10.8 per cent of the non-Russian population. The article emphasizes that in the republics, although Russian is widely used as a second language, the position of the language of the titular nationality has remained stable or even improved, largely on account of the consolidation of nations. In all but two union republics (Kirgizia -40.5 per cent and Kazakhstan -30 per cent) the titular nationality constitutes a majority of the population; therefore the national state languages are predominant. The article asserts that the flourishing state of the languages of the socialist nations and their importance in the cultural life of the republics, show that the spread of Russian has not been at the expense of supplanting or even diminishing the role of the national languages but has taken place parallel with the growth of the latter, i.e. as a second language. This refutes foreign charges of a Russification policy.

The authors emphasize that not only does Russian make accessible to all peoples of the USSR the achievements of each republic in the fields of science, technology and culture, but it also plays a special role in the autonomous republics and oblasts where several nationalities live, for example, Dagestan where Russian is the main means of intercourse between the indigenous narodnost' speaking different languages. Similarly in the Far North the small peoples often use Yakut, Komi or Russian. Although textbooks have been published in the languages of the Far North, they are not always used and recently some schools have voluntarily gone over to Russian. But, the authors stress, one of the distinctive features of Soviet democracy is that each Soviet citizen has the right to choose freely for himself and his children the language which he finds the most convenient.

#### All-Soviet forms of culture and way of life

The article then dwells on the new all-Soviet forms of culture and way of life, whose formation is closely connected with the current ethnic processes. Due to backwardness and other reasons, it says, up to the Revolution there were certain ethnographic peculiarities in the culture and family life of every people which were doomed to disappear or be radically transformed from the first years of Soviet rule, and this process is still continuing. At the same time the cultures of the peoples of the USSR, socialist in content and national in form, were taking shape. The socialist content includes the elements of culture common to all the socialist nations which appear in a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, a conscious Communist attitude to work, Communist moral principles, socialist realism in art etc., while the national features embrace all the progressive traditions and forms which have prospects for development in the future. The socialist content unites the diverse national cultures which develop in close contact with each other.

"The treatment of the problem of all-Soviet culture is a matter of principle of great importance, particularly as bourgeois theoreticians, favouring an a-national cosmopolitan culture, try to assert that socialist culture is incompatible with national culture." Unfortunately, say the authors, "some practical and research workers represent all-Soviet culture as something grey and characterless. . . and are often inclined to substitute for this concept 'European' culture, which, however, cannot in any way be regarded or recommended as a model for all the peoples of the world." For example, 'European' forms of dress are not suitable for hot climates and a more serious effort should be made to use national costume as a basis for the development of beautiful, new, hygienic and comfortable models. 'European' forms of material culture are far from always being a sign of a cultured life.

"All-Soviet culture is international (internatsional'nyy)."<sup>1</sup> The article suggests that the intensive process of the coming together and interpenetration of the national cultures of the large and small peoples merits special research. It can be seen in the fields of science, literature and the arts. Examples are the translations of the works of the best writers of the republics into Russian and other languages, the exchange festivals of literature and art between the republics, and tours by national theatres and dance groups. It is also taking place in everyday life. For example, the embroidered Ukrainian shirt has become a favourite form of dress in Central Asia and the Central Asian tyubetyka (embroidered skull-cap) is worn throughout the Soviet Union in summer. The article singles out all-Soviet literature as a very important factor in the growth of internationalism and the coming together of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The article then asserts that "at the present time mistakes are often made in evaluating the cultural heritage and traditional way of life of the peoples of the USSR." On the one hand there are attempts, which have a clearly nationalistic tendency, to make a fetish of all the old culture and many survivals of the old way of life. These include the efforts by certain architects to create a 'national' building style by an uncritical use of religious edifices such as mosques as models. The article says this hinders the changing of the old way of life and leads to the preservation of a religious world outlook. A genuine example of a creative approach to national architecture and art and a transformation of its cultural traditions in the spirit of socialist realism is the Opera and Ballet Theatre in Tashkent. The opposite tendency is also condemned where the importance of a careful approach to the preservation and further development of valuable elements in the cultural heritage is ignored on the pretext that they are only 'survivals of the old way of life'. As a result of this attitude in many republics whole branches of excellent applied art are disappearing through neglect. The article goes on to criticize the many cases where plans for towns and houses in Central Asia and the Caucasus take no account of local climatic conditions, and attempts to get the people of the Far North to work in mines or on timber exploitation while there is a shortage of labour in the occupations for which they have traditional skills, such as reindeer breeding, hunting and fishing. It says that ways must be worked out for the manufacture of objects of material culture adapted for the different geographical areas. Articles like the yurt of the Central Asian and Kazakh herdsmen and shepherds, and the Caucasian burka (felt cloak), which are eminently practical for local conditions have often been considered by certain leftist-minded people as the personification of 'the old way of life' and their production discouraged. Khrushchev was quite right to suggest recently that high quality felt or equivalent chemical substitutes should be produced for yurts. The article recommends that

the experience of the Mongolian People's Republic in adapting the yurt to present-day conditions could also be copied with advantage.

The article ends by stating that ethnographic data on national habits are necessary for the solution of many vital economic questions, such as the redistribution and consolidation of labour resources in the newly developed areas of the country, in supplying the population with goods, and also for the further reconstruction of the way of life and the development of the culture of the rural population of various national areas etc.

---

An article on "The Cultures of the Socialist Nations, Their Present and Future"\* by the late N. Gadzhiyev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, in KOMMUNIST, No.1 of 1962, was largely concerned with the coming together of these national cultures. After describing the ways in which this is already taking place - through translations of literary works, films, concerts, etc. - he went on to say that this process will become more intensive in the future and "fewer and fewer signs will remain distinguishing one nation from another." But it will take a long time and "there are grounds for thinking that even after the transformation of the socialist nations into Communist ones the culture of the latter, for a certain time, will be Communist in content and at the same time will still preserve its national form." Gadzhiyev forecast that the old national forms will go through a process of refinement and "at the same time such new national forms will emerge as are capable of conveying the Communist content in the best possible way." Gadzhiyev then touched on the development of national languages and in particular the large number of Russian words that have enriched them during the Soviet period. "This process . . . clearly portrays the general tendency to linguistic internationalization and to the further mutual enrichment and coming together of the languages of the Soviet peoples." After paying tribute to the Russian language and people, and giving the usual explanations for its importance for the peoples of the USSR, Gadzhiyev concluded by attacking those who cling to the old traditional forms in the arts. He claimed that "the adoption of the forms of culture of other peoples far from deprives art of its national distinctiveness." National form, though based on traditions, cannot develop by remaining in the framework of the old forms. The borrowing of such progressive genres as comedy and the short story

---

\* "Kul'tury sotsialisticheskikh natsii, ikh nastoyashcheye i budushcheye."

from Russian and other literatures is beneficial and part of the process of the coming together of the socialist cultures.

Not long after the XXIIInd Congress there was a lively discussion on the future of national cultures, and literatures in particular, in the pages of IZVESTIYA, LITERATURA I ZHIZN' and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The poet V. Soloukhin, writing in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 6.2.62, disagreed strongly with certain statements made by the Dagestan writer A. Agayev in two articles in IZVESTIYA of 5.12.61 and LITERATURA I ZHIZN' of 17.11.61. He ridiculed Agayev's statement that "Now more than ever they [cultural workers] are called on to create works of an international character and to create consciously for all peoples. This is precisely the main direction of the process of the mutual exchange of spiritual values and the formation of a single international culture," and he said that Agayev's idea of the coming together of national literatures amounted to this: "Introduce into your books as many heroes as possible from other republics, try to write in some other language (but preferably in Russian) and also, when you write, 'consciously' create not only in the name of your own people but also that of all the peoples inhabiting our multi-national homeland." Soloukhin declared that it was unnecessary to introduce other nationalities into a book unless the story warranted it. As for language, that is the writer's affair, but there can be no such thing as a Dagestani literature in Russian. Soloukhin asserted that "a writer is interesting to other people and is internatsional'nyy (international) and mezhdunarodnyy (international)\* in so far as he expresses the soul and character above all of his own people. . . . The formation of the single international culture about which A. Agayev writes should hardly take the path of levelling and the disappearance of national traditions, national peculiarities and national colour of music and language. . . . How could we, taking this view, help but slip into the most elementary and vulgar cosmopolitanism instead of internationalism. It is already impossible to tell from a picture by an abstract artist, the nationality of the artist, whether he is Italian, French, American or Japanese . . . . If that is good, then let us write in Esperanto." Soloukhin concluded by saying that it is the single socialist world outlook that makes Soviet literature international, and gave examples of books that are both profoundly national and profoundly international. As for national forms, long may they live!

Not surprisingly this brought retorts from both Agayev (in LITERATURA I ZHIZN' of 2.3.62) and IZVESTIYA. Agayev accused Soloukhin of caricaturing his ideas and failing to understand the historical process whereby the national cultures draw together. "In incomprehensible fear

---

\* For the difference in meaning between these two words please see note at end of article.

of this historical process, Soloukhin, appealing to national feelings, essentially calls for preserving national differences and peculiarities forever." Agayev quoted Lenin's words, "the proletariat supports everything which helps the obliteration of national differences and the fall of national barriers, everything which makes the connexion between nationalities closer and closer, everything which leads to the merging of nations. To act otherwise means to take sides with reactionary philistinism." He concluded that Soloukhin's article "in its entire spirit not only contradicts the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the national question, but also indulges in the nationalistic philistinism of which the great Lenin wrote."

G. Shakhnazarov in IZVESTIYA of 23.3.62 conceded that Soloukhin had justly noted "certain unsuccessful formulations" in Agayev's articles but disagreed strongly with the general trend of his attack. Shakhnazarov maintained that there was no justification for even asking whether the culture of Communist society would not be colourless, having lost the elements of national colour. "On its Communist path towards the heights of unity and fraternity, mankind will not lose one valuable grain of the entire wealth of material and spiritual culture accumulated by the national genius of all peoples. An all-mankind culture is forming and being developed as a natural synthesis of national cultures." Shakhnazarov supported Agayev's "appeal to use more boldly international forms in literature and art". Shakhnazarov concluded that "the sacred duty of each true internationalist and builder of Communism is to promote by all his actions and thoughts the strengthening of the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the drawing together of their national cultures, and the development of a single Soviet culture, Communist in content and all-mankind in character and form."

N. Shamota, in IZVESTIYA of 4.6.62, also sided with Agayev, but at a meeting in Tbilisi of the Transcaucasian Regional Conference on Artistic Translation "the viewpoint of Agayev. . . which unconvincingly tries to settle the problems of the development and mutual influence of national cultures and languages was justly not supported." (KOMMUNIST (Yerevan) of 28.3.62.)

As a final point it is worth noting that at two recent conferences in Central Asia, which were devoted to the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union and the benefits it has brought to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular, several speakers showed themselves concerned about Western attacks on this policy. The conferences were an all-Union Conference of Higher Educational Establishments held in Tashkent in May 1962 on "The Triumph of the Leninist Nationalities Policy in the USSR", and an all-Union Scientific Session in Dushanbe in June 1962 on "The Laws of the Transition of Formerly Backward Peoples to Socialism and Communism by-passing the Capitalist Stage". The Soviet Union is, of course, extremely sensitive to any criticism, but in this case the

speakers seemed to be particularly worried that the underdeveloped countries, for whom Central Asia is supposed to be an outstanding proof that the socialist way of development is the only true path of progress for backward areas, might be dissuaded from pursuing it by the "bourgeois falsifiers". Thus Rashidov, First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, said at the conference in Tashkent that the newly independent countries realize that the capitalist path is no good and can see from the example of Central Asia and other parts of the Soviet Union the advantages of the socialist system. This frightens those who hope to continue exploiting the backward and underdeveloped countries, and that is why "bourgeois falsifiers" do all they can to denigrate the achievements of the Soviet peoples and to distort the substance of the Leninist nationalities policy. Unable any longer to deny the great changes that have taken place, they direct their fire at some matters of principle in that policy and "cover up their fantasies with the semblance of objectivity using material from our papers, journals and books which they shamelessly garble and falsify." Rashidov went on to say that "it is our duty resolutely to unmask the bourgeois falsification and slander on the Soviet Union and the nationalities policy of the Soviet Communist Party." (PV of 8.5.62.)

---

Note on the words internatsional'nyy and mezhdunarodnyy

The use of the words internatsional'nyy and mezhdunarodnyy by Soviet writers is not always easy to follow. The following definitions are given in the four volume SLOVAR' RUSSKOGO YAZYKA (DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE), published by the Academy of Sciences in 1957-61:

internatsional'nyy (1) mezhdunarodnyy

- (2) in accordance with the principles of internationalism, based on the principles of internationalism

internatsionalizm the international (mezhdunarodnyy) unity and solidarity of the proletariat in the struggle for the overthrow of the capitalist system and the building of Communism; the upholding of the freedom and equality of all peoples (narod), the struggle for friendship and collaboration between them, against chauvinism and nationalism

- mezhdunarodnyy (1) concerning the relations between peoples (narod), countries
- (2) existing between peoples, extending to many peoples; internatsional'nyy.

It sometimes seems as if the word internatsional'nyy refers more to relations between the nations of the USSR, while mezhdunarodnyy is a more general term used for the nations and states of the world.

#### Peaks named after Soviet astronauts

There are already peaks in the Zailiyskiy Alatau mountain range bearing the names of the Soviet astronauts Gagarin and Titov. Now a peak in the Kungey Alatau has been named after the most recent astronauts, Andriyan Nikolayev and Pavel Popovich. It is 4,800 metres high and its pointed pyramidal summit is covered with ice and visible from a long way off. KP 16.8.62

A nameless peak of 6,000 metres in the Turkestanskiy range has been climbed by two Tashkent alpinists who have named it "Cosmonauts of the USSR". KT 9.8.62

#### Caviar from Lake Biylikol'

Four years ago sevryuga (a kind of sturgeon producing high quality caviar) was brought from the Caspian and released in Lake Biylikol', near Dzhabul. It was kept under strict protection. Recently one was caught by fisherman of the Dzhabul Fish Factory and it was established that it had spawned. The fish was 160 cm. long and weighed 13 kilos. In the near future sevryuga will be fished commercially in the lake. KP 3.7.62

#### "Music While You Work"

Artistes of the Kazakh Concert Organization are to give more than a thousand concerts for the virgin-landers during the harvest. KP 5.8.62

ARCHAEOLOGY IN SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA  
AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

By Grégoire Frumkin

This is the first of a series of articles on current developments in Soviet archaeology specially written for CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW by Grégoire Frumkin, author of ARCHÉOLOGIE SOVIÉTIQUE EN ASIE which was reviewed in CAR No.1 of 1960. The present article is an introductory one and will be followed by other articles on archaeology in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics.

---

I. Introduction - II. Archaeology as Viewed by the Communists -  
III. The Role of Marxism in Archaeology - IV. Some Features of  
Archaeology in the USSR - V. Archaeology in Central Asia.

I. Introduction

The aim of the present article is to appraise the development of archaeology in the Soviet Union, with special reference to its Central Asian Muslim republics: Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan. A sixth Muslim republic, Azerbaydzhan, lies actually on the periphery of Asia. There is, however, no hard and fast line of demarcation between the Asian and European Soviet territories and the main characteristics of Soviet archaeology ipso facto apply to these republics.

The Soviet conception of archaeology transcends geographical frontiers and claims to be of universal validity. Realization of this conception will help Westerners to find a reply to the question "what is being done and why", as well as to understand the difference between "Soviet archaeology" and "archaeology by the Soviets".

It is obviously the duty of Western scholars to deal with the results achieved by their Soviet colleagues unemotionally, putting aside

all prejudices and preconceived ideas. Soviet spokesmen may hurt Western ideas and may not adopt the Western rules of the game, but nevertheless the present exposé of what is believed to be the Soviet outlook is not meant to serve as a preamble to controversies or counter-attacks. This does not imply, however, that all the Soviet arguments should be accepted at their face value. There is between East and West a painful lack of agreement on the meaning of "colonialism" as distinct from Russian "annexations" in Asia (or, as they call it, "incorporation"), of democracy, freedom, objectivity, scientific laws, etc., but such controversies are outside the scope of this article and irrelevant to the expansion of Soviet archaeology.

There is a widespread belief among Western scholars that even where the material results of digging by Soviet scholars are good, the interpretation of the results is frequently biased and scientifically defective.\* Things are possibly even more complicated than this. So long as there remains a gulf between the different underlying ideologies (Weltanschauung), it will be difficult to reconcile divergent judgments. The gulf may be narrowed by a better knowledge of the respective views, which may require on the Western side not only an adequate knowledge of Soviet archaeological work, but also of Marxism. Many Western archaeologists are prone to criticize Marxist ideology, but probably few of them have an adequate idea of the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin. As to the Soviet material on archaeology, Westerners usually find it difficult to obtain or else cannot use it for reasons of language. The difficulties are particularly great in the case of Central Asia. Surprising as it may seem, even scholars in Moscow and Leningrad find it difficult to get hold of all the material published in the various Central Asian republics. It is an unexpected feature of the numerous deficiencies in the Soviet distribution services.

## II. Archaeology as Viewed by the Communists

Archaeology being a study of history based on the material remains of bygone times, history and archaeology are inseparable sciences. In conformity with the teaching of Marx and Engels, amplified by Lenin (and, last but not least, by Stalin), societies develop according to the inexorable law of "historical materialism", which is the summit of all science. Under this law, changes in means of production ("productive forces") determine social and economic changes, as well as the corresponding evolution of societies by stages: from a primitive collective period (roughly the pre-historical period) to the slave-owning society (roughly the ancient world), to feudalism (Middle Ages), to capitalism

---

\* See in this connexion CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, p.160.

and socialism, with atheistic Communism as the final goal. Without a study of the past, from the most ancient times, it is impossible to grasp the conditions of the present.

Extremes meet: the original society, looked at now and then somewhat in the spirit of Rousseau, is "class-less", just as is the ultimate Communism. Where the means of production are common, there can be no exploitation of man by man. Economic and social determinism applies to all nations, irrespective of the will and conscience of the individual members. Changes in culture are thus due in the first instance to economic factors, and not to migrations or the influence of foreign "superior" cultures as professed by Western science. Cultures are largely autochthonous and the theory of pure races is a Western myth responsible for racism and imperialism. There are no higher or lower races or nations, some destined for ruling, others for obeying. It would appear that the unfortunate and thoroughly misleading German usage of calling Aryans "Indogermanen", haunts the Russians, who also, and rightly, dread the "Aryan superiority" of Hitlerism. They categorically reject the Aryan theory as a sign of Western racism.

The unreserved adoption of Marxist-Leninist methodology - the only one which is considered as truly scientific - implies for Soviet scholars, whose activities are said to be directed by the Party, the duty of fighting the so-called reactionary and unscientific Western theories on the alleged stagnation and cultural backwardness of the people of the East. They are also expected to oppose capitalism, Western imperialism, and colonialism, as well as all religious beliefs, and to strive for national uprisings and the independence of nations. In the Soviet view, Western archaeologists, who frequently deal with isolated finds, merely collect and classify objects in chronological order or hunt in an amateurish way after antiquities, artistic or "interesting" objects. They lack not only an all-round outlook on the development of human societies, but frequently any wide view even of the individual country in which they happen to work. Soviet archaeology is, on the contrary, closely connected with the inexorable evolution of societies and with political action exercised in the same direction. Its scholars aim at an all-round archaeological and historical survey of a country, utilizing for this purpose all the archaeological material they can discover.

### III. The Role of Marxism in Archaeology

The above rudimentary summary of Soviet arguments, deeply rooted as they are in the teaching of Marx and Engels, may, admittedly, not always be clear and convincing. Even if we presume that not all Soviet archaeologists staunchly support Marxist determinism, nevertheless the Party arguments are repeated ad nauseam in their works which have to be uniformly presented in the standard Marxist dressing.

Officially Soviet archaeology still appears to be an integral part of the ideological warfare directed against the foundations of Western civilization. There is in the present Soviet system of archaeological research no room for an apolitical ("unscientific") approach or for any religious belief. Archaeologists are expected to be militant atheists.

Whereas Soviet scholars are repeatedly warned that they must work on rigid Marxist lines and follow unwaveringly the rules as codified by the Party, without any concession to ideologically hostile work, they are nevertheless urged to display criticism and self-criticism, so as to promote creative discussion. Under given circumstances this has occasionally involved suspicion, mutual accusing among colleagues or abjuring one's own work. What liberty is, after all, left to an engine driver who has to follow the rails? It is true that the reign of terror of the years 1930-4 has given way to milder treatment, but the ideological grip has remained as tight as ever.

It is immaterial in this connexion whether historical materialism is a scientific law of evolution, an atheist creed or a pragmatic scheme used for a determined aim. Working hypotheses need not be correct to result in violent reactions. The history of the West, as well as of the East, shows that absurd and even criminal slogans may be the most effective. The only thing which matters to the West is the implication for archaeological work of this enforced determinism and of the high-handed methods employed.

There can be no doubt about the remarkable impulse given to archaeology in the USSR and its outstanding results. Central Asia is a particularly striking example in this respect. It would be both unfair and unwise to minimize the achievements resulting from the revolutionary outburst of energy and a fanatical "reason of State" atmosphere. It is high time to abandon any traditional and egocentric illusions which may possibly be still inherent in a Western superiority complex in this field. This applies not only to archaeology. Marx, Engels and Lenin still maintain their full authority and their atheistic scriptures have proved more durable than more recent cults of personality and their monuments of brass.

Although Westerners may, as a rule, not agree with the Soviet gospel of infallible Marxist laws, it is believed that many of them have laid too much stress on the political, artistic and chronological aspects of history and archaeology, at the expense of their economic and social aspects, on which emphasis is properly laid by Soviet scholars.

As might be expected, Soviet archaeology with its dogmatic zeal outstripped the national frontiers of the Union. Apart from its obvious interest in some contiguous countries, Soviet archaeology is also

gaining a foothold in several distant countries. The Western scholar who wants to know, for example, the latest developments in the former French possession of Tonkin (at present North Vietnam), may find it useful to have recourse to Soviet publications, where he will learn that some archaeological research is being conducted there with the help of a team of Soviet archaeologists and geologists. In Afghanistan, the manifold economic and cultural assistance received from the USSR does not appear, to the writer's knowledge, to include up to the present a similar collaboration in archaeology. The rapidly increasing Soviet interest in Afghanistan is focussed, however, not only on economic development, but also on the history and cultural developments of a country which is adjacent to the most famous archaeological territories of Soviet Asia. Recent Soviet studies on Afghan archaeology may be a prelude to further moves which would greatly interest Western scholars.

#### IV. Some Features of Archaeology in the USSR

At the very beginning of Soviet rule, in 1919, Lenin gave a start to Soviet archaeology by creating the Academy for the History of Material Culture. This body was absorbed in 1937 by the Academy of Sciences (Akademiya Nauk), to become afterwards the Institute of the History of Material Culture of the Academy (Institut Istorii Materialnoy Kultury, IIMK). The teaching of archaeology was introduced in Soviet universities in 1922. The IIMK started issuing several publications of a high standard: SOVETSKAYA ARKHEOLOGIYA (1936), the KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA IIMK (1939) and the volumes MATERIALY I ISSLEDOVANIYA PO ARKHEOLOGIY, MIA, published since 1940 at irregular intervals. These publications still represent the main Soviet sources of information on archaeology.

Interrupted during the last World War, archaeological activity was rapidly resumed, and in 1945 alone the number of archaeological expeditions amounted to 25.

In the post-war years Soviet archaeology, an obedient servant of Marxism as laid down by the successive Party Congresses, made rapid progress. Marxist methodology was, moreover, confirmed at the first All-Union Conference of Orientalists, which took place in Tashkent in June 1957; it dealt especially with the practical propaganda decided upon by the XXth Party Congress (1956).

The rigidity of Soviet ideology was conspicuous at the XIth International Congress of Historians (Stockholm, August 1960), when during and after the Congress Marxist teaching was stated by Soviet scholars to be the only scientific one. This was reaffirmed at the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists convened in Moscow in August 1960. Whereas the

general attitude of the Soviet hosts at this Congress was, on the whole, moderate, its President adopted a more rigid and dogmatic attitude in his writings issued after the Congress.

The expansion of archaeological work in the USSR is greatly favoured not only by the binding nature of Marxist philosophy, but also by the structure of Soviet society. The Government and the Party have full power over the Soviet continent; there is no private ownership of the soil, no private ownership of archaeological finds and there are no private museums or collections to which any archaeological objects could be illicitly sold. All educational institutes, all scientific bodies, the press, the wireless, as well as all publishing houses are likewise in the hands of the State which alone supplies the necessary funds. There is probably no other country in the world where archaeologists, who are apparently well paid, have such powerful financial and technical means at their disposal. All archaeological work throughout the Union being concentrated in and supervised by the IIMK, digging without a special license is strictly forbidden. Holders of such licenses have to submit reports; if they are wise they draft them in accordance with official ideology.

A special feature of Soviet archaeology is the complete all-round expedition (Kompleksnaya Ekspeditziya) made up of teams of specialists in archaeology, history, linguistics, ethnography, anthropology, geology, paleozoology, paleobotany, etc. All Western countries could envy the Soviet Union in this respect. In addition, the numerous public works, sometimes undertaken on a vast scale, such as canals, railways, irrigation schemes, electrical power-plants, etc. afford excellent opportunities to archaeologists, especially when there is the necessary coordination between building and archaeological requirements.

Archaeological work is, moreover, greatly facilitated by the rise in the general education of the people, including the rural population. A number of finds were actually made in areas belonging to kolkhozes. In the endeavour made throughout the country to acquaint the general public with and to interest it in archaeology, there are, in addition to the publications referred to above and to the daily Press, several reviews issued by the former Oriental Institute (now the Institute of the Peoples of Asia and Africa) of the Academy of Sciences, as well as scientific papers and reports issued by the regional Academies and similar bodies. The numerous books on archaeology range from highly specialized publications for the use of a limited number of scholars, to quite popular but most valuable books issued for the mass of general readers. Some of these publications are the work of well-known scholars.

Books are occasionally the joint work of several authors, and whereas this team-work has the great advantage of ensuring all-round treatment

of the subject which would otherwise be beyond the scope of a single scholar, there are obvious drawbacks in impersonal production in an ideological mill.

## V. Archaeology in Central Asia

Valuable archaeological research work had been done during the Tsarist period in the former "Russian Turkestan", but a new impetus was given to it under the Soviet regime. As the general problems of archaeology in the USSR, referred to above, likewise apply to its constituent parts, there are not many problems peculiar to Central Asia. In spite of particularly difficult conditions of exploration in an immense archaeological region stretching from the sands of the Caspian to the glaciers of the Tyan'-Shan', the special effort made in these Central Asian republics has produced spectacular results. Several ancient civilizations have been discovered in this archaeological paradise of clay or loess: monuments of unburnt clay, containing objects in clay, buried also in clay or in sand. This, together with the existence of multiple layers and thick top strata, occasionally made the work of the archaeologists rather arduous. The combined (kompleksnaya) expeditions with powerful equipment at their disposal proved very useful in remote and arid areas and in several cases the use of aerial photography on a large scale was a decisive factor. Used specially by the Khorezm expeditions, it revealed hundreds of sites in the desert.

There are national Academies of Sciences in all the six Muslim republics and much exploratory work is done by them within the present political boundaries. It is fortunate, however, that quite a number of expeditions are organized on an all-Union basis and thus cut across national frontiers. The existing political divisions do not coincide with ancient cultural regions: Bactria, north of the Oxus (i.e. other than Afghan) covered, for instance, parts of Tadzhikistan and of Uzbekistan, and so did ancient Sogdiana; but the fact that the old Bactrian Termez happens to lie in Uzbekistan and not in Tadzhikistan is irrelevant. The famous site of Pendzhikent (Pianjikent) lies near the Uzbek town of Samarkand, but is actually in Tadzhikistan; Khorezm includes mostly part of northern Uzbekistan, but also to a lesser degree part of Turkmenistan.

To classify archaeological finds according to present national frontiers would be particularly meaningless in the case of remote antiquity. Thus Neanderthal and similar Paleolithic finds in Uzbekistan, Transcaucasia or Crimea belong to primitive mankind and are not local finds of a native civilization.

Central Asia has been from ancient times a melting pot of nations and cultures, a cross-road from all directions. Trade, religions and other cultural currents followed the tracks crossing these regions which also served as stages of transit for Scythians, Kushans, Huns, various Turki tribes, Mongols and many others. Central Asia was, moreover, the focus of influences from Greece, Iran, India and China.

As regards the Stone Age, the potentialities of this region appear to be immense, so that irrespective of other possible reasons the effort made there by Soviet science was from an archaeological point of view fully justified. Among the invaluable results of expeditions are those in Khorezm, Turkmenistan, part of Uzbekistan and in Tadzhikistan - including the stupendous Pendzhikent wall-paintings - and finally the investigations into the ever moving artistic culture of the Scythian, those mounted nomads for ever galloping between the Upper Altay and the Crimea.

As a result of the growing archaeological importance of Central Asia, the first Congress of Archaeologists and Ethnographers of Central Asia took place in April 1955 in Moscow and a second Congress was held in October 1956 by the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences in the Tadzhik capital Stalinabad, recently renamed Dushanbe.

Communism believes that by means of a common Communist structure it can eventually bridge the past and present antagonisms between the constituent parts of the Union. The pursuit of unification may have proved the more necessary because the non-Slav regions, for the most part conquered and annexed no longer ago than the second half of the nineteenth century, present linguistic and religious problems of their own. Tadzhikistan happens to be Iranian, and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia Turkic; but all of them have the Muslim faith in common. On the other hand the philosophy underlying Communism is unconditionally and actively atheistic, and is directed against all religious beliefs. The situation seems to be largely inconsistent: if the people of Central Asia are to become wholehearted Communists, it is not possible for them to remain devoted Muslims. And vice-versa: if they remain faithful Muslims, they cannot logically become strict Communists. The solution of this perplexing situation which no dialectical acrobatics can overcome, belongs to the future.

The attempt to impel these aliens towards a cultural and social unity, may thus account to some extent for the Soviet tendency to magnify in a flattering way the past local histories of these hitherto backward countries, now united under the red banner. (This applies in a general way to the Soviet attitude towards the non-Soviet populations of Asia and Africa; according to Soviet opinion they should be assisted rapidly to overcome their backwardness, the dreadful legacy of Western colonizers.)

It may, however, be queried, whether in view of their agitated history and the concatenation of so many influences, these Central Asian regions were, a priori, a good test-case for the detraction of foreign influences and the emphasis on local, autochthonous cultures.

By opposing the "Western" theories of pan-Iranianism or of pan-Turkism, by glorifying local native civilizations and by minimizing the role of migrations, as well as the alleged influences of Hellenistic, Iranian, Byzantine or Arab cultures, Soviet authors have occasionally resorted to exaggerations, oversimplifications and even to distortions. Tadjik people may have been proud to learn that their past civilization was neither Iranian nor Arab, but "Tadjik", that the language of their ancestors was not Persian, but "old Tadjik" or "Dari", and finally that many of the outstanding men of science, arts or poetry of former times were not Persians as believed by the Westerners, but Tadjiks. Similarly Uzbeks may be gratified at the idea that their culture was at times among the highest of all. In a general way the populations of these nations alien to Russia have been induced to believe that in many aspects the cradle of Iranian civilization was not Iran itself, but Central Asia.

It is by no means intended to suggest that all the above views are patent fallacies, and it is on the contrary believed that there is much truth in the Soviet claims regarding the numerous cultural contributions of Central Asia. The Western expression "Iranian" and particularly "Sassanian" may occasionally be a convenient expedient for hiding a certain lack of knowledge with regard to Central Asia's past. Its countries were not only receiving, but also giving. Westerners should, therefore, feel greatly indebted to Soviet scholars who, in spite of occasional exaggerations, are making a substantial contribution in this field.

It may be tempting to contrast Western civilization with Eastern backwardness and at the present moment such a contrast may well exist. But viewed as a whole the panorama of world history suggests that the periods when high civilization in the East coincided with conditions of underdevelopment in the West have been substantially longer than the periods where this situation has been reversed.

Stereotyped ideologies or preconceived ideas applied in a proscriptive spirit are detrimental to scientific research. Disregarding, therefore, the question of the nationality attributed to the great Central Asian scholar Ibn Sina (Avicenna), or the name of the language used by him almost a thousand years ago, let us bear in mind his saying, the last words of which are applicable to the East as well as to the West!

"Among asses be an ass, do not uncover your face;  
whoever has not asinine ears, is for asses an evident heretic."

THE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS  
OF KAZAKH CRAFTSMEN BEFORE  
THE REVOLUTION

The following is a summary of E.A. Masanov's article "The Living and Working Conditions of Kazakh Craftsmen (During the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Centuries)" in IZVESTIYA AN/KAZ.SSR, Vyp.1(15), 1961.\* The author's sources for this study of Kazakh craftsmen are largely pre-revolutionary writings and photographs. As well as dealing with those who exercised a craft as a means of livelihood, the article covers the making of felt, carpets, etc. by each household solely for its own use and also some of the rites connected with the craft industries.

. . .

### Introduction

The study of the living and working conditions of the Kazakh craftsmen of the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century is of great interest, but up till now insufficient attention has been devoted to it.

A large number of people were engaged in domestic arts and crafts among the Kazakhs and they produced a great variety of articles. The works of master-craftsmen are astonishing both in the perfection of their workmanship and the expressiveness of their ornamentation. The artistic taste of the Kazakh craftsmen was very highly developed and they strove to decorate any article, no matter what its purpose. This was completely in accordance with Kazakh traditions. At the same time the craftsmen adopted all that was best in the culture of neighbouring peoples - Russians, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kara-Kalpaks, Altay peoples, Ukrainians and others who had settled in Kazakhstan.

---

\* "Usloviya truda i bytovoy uklad kazakhskikh remeslennikov (vtoraya polovina XIX i nachalo XX v.)", IZVESTIYA AN/KAZ.SSR, Seriya Istorii, Arkheologii i Etnografii, Vyp.1(15), Alma-Ata, 1961.

### Material and social position

The Kazakh craftsmen were not prosperous. Often it was ruined livestock breeders and poor men who became craftsmen, but this did not improve their position. Contemporary photographs show them in small yurts full of holes, with meagre belongings. They made enough to live on but no more. As the popular saying went, "a craftsman is neither hungry nor satisfied."

The social position of the Kazakh craftsmen varied. In time some of them gave up their trade and devoted themselves completely to livestock breeding or land cultivation. However, the vast majority swelled the ranks of the rural proletariat.

### Methods of payment

There is a dearth of information on how the Kazakh craftsmen were paid for their work, but, on the basis of fragmentary information in pre-revolutionary writings and the accounts of elderly Kazakhs who were once craftsmen, it can be asserted that the craftsmen were most often paid in kind - with horses, sheep, wool and remnants of material. Payment in kind was particularly common in the Kazakh auls, where money was little used. Moreover, the craftsmen always hoped to return to their former way of life and therefore preferred to receive payment in livestock. The customers too, being mainly livestock breeders, found it easier to pay with animals. Only the craftsmen connected with the market, who were in the minority, sold their work for money, the price depending on the state of the market.

As a rule there was no fixed payment in kind for a given article even within one volost. The customer paid the craftsman solely in accordance with the practice in his aul or a precedent known to him. This manner of payment was open to widespread abuse on the part of the customer. The rich men, who took the main and best part of the craftsmen's production, usually ignored the general practice and paid what they felt like. There were, of course, isolated instances when rich customers paid lavishly, but their importance was exaggerated by some pre-revolutionary authors. Ruling circles made no exception of the craftsmen in their exploitation of the masses.

Normally a Kazakh craftsman working on an order boarded with the customer. His keep was not usually taken into account when settling up, since, according to prevailing ethics, he was regarded as a guest and could thus expect free hospitality.

Payment of the craftsmen in kind hindered the development of commodity circulation. The little they received all went on their personal consumption, as among other peoples of Central Asia.

### Working conditions

The Kazakh craftsmen had no special workshops. In winter they worked in the house and in summer in the yurt or nearby. This can be seen from photographs. One dated 1908, for instance, shows a silversmith clearly at work in his own yurt with his wife beside him using a sewing machine. After years of practice the craftsmen were adapted to nomadic life. With their few tools usually carried in small leather bags, people like silversmiths or bone-carvers could set to work in any part of the yurt. Only the blacksmiths set up a certain semblance of a smithy, but even then it was usually in some part of their dwelling. At the beginning of the 20th century a few permanent smithies appeared mainly in localities with a sedentary way of life.

Those craftsmen who went from aul to aul looking for work while their families remained in their own aul, lived and worked in the yurts of their customers or built themselves temporary dwellings from branches, turf and stones, which were called chorbakh uy in north-east Kazakhstan. The stonemasons worked part of the time in quarries and the rest in huts near their homes. When they were erecting a mausoleum they moved with their families to the site.

Thus Kazakh craftsmen did not have normal working conditions. Constantly on the move and with home-made tools, they nevertheless achieved excellent results thanks to their great ability and painstaking work. Productivity, however, was low in these conditions.

### Division of labour between men and women

The current idea that among the Kazakhs some crafts were exclusively masculine and some feminine is largely true but needs qualification. In a livestock breeding household the men naturally had little time for domestic crafts, which consisted primarily of processing the raw materials from livestock. It was the women, therefore, who dressed the hides, wove, and made koshma (large pieces of thick felt) and other articles from wool and hair. They made two or three koshmas, several dozen metres of camel hair cloth, alasha (hand-woven carpeting) and ropes, and dressed several hides etc. for the family. The idea grew up that these occupations were exclusively feminine. In fact, however, this was typical only of the comparatively prosperous livestock breeding households, whose number decreased every year. In poor households the husband and wife usually carried out the work together, as can be seen

from photographs. Frequently these domestic crafts were executed jointly by several neighbouring families. Thus one photograph shows one old man and three young ones, two boys, five women and two girls at work making felt. As for large households, in the preparation of felt, for instance, they could not manage without the men, and at one important stage in the production of felt (kiiz karpu) the men participated in all circumstances. Similarly in dealing with a quantity of hides in large households the men and women worked together.

In a nomadic economy it was impossible to keep raw materials from livestock in their natural state for a prolonged period. Directly after shearing the sheep, the Kazakhs usually either sold the wool or made things from it. In hot weather the hides were dressed immediately after the livestock were killed. During the winter the hides were not dressed but frozen. Therefore with the onset of spring, particularly in big households, a large number of hands were needed to dress the hides which had accumulated. For these reasons the Kazakhs were forced to use the men in the labour-consuming production of felt, leather and sheepskin. Where these occupations became a domestic industry and livestock breeding diminished, the participation of the men in the so-called women's crafts increased sharply.

Some men even prepared the stencils from which the women cut out the appliqué designs from material and felt, and some knitted belts. In the second half of the 19th century there were male tailors, too, who made clothes on a sewing machine not only for themselves and their families but also for customers. Only weaving remained an exclusively feminine occupation among the Kazakhs, whereas among the settled population of Central Asia the weavers were mainly men.

### Training of children

There was no system of apprenticeship among the Kazakhs. Usually a craftsman's pupils were his children or relatives who learnt from watching and helping him. The techniques and implements of the trade were so simple that they could be mastered in a comparatively short time. Much more attention was paid to training the girls. From childhood they learnt to sew, knit, weave and spin, and they were expected to be proficient at the age of 13 or 14 and even prepare their own trousseaux which included carpets, patterned koshmas and embroidery. Felt and woven goods were produced annually in each Kazakh household in a festive atmosphere which attracted the attention of grown-ups and children. Children watched from the cradle and teaching the girls presented no difficulties. Even now women weaving carpets prefer to have the assistance of young girls. Thus among the Kazakhs almost all the members of the family were engaged on domestic crafts.

### Cooperation among neighbours

Besides collaboration inside the family there was a certain amount of cooperation among neighbours. Joint efforts were particularly necessary during the autumn sheep-shearing and felt making. In autumn the Kazakh auls concentrated on the autumn pastures (kuzeu), sheared the sheep, made felt and sewed their winter clothing. With the other preparations for winter everyone was occupied from morning to night. When a housewife started to make felt her neighbours gathered to help her and came conscientiously every day until the work was finished. They gave their help free but the master of the house killed a sheep or goat with which he regaled all who had taken part in the work.

### Assistants in craft industries

The situation was different in the craft industries where the craftsmen - turners, carpenters, silversmiths, shoe-makers, bone- and stone-carvers and others - usually worked on their own and were often unable to make use of their relatives since they left their native auls in search of orders. It is true that sometimes two or three cobblers, for example, united to carry out the orders of a large aul but they were in no way dependent on each other and divided the earnings equally. In a number of cases the craftsmen did use the labour of members of their families. Blacksmiths, for example, were often assisted by their children and brothers, but this assistance was frequently only of a temporary and casual nature. Blacksmiths and those making the framework of yurts (kerage) only needed help for one part of their work. However, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century with increased demand and the craftsmen's strained circumstances the question of raising production became vital, and it was necessary to employ others for the secondary but time-consuming operations. Therefore a few craftsmen - mostly smiths, saddlers, turners and carpenters - began to employ permanent assistants. The contracts were usually oral and for not less than a year. The craftsmen and their assistants worked together, and the working day depended on their orders. The assistants received for their work only the payment agreed beforehand while the craftsmen took all the profit; their wages were very low. One smith's assistant received five six-months old lambs, food and clothing for a year's work, and a saddler's assistant got 25 rubles and 4.6 acres of crops. Sometimes, in order to acquire a trade, assistants worked only for their keep and a small payment at the end.

### Craft auls

In the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century the population of whole auls engaged in one craft, particularly wood-

working or the making of articles from wool and hair. There was a well-known aul of blacksmiths and silversmiths, and several of saddlers. Unfortunately, at present there is no information on the features of production in these craft auls, but up till now their existence in Kazakhstan was not even suspected. It was generally thought that in each pre-revolutionary aul there would be two or three craftsmen who carried out customers' orders and at the same time kept livestock or tilled the land. In fact, side by side with domestic crafts, craft industries developed in the Kazakh aul. A craft became the main occupation of a fairly large group of people but with the prevailing semi-nomadic way of life it was more profitable for the craftsmen to live among the population than to isolate themselves. Auls of craftsmen appeared only in settled areas and near Russian towns and settlements.

#### Rites and customs connected with craft industries

Kazakh craftsmen did not know those rites which were widespread among the Uzbeks and other Central Asian peoples, such as the institution of protectors (pirs), initiation rites, the cult of dead master-craftsmen and religious and workshop charters (risolya).<sup>\*</sup> They were not organized in workshops, had no apprenticeship, there was practically no rivalry between them and therefore no need to preserve the secrets of the trade. Up to the middle of the 19th century Kazakh crafts were still domestic crafts and although certain of them became, during the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, an independent sector of production, their part in the economy was small and the majority of craftsmen remained livestock breeders at heart. Another reason why no body of religious ideas connected with crafts emerged among the Kazakhs was because Islam did not have a strong hold. It was only at the turn of the century, with increased activity on the part of the Muslim clergy, that legends about pirs and the origins of various trades penetrated Kazakh circles.

Interesting rites and beliefs were connected with the trade of blacksmith. The smithy was revered as a holy place with a particularly beneficial effect on epileptics and women in childbirth. Epileptics and madmen were brought to the smithy in the evening and remained there for several days, depending on the course of the illness. On the first day molten tin or lead was poured into a wooden bowl full of water placed on the patient's brow. This was done three times and if the patient did not recover, then the illness was considered incurable. The way the lead sank in the bowl was believed to indicate whether the heart was in the right

---

<sup>\*</sup> For some present day survivals of these rites and beliefs among craftsmen in Uzbekistan see CAR, Vol.VI, 1958, No.1, pp.13-14.

place and the lead was expected to show the figure of the one who caused the illness. This procedure was carried out by sorcerers (baksa) with the help of the smiths. In the case of women in childbirth, when the baksa was unable to cure the woman the smith was summoned and set up his anvil beside the unconscious woman. The noise of the forging and the sparks flying were expected to force the evil spirits to leave her body. From time to time the smith held the white-hot iron close to the patient's face and the baksa called on her to open her eyes. If the patient came to and repeated words dictated by the baksa the smith gave her iron or steel files to hold in her teeth.

Both these practices show that curative properties were ascribed to metals which is not surprising when metals played a very important role in man's economy. Other metals were also thought to have healing properties. In east Kazakhstan, for example, the Kazakhs passed gold objects over their eyes to keep them well and make them more sharp-sighted. On Mangyshlak the belief existed that copper necklaces helped against sores on the neck. Bronze arrows found in the steppe were considered effective in curing sick children and animals, particularly camels on whose necks such amulets were hung. The cult of the smithy and recognition of the curative properties of metals were also found among other Central Asian peoples.

There were also a number of rites connected with felt-making. The people engaged in this sometimes set off for the neighbouring aul rolling a bundle of wool done up in matting. The inhabitants of the neighbouring aul came out to meet them with kumys and sour milk (ayran). The guests accepted this but before drinking it poured a few drops on the roll of wool. The same custom was used in the making of mats from chiy (Central Asian feather grass). The words used as the drops were poured show that it was some kind of ancestor worship. In making a "tuskiiza" felt carpet the Kazakhs sewed the feathers of an eagle owl to the upper corners so that wicked people should not bewitch the craftsmen. Other craftsmen, like saddlers, also took certain precautions.

From the rites connected with the domestic arts and crafts of the Kazakh people one comes to the tentative conclusion that the Kazakhs lacked the professional ritual characteristic of Central Asian pre-revolutionary craft workshops, and that the consciousness of the craftsmen was swayed by pre-Islamic religious ideas such as animism, the cult of ancestors and nature, the cult of saints and their graves, and shamanism.

R E C E N T   L I T E R A T U R E   I N  
C E N T R A L   A S I A   A N D   K A Z A K H S T A N

This account deals with some of the more important articles on literature in general and prose writing in particular which have appeared in the daily and periodical press of Central Asia and Kazakhstan during the period March 1960-June 1962.

The state of literature in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan has already been the subject of two articles in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW ("Recent Literature in Central Asia", CAR, 1959, No.3, pp.251-8, and "Soviet Muslim Literature and The Party Line", CAR, 1960, No.1, pp.24-32). These showed that there was no ideological crisis in Central Asian literature but considerable concern over the low level of technical skill of many writers. This low level was largely due to Soviet efforts to force the all-round development of literatures which up to the Revolution had been almost entirely poetical.

Chingiz Aytmatov

The period since these articles has seen little, if any, appreciable change in this state of affairs, though one indigenous and talented young writer has emerged in Kirgizia who writes psychological stories which at the same time completely satisfy the canons of socialist realism. This writer is Chingiz Aytmatov who was born in 1928 in an aul in Frunze oblast and first worked during the war in the village soviet. From 1947 to 1953 he studied at the Dzhabul Livestock and Veterinary Tekhnikum and the Kirgiz Agricultural Institute and then worked for three years as a livestock expert. As a student he started to write articles on linguistics and literary translation. His first story, about a Japanese paper boy collecting signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal, was written in Russian and appeared in 1952. Later stories about life in Soviet Kirgizia were written in Kirgiz and Russian. Aytmatov is equally at home in Russian and Kirgiz and sometimes translates his own works into Russian as well as those of other Kirgiz authors. His translations include the second volume of T. Sydykbekov's novel AMID THE MOUNTAINS. In 1957 he submitted a film script, KERIMBEK, on the Revolution in Kirgizia in 1917 for an all-Union competition in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Revolution. From 1956-8 Aytmatov was a student of the Higher Literary Courses of the

USSR Union of Writers in Moscow. He appears to be currently working as PRAVDA correspondent for Kirgizia, since a Chingiz Aytmatov was among those who received the Order of the Red Banner of Labour, the second highest award, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of PRAVDA in May 1962. (VVS SSSR of 12.5.62)

The work that made Aytmatov's name was his story (povest') DZHAMILYA which appeared in 1958. It was published the same year in Russian in the literary journal NOVYY MIR and also as a separate work. The French Communist writer, Louis Aragon, has described it as one of the most beautiful love stories in the world and "evidence that only realism is capable of telling a love story." He himself translated it into French and published it in Paris in 1959. It has also been translated into English, Spanish, Polish and many languages of the Soviet Union. Among Soviet critics and writers who praised it highly was the late Kazakh writer Mukhtar Auezov, who is said to have "rarely commented on individual works". (SK 12.10.61) DZHAMILYA and an earlier story by Aytmatov entitled FACE TO FACE were put forward for a Lenin Prize in 1961 and in this connexion were reviewed by the prominent Russian critic Z. Kedrina, in LG of 7.2.61. Kedrina describes DZHAMILYA as "a new page in history of the development of the so-called 'little' genres in Kirgiz prose." Aytmatov does not force his characters to illustrate ideological positions in the plot "but really reveals his idea through a profound portrayal of the psychology of his characters." The subject of DZHAMILYA "would seem more than simple and at first glance slight: young Dzhamilya, having seen off to the front the husband to whom she was given in marriage not long before the war, falls in love with someone from the front who has been demobilized because of a wound and goes off with him, scorning family customs and people's condemnation." But, says Kedrina, this simple story has great purport. Aytmatov "unmasks with psychological clarity and exactitude the inhuman old marriage according to the adat (customary law) and shariat . . . and liberally reveals to the reader the inner world of the young woman and the purity and spontaneity of her striving for happiness." Kedrina concludes, "the figurative concreteness of the story, its lyricism and transparent clarity of style all become effective in the fight for the new man, for his happiness and dignity." FACE TO FACE, says Kedrina, "ideologically complements DZHAMILYA" and is "a tragedy of love for an unworthy man who must be rejected like an enemy." The heroine, Seyde, is happily married with a child and when her husband suddenly returns from the front she is glad. The fact that he is a deserter does not seem to concern her. "Penetrating into the depths of the feelings of his heroine, Aytmatov shows how a man, having committed a crime against his country, goes downhill morally, gradually destroying the love and trust of his devoted wife. The reader sees how the young woman's eyes are painfully opened - the difficult but steady maturing of civic feelings which force Seyde to give her husband up to the authorities."

Kedrina's only criticism of these stories is that the subsidiary characters are often drawn with only a few conventional strokes.

Later stories by Aytmatov have also been well received. Two of them, MY LITTLE POPLAR IN THE RED KERCHIEF and THE CAMEL'S EYE, were reviewed by Kedrina in the literary journal MOSKVA (reprinted in SK 12.10.61) under the heading "A Vein of Gold". The first is the same kind of psychological narrative as DZHAMILYA but "is more complicated in idea and construction". The hero, Il'yas, is a lorry-driver and his work determines much in his character and fate. Kedrina writes that "the picture of social relations in the new story are broader, there are more characters, their relationships are more complicated and the conflicts are sharper." The setting of the story is the present day when the old customs are comparatively easily overcome and "the difficulties begin when one has to overcome the shadows of the past in one's own soul, in one's character, in one's relations with people and towards work." Il'yas, determined to prove to his disbelieving comrades that a trailer can be taken over the difficult Dolonakiy pass, secretly takes one out, has an accident and cowardly throws the trailer in the ditch. In his humiliation Il'yas gets drunk and is unfaithful to his wife, who leaves him when she hears of it. Several years later he finds her happily married to another man and sadly goes on his way. THE CAMEL'S EYE is about the urban schoolboy Kemel' who goes off to the virgin lands full of youthful enthusiasm. There he comes up against the tractor driver Abakir who is only out for money. Kedrina says that "the clash of Kemel's youthful enthusiasm with the diversity of harsh virgin land reality becomes the centre of the story and the basis for the formation of the character of a fighter for Communism." This is the traditional epic conflict between the forces of good and evil between which there can be no compromise, and Kedrina considers that Aytmatov makes it realistic and full of concrete content. Kemel', though more than once discouraged, eventually triumphs over Abakir. Once again Kedrina notes Aytmatov's tendency to deal sketchily with any character or object which does not interest him. She thinks THE CAMEL'S EYE is better proportioned than MY LITTLE POPLAR IN THE RED KERCHIEF and approaches, but does not equal, the perfection of DZHAMILYA in this respect. However, she is pleased to see that the author is not standing still and is extending his range of interests. Kedrina comments that Aytmatov's "vocabulary is rich and finely shaded and his language flexible" and the national traditions give his style of narration certain extra tones. She concludes by saying that "having enriched Kirgiz literature with the art of psychological analysis [psikhologizm] and as it were burst upon all-Union literature, the young artist gives promise in the future of many new and interesting works."

Aytmatov's latest story, BALLAD OF THE FIRST TEACHER, shows "the truthful and profoundly humanistic figure of one of the pioneers of popular education in Kirgizia." (SK 3.6.62)

Recent novels and stories by some established writers

For the present Aytmatov's psychological stories seem to be the exception in Central Asian prose, though no doubt as time goes on the younger generation of writers who have had time to absorb Russian and European culture generally, will increasingly produce works which bear little or no trace of the old native epic poetic tradition. Meanwhile most writers, young and old, continue to churn out the same kind of heroic novels and stories as they have been writing for years. In spite of the favourable reviews which many of these works, particularly by established writers, have received, it is difficult to avoid the impression that they are still somewhat laboured. The faults most commonly found in them by Soviet critics are unsatisfactory "positive heroes" and tedious and unnecessary descriptions of the old national way of life.

A Kirgiz novel that was put forward for a Lenin Prize in 1961 at the same time as Aytmatov's stories, was T. Sydykbekov's novel AMID THE MOUNTAINS. In LG of 7.2.61, Kedrina comments that a literature which contains novels like AMID THE MOUNTAINS and Aytmatov's works no longer needs to have allowances made for its youth. AMID THE MOUNTAINS, a new version of Sydykbekov's novel KEN SU written in the 1930s which was subjected to harsh criticism, "shows Sydykbekov's greatly increased skill as a realist". The novel is about the first years of collectivization in Kirgizia and the fight with the kulaks. Kedrina praises the fact that all the numerous characters in the novel live. Its main failing, according to her, is "the lack of a convincing and powerful figure who would typify the driving force of Kirgiz society in the collectivization period." Of the positive heroes, the young activist Samtyr is "a man in many ways still in the grip of old ideas", the 'female-aksakal' Byubyush "is an almost episodic figure", and the Communist Saparbay "is not only a rather pale character but also his ideological position seems to me to a large degree inconsistent and unclear." This prevents the book from being of the same ideological and artistic importance as VIRGIN SOIL UPTURNED or THE WAY OF ABAY, says Kedrina. "But the novel AMID THE MOUNTAINS has undoubted merits. It is the first major multi-plot realistic work in Kirgiz literature in which all the descriptive means and the pictures of people and nature are in strict artistic unity with the ideological intentions of the author." Other critics find the novel uneven and long-winded in parts. (SK 11.9.60, 22.4.62)

Another work submitted for a Lenin Prize in 1962 is THE POET, a biographical novel by Beki Seytakov about the life of the blind Turkmen shakir (bard) Durdy Klych (1886-1950). A long and enthusiastic review of the book by the Moscow writer K. Gorbunov appeared in TI of 20.3.62. Gorbunov says that Seytakov "creates the character of the talented blind man not with a verbose psychological analysis and synthesis, but mainly

with the aid of happily chosen details and laconic facts." At the same time the story of the establishment of Soviet power in Turkmenistan, in which Durdy played his part, is organically merged with the life and activity of the folk poet. K. Potapova, however, reviewing THE POET in LG of 13.2.62, complains that the characters do not stick in the mind. She would like to know more about what went on in their minds, but Durdy Klych and his fellow-villagers "think in ready-made formulae" and "questions which in their time constituted an epoch in the life of the people are resolved in the hearts and minds of its heroes in a simplified way." Potapova considers "the difficulties of the formation and growth of the revolutionary consciousness of the peasant masses" are shown "much more convincingly" in Seytakov's novel BROTHERS, although it is over-complicated and long-winded. The first volume of the latter work was reviewed by G. Apresyan of the Gor'kiy Literary Institute in TI of 23.10.60. Apresyan thinks that the novel, which is about the early years of the Revolution in Turkmenistan, is on the whole "realistic and true to the historical truth" and the characters well-described, though not enough attention is paid to their thoughts and feelings. Also there is a certain monotony in the negative heroes. Apresyan says that the novel is vividly national - this comes out not only in the characters and the sometimes over-scrupulous description of customs, but also in the manner of telling and in the expressive language. At the same time "Seytakov's novel, in its ideological content, substance and spirit, is profoundly international" in that it shows the weakening of prejudices and beginnings of friendship between different peoples. The novel has "range, clarity of thought and powerful emotions" and "successfully combines epic breadth and lyricism".

THE WEB, a story by the Tadzhik writer Dzhhalol Ikrami, was reviewed in KT of 14.9.60. It is set in Bukhara just after the Revolution has triumphed but while its enemies are still active. The review considers that on the whole it is "a necessary and interesting book" and its characterization is good. The figure of the revolutionary Khamidzhan, however, could have been more profound and "the actions of the heroes are not always logically justified." Also, "the role of the Russian people in the fight of the Tadzhiks with the counter-revolution is very weakly shown", and "there is not a single memorable Russian figure in the story."

Two recent novels devoted to the present-day working-class are BIRTH, by the Uzbek A. Mukhtar, and TEMIR-TAU by Zein Shashkin. The former was reviewed by M. Nikolayev in PV of 25.2.62. It is the story of one of the big construction projects in Uzbekistan and in particular the youth Lukmoncha, who leaves his job as a barber in the town to work as a labourer. While some of his less admirable fellow-workers actively seek glory, the modest Lukmoncha dies accomplishing a feat which he sees only as his duty. According to Nikolayev the heroes of BIRTH immediately interest the reader and sustain his interest throughout. "Mukhtar knows

how to create positive heroes" and his novel "has caught the spirit of the times". Nikolayev criticizes certain emotional incongruities and inconsistencies and also the climax of the novel, the burial of the hero, where "much seems contrived". He dislikes in particular the placing of the mother's flowers on the grave by a building crane. But on the whole the book is "really good" and will inspire others to labour exploits. Shashkin's novel about the metal-workers of Kazakhstan has been particularly welcomed as the first major work on the working-class for some years. At the plenum of the creative organizations of Kazakhstan in November 1961 it was singled out for praise: "Shashkin has created a true picture of those transformations which have taken place in our days on the steppes with the development of major industrial centres. . . He has shown the destruction of the old system, the consolidation of the new morals and the overcoming of outlived national traditions." (KP 28.11.61)

Two novels about the Kazakh aul in the 1920s are AFTER THE STORM by Gabiden Mustafin and RADIANT LOVE by Sabit Mukanov. The former tells of the "sovietization" of the aul and the bitter struggle with the bays, mullas, and old customs. All the critics agree that the figure of the positive hero Aman in AFTER THE STORM is not a success. Thus V. Goffenshefer, in LG of 28.11.61, regards the events and background of the book as well told, but when he finished it he was left with the impression of having been round a museum of local lore and no more. Goffenshefer attributes this to "the insufficiently profound portrayal of the main hero Aman" who "is shown as the traditional hero of a folk epic." Another critic, Khassen Adibayev, comments that this is a failing common to all Mustafin's works. However, he describes the book as "a great creative success for the author" with "its authenticity, profound realism, vivid typical human figures, rich language and national colouring." Adibayev comments in particular on the colourful filigree-like language of the novel (KP 15.3.60), and this is praised too by the critic Ye. Ismailov who says that Kazakh writers now have another work worthy of serious study for its skill in the use of language, besides Auezov's works. (PROSTOR No.8 of 1960, pp.121-7) Mukanov's RADIANT LOVE is a new version of his first novel, THOSE WHO HAVE LOST THEIR WAY, which enjoyed a great success in the 1930s but was criticized "for a number of ideological and artistic errors." It covers the years 1909-27 and its main thread is the love story of Burkit and Bates, the children of wealthy parents, and organically linked with this their gradual realization that right and their own happiness lie with the ordinary people. Both Adibayev and Ismailov consider that the figures of the hero and heroine are successful, but they complain of "elements of naturalism" and too much "ethnography". (KP 21.4.60 and 9.6.60) "However", says Ismailov, "with all their faults the large-scale multi-plot novels of Mustafin and Mukanov are a new page in the development of this genre in Kazakh literature."

Another recent Kazakh novel is the two-volume YAIK IS A BRIGHT RIVER by Kh. Yesenzhanov which is about the Revolution and civil war in West Kazakhstan. Of this work Adibayev says, "on the whole the author has succeeded in creating an artistic work which enjoys deserved success with readers." He criticizes the fact that some characters are not shown with sufficient depth and that "the friendship and joint life of the Kazakh and Russian poor is weakly brought out." But the author's skill increases as he goes along and the second volume is undoubtedly better artistically than the first. (KP 19.2.61)

One book which received an extremely hostile review was IN THE TOWN OF VERNYY by D. Snegin, the chief editor of the literary journal PROSTOR. The first two books of this trilogy which have appeared tell of events in Alma-Ata from the eve of the First World War until the Revolution. Writing in KP of 14.6.60, K. Kurova says that "Snegin, having decided to create a monumental work on a historical revolutionary subject, has not coped with this task, has not been able to fill his novel with revolutionary passion and has peopled his books with dull, pale figures." She objects in particular to the detailed portrayal of the life of the local bourgeoisie in all its nastiness.

### Two novels by younger writers

Among the novels by younger writers singled out for attention were CARAVANS GO - ROUTES REMAIN by Kamil' Ikramov and BLOOD AND SWEAT by the Kazakh writer A. Nurpeisov. The former is about the formation of the first regular units of the Red Army in Khorezm territory and their fight with the basmachi and British emissaries. In a review in PV of 10.6.61, M. Yelinin says that "proletarian internationalism" is at the basis of the novel which is full of characters, action, true drama and interesting and complicated human destinies. Yelinin describes Ikramov as an attentive and observant writer who knows his material, but sometimes he tries to be too laconic and he should pay more attention to the construction of his work as a whole and should know more of the inner world of his characters. BLOOD AND SWEAT, about the civil war in the area round the Aral Sea, is said to "deserve attention" (KP 28.11.61) and is apparently popular although it has been fairly harshly criticized. At a conference of writers in June 1960 the novel was said still to need a lot of work on it. Shashkin quoted specific examples of its stylistic and linguistic shortcomings, and Ismailov said the novel was overburdened with "all sorts of events and naturalistic facts," and showed "not only a poor knowledge of life but also insufficient technical skill and an inability to embody in typical forms [tipizirovat'] the facts and phenomena of life." (KP 9.6.60, PROSTOR No.8 of 1960, p.125)

### Autobiography and memoirs

Very few autobiographical works or memoirs seem to be published in Central Asia. The peculiar difficulties which writing memoirs presents for Soviet authors were illustrated by the fate of those of a retired Major-General, M.K. Serikov. Serikov first published his memoirs in the journal SOVETSKIY KAZAKHSTAN in 1958 under the title "On the Three Fronts of the Republic". This was an eye-witness account of the actions of the 22nd Nikolayev Infantry Division during the civil war and in particular of the defence of Ural'sk in Kazakhstan. It was criticized on a number of counts including "a preoccupation with form to the detriment of the content." Clearly the authorities did not entirely agree with Serikov's version of events. Serikov "took this just criticism seriously and, with the help of Candidate of Historical Sciences A.S. Yelagin, eliminated most of the defects noted." The revised version of his memoirs was published as a book called FIGHTING YEARS in 1960. This met with the approval of the historian T. Yeleuov, who reviewed it in KP of 14.9.60, but G. Semenyuk, discussing it in PROSTOR No.11 of 1960, found the second version inferior as literature. He said it suffered from an uneven style, heavy, unsuccessful turns of phrase, unnecessary repetitions and expressions which are illiterate from the literary point of view. "There is no doubt", he concluded, "that the first version wins as regards form" and "the book would only have gained from a skilful combination of the documentary exactness and historical reliability [of the second version] with the literary merits of the first."

The second volume of Sabit Mukanov's autobiographical novel THE SCHOOL OF LIFE, which covers the years 1919-24, was reviewed by I. Gabdirov in KP of 11.11.60. This work is considered the most outstanding autobiographical work in Soviet Kazakh literature to date. Gabdirov says that Mukanov "correctly interprets the meaning of historical events, knows how to see life with the eyes of the popular masses and creates authentic figures." He draws good portraits of the Kazakh revolutionaries and members of the intelligentsia as well as the Russian bolsheviks, and reveals the true nature of the bourgeois-nationalists, bays and kulaks. The book's main faults are that too many insignificant personalities are introduced, and unnecessary long accounts are given of the names of clans and degrees of kinship.

### Rehabilitation of three prominent Kazakh writers

While the denunciation of Stalin and the relaxation of controls generally has not been followed among Central Asian writers by the same ferment which is evident in the leading Russian writers in the Soviet Union, one significant result has been the rehabilitation of three prominent Kazakh writers who disappeared during the purges. These are Saken

Seyfullin (1894-1939), one of the founders of Kazakh Soviet literature, Il'yas Dzhansugurov (1894-1937), a major epic poet, and Beimbet Maylin (1894-1939), prose writer, poet and dramatist. Their names were restored to the ranks of leading Soviet Kazakh writers after the XXth Party Congress in 1956 and their works began to be republished, but at first no indication appears to have been given in any accounts of their lives that they had ever been under a cloud. At most the bare fact was recorded that they had died "tragically". It was only after the XXIInd Congress in October 1961 that it was stated openly that they had been victims of the personality cult. At a joint plenum of the creative organizations of Kazakhstan held in November 1961, the First Secretary of the Union of Writers, Musrepov, spoke of the "magnificent creations of the outstanding founders of Kazakh Soviet literature, S. Seyfullin, B. Maylin and I. Dzhansugurov" who were "innocent victims of the period of Stalin's tyranny." After naming some of their outstanding works he said, "it is sad to recall that Beriya's butchers destroyed his [Maylin's] last novel THE RED BANNER and also his opera libretto DUDARAY, which were highly valued by the literary public in their time." Musrepov felt sure that everyone present would support his suggestion that worthy monuments should be erected to each of these writers in Alma-Ata. (PROSTOR No.2 of 1962, p.110)

#### No rehabilitation for Moldo Kylych and K. Tynystanov

A reminder that rehabilitation for some does not mean rehabilitation for all, was given in Kirgizia where certain prominent writers and literary experts clearly resent having to exclude important writers from their literary annals on purely ideological grounds. A resolution of the Kirgiz Central Committee, adopted on 27 February 1960, "condemned as harmful to the cause of the international education of the workers and the strengthening of the friendship between peoples, the attempts by certain academic and literary figures in the republic to laud to the skies the creative work of the reactionary poet Moldo Kylych and the ideologist of bourgeois nationalism K. Tynystanov." (SK 4.2.60) The resolution was preceded by a long leading article in SK of 24.1.60, which recalled that in 1952 the Kirgiz Central Committee had condemned as anti-Marxist attempts "to include in the treasure house of the literary heritage of the Kirgiz people" the works of the ideologists of the reactionary 'zaman' trend of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries - Kalygul, Arystanbek and Moldo Kylych. However, it went on, this has not stopped certain scholars and writers, in particular B. Yunusaliyev, B. Kerimzhanova and the poet Aaly Tokombayev, from "trying to revise the Party evaluation of Moldo Kylych's creative work and asserting that Moldo Kylych was a democratic poet and the sole forefather of Kirgiz written literature." In reality Kylych was a militant Islamist of reactionary views. "No less politically harmful", the article continued, is praise

of Tynystanov by Yunusaliyev, Sh. Umetaliyev and the poet K. Malikov. "These comrades have interpreted Tynystanov's civil rehabilitation as an amnesty for his nationalistic views and major political mistakes." But Tynystanov grossly slandered Soviet reality and was justly condemned in 1933 and 1934 for "dragging the bay-manap ideology into Soviet literature and art." Yunusaliyev's high claims for Tynystanov's linguistic achievements are said to be grossly exaggerated. "Such views [on Kylych and Tynystanov] contradict Leninist teaching about the party spirit [partiynost'] of literature and are nothing but an attempt to revive the anti-Marxist theory of the 'single stream' in evaluating the cultural heritage."

In spite of the Central Committee resolution, about 18 months later at a Party meeting in the Union of Writers "the young poet Ramis Ryskulov tried to throw doubt on the correctness of the resolution. . . about the creative work of the poet and nationalist Tynystanov, and put forward the opportunist theory of 'pure art' free from the influence of Party policy." Ryskulov is a graduate of the Gor'kiy Literary Institute in Moscow and a member of the Union of Writers who has worked in the editorial offices of republican Komsomol papers. His serious "ideological disorder" is attributed to very poor educative work with the young. (SK 19.9.61) Elsewhere it has been said of Ryskulov that his "brilliant talent. . . is unorganized." (SK 23.7.61)

### Young writers

As before, the critics are held to be largely to blame for the shortcomings of young writers. There are frequent complaints that they do not pay enough attention to their works. In a long article in KT of 21.5.61 Masud Mullodzhanov states that literary criticism is not coping with its most important task, the education of young writers. Reviews of their works are too general, sometimes conclusions are reached on the basis of only one or two stories or verses, or the critics, while praising the subject matter, lose sight of the style and language. Sometimes it seems that the critic has not even read the book properly. Mullodzhanov says that criticism of young writers tends to be inordinately enthusiastic or unjustly harsh. He quotes one instance where a critic praised enthusiastically one book of verse by a young poet and shortly afterwards, in a review of another book by the same author, condemned him as a formalist, without in either instance justifying his views.

In an article in PROSTOR No.11 of 1961, pp.110-12, Nikolay Anov lists some of the faults of young writers. One is a tendency to try their hand straightaway at novels or long stories, and another to write about subjects of which they know nothing. He instanced a vast novel about America which the author had never visited, and the case of a

schoolmistress who used the interesting school life she knew well only as a background for a banal love story. Other failings of beginners, says Anov, are that they use only two colours in their work - black and white - so that the positive hero is "invariably strong as an oak and upright as a poplar" while the negative character is "almost a criminal", and describe the technological process rather than the working people. Anov also complains of dry formal language and the hackneyed portrayal of contemporary heroes. Sometimes their descriptions of people are more suitable for a police record than a work of literature.

### Closeness to life

One of the reasons most frequently given for the unsatisfactory standard of many literary works is that the authors are out of touch with life. At the plenum of the creative unions of Kazakhstan in November 1961, Musrepov said that if literary and artistic workers are to carry out their task of educating the new man who will live under Communism, they will have to come much closer to life and put an end to the "abnormal situation when nine-tenths of the time of many creative people is swallowed up by meetings and conferences." Another speaker said that the links of some writers with the life of the people "depend on the services of the Literary Fund: if they give him money he goes on a month's trip; if not, then he may sit at home for 10 years." (PROSTOR No. 2 of 1962, pp.107-18) Similarly, in SK of 23.7.61 V. Svetlichnyy reports that a meeting of the Party organization of the Kirgiz Union of Writers expressed concern about divorce from life: "who among the writers has shared the joys and sorrows of the constructors of the Uch-Kurgan hydroelectric station, that major project of the Seven Year-Plan in Kirgizia, for any length of time? Who has spent even one season with the shepherds on the pastures?"

On the other hand allegations that certain Turkmen writers are out of touch with life and the collective because they do not work in some kind of undertaking have been pronounced mistaken by IZVESTIYA. The poet Kara Seytliyev had written complaining about an article in the Turkmen language journal of the Turkmen Communist Party which alleged that the young writers Ata Atadzhanov, Kirim Kurbannepesov and Anná Mukhatov avoided work in the collective and engaged wholly in their own individual creative work. This showed the influence on them of bourgeois culture and ideology and could not be tolerated. Seytliyev argued that a writer's work is inevitably individual. He agreed that early professionalization is harmful but said that the writers in question are not novices, have already written several books and are working well. Moreover, they all take part in the work of the Union of Writers and frequently travel round the republic, meeting readers and helping young authors. Seytliyev said that in these circumstances "to talk about their individualism and

the influence on them of bourgeois culture and ideology sounds more than strange," the more so as their works campaign against alien views and survivals and in favour of the Communist world outlook. (IZ 3.2.62, 25.3.62)

### Contemporaneity

Reviews of the literary harvest in the Central Asian republics in recent years note a marked and welcome increase in the number of works on contemporary themes since the XXth Party Congress, but they invariably go on to complain that there are still not nearly enough of them. In particular, not enough authors write about the working-class or the intelligentsia and there have been no books yet about the new Brigades of Communist Labour. The statement by Sh. Rashidov, writer and First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, at the Congress of the Uzbek Intelligentsia in January 1962 that "Soviet reality, the thoughts and deeds of Soviet people, are immeasurably richer and more many-sided than their portrayal in the creative work of the writers and artists of the republic" (PV 26.1.62) is typical.

Many works on contemporary themes fail to satisfy the required standard because they do not "correctly reflect the present day". In KT of 30.4.61, the Tadzhik poet G. Mirzoyev complains that some prose writers cover up their lack of skill with false enthusiasm and magnify successes while closing their eyes to serious failings. This is particularly lamentable in some feature stories. As an example Mirzoyev quotes an unpublished story by Ya. Nal'skiy in which he lauded a kolkhoz chairman to the skies; if Nal'skiy had taken a little more trouble he would have discovered that the kolkhoz chairman had not learnt to read or write in 43 years of Soviet rule and could therefore hardly be "a bearer of a lofty Communist consciousness." Rashidov, on the other hand, complained about writers who magnify the shortcomings in present-day life. "Some writers. . . who do not have a profound understanding of their duty towards the people, do not travel the central road of life but rave along its by-ways and back streets. . . Individual writers, instead of a full-blooded portrayal on contemporaneity, create feeble, badly-constructed, immature, dull and boring works. . . There are also instances when individual writers seize on certain shortcomings and temporary difficulties in our life, inflate them to a monstrous size and make generalizations which distort Soviet reality and contain a slander on our life. When this is mentioned to them they declare that they have not sinned against the truth since the shortcomings described by them did not exist. But the point is not that the writer has exposed shortcomings. The point is. . . what generalization he made about them."

According to A. Aborskiy and D. Khaldurdy writing in LG of 9.8.60, many Turkmen prose works are disappointing largely because the real life heroes of today are not the main heroes of these works. Many writers, particularly young ones, "often make the main characters of their stories either a deceiving mulla or ishan or a guardian of holy graves selling talismans, or an inveterate polygamist, a petty tyrant of a husband who tortures his wife because she does not bear him sons, or parents giving their daughters away for kalym." Of one story in which an idler and speculator, desperate for a son, forces his successive wives to perform age-old fertility rituals, they say that it could be a kind of popular handbook for ethnographers. These stories are "no more than an impartial description of ugly features in everyday life" and do not correctly reflect the present day or touch on vital problems exercising the present generation. Aborskiy and Khaldurdy dismiss claims that such writers are continuing the national traditions of Turkmen prose of the 1930s. The theme of the struggle with the old morals answered the needs of the 1920s and 1930s, but today's parents are the Komsomols of the 1930s who were on the side of the new way of life. They conclude that "to develop today the traditions of the prose of the 1930s does not mean to copy its themes and characters mechanically. Fidelity to traditions lies elsewhere - in the ability to catch the main object behind the life of the people, to seize what is new that is emerging in reality itself and write about it passionately and with conviction."

### Literary criticism

The standard of literary criticism in the republics continues to be one of the main targets of attack in all discussions on literature. An article which embraces most of the complaints voiced against the critics in all the republics is that by Mukhamedzhan Karatayev in PROSTOR No.7 of 1961, pp.145-54. Karatayev complains of the narrow range and low level of literary criticism in Kazakhstan and the stereotyped book reviews in which there is no profound analysis of the work. Even leading critics like Ye. Ismailov are guilty of this. Karatayev attacks in particular two reviews of Shashkin's novel TEMIR-TAU by Ismailov which, he says, contain unsupported statements of a general nature and offer no practical assistance to the writer. In general, says Karatayev, the critics tend to dwell on the past and avoid the burning questions of contemporary criticism. There is also insufficient specialization by genres. Only the lack of a professional approach explains the praise of Abilev's narrative poem LOVE'S FATE as a model work when in reality it is weak in both the ideological and artistic sense. Karatayev asserts that it is not enough for a critic to talk of an insufficient knowledge of life and low level of technical skill on the part of the writer; he must give him practical assistance. One of the main reasons why criticism lags is that critics are divorced from Soviet reality. But they need a knowledge of

life just as much as the writers. Karatayev ends by saying that there are still relics of Stalin's days when ignorant critics ran down talented writers and praised weak works. He quotes the poet Kh. Bekkhozhin's unfounded attack on a poem by the young writer G. Kairbekov which showed that Bekkhozhin had decided to settle personal scores with the young poet, and also Bekkhozhin's unctuous praise for Abilev's poems. The latter is a case of objectivity being marred by friendly personal relations, but goodwill and tact, says Karatayev, do not mean keeping quiet about shortcomings. However, often a writer resents practical criticism and gets a friend to refute it and tries in every way to compromise the "malevolent" critic. "In this way definite groups of 'well-disposed' and 'ill-disposed' critics are created around writers."

The problem of cliques among writers is currently a matter of concern in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Uzbekistan at least. Musrepov, at the plenum of Kazakh creative organizations in November 1961, said it was a relic of the personality cult. "The cult furthered the ugly elephantiasis-like exaltation of the personal 'I' to the detriment of the collective. And this combined with the feudal survivals we have in Kazakhstan, has been a great hindrance in directing the activity of writers and artistic workers into a general purposeful stream. Houses of Montague and Capulet were created, houses of mutual envy and hate." Unfortunately, some of the younger writers had followed in the footsteps of their elders in this. In Kirgizia "fear of spoiling relations" leads to inferior works being described as artistic masterpieces (SK 23.7.61), and certain authoritative writers, in particular K. Malikov and N. Baytemirov, are unduly sensitive to criticism. (LG 7.6.62) Jealousy no doubt explains why Baytemirov disagreed with the official criticism of DZHAMILYA and declared that he found the work poor and its characters unsuccessful. (SK 23.7.61) Members of the Russian section of the Kirgiz Union of Writers are also unwilling to spoil friendly relations between themselves. This leads them to recommend for publication bad works by their friends (SK 28.5.61, 29.6.61 and 23.7.61) and explains why Ye. Kovskiy is able to go on publishing books of short stories which are invariably found to be of poor quality. (SK 15.4.62)

---

The conclusion which most non-Soviet students will draw from this brief review of contemporary Soviet Central Asian literature, is that much, if not most of it, is at once priggish, mawkish and lacking in any real literary quality, and that officially inspired literary criticism is as a rule equally priggish and filled with stereotyped clichés. It can readily be admitted that the creation of "literatures" in languages many of which were hardly developed at all 40 years ago, and none of which

were attuned to the writing of prose, is in itself an achievement of considerable interest; but it is doubtful whether, with the steady insistence on Western genres and socialist realism, and on the superiority and professional necessity of Russian, the languages of Central Asia can ever rise above the level of vehicles for political indoctrination. Neither political nor religious indoctrination, nor even the laudable object of producing "healthy reading for young people", are as a rule conducive to the creation of good literature in any country. There are, however, some grounds for hoping that the native genius of such writers as Mir Ali Shir and of the oral literature of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz will in the course of time reassert itself. - Ed. CAR.

#### A solar water-freshener

Turkmen scientists have constructed a simple water-freshener, which uses the sun to turn saline water into fresh, at a well in the sands of the Karakum. It produces 50 litres of drinking water a day for the sovkhos shepherds who previously had to have it brought to them in tanks. The sovkhos has asked for a larger one to be built which will supply up to 7,000 sheep with water all the year round. KP 20.7.62

#### New telephone exchange for Frunze

A new inter-urban telephone exchange is being built in Frunze. It will be four storeys high and will have the latest radio-electronics equipment. The inter-urban telephone system will become fully automatic and an inhabitant of Frunze will be able to dial subscribers in Moscow, Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Osh, Naryn and many inhabited points of the Chu valley direct. The capacity of the exchange will be twelve times that of the existing one. SK 6.7.62

## THE ARAL AND AMU-DAR'YA FLOTILLAS

## A RECENT SOVIET ARTICLE

The two main rivers of Central Asia, the Amu-Dar'ya and Syr-Dar'ya, present great difficulties to shipping. The latter is particularly unstable with violent fluctuations in the water level and frequently shifting channels. Even today navigation is only developed in a very small way on the section of the river flowing through Kazakhstan mainly for the transport of saksaul.

Transport on the Amu-Dar'ya is much more developed and, until the railway from Chardzhou to Kungrad was completed in 1955, it was of prime importance for the Khorezm oasis. It is still of importance for the carriage of freight (oil, fertilizers, cotton, grain, machinery and many other goods) and in the river delta, where the construction of a railway is impossible. In 1960 there were 300 vessels of all kinds on the river. However, normal exploitation is difficult because of fluctuations in the water level, the swift current and the shallow, shifting channels, and navigation is only possible for eight or nine months of the year.

There are regular steamship services on the Aral Sea from Aral'sk in the north to Muynak and Taldyk in the Amu-Dar'ya delta for approximately seven months of the year, but the importance of the Aral as a transport link is limited by its position.

When the Russians advanced across Central Asia in the second half of the 19th century, they hoped to make extensive use of the rivers for transport purposes. With this in view the Aral and later the Amu-Dar'ya flotillas were created. Reports of the formation of the latter in 1887 aroused lively fears among certain circles in England, who saw in this added proof of Russian intentions of advancing on Afghanistan. Lord Curzon, however, after seeing the flotilla at Chardzhou in 1888, concluded that with its meagre resources and the difficulties of navigation the flotilla presented little danger. The insignificant role which the two flotillas played in the Russian conquest of and early years of rule in Central Asia, is shown clearly in a recent article by M.Yu. Yuldashev entitled "K istorii Aral'skoy flotilii" (The History of the Aral Flotilla), O/N V UZB., No.12, 1961, pp.30-39, of which a summary is given below. They were, however, as Yuldashev says, the forerunners of the present shipping services on the Aral and Amu-Dar'ya.

---

### Early interest in a trade route to India by water

From the time the Russians appeared on the Caspian in the 16th century, the Russian Government often thought of opening a trade route to India by water. Peter the Great was particularly interested in this. In 1716, when Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskiy was sent to Central Asia to win the Khivan khan over to Russia and search for gold, Peter ordered him "to ask the khan of Khiva for ships and on them to despatch merchants along the Amu-Dar'ya to India, bidding them to travel it as long as the ships can go and then go to India, noting the rivers and lakes and describing the route to India by water and by land, but particularly by water by this or that river." Bekovich-Cherkasskiy was instructed to build a fort at the former mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya on the Caspian and to go from there to Khiva following the course of the river, to observe any dams and if possible turn the water back into its old course, blocking up its outlet into the Aral and building a fortress at a suitable place on the Amu-Dar'ya.\*

In later years the tasks of other envoys sent to Central Asia also included finding a water route to India. Thus Dr. Blankennagel', sent to Khiva in Elizabeth II's reign, made a report on the development of trade with Central Asia and India on his return in 1797.

### The formation of the Aral flotilla and its first ventures

By the middle of the 19th century Russia had reached the frontiers of the Central Asian khanates and also the Aral Sea and Amu-Dar'ya. The erection of a number of forts and the formation of the Aral flotilla was necessary for the further conquest of Turkestan. The first warship in the Aral basin was the schooner "Nikolay" built in Orenburg in 1847 and transported in pieces by cart to the Raim fortification in the mouth of the Syr-Dar'ya. On 20 August 1847, armed with two pieces of ordnance, she took part in the attack on the small Khivan fort of Dzhan-kala 70 versts above Raim. The same year she attempted to survey the Aral Sea, but with negligible results. In 1848 the schooners "Nikolay" and "Konstantin" (built in Orenburg in 1848) were despatched to survey the Aral. They carried this task out brilliantly in 1848 and 1849, describing also the southern shores of the Aral belonging to Khiva and the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya.


In 1850 the steamer "Perovski" and the steam launch "Obruchev", with sliding keels for navigation in seas and rivers, were ordered in Switzerland. They arrived on the Syr-Dar'ya in 1852 and were launched in

---

\* Bekovich-Cherkasskiy was killed in Khiva and his forts were destroyed.

# THE AMU-DAR'YA AND SYR-DAR'YA 1900

Scale: 1:1,000,000  
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Kilometers  
0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles





February 1853. In the same year the "Perovskiy" took part in the capture of Ak-Mechet,\* and in 1856 she entered the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya, sailing as far as Kungrad.

#### Ignat'yev's mission in 1858

In 1858 the steamers of the Aral flotilla under Butakov, accompanied the mission of Ignat'yev to Khiva and Bukhara from Chernikov Bay on the western shores of the Aral. The mission was to carry out a reconnaissance of the Amu-Dar'ya and occupy Kungrad. On approaching the mouth of the river Colonel Ignat'yev learnt that the Khivans were not prepared to let the ships enter the Amu-Dar'ya and that a drop in the level of the river was soon expected. Fearing that these circumstances would prevent his embassy reaching the capital of the khanate, Ignat'yev gave up his original idea of going to Khiva by steamer and decided instead to use the ships to extend their knowledge of the Amu-Dar'ya delta. He therefore sent part of the gifts and heavy loads to Kungrad by the flotilla and continued his own way there by land along the western shore of the Aral. The mission was outwardly welcomed in Kungrad, but it was obvious that the Khivans were apprehensive about the forthcoming arrival of the ships. The embassy left Kungrad without waiting for the flotilla's arrival and continued to Khiva in Khivan boats, arriving there on 18 July. The steamer "Perovskiy" and two barges soon reached Kungrad. The ruler of the town and local inhabitants were very alarmed at the appearance of the ships, particularly as they had never seen a steamer before. They told Butakov that the khan was not willing to let the ships pass further up the river. Butakov himself realized that the proposed passage of the steamer to Chardzhou and beyond was a very risky affair, since without a knowledge of the navigable channels the ship could easily be grounded and, moreover, he had insufficient fuel. Although the fuel problem was solved by the arrival of a third barge in Kungrad, Butakov still feared the low water level at the end of August and withdrew to the mouth of the river to await the outcome of the talks in Khiva.

#### The Khiva campaign of 1873

When the plans for the Khiva campaign of 1873 were drawn up it was decided that a squadron of ships from the Aral flotilla should be sent to the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya to assist the expeditionary troops of the three military districts (Orenburg, Turkestan and Caucasian). The commander of the Turkestan military district, von Kaufman, ordered the commander of the Aral flotilla to hold ready the steamer "Perovskiy"

---

\* Later renamed Perovsk and now known as Kzyl-Orda.

(the only steamer of the Aral flotilla then fitted for sea navigation) and two sea barges. On arrival in Kazalinsk from St. Petersburg, von Kaufman arranged for the squadron to be reinforced by another barge and the river steamer "Samarkand", which it was thought could reach the Amu-Dar'ya with due care. The complement of the two steamers and three barges consisted of eight officers, one doctor and 259 other ranks including two topographers. The "Samarkand" had four guns, and the "Perovski" three, while the wooden barges had five between them. A hundred and seventy-five charges were taken for each gun.

It was proposed that as soon as the Syr-Dar'ya opened to navigation, the ships should leave Perovsk and establish contact between the Orenburg expeditionary force under Verevkin moving along the south-west coast of the Aral and the Turkestan detachment under von Kaufman. They were then to start exploring the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya, proceeding towards Kungrad but remaining out of reach of gunfire from Kungrad fort. On 14 March 1873 the Syr-Dar'ya opened for navigation and the steamers left Perovsk for Kazalinsk, but the wind piled up the ice in the night and the river became so shallow that the ships went aground. They were refloated with great difficulty with the help of 100 Cossacks and 400 Kazakhs sent from Perovsk and the "Samarkand" only arrived in Kazalinsk on 6 April. It reached the island of Kos-Aral\* on 17 April and the following day the ships set out to sea with the three barges in tow. On 26 April the flotilla moved to the mouth of the Amu-Dar'ya. A Khivan captive told them that 14 versts from the mouth of the river the fort of Ak-Kala had been built with a garrison of 1,000 men and five cannon. The flotilla entered the river and on 28 April caught sight of Ak-Kala. As soon as the ships came within range the fort opened fire. The flotilla replied and soon the Khivan cannon were put out of action. In the exchange of fire the port side of the "Samarkand" was breached, the pad of one of the guns smashed, an anchor fluke knocked off, and seven other ranks and the flotilla commander, Sitnikov, wounded. The flotilla was unable to progress further up the arm of the delta because of Khivan dams. Learning this, General Verevkin of the Orenburg detachment invited Sitnikov for discussions. Sitnikov was unable to go himself because of his wounds and sent instead, on 7 May, an ensign with an NCO, a topographer and nine sailors. Ten versts from Kungrad they were murdered in their sleep by their Kazakh guides. Sitnikov wanted to demolish the Khivan

---

\* The island of Kos-Aral was situated in the mouth of the Syr-Dar'ya. It is now joined to the mainland and is known as the peninsula of Teras Shevchenko in honour of the great Ukrainian writer who, when an exile in Siberia, took part in the 1848-9 survey of the Aral described in the article. The island was used as winter quarters during the survey.

dams which were preventing the advance of the flotilla, but Verevkin insisted that a passage must be looked for among the overflows along the right bank, which the flotilla would not consent to do without guides. The flotilla's part in the rest of the campaign consisted of transporting the sick and wounded, artillery weapons, etc. to Kazalinsk.

#### Activities 1874-81

In 1874 the "Perovskiy" went up the Amu-Dar'ya through the rocky rapids as far as Petro-Aleksandrovsk.\* In 1875 the "Samarkand" made an unsuccessful attempt to go above the Dul'-Dul'-Atlagan gorge. In 1876 the "Perovskiy" succeeded in getting through the gorge, and in 1878 reached Khodzha-Salar on the Afghan frontier.

When the Russian embassy was despatched to Afghanistan in 1878 the Amu-Dar'ya detachment was ordered to follow the right bank of the river from Petro-Aleksandrovsk, with the heavy loads carried by the "Perovskiy" and "Samarkand" towing barges. For the crossing at Kelif the steamers were to take in tow kaufmanki (pontoons) and kayuks (flat-bottomed native boats), but they were unable to manage this.

Since it was impossible for a steamer to go above Khodzha-Salar, in 1879 Lt. Zubov decided to use sloops and a Khivan kayuk to see how far the Amu-Dar'ya was navigable. Leaving Petro-Aleksandrovsk on 10 June when the river was beginning to rise, Zubov went in the kayuk as far as Fayzabad-kala. He acknowledged that the Pyandzh was not navigable higher up where the river divides into a whole network of mountain streams. Saray was the last place where the river was crossed in kayuks; higher up, because of the swift current and shallow water, the crossing was made on gupsars (inflated cattle and sheep hides). Zubov's investigations were made when the river was fairly high and he could not examine in detail the rock barriers, nor did he have information on the annual variation in the level of the water. He reached the conclusion that the Pyandzh was navigable despite its strong current, that the narrows were passable or could be made so, that the banks were suitable for mooring, and that navigation along the Amu-Dar'ya was possible from May to October and possibly to November.

Apart from the expeditions mentioned, as the Aral flotilla increased it gradually extended its area of activity, sailing at first along the Syr-Dar'ya and Aral Sea and then along the Amu-Dar'ya. Unfortunately, little information about the Aral flotilla survived the fire in the archives of the Turkestan Military District, but from the data gathered

---

\* Now called Turtkul'

it is clear that low-powered steamers managed to sail great distances towing two barges each with a capacity of from 2,000 to 7,000 puds. From 1877-8 the steamers did four runs at the following speeds:

Kazalinsk - Perovsk	2 weeks out, back in 7-8 days
Perovsk - Chinar*	3 weeks out, back in 12 days
Kazalinsk - Kos-Aral	24 hours out, back in 4 days
Kos-Aral - Nikolay Island**	2 days out, back in 2 days

The Aral flotilla was composed of the steamers "Samarkand", "Aral", "Tashkent" and "Syr-Dar'ya", the steam launch "Obruchev", ten barges, five ferries, and a hulk of two iron caissons and ten longboats. In 1881 the "Samarkand", the best steamer of the flotilla, sank at Perovsk. The other ships were old and weak and not suitable for navigation along the Amu-Dar'ya.

#### The Aral flotilla is abolished

In October 1882 General Chernyayev set up a commission to study the question of the abolition of the Aral flotilla. On 7 April 1883 the commission decided to abolish the flotilla and sell the steamers for scrap. It was argued that a military steamship line prevented the development of a private one, cost 200,000 rubles a year and brought little benefit. But any regular steamship line was out of the question because the Amu-Dar'ya and Syr-Dar'ya frequently shifted their channels, and periodically became shallow when even shallow-draught boats passed with great difficulty; steamer passengers were constantly disembarked and had to haul the steamers with a towing-rope. In these circumstances private companies demanded large subsidies over and above payments for the transport of military freight which would have cost the Treasury more than retaining the flotilla. In June 1883 the entrepreneurs of a steamship line on the Amu-Dar'ya were offered all the property of the Aral flotilla as a premium and in addition a subsidy of 150,000 rubles a year, but the three competitors each demanded a subsidy of 300,000 rubles. It was then decided to lease the ships to private persons for 24 years and to hand over the stock of Kazalinsk port at procurement price. There were no takers, and so the port property (tarpaulins, ropes, chains, anchors, etc.) was handed over partly to the commissariat and partly to the artillery arsenal and engineering department. The furniture from the steamers went to the flat of the commandant and the officers' mess in Kazalinsk, while the custodian of the port property distributed china, table-linen etc. to all his acquaintances. The engines were stripped and the ships pulled up on shore where they rusted and rotted.

---

\* sic - should probably be Chinaz

\*\* Now called Vozrozhdeniye Island.

In 1887, 640 rubles were spent in trying to strip the "Samarkand" at the bottom of the river but the pieces salvaged realized only 6 rubles 33 kopeks at auction. In 1889 the ship was unsuccessfully put up for auction in Kazalinsk, Perovsk and Tashkent at 250 rubles. Even an offer in the local papers that anyone who raised the ship could have all the materials, brought no response.

Meanwhile in 1884 the Aral flotilla had to be revived as the ships had not yet been ordered for the proposed Amu-Dar'ya flotilla which was to take its place. The steamers of the Aral flotilla sailed until 1888 when the new Amu-Dar'ya flotilla came into being, but the ships and other property were in a very bad state. In the summer of 1891 a steamer of the Amu-Dar'ya flotilla brought from Kazalinsk to Chardzhou some machinery from the workshops of the former Aral flotilla. The rest of its property went for a song.

#### The Amu-Dar'ya flotilla

The Amu-Dar'ya flotilla was founded on 13 November 1887. Its charter stated: "The Amu-Dar'ya flotilla is intended (1) to maintain a regular towing and passenger service and also for the carriage of freight for the State and private persons along the Amu-Dar'ya river; (2) to assist the troops of the Turkestan Military District in the transport of military, food and other supplies in peace time and also in the case of the opening of hostilities; (3) to assist the needs of the Transcaspian Military Railway; and (4) to carry out hydrographic work." But in the event the functions of the flotilla were much narrower since it was badly organized from the beginning. For instance, its first two steamers "Tsar" and "Tsaritsa" could not even ensure a regular towing and passenger service between Petro-Aleksandrovsk and Chardzhou (400 odd versts) and between Chardzhou and Kerki (200 odd versts). If the steamers undertook hydrographic work the passenger service stopped, and in general the service was bad and irregular to the great dissatisfaction of the public. However, this did not worry the senior management or the employees. In 1895 the flotilla received an additional steamer, the "Tsesarevich", but its design was so unsuccessful that in 1902 it had to be almost entirely rebuilt. Meanwhile, with the construction of Termez which demanded the transport of a large amount of various cargoes, another two steamers, the "Velikaya Knyazhna Ol'ga" (1899) and the "Imperator Nikolay II" (1901) were added to the flotilla. From this time regular passenger and freight services in fact began. Gradually turnover increased and at the same time the range of scientific knowledge about the nature and peculiarities of the Amu-Dar'ya basin was extended.

THE SIZE OF THE GERMAN POPULATION  
IN KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

Robert Conquest in his book THE SOVIET DEPORTATION OF NATIONALITIES (London, 1960), showed that the existence of a German population of approximately one and a half million in the Soviet Union had been almost totally ignored in Soviet statements and publications ever since August 1941 when a decree was published on the deportation of the Volga Germans to "Novosibirsk and Omsk provinces, the Altay territory, Kazakhstan and other neighbouring localities". Although no official announcement was made, it was known that at the same time the other Germans living in the European part of the Soviet Union had been deported to the Asian half of the country, where there were already some German settlements. Such indirect information in the papers and unofficial reports as there were up to 1959 confirmed that the Germans were mostly in Siberia and Kazakhstan, but the ethnographical maps in Volume 50 of the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA devoted to the USSR, which was published in 1957, showed no Germans anywhere, though minorities as small as the Gypsies were indicated.

With the publication of the 1959 census results the existence of this large German population in the USSR was again admitted. There has been no effort, however, to rehabilitate the Germans as in the case of five (Kalmyks, Chechen, Ingush, Karachay and Balkars) of the other six nationalities who were deported to Central Asia and Siberia during the war (see CAR, 1957, No.2, pp.215-16), and it is clear from the way the census figures were treated that the Soviet Government is still extremely sensitive about the Germans, particularly those in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

The main results of the census were published in PRAVDA of 4 February 1960, and subsequently, with some of the figures slightly revised, in THE NUMBER, COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE USSR (CHISLENNOST', SOSTAV I RAZMESHCHENIYE NASELENIYA SSSR, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1961). According to the latter there were 1,620,000 Germans in the Soviet Union in 1959, of whom 75 per cent regarded German as their native tongue. This made them the thirteenth nationality in the country. Of the total of 1,620,000, 820,000 were in the RSFSR, the vast majority being presumably in Siberia. The whereabouts of the remaining 800,000 was not given.

More detailed census figures for Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia were published in PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 31.7.60, KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA of 26.4.60 and SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA of 23.7.60. According to these, in 1959 there were:

18,000	Germans	living	in	Uzbekistan
33,000	"	"	"	Tadzhikistan
40,000	"	"	"	Kirgizia

i.e. 91,000 in the three republics. In Tadzhikistan the Germans were the fifth most numerous nationality and in Kirgizia the sixth. Yet, in PRAVDA's lists of the main nationalities in each republic the Germans were omitted while three or four smaller nationalities were listed. The Germans must therefore have been deliberately excluded for political reasons. (In Kirgizia this was also true for the Chechens who, according to the republican census results number 25,000, coming immediately after the Germans.)

Neither Kazakhstan nor Turkmenistan appear to have published more detailed census results for their republics. As regards Turkmenistan there is no reason to suppose that a substantial number of Germans are living there. The PRAVDA figures for the main nationalities of Kazakhstan, however, left 12.2 per cent of the population unaccounted for, by far the largest percentage for any republic. This is approximately 1,135,800 people and the probability that a majority of these are Germans is supported by figures for the number of Germans in Tselinnyy Kray given by Ya.R. Vinnikov in a paper on the population of the kray presented at a Soviet conference on the geography of population held in Moscow University from 30 January - 3 February 1962. Vinnikov stated that in 1959 Germans made up 12.1 per cent of the population of Tselinnyy Kray. (SOVIET GEOGRAPHY: Review and Translation. April 1962. Published by American Geographical Society, New York.) Since the total population of Tselinnyy Kray at that time was 2,753,000, this gives a total of approximately 333,000 Germans in the kray. This figure alone would make the Germans the fourth most numerous nationality in Kazakhstan after the Russians (3,974,000), Kazakhs (2,795,000) and Ukrainians (762,000), but again the Germans were omitted from the list of leading nationalities in Kazakhstan published in PRAVDA although seven smaller ones were listed. Since the Germans are known to have been deported to other areas of Kazakhstan besides Tselinnyy Kray it seems a fair assumption that most of the remaining 376,000 Germans in the Soviet Union are to be found there, giving a total of approximately 700,000 for the republic.

## N E W S   D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 July - 30 September 1962. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

## ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changesKazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 13 September 1962 Sal'ken Daulenov was released from his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Masymkhan Beysebayer was appointed in his place. Beysebayer was previously First Secretary of the Alma-Ata Oblast Party Committee. KP. 14.9.62

Uzbekistan

After a plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party held on 2 August 1962, it was announced that F.Ye. Titov had been released from his duties as Second Secretary and member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party in connexion with his transfer to work outside the republic. Vladimir Alekseyevich Karlov was elected Second Secretary and member of the Central Committee Bureau in his place. PV. 3.8.62

Territorial changesAzerbaydzhan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 5 July 1962, the village of Leninkend, Shamkhor rayon, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlements and renamed Lenin. VVS. 13.7.62

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 9 July 1962, the town of Atbasar, Atbasar rayon, Tselinograd oblast, Tselinnyy kray, has been transferred to the category of towns of oblast subordination.

VVS. 27.7.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 9 July 1962, the town settlement Serebryanka, Zyryanovsk Town Council, East-Kazakhstan oblast, has been transferred to the category of towns of rayon subordination and renamed Serebryansk.

VVS. 27.7.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 14 September 1962, the town of Fort Shevchenko, Shevchenko rayon, Gur'yev oblast, West-Kazakhstan kray, has been transferred to the category of towns of oblast subordination.

VVS. 28.9.62

Kirgizia

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 31 July 1962, Przheval'skiy rayon has been renamed Karakol'skiy rayon.

VVS. 17.8.62

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 6 September 1962, Leninskiy and Pervomayskiy rayons have been formed in the town of Frunze.

VVS. 21.9.62

## ARCHAEOLOGY

Among the reeds and marshes 30 km. north of Termez rises a solitary hill called Zang-Tepe. The Uzbek Academy of Sciences began excavations here in 1961 and discovered the contours of a large ancient castle. More than 20 rooms of the first and second floors have now been uncovered. The castle is believed to have been erected at the end of the 5th century A.D. The most interesting find is pieces of decayed birch bark covered with letters of a script unknown up till now in Central Asia. It is similar to Brahmi, an ancient writing of Indian origin. The letters were written not with a brush, as was normal in ancient documents, but with a thin reed. Photographs have been sent to Leningrad for deciphering.

KT. 26.7.62

During excavations on the bank of a reservoir in the middle of Samarkand, the remains of a man who inhabited the territory 300 centuries ago have been found. The well-known Soviet anthropologist M. Gerasimov has confirmed this after examining the lower jaw with its well preserved teeth. The discovery is of great scientific interest and confirms the conclusions of Soviet scholars that Central Asia is one of the oldest inhabited areas of the world.

IZ. 8.9.62

Spelaeologists of the Fergana Museum of Local Lore have entered a cave in the mountains near the village of Aravan known as the Cave of Secrets or Chil'-Ustun (Forty Columns). Local legend had it that those who entered the cave were turned to stone. The spelaeologists discovered that there were six large caves all connected by very narrow passages with masses of side turnings and dead ends. They found wall paintings, Sogdian inscriptions, pottery and vessels for holding water. They also found the skeletons of those who, having entered the underground labyrinth, could not find their way out again. TRUD 23.9.62

#### CONFERENCES

One of the items on the agenda of the fourth plenum of the Kirgiz Central Committee held on 10-11 August 1962 was the safeguarding of State, cooperative and collective farm property. The main speaker on this item said that efforts to combat speculation and embezzlement were quite inadequate and cases had not decreased in 1962. They were particularly common in light industrial enterprises, in the meat and milk industry and the building materials industry. The debts of those kolkhozes where property was not properly safeguarded were increasing. The speaker called for greater efforts to eradicate embezzlement and in particular improvements in selecting and training personnel as well as in stocktaking and checking. SK. 21.8.62

The fifth plenum of the Tadzhik Central Committee was held on 28-29 August 1962. There were two items on the agenda - ideological work among the masses and improving the work of primary Party organizations - and long resolutions were adopted on each. The plenum expelled Ali-bay Kasymov from the Central Committee. KT. 29.8.62, 30.8.62

[No reason was given for Kasymov's expulsion from the Central Committee. He has also been relieved of his membership of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (VVS. 28.9.62). - Ed.]

A plenum of the Azerbaydzhan Central Committee was held on 29-30 August 1962. The main item on the agenda was a report on improving ideological work by the First Secretary V.Yu. Akhundov. After saying that there had been definite improvements in ideological work since the July 1959 plenum which revealed serious shortcomings, Akhundov went on to state that ineffective ideological work accounted for the current non-fulfilment of plans in certain industrial enterprises and agricultural rayons. Some Party organizers were too keen on making boastful speeches and holding meetings instead of giving concrete assistance. Akhundov called for an intensification of work among young people and the intelligentsia and "a decisive rebuff to nationalistic



manifestations, relapses into which still occur here and there." He said that Abas Zamanov, a former teacher at Azerbaydzhan State University, had been expelled from the Party for his "nationalistic, anti-Party utterances". Akhundov then attacked "private-property tendencies" and bribe taking, for which a former member of the Azerbaydzhan Supreme Court, Kuliyeu, and a former teacher at the Azerbaydzhan State University, Akhundov, have recently been expelled from the Party. Akhundov criticized the backward attitude towards women, found particularly in rural areas, and certain writers who try to assert that this attitude is a good national tradition. BR. 30.8.62

An International seminar of African women devoted to the education of women took place in Tashkent from 5-10 September 1962. It was organized by the USSR Commission for UNESCO Affairs and the Committee of Soviet Women. There were delegates from 14 African countries as well as from Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia. A representative of the Director-General of UNESCO also took part. Soviet delegates told of the experience of their republics in combating illiteracy and improving the position of women and expressed their willingness to help the African countries in any way they could, while the African delegates described the past and present position in their countries and measures currently being taken to educate women. PV. 4-11.9.62

#### EDUCATION

On 14 September 1962, 150 young Cuban men and girls arrived in Uzbekistan to train in Kokand as machine-operators in agriculture. Among those who met them at Tashkent airport was a group of their fellow-countrymen already studying in Tashkent to become specialists in the textile industry. P. 15.9.62, PV. 15.9.62

Sixteen Cubans have arrived in Baku for five years study at the Institute of Oil and Chemistry. There are altogether 115 foreign students in their first year at this institute. There are also many foreigners in other Baku educational establishments including students from Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, India, Indonesia, Mali and the Congo. BR. 2.9.62

Several new departments have been set up in Tashkent University. They include departments in the Physics, History and Geography faculties for training teachers of physics and history in the English language, and teachers of geography in the English and German languages. Each course lasts six years. A department of Romance and German Languages and Literature is also being opened. PV. 11.7.62

The new buildings for the Azerbaydzhan State University are going up on Nagornoye Plato in Baku. They will include lecture halls for 3,000 students, four hostels for 500 students each, a hospital, canteen, stadium, garage, an assembly hall for 400 students, a reading room for the same number, archives holding 350,000 books and a gymnasium. The lecture halls and one hostel were expected to be completed in 1962. This would enable 2,000 students to start attending lectures in the new building, and the administration and faculties of chemistry, physics and mathematics, geology and geography, and biology to be transferred there.

BR. 26.7.62

In the township being built for scientists of the Kazakh Institute of Nuclear Physics on a picturesque site near Alma-Ata there are already more than a hundred three-roomed houses; a school, shops, a restaurant and wide-screen cinema have been opened. The applied physics building is ready and many laboratories have started work. The buildings for the cyclotron and mechanical workshops are nearing completion and the foundations have been laid for the physics building. The new research centre is intended to be an eastern "Dubna" where the scientists of a number of Asian countries will work with Kazakhstan scientists.

SK. 26.9.62

## HOUSING

The Supreme Soviets of the six Muslim republics have passed decrees under which houses, dachas and other buildings erected or acquired with un-earned income or by the illegal use of funds of state, kolkhoz or other organizations are to be confiscated and handed over to the communal housing fund.


TI. 28.7.62, KT. 5.8.62, BR. 7.8.62

KP. 8.8.62, SK. 9.8.62, PV. 5.9.62

## IRRIGATION

### Kirgizia

Work has started on the site of the Toktogul hydroelectric power-station and reservoir on the river Naryn in Kirgizia and it is expected that work on the dam itself will begin next year. The Toktogul hydroelectric complex (gidrouzel) has the combined purpose of ensuring the steady irrigation of two million hectares of the most fertile land in Kirgizia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, allowing the development of flood-season irrigation on more than 400,000 hectares of land and providing an electric power capacity of 1,200,000 kilowatts with an output of 4.5 milliard kilowatt hours of electricity a year. It will eliminate completely the dangers of flooding of the low-lying areas and the railway



line in the lower reaches of the Syr-Dar'ya. The reservoir will have a capacity of more than 17 cubic kilometres which will make it possible to store water in years when there is a surplus, for discharge when it is short. The eternal threat of drought will thus disappear and the whole cascade of hydroelectric stations on the Naryn and the Syr-Dar'ya will be able to work at a uniform rate on the regulated flow. The Toktogul reservoir will flood the Ketmen'-Tyubinskaya valley including about 20,000 hectares of agricultural land, the present rayon centre of Toktogul and 34 kilometres of the Frunze-Osh highway, but the salt-bearing strata will not be affected. Owing to its composite purpose and the rare natural conditions the Toktogul hydroelectric complex will be one of the most effective and economic in the Soviet Union.

SK. 2.9.62, 19.9.62

### Uzbekistan

The first section of the 35 kilometre Miankal'-Khatyrchinskiy canal in Uzbekistan has been completed. It has a capacity of 20 cubic metres of water a second.

PV. 24.7.62

The first part of one of the biggest irrigation installations in Uzbekistan - the Yuzhnosurkhanskoye reservoir - has been handed over to the state commission for operation. More than 130,000,000 cubic metres of water have already accumulated in it which will supply the necessary reserve to irrigate fine-staple cotton in the Surkhan valley.

IZ. 26.7.62

Work has begun on the main canal which will bring water from the Yuzhnosurkhanskoye reservoir to the Shirabad valley. The canal will make it possible to reclaim almost 100,000 hectares of fertile land for cotton. The Shirabad canal will pass through exceedingly difficult country and pumping stations will be used to raise the water over the Khaudag mountains. With a capacity of 110 cubic metres of water a second the canal will be one of the largest irrigation highways in Uzbekistan.

PV. 7.8.62

### Kazakhstan

Workers building the Sergeyevskaya hydroelectric station on the river Ishim in Kazakhstan have begun work on the dam and diversion canal six months ahead of schedule. It is being constructed near the village of Sergeyevka and the reservoir, which will have a capacity of 700,000,000 cubic metres, has been given the name of Tselinnoye More (Virgin Lands Sea). The new town for the power-station has been unofficially named Tselinomorsk. From there a gigantic fan-shaped pipe system with two main pipes - the Ishimskiy and Bulayevskiy - will supply water to more than 200 kolkhozes and sovkhoses in North-Kazakhstan, Kokchetav and Kustanay oblasts.

KP. 12.8.62, 20.9.62

### Azerbaydzhan

Work has started on the site of the Akstafa reservoir, a big irrigation project in Azerbaydzhan. The large artificial lake will hold millions of cubic metres of water.

BR. 27.9.62

## RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

At a plenum of the Board of the Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (UzDOKS) held on 7 July 1962, it was stated that the society is in permanent contact with 67 countries and had entertained 53 foreign delegations in the past year. Friends abroad had welcomed the publication of monthly information sheets about the successes of Communist construction in Uzbekistan, which are circulated to 250 addresses, and also the organization of regular broadcasts for foreign listeners.

PV. 8.7.62

On 16 August 1962 a branch of the Soviet Association for Friendship and Cultural Collaboration with the Countries of Latin America was set up in Azerbaydzhan.

BR. 18.8.62

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS

The main item on the agenda of the 7th Session of the Tadzhik Supreme Soviet which met on 11-12 July 1962, was the state of trade and public catering in the republic and ways of improving it. While the speakers noted the greatly increased turnover since 1953 and the large number of new shops and eating places which have been opened in recent years, they made it plain that the service provided by these establishments is far from satisfactory. Among the chief complaints were unintelligent distribution which led to shops being out of indispensable articles although there were plenty in store, the poor quality of locally produced goods which account for 55 per cent of those on sale, the shortage of eating places, the lack of variety and taste in the dishes offered, unhygienic premises, indifference and rudeness towards customers on the part of some salespeople, cheating the customers, and embezzlement. Many speakers complained of the lack of fruit and vegetables both in the shops and in restaurants and said that this was entirely the fault of the trading organizations as the kolkhozes and sovkhozes have more than enough.

KT. 12.7.62, 13.7.62

## TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

Canals

A 12 kilometre deep-water canal is now being laid at the bottom of the Irtysch river from the Ust'-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power-station to the town's large mechanized wharves. This is to enable ships now running regularly between the Chinese frontier and the power-station to reach the wharves. The canal is expected to be completed in the spring of 1963 and at the same time the unique four-chamber navigation lock of the Bukhtarma hydroelectric power-station will come into use. As a result a water highway of more than 600 kilometres will appear in the Altay mountains.

TRUD 13.9.62

Roads

The new 700 metre-long road bridge over the Irtysch at Pavlodar has been completed a year ahead of schedule and was expected to be opened to traffic at the beginning of November 1962.

PV. 28.9.62

Three kilometres of the Osh-Khorog highway were flooded and traffic halted when a massive avalanche of mud and rock dammed the middle course of the Gunt river in the Pamirs. In a few hours a lake was formed which is more than two and a half kilometres long with a capacity of 2,600,000 cubic metres of water. After five days of working round the clock, traffic started moving again along a new stretch of road on the banks of the peaceful blue lake.

SK. 5.9.62

Television

A second transmitter has been constructed at the Tashkent Television Centre and started working on 1 August 1962. As yet the programme can only be received in Tashkent because of the low power of the transmitter. Also as the programme is transmitted on Channel 9 and most local sets have only Channels 1 to 5 they have to be adapted to receive the new programme. PV. 8.8.62

The First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Sh. Rashidov, opened a new television centre at Urgench on 8 August 1962. PV. 9.8.62

## OBITUARIES

Nazim Mamediya ogly Gadzhiyev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party, died on 30 July 1962 after a long illness. Born in 1924, Gadzhiyev joined the Party in December 1945 and soon came to notice. In 1947 he was elected Secretary of the Baku Komsomol and in 1952 First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Komsomol. At the same time he was a member of the Central Committee of the all-Union Komsomol. From 1956-8 he headed the department of science and schools of the Azerbaydzhan Central Committee and was then transferred to responsible work in the offices of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In February 1960 he was elected a member of the Azerbaydzhan Central Committee and then a member of the bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee. BR. 31.7.62

The well-known Tadjik scholar Shavkat Niyazi died suddenly on 7 September 1962. Born in 1905 in a poor peasant family, Niyazi took an active part in the reform of the Tadjik alphabet both from Arabic to Latin script and Latin to Russian. He was responsible for the training of a large number of linguists and teachers, and many thousands of Tadjik children studied from his textbooks. His scientific works are an important contribution to Tadjik linguistics. KT. 9.9.62

T H E   E T H N O G R A P H Y   O F   T I B E T

In 1961 the USSR Academy of Sciences published Volume II of an EAST ASIAN ETHNOGRAPHIC COLLECTION (Vostochno-Aziatskiy Etnograficheskiy Sbornik, Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1961), and it includes a most interesting article by Yu.I. Zhuravlev on "The Ethnic Composition of the Tibetan Region of the Chinese People's Republic and Tibetans of Other Regions of the Country" (pp.79-136). In this article the author gives detailed information on the various peoples speaking languages classified in the Tibetan group of the Tibetan-Burmese branch of the Chinese-Tibetan family of languages, though he admits that much of the information is based on incomplete data. He acknowledges that the Chinese and Russians disagree on just which peoples are correctly classified as Tibetans, and explains the reasons for these differences of opinion. Information is included on the location as well as the history, names, customs, housing, occupations, dress and food of the Tibetans proper, as well as the Sifan', Tsyau, Nu, Dulun, Tszuyazhun and Loba nationalities. In a concluding section, Zhuravlev comments on changes that have taken place in Tibet in recent years, including the creation of people's communes. In this regard, it is interesting to note that he compares the communes with "agricultural cooperatives of a higher type". The present article reviews some of the more important information gleaned from this article, which is certainly the most complete study of these peoples which has yet appeared in a Soviet source.

Throughout the article proper Tibetan names have been transliterated from the Cyrillic version given in the original.

- 
- I. Distribution and Ethnic Composition of the Tibetan Peoples -  
 II. Social Structure, Customs and Occupations - III. Author's  
 Conclusions - IV. Tibet in Recent Years.

I. Distribution and Ethnic Composition of the Tibetan Peoples

According to Zhuravlev the Tibetans, one of the most ancient peoples of China, are among the more numerous of the nationalities of the country. At present Tibetans inhabit large areas of north-west, western and south-


west China, as well as northern Nepal, parts of India, Bhutan and Sikkim. The present-day distribution of Tibetans and other peoples speaking languages classified in the Tibetan group of the Tibetan-Burmese branch of the Chinese-Tibetan family of languages, asserts Zhuravlev, reflects the ethnic history of the peoples. He claims that research on them can shed light on many problems linked with the ancient history of the peoples of central, eastern and south-east Asia, as well as on the migrations of the people in the northern areas of Central Asia and in regions to the south of the upper course of the Yangtze River. In this article Zhuravlev examines the locations and culture of the peoples in the Tibetan linguistic group in China in relation to their ethnic community and the ethnic processes of the present day.

It is acknowledged that the history of the formation of the ethnic composition of the Tibetan region of China and the settlement of Tibetans in other areas of China has been made difficult by the fact that there has still been no general study of the history of the peoples speaking these languages. The author admits that he is using extremely incomplete, and sometimes contradictory, data on the ethnography of these people. He includes material not only on the Tibetans themselves, but also on other peoples of the Tibetan linguistic group, for, as he points out, "it is impossible to study the ethnic history of Tibetans separately from the history and ethnography of peoples closely related to them." West European, Russian and Chinese sources are used in this compilation.

Soviet sources do not always agree with the Chinese on just which peoples are properly included as separate ethnic groups within the Tibetan family. The Russians include the Tibetans themselves, the Tsyang, Nu, Dulun, Tszuyazhun and Sifan' as ethnic groups speaking languages in the Tibetan group of the Tibetan-Burmese branch of the Chinese-Tibetan family of languages. There is some dispute, however, whether the Nu, Dulun and Loba peoples should properly be classified as Tibetans, though they are included as such in the present article.

There would appear to be a number of discrepancies in the use of the names of the several Tibetan peoples between the present article and the last known Soviet ethnographical study of Tibet. (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.1, pp.84-92, and SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1958, No.1, pp. 75-89.) In the earlier study there is no mention at all of the Sifan' or the Tszuyazhun peoples, while the earlier classification of Lo-yuy, near the Sino-Indian border, and including several smaller groups (the Dafla, Miri, Abor and Mishmi) are now referred to as the Loba, and include the Abor, Dafla, Aka, Miri, Mishmi, Apa-Tani and other smaller groups.

In all of China, according to Zhuravlev's article, there are now 2,800,000 Tibetans. Less than half of these, or 1,273,969, live in Tibet







itself, including the Chamdo district. These Tibetans form an absolute majority of the people living in Tibet. The author says that in 1953, according to a Chinese source, there were 14 or 15,000 Chinese, Khuey and Mongols living in Tibet, mainly in the cities. A sizeable number of the Khuey live in Lhasa, while the population of the Dam (Valley of Choice) Valley, to the north of Lhasa, is Mongol in origin. Uygur cattle-breeders have come from Sinkiang into the north-western part of Tibet. The people living in the cities on the western and southern border of Tibet are related to their neighbours in India and Nepal, and are mainly traders. However, very little is yet known about the whole south-eastern part of Tibet and the southern parts of Chamdo district, except that there are some settlements of Lisu, Nasi, Nu and Dulun.

The great majority of the people in Tibet live in villages or follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic life with their herds of cattle. The urban population is comparatively small. In Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, there is a permanent resident population of 20-25,000. In Shigatsze there are 20,000. Kandin, the largest city in eastern Tibet, had 13,400 people in 1955.

Zhuravlev gives fairly detailed statistics on the number of Tibetans living in other parts of China. Many provinces have formed autonomous Tibetan districts where Tibetans form a majority of the population. Kansu Province had 204,632 Tibetans in 1956; Tsinghai Province has 516,180 Tibetans; Szechwan has 712,869; and Yunnan 66,893.

The distribution of Tibetans in Tibet is very uneven. The main part of the population is concentrated in the basin of the Tsangpo River, the principal agricultural zone of the country. The density of population for the whole of Tibet, excluding the southern valley, is less than one person per square kilometre. The south-western part of the country is almost uninhabited, and there are also unpopulated expanses in the north. In recent years new roads in the cattle-breeding areas has increased the number of villages. Most of the Tibetans live in valleys not over 4,500-4,800 metres above sea level.

The greater part of the other Tibetan nationalities live in China proper. The Sifan' group number 48,000, and 15,000 of these live in Yunnan Province. Most of the rest inhabit Szechwan Province. However, the author acknowledges that it is difficult to give precise details on the Sifan' (as with the Tszyazhun), since the Chinese do not ordinarily distinguish them from the Tibetans themselves. The Tszyazhun number approximately 70,000, and the Tsyan 35,660, and both are found primarily in Szechwan Province. The Nu ethnic group of Tibetans live mainly in Burma. On the Chinese side of the border they live predominantly on the Burmese border along the Nutszyan (Saluen) River, and in Yunnan Province, and number 12,737. There are only 2,592 known members of the Dulun

ethnic group in China, and almost all of these are in Yunnan Province. The Loba, numbering about 50,000, occupy a large area south-east of Lhasa and, as has been noted, include a number of smaller groups. The author stresses that the political history of this area is still "complicated", and that the state border between China and India in this area has not yet been precisely established.

Anthropologically, according to Zhuravlev, there are two main types of Tibetans, and the majority are linked with the northern Chinese. The first main group are tall in stature, and are found chiefly in the northern part of Tibet and China. The second are much shorter, resemble South Asian races, and are related to the Burmese. The whole history of Tibet, he continues, is inseparable from that of China as a whole. It is claimed that the links between ancient China and Tibet stretch back to many centuries B.C. In the 4th century A.D. Chinese culture began to expand in Tibet, and by the 7th century political, economic and cultural links between them were very close. The author cites as proof of the close historical links between China and Tibet the fact that the Tibetan language has taken much from the Chinese in every-day vocabulary connected with the daily life and economy of the Tibetans. Such a close connexion between them is mentioned as the basis for the incorporation of Tibet by China in the 13th century.

## II. Social Structure, Customs and Occupations

### The Tibetans

The author devotes 15 pages to a description of the ethnography of the Tibetans proper. He introduces this section with a description of some of the many names under which they are known. These names are based not only on the areas where they live, but also on their occupations. The two principal occupations of the Tibetans are agriculture and live-stock-breeding, though it is often hard to draw a clear line between the two. As a rule, Tibetan farmers keep cattle, while the cattle-breeders often grow grain crops. The main crops grown by Tibetan farmers are barley, wheat, oats, millet, buckwheat, and also smaller amounts of peas, mustard, maize and some rice. Much of Tibetan land is unsuitable for farming. The cattle-breeding areas lie mainly in the north and west, and also north of the Chamdo district and good pastures lie mainly at a height of 4-5,000 metres. Nomadic Tibetans have long been great cattle-breeders. The neat-cattle raised include especially the domestic yak and the tszo, the latter related to the yak, as well as sheep and horses. The tszo is a more docile and stronger animal, and is especially used for heavy field work. The Tibetans get the maximum use out of the yak. Its meat is used for food; the hair for felt and cloth; the dung for fuel; the skin for harnesses; and yak milk has a

high fat content and is especially good for making butter and cheese. In the north and west of Tibet sheep are also used as draught-animals. In former days the use of pasture land was a permanent source of disputes between families and tribes.

Many Tibetans also engaged in hunting, especially in the north and north-east. The range of animals hunted is extensive, and includes wild yak, antelopes, mountain rams, bears, wolves, foxes and marmots. Among the domestic industries are weaving, pottery, the casting of handicraft from bronze and copper; stone-work, etc.

With its seasonal and temporary population, Lhasa often numbers over 50,000 people, and it is the main market for the Tibetan artisans. Almost one-third of the population are artisans, and are united in guilds, each of which is headed by an elder. In the past most of the revenue went to the local government in taxes and as gifts on festivals. Besides Lhasa, the other cities in Tibet and other parts of China which have any considerable number of Tibetans are Shigatsze, G'yantsze, Tszetan, Tashigang, Tuksum, Batan and Kandin.

The Tibetans living in cities have houses, but nomadic cattle-breeders live mainly in tents. Tibetan farmers build their houses from rough stone, raw bricks, rammed earth and clay. There are variations in the types of houses from one district to another. Essentially, the Tibetan home has one to three floors. The lowest floor is usually for cattle and for storing foodstuffs; the second includes the kitchen and bedrooms; while the third floor is ordinarily a chapel. Only the second floor has any windows. The Tibetan house usually has a flat roof. The furniture is very simple, for those who have any. The nomads have a square or rectangular tent and a roof that is almost flat. The outer covering of the tent is made from the skin of the yak, which affords good protection from rain, snow and wind. Most tents include drawings of the Buddha and other objects reflecting the Lamaist culture.

The outer clothing of both the Tibetan male and female is called the chuba, a long gown with high collars and long wide sleeves. The chuba varies in quality depending on the owner and where he lives, and it is made of a heavier material in the winter. Today the Tibetan, especially the farmer, has more variety of local dress, often with widespread shirts, high standing collars and buckles. Most Tibetans, both men and women, wear their hair in plaits, and the women's hair is specially adorned for festivals.

The basic food of the Tibetan farmer is a dish called tszamba, which is based on barley, and often taken with tea, milk or chan, a kind of beer made from barley. Vegetable soups and flat cakes also form part of the diet, while meat is not generally eaten by farmers, though it is

by cattle-breeders. Not much fish, eggs or fowl are eaten by Tibetans, with fish mainly associated only with the poorer people. Tibetan nomads are wont to eat a large quantity of dairy products - butter, cheese, curds and sour milk. There is no established meal-time, and when Tibetans do eat, they do so from their own cups, which they carry around all the time.

Monogamy is the general practice among Tibetans, and the woman occupies an important role, often having the deciding voice in economic matters. Polygamy has been known, though usually only among the tribal leaders. Occasionally, for example, sisters had a common husband. One rare type of polyandry is known in Tibet, whereby a woman may be the wife of both the father and his son, when she is not the mother of the latter. This custom is almost exclusive to the Tszan people. Considerable detail is given in the article on Tibetan wedding and burial customs, which reflect ancient beliefs. Cremation is quite common, especially in the western part of the country. Usually only those with contagious diseases are buried in the earth. Only the highest personages, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, are embalmed. Generally the relations of the deceased and those participating in funeral ceremonies are considered "unclean", and have to undergo a cleansing.

Tibet itself is the place of origin and the centre of the practice of Lamaism, the religion of the Tibetans. It has almost completely replaced their ancient Bon religion, which was related to Shamanism, a religion based on belief in spirits and worship of the forces of nature. Until quite recently, however, the Bon religion occupied an important role in the worship of the Tszyan and Tszyazhun. Some details are given on the history and development of religion in Tibet, and also on some of the sects.

Zhuravlev's comments on the present-day hierarchy are worth translating, particularly because of recent events in the country:

"The leaders of the Lamaist hierarchy comprise a group of so-called 'incarnations' around whom are united numerous representatives of the clergy of different ranks. The highest hierarch of the Lamaist Church is the Dalai Lama, who is considered the 're-incarnation' of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara. The second person in the Lamaist Church is the Panchen Lama, considered the 'incarnation' of the Buddha Amitaba. If the Dalai Lama occupied himself with clerical as well as administrative affairs, the Panchen Lama was occupied mainly with religious matters. By tradition the older of them was considered the teacher of the younger. The Dalai Lama administered the rich and broad areas of Tibet, and therefore in secular relations he was more influential. In religious relations they were either considered equal with each other, or else the Panchen Lama was considered even higher than the Dalai Lama

as an incarnation of the Buddha, and not of the Bodhisattva, and as a person who came less into contact with secular affairs.

"The lamas, who comprise a significant part of the population of Tibet, live in numerous monasteries. The largest of these - Galdan, Braybun, Sera, Dashilkhunbo, are numbered in thousands of lamas. In the lesser monasteries they are numbered in tens. The whole mass of lamas lived from taxes and presents from the peasants, and the lamaist leaders owned great riches and exploited the labour not only of the peasants who were serfs, but also of the lamas of lower levels. Of course, this does not mean that Lamaism on the whole is not a parasitical stratum, living at the expense of the working people.

"Lamaism in the first stage of its existence had a positive significance, aiding the development and preservation of culture, but recently its reactionary essence came to the fore. Lamaism was the reliable support of feudalism in Tibet, while the narcotic of religion facilitated the keeping of the peasants in obedience to the feudal lords."

The section on the Tibetans ends with a description of some of the Tibetan national holidays and the ceremonies connected with them.

### The Sifan'

Unlike the Tibetans proper, Zhuravlev admits that there is little information on the other ethnic groups and nationalities of the Tibetan peoples, and the material on these is considerably shorter. The Russians consider the Sifan' to be an ethnic group of the Tibetans, while the Chinese, as a rule, do not distinguish them from the Tibetans. The author cites some of the names used for the Sifan', and points out several of the similarities and differences in the languages of the Sifan' and Tibetans.

Farming is the main occupation of the Sifan', and cattle-breeding the next. Farming is carried out in the valleys and mountains, and the chief crops are buckwheat, millet, dry rice and some wheat. Sheep, horses and neat-cattle are bred, and many of the Sifan' are also engaged in fishing, hunting, herb-gathering, making iron and wood objects, and weaving. According to the author, the land used to be owned by large landowners, and the peasants were constantly in debt and in personal dependence on the family of the landowner. Many of them were bought and sold.

Mountain land was considered collective property of a whole village. The inhabitants, with the permission of the village elders, uprooted trees and worked parts of the land for periods of five years, without

making any payment for its use. After five years the land went to the use of all the residents of the village, but the scale of rent for its utilization was one-half of that for the land of the landowner. The rent filled the general village coffers, but a significant part of it went to the elders. Formerly not only farming and cattle-breeding, but also hunting, fishing, trade and all other activities were subject to state taxes. The local authorities forbade the residents of the village to sow rice, and the development of handicrafts was also strictly controlled. According to Zhuravlev, the Kuomintang policy of national oppression hindered the social and economic development of Sifan' territories. Feudal land-ownership, he asserts, was abolished "only as a result of the agrarian reform carried out after the Liberation".

Sifan' housing is very similar to that of the Tibetans. The clothing, because of the long contact with both the Tibetans and Chinese, was a combination of the two, especially men's wear. Women's clothing shows more local variations. The Sifan' diet is also similar to the Tibetans, but, unlike the latter, and despite the laws of Lamaism, the Sifan' eat more fish. The Sifan' are mainly a monogamous people, though until recently a man had to marry his brother's widow, even if he were already married. The majority of the Sifan' are Lamaists, though some practise the Bon religion. Once again, some information is given on the ceremonies and national holidays of the Sifan'.

### The Tszzyazhun

The Tszzyazhun, according to some legends, Zhuravlev writes, are not native to their present dwelling places. It is believed by some that nearly 600 years ago their ancestors lived in an area north of Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Later, at the invitation of the Chinese authorities, they migrated south where, in return for services in the wars against tribes unfriendly to the Chinese, they were given land west of the Min'tszyan river. Then troops of feudal China drove the Tszzyazhun from the valleys to the mountains. Other legends give different explanations to the movements of this people.

The Tszzyazhun also are engaged mainly in farming and cattle-breeding, and are particularly adept at building dams and irrigation canals. They grow wheat, barley, maize, buckwheat and vegetables, and in the past they used to grow opium poppy. The livestock-breeders breed yaks, neat-cattle, short horses, goats and pigs, and in the autumn and winter hunting is a favourite occupation. Many people are engaged in weaving, and some are known for their ability to make weapons.

Tszyazhun houses are usually made of stone, are two stories high, and have a gable roof. The ground floor, as in the Tibetan house, is for cattle, and the upper for living. If there is a third floor, it is used as a chapel. Their settlements have from 50 to 100 houses, and are located on mountain slopes. Each village has one or two stone towers, 18 to 20 metres high, which formerly were used to warn the villagers of approaching enemies. The dress is similar to that of Tibet, with the chuba, breeches and shirts. Tszamba and vegetables form the main part of their diet, in addition to meat, milk and butter. Unlike other Tibetans, the Tszyazhun readily eat eggs.

The people are essentially monogamous. In the past polygamy was practised among the leaders. Girls marry at the age of 18-19, and men at 20. The wedding takes place with the consent of the parents, and the uncle of the betrothed acts as match-maker. After the wedding the bride returns to her parents' home for a few months, before going to live in the husband's home. Women are very much respected, and have an equal say with men in many aspects of their life. The Bon religion is more common among the Tszyazhun, and there are many animistic features in their beliefs. Their New Year ceremonies have links with the nature cult. On the whole, despite the similarity of the historical development of the Sifan' and Tszyazhun, the differences between them are quite clearly marked.

### The Tsyau

The Tsyau are one of the larger of the Tibetan nationalities. They also practise farming and cattle-breeding, and live in the mountains. Most of their settlements are 1,500-3,000 metres above sea level, and their arable lands lie in the river valleys. Their main crops are tsinko (a type of grain), millet, wheat, buckwheat, maize, potatoes, hemp, tobacco and walnuts, and horned cattle and pigs are bred. They used to be one of the most backward nationalities of China, especially in their farming methods. The Tsyau are also a monogamous people. Until they marry, the girls have considerable sexual freedom. The Tsyau woman is greatly respected, and before the "Liberation" many of them even headed tribes. Bon and Lamaism are practised, and the cult of mountain spirits is very strong.

### The Nu

The Nu are one of the smallest of the Tibetan nationalities. On their irrigated fields they grow wheat, millet, oats, rye, beans and vegetables, and especially maize and buckwheat. Hunting is as important an occupation as farming among them, and they hunt wild animals and birds. They do not breed cattle, but fishing is popular. The family is

very important among the Nu, though in more recent years territorial links have tended to replace the family in importance. Tattooing is a common practice among them.

The basic food is a porridge made from maize, and they also eat vegetables, meat of wild animals and birds, and fish. They drink a beer made from grain, in addition to yet stronger drinks. The nature cult is very strong among the Nu.

An interesting feature among them is the influence of the Roman Catholics; Roman Catholic missionaries have long lived with the Nu, and Catholicism has spread "using the local forms of beliefs". According to Zhuravlev, the missionaries have kindled enmity between the Nu Catholics and Lamaists which on occasion has caused armed conflicts. However, he continues, "after the Liberation these discords completely disappeared."

#### The Dulun

The Dulun are a small nationality located partly in the province of Yunnan, and living mainly in the border areas of Burma. They engage chiefly in agriculture, and their main crops are maize, rice, tsinko, millet, buckwheat, oats, vegetables and root-crops. Their principal domestic livestock are pigs. Bulls, for sacrificial purposes and for meat, are obtained from their neighbours. Hens are kept by some, and fishing and hunting are important occupations. Before the "Liberation" each family made its own essential domestic articles. Previously Dulun land was divided among families and was the property of a family as a whole. Some Dulun families worked the land in a kind of collective. The main food is a type of porridge made of maize, as well as barley, millet, buckwheat, rice, oats and vegetables. They eat the flesh of wild animals, pigs and bulls, but only on days of sacrifices and at the completion of a successful hunt. Exogamy, or marriage outside the tribe, is common, and families are linked by strict rules resulting usually in a three-family union. The Duluns are essentially spirit worshippers.

#### The Loba

As noted earlier, the term "Loba" is used to include the population of areas which have not been studied in detail on both sides of the Chinese-Indian border at the junction of Tibet and the Chamdo region with Assam. The Loba include the Abor, Dafla, Aka, Miri, Mishmi, Apantani and some other less known groups. The Tibetans call the area where the Loba dwell "Loyul", which probably explains the term "Lo-yuy" formerly used for the Loba. In the present article the description of

the various groups united under the name Loba is fairly general, though some information is given on each of them, including data on their names, occupations and customs.

### III. Author's Conclusions

Within Tibet, the author notes, the Tibetans have an absolute predominance, and other nationalities, which have settled chiefly in the cities, are not numerous. In China, however, for various historical reasons over a long period, the Tibetans were separated into various groups. The national consolidation of the Tibetans was prevented, and until recently, the "feudal landlord structure" was maintained even in Tibet. Family and tribal relations among the Tibetan nomads also hindered this process of consolidation. At the same time, Zhuravlev notes that there is a known community of basic features common to all Tibetans, and he expresses his hope and belief that future ethnographic research will be able to make further distinctions among the sub-groups, and also solve the problem of the ethnogenesis of the Tibetans.

He points out again that at present the Chinese do not distinguish the Tszyazhun and Sifan' from the Tibetans proper, although their cultures have retained many peculiarities not characteristic of Tibetan culture. These distinctions are explained, he continues, by their proceeding from their ethnogenesis and the cultural inter-actions of the groups with other nationalities in the course of historical development. After examining the fundamental features of the material and spiritual cultures of the two groups, as well as their languages, he comes to the following conclusions. He feels it to be proven that the Tszyazhun and Sifan' are definitely independent nationalities of the Tibetan linguistic group. These two peoples, in the course of historical development, were constantly in contact with the Tibetans themselves. The process of ethnic consolidation of the Tszyazhun, Sifan' and Tibetans has not yet been completed by means of the merging (sliyaniye) of all these groups into one nationality, but is in accordance with the degree of their national development at the present time.

One of the main obstacles to a strengthening of ethnic consolidation, Zhuravlev asserts, is the continued preservation of the family tribal structure among the nomadic cattle-breeders of the Nu, Dulun and Loba nationalities, especially the latter two. The author suggests that this structure is now being "liquidated". Fragmentary evidence that is available shows that the process of formation of the Tsyan, Tszyazhun and Sifan' nationalities differed considerably. It is believed, for example, that the ancestors of the Sifan' were caught up in the stream of the Mongol conquerors, and migrated in the 13th century

to their present location in Yunnan from the most northern areas of China, and here they mixed with the local population. Linguistic data and ethnographic information (e.g. details of clothing and housing), make it possible to suggest that the Tsz'yazhun also are not indigenous to their present location, though the ethnogenesis of the Tsyau and Tsz'yazhun, who have more similarities in economy and culture, has much in common.

In the Nu culture, and even more with the Dulun and Loba nationalities, there are a considerable number of peculiarities in culture as compared with the northern Tibetan groups. Zhuravlev cites as examples the customs of tattooing and the burial from side to side in painful positions of the Nu and Dulun. Pile-housing, identified among the Dulun, as well as other customs, link them with nationalities of the Burmese group. Apart from language, in fact, it might even be thought that the Duluns have little in common with the Tibetan peoples of China, and belong more by their ethnogenesis and culture to the Burmese people. At the same time there is a high degree of ethnic similarity between the Dulun and Nu nationalities. Some features of the Loba culture (e.g. pig-breeding) also link this people with the Burmese. The author does not exclude the possibility that future research will link the Loba more closely ethnologically with the Burmese than with the Tibetans, though it is certain that they have long had close cultural and economic relations with the latter.

Zhuravlev acknowledges that the Dulun and Loba belong to a different historical and ethnographic sub-group from the Tibetans, Tsyau, Sifan' and Tsz'yazhun. However, peculiar traits which link them with neighbouring Burmese peoples cannot be explained only by fairly similar geographic conditions in the areas where they live and approximately the same level of social and economic development or long-time cultural contact, for these peculiarities present a limited unity. In this light the author sees all the more clearly the need for a complete study of the culture and language of these nationalities, to ascertain the earliest links of the Tibetan and Burmese nationalities and to note how and where they settled in the distant past.

#### IV. Tibet in Recent Years

Zhuravlev's final section is devoted to changes in Tibet since the Communists took full control in 1951. He admits that since the formation of the Chinese People's Republic the life of the Tibetan nationalities has changed very much. He claims that the national policy of the Chinese Communist party is one of "strict differentiation of approach to each nationality, considering the specific needs of their historical,

social, economic and cultural development." He asserts that the Communists are seeking to solve the national question in China by "giving national autonomy to the national minorities". The first step taken in the economic development of Tibet "after the peaceful Liberation in 1951" was the beginning of large-scale road-building. All the more important cities of the region are now linked by road with the internal areas of the country.

The new roads are credited with facilitating "the liquidation of the economic seclusion" of Tibet. Inhabitants of the cities and villages, as well as the cattle-breeders, now buy industrial goods from China, and they provide wool, leather, furs, carpets and medicinal raw materials for the country. The growth of trade with the central areas of China has resulted in a lowering of retail prices in Tibet for essential goods. Zhuravlev notes that the new roads enable Chinese scholars, doctors, veterinarians (though not troops!) and technical equipment to go to Tibet, while Tibetan youths go to Peking and other Chinese cities to study.

The author continues to praise alleged improvements in Tibet in farming methods, irrigation works, utilization of virgin lands, the creation of agricultural experimental stations to develop new crops, and the construction of industrial enterprises, including hydroelectric stations. By 1956, Zhuravlev asserts, 1,000 Tibetan workers were employed in Lhasa, and all these changes occurred within "the feudal theocratic structure".

On 22 April 1956 a Preparatory Committee for the creation of a Tibetan autonomous oblast was set up, and this area was to include the Chamdo district. According to Zhuravlev, "a group of reactionaries, large landlords and feudal lords who were in the local Tibetan government, hindered its democratization, until in March 1959 it started an open armed mutiny against the Chinese People's Republic." The author claims the end of the mutiny of what he calls "traitors to the motherland" resulted in a speeding up of the "democratization" of Tibet and brought nearer the beginning of socialist construction. On 17 July 1959 the second session of the Preparatory Committee decided to carry out "democratic reforms", and at the present time, he claims, democratic reforms have been just about completed in the agricultural areas. Lands to the extent of 2,800,000 mu\* has been given to some 800,000 former serfs and laves, and this has come from land confiscated from the "mutineers" and bought from feudal lords who did not take part in the rebellion. In areas populated by Tibetans in the Kansu, Tsinghai, Szechwan and Yunnan Provinces of China, autonomous districts and

---

\* 15 mu = 1 hectare

provinces were created. By September 1958 the creation of people's communes was completed in Kansu and Tsinghai Provinces, and the formation of such communes among the farmers of Szechwan and Yunnan is also progressing rapidly. In many regions of the Abas Tibetan autonomous district, for example, where agriculture is most highly developed, 31 people's communes, uniting 24.75 per cent of all the farm households, had been formed by 1 October 1958.

In what might be an indirect way of suggesting that communes are not the highest type of agricultural organization, Zhuravlev notes that "the transfer to higher forms of organization of agricultural production (agricultural productive cooperatives of a higher type, people's communes)" makes it possible for farmers to make the best use of the available agricultural machines, to raise the productivity of the fields, and to increase the area of arable land.

In the areas of Tsinghai, Kansu and Szechwan Provinces which are populated by Tibetan cattle-breeders, "the process of creating people's communes is going on, or the formation of cooperatives of a higher type has already been completed." At the same time cattle-breeders are tending to give up their nomadic way of life and to live in settled communities. The communes are organizing enterprises for the processing of livestock products. Members of the communes and cooperatives are cultivating and watering the pastures, building permanent shelters for the cattle and preparing feed for the winter. Workers in the veterinary stations are advertising the best methods for curing cattle diseases; as a result, the number of cattle has increased. Some data is also given on the creation of industrial enterprises and steps being taken towards the formation of a Tibetan working-class.

The same methods of collectivization of agricultural life have been applied to other Tibetan nationalities. Among the Tsyans, for example, an agricultural cooperative was formed in 1955, and in 1957 it was transformed into "an artel of a higher degree", uniting 88 of the 93 households in one village. This has resulted, the author asserts, in an increase in the cultivation of unused land and in an increased production of grain. By the end of 1958 more than 90 per cent of the peasant households in three regions were united into "agricultural cooperatives of a higher type". By the beginning of 1959 in the autonomous region of Maoven' more than 15,000 Tsyans peasant households had entered people's communes, "and along this path go all the Tibetan nationalities of China". From 1959, it is pointed out, the Tibetans of Tibet itself "are also following this path" (of people's communes).

Zhuravlev notes steps taken to give improved agricultural equipment to the various Tibetan nationalities, as well as monetary help for developing the economy. The Communist government is also starting to

build national schools and cultural centres and helping to end malaria which is endemic in some areas.

In concluding, the author claims that mutual relations between Tibetans and the Chinese and "other brotherly people" of the country have been strengthened, and a process of "ethnic consolidation within the Tibetan nationalities" is being intensified, with the purpose of breaking down the family and tribal branches "which had been holding them in". It is claimed that the Tibetans of China are enjoying the fruits "of the liquidation of the feudal landlord order, and wide democratic reforms" as part of "the greater sweep of the construction of socialism."

## THE DICTATORSHIP OF REZA SHAH

In 1956 CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW\* commented on the relatively meagre attention paid by Soviet writers to events in Persia from 1921 onwards. A recent work which amounts to a full-scale study of the coup d'état of 1921 and of Reza Khan's unpredicted rise to power on the morrow of that episode is thus deserving of careful notice. This is O.S. Melikov's USTANOVLENIYE DIKTATORY REZA-SHAKHA V IRANE (The Establishment of Reza Shah's Dictatorship in Iran) published under the general editorship of M.V. Popov by the AN/SSSR, Institut Narodov Azii, Moscow, 1961. Within the compass of 120 pages supplemented by copious notes, the author tells the story of five years from the collapse of the national liberation movement in the northern provinces in 1921 until the coronation of the first of the Pahlavis in April 1926. The book is made up of a preface, introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The chapter headings are: Coup d'État 21 February 1921; The Consolidation of Reactionary Forces and Intensification of the Struggle for Power; The Republican Movement 1924; Policy of Centralization; Denouement of the Qajars and Accession of Reza Shah Pahlavi.

The authorities consulted, Persian, English and Soviet, are broadly classified in the Preface; and specifically acknowledged wherever they are quoted in the body of the volume. The press of Persia has been widely laid under contribution and on more pages than not there is something from one or other of such newspapers as SETAREYE-IRAN, SHAFaq-E SORKH, IRAN, SETAREYE-SORKH, NEHZAT E SHARQ. Here Melikov anticipates objection with a warning that many journals in those years failed to distinguish truth from rumour and that others by no means reflected public opinion. In illustration of this he tells us further on how the editor of SETAREYE-IRAN was given the bastinado and "afterwards became an ardent defender of Reza Khan". Among historical works "which did not begin to appear until the 40s" the debt is expressed first and foremost to Husayn Makki's massive and still unfinished TWENTY YEARS IN PERSIA'S HISTORY; then to the SHORT HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PERSIA by Malek Eshsho'ra Bahar; and to two essays by Ali Azri, "The Revolt of Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan in Khorasan" and "The Revolt of Shaykh Mohammad Khyabani in Tabriz". Actually, not only these but Abul Fazl Qasemi's BLACK STORY and Ali Basri's MEMOIRS OF REZA SHAH are freely drawn upon in the text itself.

---

\* CAR, 1956, No.3, "Persia", p.316.

In the English language there is the daily press, especially THE TIMES which Melikov calls "rich in factual information and besides a helpful exponent of the real imperialistic essence of Britain's policy in Persia." Of self-contained works in English "a book by J. Balfour" takes pride of place in the Preface; but Conolly, Elwell-Sutton, Fischer, Haas, Lambton, Lenczowski and Millspaugh are quoted in the succeeding chapters. Turning to the Soviet orientalists, Melikov observes that the political struggle for mastery in the years 1921-5 has so far received inadequate treatment. He admits that the period has latterly come in for correct assessment by such scholars as M.S. Ivanov, M.V. Popov, and A.V. Bashkirov "but no research has been done into the actual course of the struggle, its stages and the forces engaged." The Preface ends with a tribute to M.N. Ivanova "whose valuable guidance contributed to the appearance of the work in its present shape." Not here mentioned but named in later pages are N. Bobynin and V. Gurko-Kryazhin.

### Introductory

The story of the Jangalis and of the short-lived Soviet Republic of Gilan lies outside the scope of the book, but this and other aspects of the "national liberation movement" are introduced briefly so as to make the background more intelligible. The author well describes how Persia, the meeting-place of Turkey and the Entente, although nominally neutral, became a battlefield in the Great War and emerged financially ruined and politically a prey to anarchy. The treasury, thanks to the wartime effect on customs and tax-collection, was empty; and in much of the territory the writ of the Government had ceased to run. Partisan armies came into being which were "too often led by representatives of the exploiting classes" and also "frequently served one or other of the belligerents". The Jangalis were the best organized of these partisans and by 1917 controlled a great deal of Gilan. In Melikov's account of them the "guidance" (see above) of Madame Ivanova is visible. They do not, it is made clear, deserve a good certificate, owing partly to the open betrayal of the cause by their leaders Kuchek Khan and Ehsanollah and partly to leftist deviation (Soltan Zadeh is never mentioned by name) in the leadership of the Persian Communist party. But they did "contribute to the revolutionary ferment and prepare the ground for a popular anti-imperialist, anti-feudal agitation." Not very much is said about the Persian Communist party, but the services of Haydar Khan Amu Ogly, secretary of the Central Committee, are lauded and we are also told of its first Congress in June 1930 and of the programme there adopted.

The February, and still more the October Revolution, Melikov insists had made a lasting impression. Instead of Tsarist Russia. . .

"that enemy of the peoples of the colonized and dependent countries. . . arose the Soviet regime, friendly to all oppressed peoples." Russian soldiers on Persian soil were "direct conductors" of revolutionary ideas. "The formation of soviets in units of the Russian Army was an example to the populace in Tabriz, Kermanshah, Resht, and other towns to create their own anjomans." Of military action by the Red Army as distinct from ideological precept, the reader is told next to nothing. But for two sentences in the whole book he might be pardoned for thinking that there were no Soviet troops in Persia during the happenings in Gilan in 1920-1. One of those sentences reveals the landing of a Bolshevik force at Anzali in the summer of 1920. The other attributes the evacuation of British troops (February 1921) to the compelling fact that the Soviet Government decided to withdraw theirs. Meantime British military operations are in these pages the target of bitter condemnation. The maintenance of the South Persia Rifles and the arrival of the columns from Mesopotamia and India under Generals Dunsterville and Malleon respectively are held to be proof positive of Britain's plan of outright annexation.\* To Melikov as to other Soviet students of Persian affairs the British by definition are aggressors. Therefore when Curzon declares the goal of H.M. Government to be the independence of Persia, he is guilty of "bombast" and "hypocrisy"; but a strikingly similar declaration by the Soviet of People's Commissars on another page is accepted at its face value.

The same want of objectivity leads to distortion in the account given of the Soviet-Persian Agreement of 1921. Melikov praises the "equitable" provisions of that treaty - the ones revoking the concessions which had been made to the Tsars - but omits to mention Article 6 (which contemplates the circumstances in which Soviet troops would be entitled to enter the territory of Persia), or to explain that both this Article and Article 5 were modified in Persia's favour by an exchange of letters which followed the signing of the treaty. This important correspondence, which forms an inseparable part of the Treaty, has also been omitted from the otherwise full text contained in the handbook of Persia, SOVREMENNYI IRAN, published in Moscow in 1957.

---

\* An article by L.I. Miroshnikov ("Anglo-Indian Troops in Persia, Transcaucasia and Turkestan, 1914-20", KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XXXV, 1959) which was reviewed in CAR, 1960, No.3, pp.296-8, made the same charges. A reply, giving the reasons for and deployment of the small force of Anglo-Indian troops in Persia, by a student of the period who was a member of the Malleon Mission in Persia, was published in CAR, 1961, No.1, pp.78-82.

## Coup d'État 1921

If the double-dealing of Kuchek Khan and Ehsanollah, and deviation within the Persian Communist party undermined the national liberation movement, this did not collapse, Melikov finds, until the British threw their weight against it, furnishing military technique, bombing towns with their aircraft and generally stiffening the stand of the reactionaries. The upper commercial bourgeoisie, we read, which initially sided with the movement had quickly dropped it, and presently even the middle and petty bourgeoisie and small landlords fell away. "They wanted" (here at least Melikov is sympathetic) "political stability and the sooner the better." The British, he goes on now "adjusted themselves", being astute enough to perceive that a more "liberal" government offered the best way out. But no government strong enough to impose order had a chance of being set up except by means of a coup d'état. This, therefore, the British proceeded to effect, choosing as their instrument Sayyed Ziaoddin, editor of the Tehran newspaper Râd. The Cossack Division stationed at Qazvin was to carry it out; and of the three officers considered for command a Colonel Reza Khan was selected. As the Qazvin Cossacks arrived outside Tehran, British troops were moved nearer the scene, "Reza Khan having enlisted the support of Ironside. . . in case of complications." The plot worked smoothly, and the Tehran garrison surrendered without resistance. It remained for the Shah to charge Ziaoddin with the formation of a new Government. Reza Khan received the designation of Sardar Sepah (Commander-in-Chief).

Ziaoddin is stated to be the paid agent of the British at whose bidding he endeavoured, however unsuccessfully, to thwart Soviet-Persian accord. On assuming office, says Melikov, he made much of his determination to liquidate the still unratified Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, but this was "by agreement" with the British themselves. He made political capital out of the evacuation of British troops in 1921 which was really due to Soviet Russia's lead in withdrawing her own. He promised a fair deal for peasants and workers simply because the revolutionary movement in the North was still in full swing. The portrait is without any redeeming feature. Before the 93 days of his "Black Cabinet" ended, Ziaoddin had become odious to governing circles, writes Melikov, and had outlived his usefulness to the British.

## The Consolidation of Reactionary Forces: Intensification of the Struggle for Power

Under this heading the author examines the period dominated by Qavam os Saltaneh but in which the authority of Reza Khan was being increasingly asserted. He quotes Makki as saying that the British had proposed the Sardar Sepah (Reza Khan) as successor to Ziaoddin but that

Ahmad Shah, the monarch, objected; whereupon the choice came round to Qavam. The latter, Melikov describes as the sole rival of Reza Khan - and a dangerous one, "being both close to the Court and, as a big land-owner, connected intimately with the feudalists." Qavam was backed, moreover, by the clerics led by Modarres. In his diplomacy he is classed as pro-American (while not ceasing to co-operate with the British); and anti-Russian, putting the brake on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in all sorts of ways, and destined to play a "wicked role" in the Second World War.

Reza Khan, retaining his post as Commander-in-Chief was also War Minister through this phase and soon used his position to force the civil administration of the country into a military frame. He also learned, as we are told, how to curry favour with the masses by the seizure of grain and its distribution to the poor. These were hardly measures to commend themselves to "the last of the great feudalists" (Qavam), and although the two men came together to stamp out the revolutionary movement, including Colonel Taqi Khan's revolt in Khorasan, it was obvious that one of them must yield. Which of them it was to be hinged on the issue of the "struggle behind the scenes" throughout this time between the feudalists and the landowner-bourgeois bloc. As soon as the bloc was strong enough to control a majority of the Deputies, Qavam had to go.

This did not mean that Reza Khan automatically received the support of the bloc; on the contrary the bloc would not agree to his becoming prime minister, preferring Mustafi ol Mamalek who was more to the left. There were lessons here, and Melikov records how Davar, Taymurtash and others taught Reza Khan to see that he must himself control the Majles, and to this end must get his own men elected in the forthcoming elections. (The parliament was due for dissolution in June 1923.) The method he chose was to identify himself with the Tajaddod - which Melikov likens to the National Republican party in Turkey - in the electoral campaign. The elections are described as being shamelessly manipulated, the Communists, Trade Unionists and workers being excluded. "But the British Imperialists participated." Before the end of 1923 Reza Khan had arrested Qavam for alleged conspiracy, taken office as prime minister, and pressed Ahmad Shah into going abroad.

#### The Republican Movement 1924

It would be wrong, Melikov considers, to think of Reza Khan as a "third force" waiting to go over to one of the contending camps. His line was to discredit the dynasty and, having done that, to demonstrate to all the representatives of established order that their interests could be defended only by a military dictatorship. Thus we see him extending the hand of conciliation to the (so-called) socialists under

Solayman Mirza and to the feudalists on the extreme right. The procedure was to convince everybody from great landowner down to petty functionary that the Qajars were bad; and then to insinuate the advantages of a republic. Our author quotes Makki to show that the British Legation and Reza Khan suborned the press in concert. The Majles hedged on the question of the monarchy and appealed to the religious hierarchy at Qom to mediate. Reza Khan's solution was to go to Qom himself and there get the clergy's assent to the painless removal of the Qajars. On his return he made a dramatic announcement calling upon the nation to abandon the idea of a republic. Melikov reproduces the appeal as it appeared in SETAREYE-IRAN on 1 April 1924. Strictly speaking, he observed, it was no volte face; for Reza Khan had never orally advocated a republic nor inwardly desired it.

Having "foamed at the mouth" for a republic, papers, parties and agitators overnight changed their tone. The item "Republic" was "taken off the agenda" but the item "Down with the Qajars" stayed on the order sheet. It could be predicted that the about-turn would occasion a government crisis. After lengthy consultation with Havard (the Counsellor at the British Legation), Reza Khan's next move was to put about this decision to resign because of intrigue against his measures of reform. The bought press and déclassé elements clamoured shrilly for the retention of the "national hero"; the generals demanded it with menacing alternatives; and the Majles adopted an almost unanimous vote of confidence.

Melikov adds that after Reza Khan's consultation with Havard, the press treated the Soviet Union to an outbreak of calumny, and there followed such cruel reprisals against the trade unions and Communist party that by the autumn (1924) the latter was driven underground.

### Policy of Centralization

Melikov here alludes to the centrifugal tendency which through the years had brought many tribal chieftains to a status of virtual independence. It was a tendency, it is argued, which had suited the book of Britain, but one which no dictator could tolerate; and so the British, in giving Reza Khan their backing were bound to withhold it from the tribes. The last decisive stage in the contest was the blow struck at Shaykh Khazal (of Mohammareh). The agreements of this ruler with Britain "had made all South-West Persia into a de facto Protectorate". The immediate occasion of conflict according to Melikov was the refusal of the Shaykh to pay the taxes which the American adviser Millspaugh had been instructed to collect. Khazal's reply was the following telegram to Reza Khan: "I flatly decline to acknowledge you as president of the Council of Ministers because you are a usurper. For no reason whatever you have banished from the country her rightful and constitutional Shah,

have occupied the capital and laid hands on the armed forces of the State." Faisal of Iraq promised friendly neutrality, but Ahmad Shah responded from Europe with a diplomatic wait-and-see. Thirty-five thousand tribesmen mustered at Ahvaz.

Reza Khan set out for Khuzstan. He halted en route at Isfahan and at Shiraz and "in these towns had talks with the British Consular representatives. He proceeded to Bushire where, after some desultory skirmishes, word unexpectedly came from Khazal that he was ready to submit. The surrender of numerically superior forces, well equipped with artillery and launches, without a blow is attributed to the fact that the British let their henchman down. Gurko-Kryazhin's assertion in his KRATKAYA ISTORIYA PERSII (Short History of Persia) that Khazal's capitulation was a defeat for British imperialism is consequently pronounced to be wide of the mark.

The process of centralization was pushed to its conclusion. The Soviet historian here pauses to reflect on the cruelty of a policy which involved the compulsory transfer and conversion into settlers of tens of thousands of nomads; Kuris being sent to Khorasan, southern tribesmen to central regions and Turcomans to the south.

#### Overthrow of the Qajars and Accession of Reza Shah Pahlavi

Reza Shah began the year 1925 by being nominated Supreme Commander - a post hitherto reserved for the Shah. A widespread failure of the crops that season led to starvation and disease, which he turned to full use, harnessing his "bloc" and the Tajaddod party to a demagogic programme of popular redress which should involve the revision of the Constitution by a Constituent Assembly. Even the opposition under Modarres was by now convinced that Reza Khan alone stood between them and revolution. There was a visit by the courtiers to San Remo in a final forlorn effort to put the Shah back. Any such prospect was destroyed by Reza Khan's resourceful demagogy, and the "bait" laid in the shape of portfolios for the Shah's supporters.

Melikov relates how until autumn the Majles went on pretending nothing was afoot. A group of Deputies then tabled a motion that "this House in the name of the well-being of the people declares in favour of the dethronement of the Qajar dynasty, and entrusts the interim government within the framework of the Constitution and the existing law to Reza Shah Pahlavi." The debate is summarized from the report in the newspaper IRAN on 1 September 1925. Modarres, Taqizadeh and Mosaddeq were among the few who objected to the cut-and-dried choice of Reza Khan as Shah. Davar denied any such implication: "Nothing of the sort. It will be for the Constituent Assembly to decide." Then after a bit he resumed, "When

Mr. Pahlavi is Shah - as of course he will be. . ." Davar spoke for the House, and the motion was carried by 80 votes to 5.

There were no external complications: Great Britain and the USA hastened to recognize the coup. Since it is not unusual to blame Britain for Reza Khan's accession to power, it is noteworthy that Melikov never says, or implies, that the British were in the plot.

Elections were held for a Constituent Assembly under the procedure laid down for those to the Majles. They resembled the latter, too, says Melikov, in excluding the working masses, and in being rigged. The Constituent Assembly had practically nothing to do except discuss whether the Pahlavis were to have the title Shah or Shah en Shah. Reza Shah took the oath on December 15 and was crowned on April 25, 1925.

### Conclusion

Looking back upon the struggle between the two exploiting classes (feudal-clerical on one side, landowner-bourgeois bloc on the other), Melikov finds that the issue ultimately turned on how far one or other camp secured the support or friendly neutrality of the people (meaning the working classes). In fact the reader is scarcely prepared for this conclusion. In the story itself the people have at every turn been cheated or persecuted, or at best left out by those in authority. Melikov is more in character when he goes on to remark that the two camps composing the top set feared the people, had no difference of principle among each other, and were joined economically; and that their struggle was "conciliatory" and incapable of producing social change. Pahlavi and Qajar relied on identical social cadres. The dictatorship of Reza Khan did not, the writer states, address itself to the fundamental problem, which was agrarian: on the contrary it preserved the feudal or semi-feudal productive relations; and by the same token it gave no lead to capital development which from 1925 onwards was "lopsided and half-hearted". It did not, he emphasizes, mean that the bourgeoisie had yet come into power.

Judgments on Reza Shah passed by the Persian Communist party are quoted with approval. He is "the bitterest enemy of the political freedom of the workers and peasants"; he is "the incarnation of the regime of feudal-clerical reaction who is, and will be, the definite champion of British imperialism;" and he is "the careerist-adventurer who has tied the State to the military interests of England."

The verdict in the last two pages of the book is that the new regime suited the anti-Soviet designs of the British and the Americans. "The dictatorship of Reza Shah was calculated to ensure the conversion of Persia into a base for aggression against the Soviet Union."

## T H E   C O N T R O L   O F   O I L   I N   P A K I S T A N

In a recent article entitled "Foreign Oil Monopolies in Pakistan" (VNESHNYAYA TORGOVLYA, 1962, No.3), Yu. Yershov attacks the role which foreign oil companies are alleged to be playing in Pakistan. He accuses Western oil companies and their governments of seeking to prevent the discovery and development of Pakistan's oil resources in order to keep prices abnormally high. The recent Soviet-Pakistani agreement on oil prospecting is praised and compared favourably with earlier agreements with American, British and Dutch companies.

According to Yershov, oil production in Pakistan has been largely in the hands of the British companies Attock Oil, Pakistan Petroleum and Pakistan Oil-fields, which are described as being closely linked with the "British monopolies" - the Burmah Oil Co. and the Anglo-Dutch group Royal Dutch Shell. The Pakistan Government and private entrepreneurs own only 30 per cent of the joint stock capital of the two latter British companies, and have no control in their affairs. The British company Pakistan Petroleum also controls the extraction of natural gas. The refining of oil extracted in Pakistan is carried out in the refinery belonging to the British Attock Oil Company, one of the same firms responsible for its production.

It is further claimed that both foreign and internal trade in oil products on the Pakistani market is monopolized by the ancillary companies of the British firms Burmah Oil and the Anglo-Dutch group Royal Dutch Shell: the Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Company of Pakistan and Burmah Oil Company (Pakistan Trading), and also two American monopolies, Standard Vacuum and Caltex. These companies also own a large tanker fleet, which controls the shipping of fuel oil to Pakistan; a huge storage system in the largest ports of the country (Karachi and Chittagong); pipes for the unloading of tankers in these ports; and, finally, a network of oil storage tanks, trading bases and filling stations throughout the country. These same companies also carry on coaling operations in the ports of Pakistan, and the refuelling of aircraft.

It is said that these oil companies operate through a large number of agents and dealers, who use their own "agents", the retailers, to sell oil products to the consumers. Burmah Shell alone had 660 such agents and dealers in 1960.

Yershov asserts that British and American "monopolies" cooperate closely in Pakistan. They are both considered as participants in an international oil cartel, and they are alleged to have divided the Indian market, particularly the areas now forming Pakistan, among themselves as far back as the late 1920s. Each of the companies in Pakistan is supposed to have established a quota for the sale of oil products. At present, Yershov claims, British and Dutch financiers control 60 per cent of the trade in fuel oil in Pakistan, while the remaining portion is controlled by American companies.

Because of this concentration of all supply channels of fuel oil in Pakistan in these few foreign oil monopolies, Yershov says, the companies receive very high profits in all spheres of their activities, beginning with the production of crude oil and culminating in the foreign and internal trade in refined products. The participants of the "international oil cartel" are accused of selling at world prices to their ancillary companies and branches in Pakistan the refined oil from their own refineries in the Near and Middle East. This gives them a form of super profit, resulting from the big difference between the extremely low production expenses in their own oil-fields in the East and the world price of oil established by the monopolies. It is said that the extraction of a barrel of oil in the Near East is 20 times cheaper than in the United States, and this oil is sold at prices established in Texas. The monopolies are also accused of taking advantage of the absence in Pakistan of a tanker fleet, and they receive additional high profits by shipping oil products to Pakistan.

The monopolistic position in the market held by British and American companies, Yershov further asserts, has helped them to establish high internal prices in Pakistan. These companies are alleged to use "Pakistan's dependence on the Western powers" to include excessively high expenses for trade, storage, maintenance of the distributing centres, administrative and managerial expenses, etc., in the wholesale and retail prices of refined products. The author also quotes Pakistan press reports as saying that long-service and freight rates at a scale of 17.5 per cent were established as a result of the blockade of the Suez Canal, though not a single tanker carrying oil to Pakistan was supposed to have passed through the Canal. Until recently, Yershov goes on to say, the British company Burmah Shell, sold refined products from oil produced in Pakistan by the Attock Oil Company at prices higher than those for refined products imported into the country. He alleges that they include in the price of refined products an additional sum for expenses in sea freight from Abadan to Karachi, expenses calculated according to an imaginary insurance for shipping by sea, unloading and storage in installations in Karachi, etc.

Yershov further claims that the British companies have repeatedly rejected requests from the Pakistan Government to review their prices, the companies implying they would prefer to eliminate completely their trade operations in the Pakistan market rather than lower prices.

At the same time the foreign oil companies are accused of seeking to hinder the development of national oil production. The author asserts that there are very promising oil deposits, though at present only six of the potential fields are being exploited. In 1960 production from these fields totalled 315,000 tons, and this satisfied only 15 per cent of the country's fuel oil needs. In addition, it is believed that the reserves of oil in these areas are not great. According to reports emanating from an oil symposium held in Delhi in 1957, there were only about 3.2 million tons of oil left in these fields, and at the present rate of extraction they would last roughly 10 years.

The lack of development of Pakistan's oil industry also threatens the growth of her economy. Because of the high price of imported oil, the development of industry, agriculture and transport is being held back through the need to economize in fuel oil. This has resulted in an extremely low per capita consumption of refined products in Pakistan: 27 litres (in 1960), as compared with 31.5 litres in Indonesia, 72 in Ceylon, and 230 in Japan. Even so, the total fuel consumption has increased in Pakistan. From 1948-60 the consumption of the main types of fuel and natural gas grew from 445,000 to 2,145,000 tons, or five times. Including the fuel oil used by foreign ships and planes refuelling in Pakistan, the increase is even greater.

Because of the small amount of oil produced in Pakistan, the country has to use a significant amount of capital on oil imports. In order to import two million tons of refined products a year, Pakistan has to spend 300m. rupees, which comprises 10 per cent of the value of all imports into the country. They lay a very heavy burden on Pakistan's balance of payments, since the oil companies allegedly accept only dollars and sterling. This has adversely affected the import of other goods vital to Pakistan's daily life. Yershov maintains that if new sources of oil are not developed in Pakistan, the result will be either a rapid exhaustion of currency or a cut in the rate of economic development.

The Pakistan government has for many years tried to solve this problem with the aid of foreign oil companies, and in order to attract them to the country it has conducted a special policy directed towards the encouragement of foreign capital towards oil prospecting. Until 1950 oil prospecting was carried out by Attock Oil. In 1950 two new companies, Pakistan Oil-fields and Pakistan Petroleum, were formed under conditions laid down by the Pakistan Petroleum Production Rules (a law on the extraction of oil in Pakistan), which stipulated that Pakistani capital

must form part of the joint capital of foreign companies engaged in oil prospecting. As a result, the British Attock Oil company formed the Pakistan Oil-fields company, in which 30 per cent of the share capital belonged to the Pakistan Government and 70 per cent to the parent company.

After 1954 large American companies began to exploit Pakistan's mineral wealth. The first such was Standard Vacuum. In an agreement concluded with this company by the Pakistan Government, a special Pak-Stanvac Petroleum Project was created as a separate organization. Funds for prospecting were to be presented jointly by the American company and by the Pakistan Government, in a ratio of 75-25 per cent. The Government's participation in the financing of the search for oil was to continue until joint expenses reached 200m. rupees, when the Government would cease to share in the cost. Income from the project was to be shared equally. The agreement was to last for 30 years, with an optional renewal for another 30 years. Pak-Stanvac Petroleum Project received a license to prospect in an area encompassing nearly 25,000 square kilometres. Similar agreements were later made with several other American companies, and the British firm Shell Oil Co. Ltd. The Pakistan Government gave foreign firms licenses to prospect over an area of 200,000 square kilometres, including 130,000 in West Pakistan and 70,000 in the eastern part.

According to data appearing in the second Five-Year Plan, 463m. rupees were spent from April 1955 to September 1959 in prospecting for oil and natural gas. Up to 31 March 1961 the Pakistan Government contributed 118m. rupees. However, the results of these efforts have been very modest. Only a few deposits have been opened up, and these mainly in the same area which has been exploited for 40 years. In October 1958 the newspaper PAKISTAN TIMES is supposed to have said that the failure of the efforts to find oil was due either to the lack of such oil or the lack of desire on the part of foreign companies to find it. The following year the suggestion was made that these companies were deliberately trying to hinder the discovery of oil in order to protect their own monopoly in the Pakistan market.

Yershov asserts that many Pakistanis have commented on the success in discovering oil of a similar Indian commission for oil and gas, especially with the aid of Soviet and Rumanian oil specialists. He claims that the Pakistan Government was afraid to approach the Soviet Union for fear of angering the Western powers, who would allegedly rather see Pakistan remain a backward country than become economically strong with the help of the Soviet Union. British and American companies are supposed to have made great efforts to prevent Soviet-Pakistan talks from ending in agreement. In order to exert pressure on the Pakistan Government, the Western oil companies, during the Soviet-Pakistan talks, refused to satisfy the Pakistan Government's request to consider lowering the prices of oil products, alluding to the alleged "changing international situation".

In any case, an agreement was signed on 4 March 1961 between the Soviet Union and Pakistan on cooperation in prospecting for oil, under which Soviet organizations in 1961-5 would supply boring, geophysical and auxiliary equipment, transport, and other material not available in Pakistan. They would also send Soviet specialists to undertake geological and prospecting work, and to instruct Pakistani specialists and workers. The Soviet Government allotted a credit of up to 27m. rubles (new exchange rate) to Pakistan, and this is to be used for the payment of equipment, materials and expenses of Soviet organizations supplying specialists.

According to Yershov, the signing of this agreement met with great approval in Pakistan. He cites Pakistani newspaper comments to this effect, mentioning that if oil is discovered, it would be the complete property of Pakistan.

An important economic result of the conclusion of the Soviet-Pakistan agreement was the creation in Pakistan of a State corporation for the development of the oil and gas industry (Oil and Gas Development Corporation) on 20 September 1961. Its main task is the planning and carrying out of the programme for prospecting for oil and gas, the freeing of reserves of oil and natural gas, the production and refining of oil and gas, and the marketing of fuel oil. The Government has allotted 50m. rupees to the Corporation.

At about the same time that the Government decided to take steps towards the development of its own oil industry, the national bourgeoisie sought to curb the control of foreign oil companies on the marketing side. In 1960 the Pakistan Government started to allot to national importers up to 40 per cent of all import licenses for lubricating oil. In October 1961 some large entrepreneurs in Pakistan founded the first national oil company for importing oil products. According to Pakistani press reports, this company proposed to begin selling imported refined products on the internal Pakistani market in April 1962. The chairman of the company is A. Jalil, a famous jute merchant. At a press conference in Chittagong, Jalil is quoted as having declared that the entrance of a national company into the market will enable the country to cut the cost of refined oil imports by at least 30 to 40m. rupees a year. He also noted that the new company will negotiate for the purchase of refined products with a number of countries who offer lower prices than the Anglo-American oil companies.

The Pakistan Government has also started to seek lower prices for refined products sold by foreign monopolies in Pakistan. The Indian Government had already succeeded in securing a reduction in prices from Burmah Shell, Stanvac and Caltex, and the Pakistan Government seeks the same concessions. As a result of long conversations, the oil companies

active in the Pakistani market were forced to lower prices by an average of 7 per cent which, according to preliminary calculations, will allow Pakistan to save 10m. rupees annually in foreign currency. The Government is still seeking a further reduction in prices to 12.5 per cent, close to the amount secured by the Indian Government. Yershov quotes from the PAKISTAN OBSERVER that the large companies can no longer dictate their conditions as in the past, because of sharp competition from other sources. The same newspaper demands that part of the payment for imported refined products should be made in Pakistani currency, to save their foreign exchange. The author holds out the hope that if the Russians can find large deposits of oil, then the monopoly of foreign companies will end, and Pakistan will be able to negotiate with these oil companies from a more advantageous position.

## C H I N A   L O O K S   A T   P A K I S T A N

A recent edition of AZIYA I AFRIKI SEGODNYA (1962, No.1) carried a review of a Chinese book entitled THE ECONOMY AND POLICIES OF PAKISTAN (Peking, 1960. 176pp.). The book is reviewed by G. Arkad'yev, under the title "Independent State or the Private Domain of 'Uncle Sam'?" It is unusual for a Chinese book to be reviewed or summarized in a Russian journal, and the text of this article is therefore given in full below.

---

"The dependence of our country on American aid exceeds the limits of human imagination." These words of the Pakistani Minister of Finance deeply reflect Pakistan's tragic situation. The reader will find abundant material devoted to the present-day situation in this country, underdeveloped in economic relations, in a book published in Peking by the Chinese scholar Do Shen, THE ECONOMY AND POLICIES OF PAKISTAN.

Although Pakistan has been free of colonial political rule since 1947, its economy still retains its semi-colonial, semi-feudal character. Pakistan was and has remained a backward agrarian country whose economy is ruled by feudal productive relations. It is sufficient to say that "in the course of the past five years nearly 59 per cent of the national income, or 83.6-86 per cent of the general volume of industrial and agricultural production has fallen to the share of agriculture; agricultural output makes up over 80 per cent of all exports, while 89 per cent of the population of the country is rural." (Pp.12,15.) The author notes that in the last few years Pakistan has not made any notable progress in the production of the most important kinds of agricultural products. Moreover, in 1958-9 the harvest of such an important product as rice was lower than the average annual harvest for the preceding 10 years. (P.16.) While earlier the Punjab, Sind and East Pakistan fully provided the country with foodstuffs, now Pakistan almost yearly imports from abroad large quantities of grain and other foodstuffs. According to data in the Pakistani press, from 1953 to 1957 alone the country imported more than four million tons of grain, while in 1958 it was forced to buy 1,090,000 tons more. (P.21.)

As for industry, as is seen from the book, it is in a still more miserable condition. Do Shen shows that the industrial base of Pakistan, and especially heavy industry, is extremely weak. In 1948, that is immediately after the proclamation of Pakistan as an independent state, the share of industry in the national revenue of the country was 5.8 per cent, while by 1958 it had grown by only 11.7 per cent. (P.24.) The present-day industry of Pakistan, the book says, bears a clearly-expressed semi-colonial character. An overwhelming part of capital investment in Pakistani industry belongs to foreign investors. From 1947 until January 1957, that is, over a 10-year period, according to official data the total sum of capital investment in various branches of industry in the country grew by more than 1,810m. rupees, of which more than 567m. rupees fell to the share of foreign capital investments. (P.25.) Foreign monopolies have almost completely appropriated Pakistan's industry. Thus, British monopolists control oil and ship-building, the extraction of chrome, natural gas, etc. Until now, writes the author, Pakistan has not had its own machine construction and metallurgical factories; light industrial enterprises have formed the basis of national industrial production. All necessary machinery, spare parts, and a significant part of fuel and raw materials, are imported from abroad.

Do Shen stresses also that foreigners occupy the leading posts of an overwhelming majority of enterprises; that the enterprises of national industry as a rule turn out not finished products, but raw materials, which are exported.

A special chapter of the book is devoted to American 'aid' to Pakistan. The data contained in it convincingly speaks of the fact that under the flag of 'aid' the imperialists are trying to retain their old and seize new positions in underdeveloped countries, to expand their own social support, to win over the national bourgeoisie, to establish military despotic regimes, and to put obedient puppets in power.

Just by such methods do the forces of international imperialism act in Pakistan. Under the guise of giving 'aid' the imperialists of the USA, as is shown in the book, have already taken full control of Pakistan's economic policy and national economic planning. It is noted further that the national bourgeoisie has for a long time been trying to secure its own metallurgical industry; however, American imperialism has prevented this until now, declaring "the time has not yet come for Pakistan to create a national, especially a metallurgical industry, since her food problem has still not been solved."

Entirely relying on American 'aid', the ruling circles of Pakistan have dragged the country into aggressive military blocs, participation in which is accompanied by many political, military and economic obligations, including a foreign policy favourable to the USA. This naturally causes

serious harm to the national interests of the country, evoking the legitimate indignation of Pakistan society. Beginning with 1956, it says in the book, many Pakistani public figures have constantly raised the question of why, although receiving military 'aid' from the USA, Pakistan not only does not reduce, but, on the other hand increases her military expenditure. Why does the economic situation of Pakistan worsen? The Pakistani people, writes Do Shen, have understood for a long time that 'aid' from the USA has little use and causes much harm, and to rely on it is the same as quenching thirst from a poisonous source.

The short-sighted policy of the ruling circles of Pakistan, conflicting with her national interests, is an anachronism in modern-day conditions, when the peoples of countries which are underdeveloped in economic conditions see the prospects of following the path of education and development of states of national democracy, national revival, deliverance from century-old backwardness and poverty, and the attaining of economic independence.

It is still possible for Pakistan to enter upon the road of real national independence. The author of the book arrives at such a conclusion. Life itself prompts such a conclusion.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE  
SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 July - 15 September 1962. The only items on India which have been included are those relating to the Indian Communist Party and on the general subject of Soviet-Indian relations. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet press gave heavy coverage to the 10-day visit of King Muhammad Zahir Shah to the Soviet Union in August. The King's visit was an unofficial one at the invitation of Khrushchev. PR (7.8.62) and other papers reported that the King was greeted at Simferopol' airport in the Crimea by Khrushchev, President Brezhnev and leading Ukrainian officials. The King's party had made a stop in Tashkent, and was greeted by leading Uzbek Government and Party officials (PV. 7.8.62). On the conclusion of the King's holiday in the Crimea, he was again received by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, once again visiting Tashkent on his return to Kabul (PR. 15-17.8.62).

Extensive coverage was also given to the 44th anniversary of Afghan independence, celebrated on 23 August in Kabul. A detailed summary of friendly Afghan-Soviet relations was given by S.U. Ulug-Zoda, Chairman of the Tadzhik branch of the Soviet Society of Friendship and Cultural Links with Afghanistan (KT. 25.8.62). Ulug-Zoda stressed Afghan support for many Soviet foreign policy positions, and mentioned the extent of Soviet aid to Afghanistan over the past 43 years.

PV (10.7.62) noted the arrival in Herat at the end of May of a Soviet expedition to help in the fight against locusts which have been plaguing Afghan crops. According to the report of V. Gavrilin, TASS correspondent, the Soviet group came on the invitation of the Afghan Government. The article describes some of the measures taken by the Soviet experts, including the spraying of crops from airplanes. The specialists returned to Dushanbe, claiming to have successfully accomplished their mission (KT. 17.7.62).

## INDIA

The brief visit of A.I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to India in late July received some mention in the central Soviet press. He arrived in Delhi on 24 July, on his return from a trip to Indonesia (PR. 25.7.62).

PR (24.8.62) carried a TASS report from Delhi on the lecture given by K. Menon at the University of the State of Kerala. Prominence was given to his statements about the peace-loving intentions of the Soviet Union and of his comment that the Soviet Government and Communist Party "repeatedly declared that their revolution is not for export".

On 22.8.62, PR reported the meeting of the plenum of the National Council of the Indian Communist Party which had adopted a resolution on the decisions of the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU, the new programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, problems of war and peace, universal and complete disarmament, and some questions concerning the internal life of the country.

All the Soviet press continued to give heavy coverage to Soviet economic aid to India. Many articles appeared on the opening of the new hydroelectric station in Neyveli, in the State of Madras, which was built with aid from the Soviet Union (PR. 7.8.62). In addition, the Soviet press continues to report on the Bhilai metallurgical factory, which has recently been expanded with Soviet assistance (PR. 14.8.62).

## NEPAL

The arrival, at the invitation of the USSR Union of Journalists, of the editor-in-chief of the Nepalese LITERARY JOURNAL and one of the editors of the magazine THE NEPALESE WOMAN was reported in BR on 22.7.62. They spent three days in Baku, having come to the Soviet Union for the Congress on Universal Disarmament and Peace. On 7.9.62, KP noted the visit to Alma-Ata of Bal Chandra Sharma, Vice-President of the Royal Nepalese Academy of Fine Arts. IZ, on 30.8.62, reported the disappearance in Nepal of an aircraft carrying four members of a commission investigating the cause of the plane crash on 1 August. On the earlier flight the Nepalese Ambassador to India was one of the victims.

## PAKISTAN

Much of the Soviet press reported the ceremonies in which the Lenin Prize was given to the Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz (KOM.P. 28.8.62). A reception was given for the poet by the Pakistani Ambassador to the USSR (T. 29.8.62). (See CAR, 1962, No.3, p.310.)

On 14.8.62, BR carried a long article by S. Borisov, alleging that after the granting of independence to India and Pakistan 15 years ago, Pakistan has remained a dependent state, with the difference only in having "changed masters". The "ruling clique" of Pakistan is accused of having counted on American aid to resolve in their favour the territorial disputes with India (on Kashmir) and Afghanistan (on Pushtunistan), "in which truth is on the side of the latter". The result of this policy, according to Borisov, has been to place Pakistan in economic and political subordination to America, and to convert the country into an armed American base. The article continues by deploring the very low standard of living in Pakistan and attacking the motives and scope of American aid.

A TASS report in TRUD (21.8.62) claimed that two employees of the American Consulate in Lahore had tried to bribe a Pakistani with 50,000 rupees to organize a new party "to strengthen American-Pakistani relations" and to serve as a nucleus "in the struggle against Communism".

## PERSIA

Commenting on the resignation of Ali Amini, IZ (19.7.62) said that it was due to his failure to solve Persia's economic and financial crisis. "The notorious American 'aid' is only aggravating Persia's economic difficulties." Forty per cent of the population were starving, and 40 per cent were half-starving, as the Persian Minister of Agriculture had recently admitted. The situation was made worse by the heavy obligations resulting from Persia's participation in "aggressive military blocs". "Contrary to the national interests, Persia's rulers pursue an unfriendly policy towards her neighbours, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan." Soviet newspapers on 26 July noted that the new Premier, Asadollah Alam, had said his Government would work for good relations with the Soviet Union.

The only mention of the Shah's visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan to act as mediator in disputes between these two countries was a short article in T and IZ (1.8.62), noting the Shah's departure from Kabul to Rawalpindi, "without having finished the programme of the visit". The article reports that "the conditions of Pakistan for the re-establishment of Afghan-Pakistani relations were unacceptable to Kabul."

A TASS dispatch from Teheran (PR. 10.8.62) noted that the lists for Soviet-Persian trade exchanges during the present year indicated a considerable increase in the volume of trade. The Persian press had reportedly expressed satisfaction at this, and had particularly noted that Persia was to receive 250 Soviet tractors.

Heavy Soviet press coverage was given to the recent Persian earthquake, including particulars of Soviet offers of aid (IZ. 7.9.62).

PR (9.8.62) and other newspapers reported that the Persian newspaper ATESH had blamed the USA for the continuation of the atomic arms race. ATESH had said: "It is the USA which by its inflexible and implacable attitude towards the Eastern bloc is creating the conditions for a new war."

On 25.8.62, PR briefly reported the arrival of Lyndon Johnson, the American Vice-President, in Teheran on a three-day official visit. PR on 30.8.62 mentioned the arrival in Persia of a Soviet delegation to the 2nd International Oil Symposium, devoted to the development of the oil resources of Asia and the Far East.



C E N T R A L   A S I A N   R E V I E W

T I T L E   P A G E S

and

I N D E X

VOLUME X 1962

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre  
in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford)  
Soviet Affairs Study Group

Central Asian Research Centre

68 King's Road,  
London, S.W.3

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW and other papers issued by the Central Asian Research Centre are under the general editorship of Geoffrey Wheeler, 66 King's Road, London, S.W.3, and David Footman, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications. In addition, the REVIEW analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang. The subscription rate is Thirty Shillings per year, plus two shillings postage. The price of single copies is Seven Shillings and Sixpence, plus sixpence postage.

Distribution agents:

Messrs. Luzac & Co. Ltd.,  
46, Great Russell Street,  
London, W.C.1

## CONTENTS

VOLUME X, No.1	Page
Editorial	1
Soviet Central Asia	
A British Family in the Kazakh Steppe. By Olivia Fell Vans-Agnew	5
The Kachak Movement in Azerbaydzhan	12
The Growth of the Working-Class of Turkmenistan up to 1941	19
Universities of Culture	31
Linguistic Survey of 1960-61	39
Book Review: Eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs during the Period of the Incorporation of Central Asia in Russia. By B.I. Iskandarov	46
The National Question at the XXIInd Congress of the CPSU	51
News Digest: Administrative and Territorial Changes, Archaeology, Conferences, Law, Literature, Irrigation, Music, Transport and Communications	57
Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia	
The Borderlands in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year- Books 1960-61	63
The Persian Revolution of 1905-11	78
Operations in Persia, 1914-1920	85
Pakistan's Military Alliances	90
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	95

## CONTENTS

VOLUME X, No.2	Page
Editorial	100
Soviet Central Asia	
Islam in Central Asia: Recent Soviet Writing	104
Sources of Turkmen Folklore	119
The Muslim Republics and the XXIInd Party Congress: Reactions to the Personality Cult and Anti-Party Group	125
Transport in Azerbaydzhan	129
Private Property Tendencies in Central Asia and Kazakhstan	147
News Digest: Administrative and Territorial Changes, Conferences, Irrigation, Public Works, Publishing, Religion, Communications	157
Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia	
Peaceful Co-existence and Revolutionary War	164
Soviet Views on Colonialism	168
Pakistan Since 1947	178
The Political and Economic Situation in Persia: The Soviet View	188
Coal-Mining in Persia	194
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	197

## CONTENTS

VOLUME X, No.3	Page
Editorial	202
Soviet Central Asia	
The Fishermen of the Southern Aral	206
The Samarkand Treaty of 712	214
Some Statistics on Higher Education in the Muslim Republics	229
The Tenth Anniversary of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences	242
Barymta. By M.O. Auezov	249
Books Received: The Land of The Great Sophy by Roger Stevens; A Modern History of Georgia by David Marshall Lang	260
News Digest: Administrative and Territorial Affairs; Archaeology, Communications, Conferences, Education, Irrigation, Oriental Studies, Town Planning	262
Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia	
Tsin Administration in Sinkiang in the First Half of the 19th Century	271
American Policy in India	285
The Soviet Union and Nepal	294
Afghanistan: A Soviet Assessment	297
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	308

**CONTENTS**

<b>VOLUME X, No. 4</b>	<b>Page</b>
<b>Historical</b>	<b>XIII</b>
<b>Soviet Central Asia</b>	
<b>The Nationalist Policy of the Soviet Union: A New Phase</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia and its Ideological Background. By Evgeniya Franko</b>	<b>334</b>
<b>The Living and Working Conditions of Soviet Draftsmen Before the Revolution</b>	<b>343</b>
<b>Recent Literature in Central Asia and Kazakhstan</b>	<b>350</b>
<b>The Aral and Amu-Darya Fisheries: A Recent Soviet Article</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>The Size of the Russian Population in Kazakhstan and Central Asia</b>	<b>372</b>
<b>New Report: Administrative and Territorial Changes, Archaeology, Unemployment, Education, Housing, Irrigation, Relations with Foreign Countries, Social Conditions, Transport and Communications, Statistics</b>	<b>374</b>
<b>Barbarians of Soviet Central Asia</b>	
<b>The Ethnography of Tibet</b>	<b>383</b>
<b>The Dictatorship of Kuan Shih</b>	<b>388</b>
<b>The Control of Oil in Pakistan</b>	<b>406</b>
<b>Three Levels of Pakistan</b>	<b>412</b>
<b>The Barbarians in the Soviet Press</b>	<b>415</b>

## CONTENTS

### VOLUME X

### MAPS

Afghanistan	facing page	299
Amu-Dar'ya and Syr-Dar'ya 1900	" "	366
Arys-Turkestan Canal	" "	267
Communications in Azerbaydzhan	" "	131
Distribution of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan	" "	320
Distribution of the Tibetan People in China	" "	384
Distribution of the Turkic Languages	" "	40
Fergana Valley	" "	58, 376
Fisher Settlements of the Southern Aral	" "	207
Soviet Socialist Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaydzhan	at end in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4	
Toktogul Irrigation Scheme	page	379
West- and South-Kazakhstan Krays	"	263

### ILLUSTRATIONS

A Kazakh Homestead on Karabayly Island	facing page	212
On Akpetki Island	" "	212
Scenes from Old Kazakhstan	" "	10
Spring in the Kazakh Steppe	" "	8
Tasbeskum Island: Plan of Kara-Kalpak Homestead"	"	211
Taylakdzhigen Island: Plan of Kazakh Homesteads"	"	211

# I N D E X

The Index consists of two parts:

- I An index to articles arranged under subject headings, namely Editorials, Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia, Archaeology, Education, Ethnography, History, Linguistics, Literature, Political and Party Affairs, Religious Affairs, Research, Social Conditions, Book Reviews and Notices, and News Digest.
- II A general index of personal and geographical names, and subjects. In this index subjects (e.g. education) are given under the republic or country to which they refer.

. . .

It will be noticed that the text of the REVIEW contains some inconsistencies in the spelling of proper names; these are partly due to inconsistencies in Soviet publications. Every effort has been made to arrive at the most accurate spelling and, where the spelling in the REVIEW differs from that in the Index, the Index version should be taken as the correct one.

In the case of small places or new settlements, the oblast and/or republic in which each place-name occurs is as far as possible stated in the general index; in the case of the borderland countries, the name of the country is given beside the place-name.

The following abbreviations are used throughout:

Afgh.	for	Afghanistan
Azerb.	for	Azerbaydzhani
Kaz.	for	Kazakhstan
Kirg.	for	Kirgizia
Pak.	for	Pakistan
Sink.	for	Sinkiang
Tad.	for	Tadzhikistan
Turk.	for	Turkmenistan
Uzb.	for	Uzbekistan

In the Index references are made only to page numbers and not to issue numbers. In Volume X of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW,

No.1 runs from pages 1 to 99  
No.2 runs from pages 100 to 201  
No.3 runs from pages 202 to 312  
No.4 runs from pages 313 to 418

I

I N D E X   T O   A R T I C L E S

Editorials            1-4, 100-3, 202-5, 313-16

Borderlands of Soviet Central Asia

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: A Soviet Assessment, 297-307  
Afghanistan in the Soviet Press, 95-96, 197, 308, 415  
In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 64-66

India

American Policy in India, 285-93  
India in the Soviet Press, 96-97, 198-9, 309, 416  
In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 67-70

Kashmir

Kashmir in the Soviet Press, 309-10

Nepal

In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 70-72  
Nepal in the Soviet Press, 97, 199, 310, 416  
The Soviet Union and Nepal, 294-6

Pakistan

China Looks at Pakistan, 412-14  
Control of Oil in Pakistan, 406-11  
In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 72-74  
Pakistan in the Soviet Press, 97-98, 199-200, 310-11, 417  
Pakistan Since 1947, 178-87  
Pakistan's Military Alliances, 90-94

Persia

Coal Mining in Persia, 194-6  
In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 74-76  
Operations in Persia 1914-20, 85-94  
Persia in the Soviet Press, 98-99, 200, 311-12, 417-18  
Persian Revolution of 1905-11, 78-84  
Political and Economic Situation in Persia: The Soviet View, 188-93  
The Dictatorship of Reza Shah, 398-405

## Sinkiang

Tsin Administration in Sinkiang in the First Half of the 19th Century, 271-84

## Tibet

In Great Soviet Encyclopaedia Year Books 1960-61, 76-77  
The Ethnography of Tibet, 383-97  
Tibet in the Soviet Press, 200-1

## General

Peaceful Co-existence and Revolutionary War, 164-7  
Soviet Views on Colonialism, 168-77

## Soviet Central Asia

### Archaeology

Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia and its Ideological Background, 334-42

### Education

Some Statistics of Higher Education in the Muslim Republics, 229-41  
Universities of Culture, 31-38

### Ethnography

Size of the German Population in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, 372-3  
Sources of Turkmen Folklore, 119-24

### History

A British Family in the Kazakh Steppe, 5-11  
Growth of the Working-Class in Turkmenistan up to 1941, 19-30  
Kachak Movement in Azerbaydzhan, 12-18  
Living and Working Conditions of Kazakh Craftsmen before the Revolution, 343-9  
Samarkand Treaty of 712, 214-28  
The Aral and Amu-Dar'ya Flotillas, 365-71

### Linguistics

Linguistic Survey 1960-61, 39-45

### Literature

Barymta, 249-59  
Recent Literature in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 350-64

## Political and Party Affairs

- Muslim Republics and the XXIInd Party Congress: Reactions to the Personality Cult and Anti-Party Group, 125-8
- Nationalities Policy of the Soviet Union: A New Phase, 317-33
- The National Question at the XXIInd Party Congress, 51-56

## Religious Affairs

- Islam in Central Asia: Recent Soviet Writing, 104-18

## Research

- Tenth Anniversary of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, 242-8

## Social Conditions

- Fishermen of the Southern Aral, 206-13
- Private Property Tendencies in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 147-56
- Transport in Azerbaydzhan, 129-46

## Book Reviews and Notices

- Eastern Bukhara and the Pamirs during the Period of the Incorporation of Central Asia in Russia. By B.I. Iskandarov, 46-48
- Modern History of Georgia. By David Marshall Lang, 261
- The Land of the Great Sophy. By Roger Stevens, 260

## News Digest

- Administrative and Territorial Changes, 57-59, 157-8, 262-3, 374-5
- Archaeology, 59, 264, 375-6
- Communications, 62, 163, 264, 381-2
- Conferences, 59, 158-60, 264-5, 376-7
- Education, 265-6, 377-8
- Housing, 378
- Irrigation, 61, 160-1, 267-8, 378-80
- Law, 60
- Literature, 60-61
- Music, 61
- Obituararies, 382
- Oriental Studies, 269
- Public Works, 161
- Publishing, 162
- Relations with Foreign Countries, 380
- Religion, 162
- Social Conditions, 381
- Town Planning, 269-70

## GENERAL INDEX

- Abadan, Persia, 407  
 Abas Tibetan autonomous district, 396  
 Abay-Bazar, South-Kazakhstan oblast (now Abay), 58  
 Abbas, Shah of Persia, 315  
 Abdrayev, M., 61  
 Abdulkhalik, Khoja of Kashgaria, 277  
 Abdurakhmanov, Nadir, 59  
 Abdur Rahman, leader of Kokand Uprising 1875-6, 48  
 Abilev, D., 362  
 Abor people, Tibet, 384  
 Aborskiy, A., 362  
 Abramov, General H.K., 48  
 Abul Ghazi, Khivan Khan, 121  
 Abu Sa'id, Sultan, 106  
 Adibayev, Khasen, 355  
 Adzhikabul, Azerb., 131  
 Adzhi-Kuyya, Kazandzhik rayon, Turk., 154  
 Adzhina-Tepa (Hill of Jinns), Tad., 59  
 Afarun, Prince of Samarkand, 226, 228  
 Afghan people, 124  
 Afghanistan, 47, 48, 50, 63, 64-66, 68, 71, 93, 95-96, 102, 173, 176,  
 193, 297-307, 308, 365, 369, 377, 415, 417. See also Part I of  
 Index.  
     agriculture, 65, 297-8ff., 304  
     archaeology in, 338, 340  
     Bartol'd on, 269  
     economy, 64ff., 298-9ff.  
     finance, 298, 299, 302ff.  
     foreign policy, 306-7  
     minorities in, 204  
     political development, 300-2  
     relations with Czechoslovakia, 306  
     relations with Pakistan, 197, 307  
     relations with USSR, 65, 66, 197, 305-6, 308  
     social conditions, 299-300  
     USA activities in, 302-3  
 Aganin, R.A., 45  
 Agasi, N.M., on Persia, q.v., 194-6  
 Agayev, A., 330ff.  
 Agdam, Azerb., 144

Agdash rayon, Azerb., 145  
 Agdzhabedi, Azerb., 145, 262  
     rayon, 145  
 Ahmad, Z.A., 96  
 Ahmad, Shah of Persia, 402ff.  
 Ahvaz, Persia, 404  
 Aka people, Tibet, 384  
 Ak-Bulak, Kirg., 58  
 Akhundov, A., 12  
 Akhundov, M.F., 60  
 Akhundov, Rukhulla, 127  
 Akhundov, V.Yu., 127, 132, 140, 141, 264-5, 376, 377  
 Ak-Mechet' (now Kzyl-Orda), 367  
 Akmolinsk (now Tselinograd), 5, 6, 9, 36  
 Akpetki Island, Muynak rayon, Uzb., 206  
 Akstafa, lake, Azerb., 380  
 Aksu (formerly Stalinskiy), Tselinograd oblast, Kaz., 158  
 Aktogay, Kaz., 163  
 Aktyubinsk, Kaz., 161  
     oblast, 263  
 Alamedin, Alamedin rayon, Kirg., 58  
 Alay valley, Kirg., 264  
 Albania, 165, 167  
 Alekseyev, L., 311  
 Algeria, 172  
 Ali-Bayramly, Azerb., 130, 140  
 Aliyev, Babu, 59  
 Aliyev, Mered, 127  
 Alma-Ata, 356, 364, 416  
     education, 378  
     exhibitions, 128  
     private property, 152  
     territorial changes, 59  
     "universities of culture", 32ff.  
     oblast, 32  
 Almalyk, Uzb., 33  
 Altay people, 343  
 Alyat, Azerb., 131ff.  
 Amanbayev, A., 61  
 Amanzholov, S.A., 42  
 Amini, Dr. Ali, Prime Minister of Persia, 188, 311, 417  
 Amirkhizi, Isma'il, Persian historian, 79ff.  
 Amu-Dar'ya, river, 46, 47, 268ff., 305, 365ff.  
     town (formerly Samsonovo), Kerkinskiy rayon, Turk., 262  
 Andalib, Turkmen poet, 245  
 Andizhan, oblast, Uzb., 58, 117  
     people, in Sinkiang, 273ff.  
 Ankara, 93  
 Anov, Nikolay, 359-60

Anzali, Persia, 400  
 Anzyr, Nakhichevan' uyezd, 14  
 Apa-Tani people, Tibet, 384  
 Appak, leader of White Mountaineers in Turkestan, 273  
 Apreysan, G., 354  
 Apsheron peninsula, Azerb., 135  
 Arab peoples, 102-3, 124, 320  
     religious leaders in Turkmenistan, 107  
 Arabic language, 43, 44, 100, 202, 221, 222  
 Aragon, Louis, 351  
 Araks, river, Azerb., 16, 17  
 Aral Sea, 122, 206ff., 356, 365ff.  
 Arandenko, Captain, 47  
 Aravan, Osh oblast, Kirg., 376  
 Archaeology. See under Republics and Part I of Index (Research).  
 Arghandab, river, Afgh., 302  
 Arkad'yev, G., on Pakistan, 412-14  
 Armenia, 15, 231, 322  
 Armenian people, 19ff., 81, 233ff., 320  
 Arstanbekov, A.A., Chairman, Kazakh Committee of State Security, 126  
 Artomshina, V.D., 44  
 Arys rayon, Kaz., 267  
     river, 61, 267  
     -Turkestan Canal, 267  
 Arystanbek, 358  
 Asadollah Alam, Prime Minister of Persia, 417  
 Ashaga-Molla, Zangezur, Azerb., 13, 14  
 Ashkhabad, 19ff., 265  
     communications, 139, 144, 145, 268  
     private property, 150ff.  
     religious revival in, 109-10  
     territorial changes, 57  
     "universities of culture", 33ff.  
     rayon, 265  
 Assa, Dzhabul oblast, Kaz., 158  
 Assam, 199  
 Astara, Azerb., 130ff.  
 Astrakhan', RSFSR, 144  
 Astrakhan'-Bazar rayon, Azerb., 145  
 Atabayev, K.S., Chairman, Turkmen Council of Peoples' Commissars, 126  
 Atadzhanov, Ata, 360  
 Atai, 44  
 Atamyshev Khan, Secretary, Turkmen Central Committee, 126  
 Atayev, B., Chairman, Turkmen Presidium of Control Commission, 126  
 Atbasar rayon, Kaz., 375  
 A'tham, Ibn al-, 215ff.  
 Athir, Ibn al-, 221  
 Atrek, river, Persia, 120  
 Auevov, Mukhtar, translation of BARYMTA, q.v., 249-59, 351

Avar people, in Dagestan, 323  
 Avicenna. See Ibn Sina.  
 Aytakov, N., Chairman, Turkmen Central Executive Committee, 126  
 Aytmatov, Ch., 62, 350  
 Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 68, 72ff., 92, 98, 187, 310  
 Azad-Sarv, 121  
 Azarbaijan, Persian, 86ff.  
 Azerbaydzhani, 96, 99, 230ff., 262, 322, 380. See also Part I of Index.  
     archaeology, 334ff.  
     Communist Party, 140, 142  
     conferences, 59, 264-5  
     education, 377, 378  
     folklore, 124  
     housing, 378  
     irrigation, 160, 380  
     Kachak movement, 12-18  
     literature, 60-61  
     nationalities, 236  
     Press, 102  
     Soviet annexation of, 86  
     territorial changes, 57, 157, 262, 374  
     transport, 129-46  
     XXIInd Party Congress and, 125ff.  
     "universities of culture", 33, 34, 37-38  
 Azerbaydzhani people, 21ff., 120, 231ff., 322  
 Azeri language, 265  
 Azimdzhanova, S.A., (Uzbek historian), 3

Babur, Mogul Emperor, 44  
 Bactria, 340  
 Badakhshan, 46, 284  
 Baghdad, 106  
 Baghdad Pact, 307  
 Bagirov, B.M.K., former First Secretary of CP. Azerb., 127, 265  
 Baglar, Azerb., 131  
 Baku, 22, 38, 81, 109, 127, 143, 265, 310, 382  
     conferences, 264  
     education, 377, 378  
     Nepalese editors visit, 416  
     religion, 109  
     Shooting of the 26 Commissars, 3-4  
     territorial changes, 57  
     transport, 129ff.  
     "universities of culture", 33ff.  
 Baladhuri, al-, 215, 221  
 Baladzhy, Azerb., 131ff.  
 Bal'ami, Abu Ali Muhammed, 214ff., 222, 228  
 Bal Shandra Sharma, 416

Bal'dzhuan, river, Tad., 47  
Balkars, Turkic Muslims, 56, 233ff., 372  
Balkhash, lake, Kaz., 10  
Baluchistan, 181  
Bandoeng Conference 1955, 93, 287, 307  
Baqer Khan, Persian revolutionary leader, 81  
Baranov, S.S., on Pakistan, 182-4  
Barda rayon, Azerb., 145  
Bartol'd, V.V., 202-3, 269  
BARYMTA, by Auezov, M.O., 249-59  
Bashkir people, 233ff., 343  
Baskakov, N.A., 44  
Basmachi uprisings, 50  
Batan, China, 387  
Batsbiytsy people. See Tsova-Tushiw people.  
Batsbiyskiy, Caucasian language, 322  
Bayati, Abd al-Wahhab al-, Iraqi poet, 158  
Baykonurov, O.A., Rector, Kazakh Polytechnic Institute, 126  
Bayram-Ali rayon, Turk., 244  
Baytemirov, N., 363  
Bekkhozhin, Kh., 363  
Bekovich-Cherkasskiy, Prince A., 366  
Belokany, Azerb., 144  
Belorussians, 21ff., 232ff., 320ff.  
Belovodskoye, Kirg., 58  
Bengali language, 185  
Bennigsen, Alexandre, French writer on Muslim affairs, 319  
Beriya, L.P., 126, 265, 314, 358  
Berdyev, on Turkmen Academy of Sciences, 242-8  
Beyseybayev, Masykhan, Chairman, Kazakh Council of Ministers, 374  
Bhilai, India, 416  
Bhutan, India, 68  
    Tibetan people in, 384  
Bil'gya, Azerb., 131  
Binis, Azerb., 13, 14  
Biratnagar, Nepal, 295  
Biylikol', lake, Kaz., 333  
Blagova, F.G., 44  
Blankennagel', Dr., 366  
Bombay, 97, 198  
Book Reviews. See Part I of Index.  
Borodulikhinskiy rayon, Kaz., 263  
Borovikov, Fedor, 162  
Borovikov, A.K., 39, 40-41  
Bowles, Chester, US Ambassador to India, 286  
Brezhnev, L.I., 95, 97, 197, 308, 310, 415  
Browne, E.G., British historian, on Persia, 81ff.  
Bugun', river, Kaz., 61, 267

Bukhara, 208, 273, 284, 354  
     Emirs of, 106  
     khanate, 46-50  
     private housing, 148  
     Regional Studies Museum, 146  
     religion, 107, 113, 117  
 Bukhtarma, river, Kaz., 381  
 Buniyatzade, Dadash, 127, 128  
 Buryat people, 233ff.  
 Bushire, Persia, 404  
 Butakov, Admiral G.I., 367  
 Buynaksk, Dagestan, 109

Cairo, 192  
     Afro-Asian Writers Conference, 158-9  
 Calcutta, 97  
 Cambodia, 68  
 Caspian Sea, 88, 268, 340  
 Caucasus, 2, 111, 122, 124, 129, 269, 319, 321ff., 367  
 Caucasian languages, 322ff.  
 Ceylon, 68, 71, 91  
 Chagatay language, 43-44  
 Chakravarti, Nikil, 96  
 Chamdo, China, 385, 395  
 Chand, Prem, Indian writer, 97  
 Chan Lin, Vice-Regent of Sinkiang, 277  
 Chardzhou, Turk., 208, 365ff.  
     oblast, 18, 21, 24, 28, 110, 268  
 Charshanga, Turk., 150  
 Charyyev, Khodja Nepes, 126  
 Chayanovskiy rayon, Kaz., 267  
 Chechen people, 56, 233ff., 322, 372  
 Cheleken, Turk., 20, 29, 36  
 Cherkess people, 56  
 Chernyayev, General, 370  
 Chernoyark, Pavlodar oblast, Kaz., 160  
 Chernoye, lake, Kaz., 163  
 Chichekli, Azerb., 17  
 Chilanzar, Tashkent, 270  
 Chimkent, Kaz., 263  
 China, 63ff., 96, 102, 173, 201, 287, 341  
     relations with Nepal, 71  
     relations with Tibet, 76-77  
     Tadzhiks in, 213  
     Tibetan people in, 384ff. See also "Tibet".  
 Chinaz, Tashkent oblast, Uzb., 370  
 Chirchik, Uzb., 148ff.  
 Chittagong, East Pakistan, 93, 406ff.

Chon-Ak-Su, river, Kirg., 62  
 Chou En-lai, 68, 69  
 Chu, river, 364  
 Chugulov, Konstantin, 158  
 Chuvash people, 233  
 Communications. See under Countries/Republics and Part I of Index.  
 Communist Party. See under Countries/Republics and Part I of Index.  
     XVIIIth Party Congress, 29  
     XXth Party Congress, 56, 177, 338, 358, 361  
     XXIst Party Congress, 31, 67  
     XXIInd Party Congress, 1, 51ff., 61, 125, 165, 198, 309, 317,  
     330, 358, 416  
     Third programme, 173  
 Conferences. See Part I of Index: News Digest, and Part II under  
     towns where held.  
 Conquest, Robert, British writer, 372  
 Crowe, Colin T., Deputy UK Representative to United Nations, 168  
 Curzon, Lord G.N., 87, 365, 400

Dacca, East Pakistan, 93  
 Dafla people, Tibet, 384  
 Dagestan, 320ff.  
 Dagestani people, 233ff., 321ff.  
 Dakhi people, 119  
 Dalai Lama, 68, 76-77, 388ff.  
 Dalus, Zangezyr, Azerb., 14  
 Dam valley, Tibet, 385  
 Dange, Shripag Amrit, Chairman of the Indian CP., 309  
 Danyalov, A.D., Dagestani Party and Government official, 2, 56  
 Dari language. See Tadjik language.  
 Darvaz, khanate, 46  
 Darvaz, river, Tad., 47  
 Daud Khan, Muhammad, Prime Minister of Afghanistan, 65, 66, 304  
 Daukara lakes, Uzb., 207  
 Daulatabadi, Yahya, Persian politician, 80  
 Daulenov, Sal'ken, ex-Chairman, Kazakh Council of Ministers, 374  
 Davar, Persian Minister of Justice, 402, 404-5  
 Delhi, 67, 198, 309, 408  
     Asian History Congress, 2  
     Chou En-lai's visit to, 69  
     Mikoyan's visit to, 416  
 Derbent, Azerb., 130  
 Diefenbaker, J.G., 168  
 Divashtich, Prince of Panjikant, 227  
 Divichi, Divichinskiy rayon, Azerb., 157  
 Do Shen, 412ff.  
 Dolgopolov, Ye.I., 172-3

Dolgykh, B.O., on the nationalities policy, 317-29  
 Dollyar, Azerb., 142  
 Domanskiy, Geronim, 162  
 Dost Muhammed, Afghan Amir, 48  
 Drobkov, Afansiy, 162  
 Dul'-Dul'-Atlagan Gorge, Uzb., 369  
 Dulles, Foster, 288  
 Dulun people, Tibet, 383  
 Dungan people, 103, 152  
 Dunsterville, General, 400  
 Dushanbe, Tad., 46, 161, 265, 415  
     conferences, 331, 341  
     exhibitions, 128  
     music, 96  
     private property, 140ff.  
     territorial changes, 58  
     transport, 259  
 Duvanny, Azerb., 131  
 Duvinchi, Kazandzhik rayon, Turk., 154  
 Dzhambul, Kaz., 152, 158, 333, 350  
     oblast, Kaz., 153, 158, 263  
 Dzhandar-Gel', lake, Azerb., 160  
 Dzhangalinskiy rayon, Ural oblast, Kaz., 263  
 Dzhansugurov, Il'yas, 358  
 Dzhergalan, river, Kirg., 62  
 Dzhey ranchel'skiy steppe, Azerb., 160  
 Dzhul'fa, Azerb., 132ff.  
 Dzhungaria, Sink., 102

East Bengal, Pakistan, 182  
 Education. See under Countries/Republics and Part I of Index.  
 Efendiyev, Sultan Medzhid, 127  
 Egypt, 172. See also United Arab Republic.  
 Ehsanollah, Jangali leader, 399, 401  
 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 66, 68, 289, 292  
 Emelyanov, Professor, 4  
 Eqbal, Dr. Manoutcher, ex-Prime Minister of Persia, 76, 192  
 Ethnography. See under Countries/Republics and Part I of Index.  
 Everest, Mount, 71

Faisal, King of Iraq, 404  
 Faiz Ahmad Faiz, 310  
 Faizabad-Kala, Tad., 369  
 Fal'gar, river, Tad., 47  
 Ferdausi, Abul Qasim, 118, 121  
 Fergana Valley, Uzb., 227, 241, 321, 376

Fizuli, Azerb., 144  
 Fon, river, Tad., 47  
 Fort Shevchenko, Kaz., 375  
 Fraser-Tytler, Sir W.K., 49  
 Freze, Governor of Yerevan, 15, 16, 17  
 Frunze, Kirg., 18, 350  
     communications, 364, 379  
     exhibition, 128  
     private property, 153  
     territorial changes, 375  
     town planning, 269-70  
     "universities of culture", 34, 35

Gabdirov, I., 357  
 Gadzhiyev, Amir, 59  
 Gadzhiyev, Nazim Mamediya ogly, 329, 382  
 Gafurov, B.G., 3, 285  
 Gagarin, Yuri, 95, 97  
 Gagarin Peak, 33  
 Galuzo, P.G., 127  
 Gardanov, V.K., on the nationalities policy, 317-29  
 Gasan-Kuli rayon, Turk., 154  
 Gasanov, I.M., on the Kachak movement, 12ff.  
 Gasanov, V.K., on the nationalities policy, 317-29  
 Gedzhanan, Zangezur, Azerb., 16  
 Geokchay, Azerb., 142, 144  
 Georgia, 231, 260-1, 322  
 Georgian people, 81, 233ff., 320  
 Gerasimov, M., 375  
 Gerusy, Azerb., 17  
 Ghosh, Ajoy Kumar, 96, 198, 309  
 Ghurak, King, 214, 218  
 Gilan, Persia, 399, 400  
 Gissar, Tad., 46, 47, 49, 156  
 Goa, 95, 97  
 Goffenshefer, V., Soviet critic, 355  
 Golodnaya step', 10  
 Goradiz, Azerb., 133, 144  
 Gorbunov, K., 353  
 Gordon, Colonel T.E., 48  
 Gorus, Azerb., 14  
 Greco-Bactrian state, 123  
 Grunina, E.A., 44  
 Guber, A.A., Soviet historian and editor, 3  
 Gunt, river, 381  
 Gurko-Kryazhin, Soviet historian, 404  
 Gur'yev, Kaz., 32, 155, 263

Guseynov, Geydar, 127, 128  
Guseynov, I.A., on the Kachak movement, 12ff.  
Guseynov, M.D., 127  
G'yantsze, Tibet, 387  
Gyurdzhivan, Azerb., 17  
Gypsies, in Central Asia, 320

Hami, Uygur princely family, 276ff.  
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 66, 70  
Hashim, Muhammed, ex-Prime Minister of Afgh., 302  
Hatim at-Ta'i, 124  
Haydar Khan Amu Ogly, Persian Communist, 399  
Hayter, Sir William, 100  
History. See Part I of Index.  
Helmand, river, Afgh., 302  
Herat, Afgh., 65, 308, 415  
Hindus, 179  
History. See under Countries/Republics and Part I of Index.  
Hodgson, Sir Robert, H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, 1924-7, 4  
Holmes, Julius Cecil, American Ambassador in Iran, 188  
Housing. See republics, towns and Part I of Index: News Digest.  
Husein-Baykara, Sultan, 124  
Hyrceanian people, 119

Ibn Sina (Avicenna), 107, 342  
Ibragimov, M.A., Azerbaydzhani Government and Party Official, 60  
Ibragimgadzhili, Tauz rayon, Azerb., 264  
Ikrami, Dzhalol, 354  
Ikramov, Kamil', 356  
Il'ichev, L.F., Head of Propaganda Dept., CC. CP., 56  
Imami, Djafar Sherif, ex-Prime Minister of Persia, 76, 191  
India, 49-50, 63-64, 67-70, 96-97, 169ff., 186, 198-9, 274, 285-93,  
309, 315, 341, 366, 377, 400, 416, 417. See also Part I of Index.  
agriculture, 67  
Asian History Congress, 2-3  
Communist Party, 67, 69, 72, 198, 416  
economy, 67  
exchange visits with USSR, 67, 416  
foreign policy, 68, 69-70  
general election (1962), 198  
National Congress, 67ff., 198  
relations with Afgh., 298ff.  
relations with Pak., 91, 94  
relations with USSR, 96, 309, 416  
Socialist Party, 69  
Swatantra Party, 69, 198

USA economic aid to, 291-3  
USA policy in, 285-93  
Indonesia, 74, 94, 169ff., 285  
Indus, river, 70  
Ingush people, 56, 233ff., 322, 372  
Iranian languages, 323ff., 341  
  people, 320  
Iraq, 91, 94, 110, 377  
Irrigation. See Part I of Index: News Digest and Republics.  
Irtysh, river, 160, 161, 381  
Isfahan, Persia, 404  
Isfara, Tad., 262  
Ishim, river, 380  
Ismailis, 49  
Ismailov, Ye., 356, 362  
Ismail Samanid, King of Bukhara, 113  
Issyk-Kul', Lake, Kirg., 62  
Isti-Su, Azerb., 140, 144  
Ivanov, M., on Persia, 188-93  
Ivanov, M.S., on Persia, 78-84

Jalalabad, Afgh., 65  
Jalil, A., 410  
Jammu, 309  
Jangalis. See under Persia.  
Jewish people, in Central Asia, 233ff., 320  
Johnson, Lyndon, Vice-President of USA, 418

Kaakha rayon, Turk., 120  
Kabardin people, 233ff.  
Kabul, 66, 95, 299, 301, 305, 308, 415, 417  
Kafirnigan, river, Tad., 47, 61  
Kaganovich, L.M., 125, 164  
Kairbekov, G., 363  
Kakhetin people, 320  
Kala-i-Mor, Turk., 154  
Kalandars, 115  
Kalmyks, 56, 102, 103, 233ff., 372  
Kalygul, 358  
Kamalvand, Ali, 83  
Kandahar, Afgh., 65, 66, 308  
Kandin, Tibet, 385, 387  
Kanibadam, Tad., 262  
Karabayly Island, Aral Sea, 207  
Karabogazgol, Turk., 21ff., 242  
Karachay people, 56, 372

Karachi, 70, 73, 98, 179, 181, 288, 311, 406ff.  
 Karadag, Azerb., 130ff.  
 Karaganda, Kaz., 6, 9, 32, 251  
     Pentecostalists in, 162  
     territorial changes, 59  
     transport, 161, 162  
     oblast, 59, 154  
 Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 206ff.  
     people, 206ff., 231ff., 243, 321ff.  
 Karakol'skiy rayon, Kirg., 375  
 Karakum Canal, Turk., 21, 244, 268  
 Karacheva, N., 42  
 Karaspaya, Chimkent oblast, Kaz., 267  
 Karatayev, Mukhamedzhan, 249, 362  
 Karategin, river, Tad., 47  
 Karategin Khanate, 46  
 Kara-Yeri, Azerb., 145  
 Karayev, Ali Geydar, 127  
 Karchevan, Nakhichevan', 15  
 Karim Khan Rashti, 80  
 Karkaralinsk, Kaz., 163  
 Karlov, V.A., Second Secretary, Uzbek CP., 374  
 Karshi, Uzb., 49  
 Kartalin people, 320  
 Kash, 226  
 Kashgar, Sink., 47, 272ff., 276ff.  
 Kashmir, 74, 93, 199, 284, 309-10, 417. See also Part I of Index.  
     American policy on, 287, 288, 310  
 Kasravi, A., Persian author, 81ff.  
 Kasum-Ismailov rayon, Azerb., 145  
 Kasymov, Alibay, 376  
 Katmandu, 71  
 Katta-Kurgan, Uzb., 59  
 Kaufman, General von, 47, 48, 367  
 Kayrakkum, Leninabad oblast, Tad. (formerly Khodzhent, q.v.), 157  
 Kazakh language, 39, 41-42, 293  
     people, 21ff., 102, 103, 343ff., 373  
 Kazakhstan, 5-11, 248, 259, 314, 320. See also Part I of Index.  
     administrative and territorial changes, 58-59, 157, 263, 374, 375  
     archaeology, 334ff.  
     craftsmen in, 343-9  
     education, 230ff.  
     Germans in, 372-3  
     housing, 378  
     Institute of Nuclear Physics, 378  
     irrigation, 61, 160-1, 267, 380  
     literature, 350ff.  
     nationalities, 236

press and publishing, 102, 118  
 reactions to XXIInd Party Congress, 126ff.  
 religious sects, 162-3  
 transport and communications, 163  
 "universities of culture", 32ff.  
 Kazalinsk, Kaz., 368, 370, 371  
 Kazan', 50  
 Kazandzhik, Turk., 154  
     rayon, 26, 154  
 Kedrina, Z., 351ff.  
 Kelif, Turk., 369  
 Kemine, 245  
 Kennedy, President J., 188, 290  
 Kerala, India, 68, 69, 416  
 Kerbala, town, 17  
 Kerimova, A.A., 40  
 Kerimzhanova, B., 358  
 Kerki, Turk., 36, 371  
 Kermanshah, Persia, 400  
 Ketmen'-Tyubinskaya Valley, Kirg., 379  
 Khachinskiy, Azerb., 144  
 Khachmas, Azerb., 133  
 Khadzer, wife of Kachak Nabi, q.v., 17  
 Khaldurdy, D., 362  
 Khalfin, M.A., 168  
 Khalmuradov, D., 126  
 Khanlyg, Azerb., 14  
 Kharmayev, 45  
 Khashimkhanly, Azerb., 140  
 Khatyrchi, Uzb., 379  
 Khauzag Mountains, Uzb., 380  
 Khauz-Khan, Mary oblast, Turk., 262  
     reservoir, Turk., 268  
 Khazal, Persia, 83  
 Khaz'al Shaykh, Persian ruler, 83  
 Kherson, Ukraine, 139, 140  
 Khilly, Azerb., 140  
 Khiva, 107, 208, 366ff.  
 Khodzhik, Azerb., 14  
 Khodzha-Salar, Turk., 369  
 Khodzhent, Leninabad oblast, Tad., renamed Kayrakkum, 157  
 Khodzhent, Leninabad oblast, Tad. (formerly Sovetabad), 157, 262  
 Khorasan, Persia, 49, 227, 398, 402, 404  
 Khorezm, 120, 215, 340, 341  
     oblast, 205, 356, 365  
 Khorezmian language, 120  
     people, 119  
 Khosroy Ruzbeh, Member of Tudeh Party Committee, 312  
 Khotan, Sink., 272ff.

Khrushchev, N., 54, 55, 56, 66, 76, 175, 197, 287, 308, 328, 415  
 Khuey people, 385  
 Khuzestan, Persia, 404  
 Kichi-Ak-Su, river, Kirg., 62  
 Kirgiz language, 39, 42-3, 350  
     in Sink., 102, 273ff.  
     people, 103, 231ff., 284  
 Kirgizia, 60, 128, 378  
     archaeology, 264, 334ff.  
     Baptists, 163  
     Central Committee of the CP., 376  
     education, 230ff.  
     exhibitions, 128  
     Germans, 373  
     irrigation, 378  
     literature, 350ff.  
     music, 61-62  
     nationalities in, 237, 326ff.  
     new laws, 60  
     press, 102  
     territorial changes, 58, 375  
     transport, 381  
     "universities of culture", 32, 37  
 Kirmani, Khoja, 118  
 Kirovabad, Azerb., 133ff., 161  
 Kishly, Azerb., 131-3  
 Kislovodsk, Azerb., 144  
 Kizyl-Arvat rayon, Turk., 21, 26, 154  
 Klych, Durdy, 353  
 Klyshdy, 140  
 Knowland, Senator, 287  
 Koirala, B.P., Leader of Nepalese Congress Party, 70, 295  
 Kokand, Uzb., 34, 46, 49, 273, 276ff., 377  
 Kokchetav oblast, Kaz., 380  
 Koksuy, river, 207  
 Kok-Uzyak, river, 207  
 Kolkhoznoye, Karaganda oblast, Kaz., 59  
 Kolykhalova, G.P., 286  
 Komi people, 323  
 Kononov, A.N., 40  
 Korkut-ibn-Abul Hamid, 122  
 Kor-Ogly, Kh., on Turkmen folklore, 119-28  
 Kos-Aral' island (now Teras Shevchenko peninsula), 368, 370  
 Kovskiy, Ye., 363  
 Koyandy, Kaz., 8  
 Krasnoarmeysk, Kokchetav oblast, Kaz., 263  
 Krasnovodsk, Turk., 19, 26, 28, 150, 155  
     communications with Azerb., 134ff.

trade with Azerb., 130  
 "universities of culture", 36, 37  
 Kshitut, river, 47  
 Kuba, Azerb., 142, 144  
     rayon, 37, 145  
 Kubatly, Kubatlin'skiy rayon, Azerb., 262  
 Kuchak Khan, 399, 400  
 Kuldja, Sinkiang-Uygur AR, 293  
 Kuli'yev, K., 126  
 Kuli'yev, N., on Islam in Central Asia, 104-11  
 Kulyab, Tad., 268  
     khanate, 46  
     river, 47  
 Kunanbayev, Abay, 249  
 Kunayev, D.A., First Secretary of Kaz. CP., 125  
 Kungey Alatau Mountains, 333  
 Kungrad, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 365, 367  
 Kura, river, 130, 140  
 Kurat, Professor A.N., 214, 215, 221  
 Kurbannepesov, Kirim, 360  
 Kurgan-Tyube, Tad., 59, 96  
     rayon, 35  
 Kuri people, 404  
 Kurova, K., 356  
 Kurama people, 321  
 Kushan people, 341  
 Kushka, Afgh., 308  
 Kustanay, 163  
     oblast, Kaz., 380  
 Kuybyshev rayon, Turk., 265  
 Kuznetsov, P.I., 44  
 Kuznetsov, V.S., 271ff.  
 Kylych, Moldo, 358, 359  
 Kypchaks, 321  
 Kyrgyzsh Island, Aral Sea, 208  
 Kyudamir rayon, Azerb., 145  
 Kzyl, Ordzhonikidzeabad rayon, Uzb., 37  
 Kzyl-Orda (formerly Perovsk, q.v.), Kaz., 367  
     oblast, 263

Ladakh, India, 284  
 Lahore, 179ff., 180, 417  
 Lang, David Marshall, 260  
 Laos, 172  
 Larni, Turko-Persian frontier, 17  
 Laz people, 322  
 Lenin rayon, Tselinograd oblast, Kaz., 58  
 Lenin, V.I., 55, 56, 169, 247, 335, 338

Leninabad, Tad., 149, 157  
  oblast, 157, 262  
Leninkend, Shamkhor rayon, Azerb., 374  
Leninskoye, West-Kaz. oblast, 157  
Lenkoran' rayon, Azerb., 37, 130  
Lerik, Lerinskiy rayon, Azerb., 262  
Lezgin people, 323  
Lhasa, 385ff.  
Linguistics. See Part I of Index.  
Lisu people, Tibet, 385  
Literature. See under Republics and Part I of Index.  
Litvinskiy, B., 59  
Loba people, Tibet, 383ff.  
Lo-Yuy people, Tibet, 384  
Lucknow, 97  
Lufti, 44

Mahdi Malekzadeh, 80  
Mahendra, King of Nepal, 70ff., 97, 294-6, 310  
Mahmud, Shah, ex-Prime Minister of Afgh., 302  
Makhachkala, Dagestan, 136, 144  
Makhtumkuli, 245, 246  
Makki, Husayn, Persian writer, 398ff.  
Maldybayev, A., 61  
Malenkov, G.M., 125, 164  
Malik, Abdul, 48  
Malikov, K., 359, 363  
Malleon, General, 400  
Mamedov, Dovlet, 126  
Mangit, Uzb., 47  
Mangyshlak peninsula, Kaz., 349  
Mansur Hallaj, Arab Caliph, 123  
Mao-Run, 159  
Mao-Tse-Tung, 97  
Margian, Iranian people, 119  
Marinovka, Taranovskiy rayon, Kaz., 163  
Mary, Turk., 35  
  oblast, 58, 265, 268  
Masanov, E.A., on Kazakh craftsmen before the Revolution, 343-9  
Mashteksay, Kaz. (now Leninskoye, q.v.), 157  
Massagets, Iranian people, 119  
Matcha, river, Tad., 47  
Maylin, Beimbet, 358  
Mekhti, 17  
Melikov, O.S., 398ff.  
Menon, Krishna, 416  
Mergenatau Island, Aral Sea, 207  
Miankal, Uzb., 379

Mikoyan, A.I., 416  
 Millspaugh, Dr. Arthur C., 403  
 Minchegaur, Azerb., 144  
 Mingrelian people, 322  
 Minorsky, V. & T., 203  
 Mir Ali Shir, 364  
 Mir-Bashi rayon, Azerb., 145  
 Miri people, Tibet, 384  
 Miroshnikov, L.I., on the British in Persia, 85-89  
 Mirskiy, G., on new states of Asia and Africa, 169-171  
 Mirza, Solayman, 403  
 Mirzoyan, Levon, 127  
 Mirzoyev, G., 361  
 Mishmi people, Tibet, 384  
 Mo'azed es-Saltaneh, 80  
 Modarres, Persian politician, 404  
 Mohammed Ali Shah, 79  
 Mokhi, Sardar, 80  
 Molotov, V.M., 125, 164  
 Mongolia, 173  
 Mongolian language, 43  
     people, 385  
 Montagu, Ivor, 4  
 Mosaddeq, Dr. Mohammad, 192, 404  
 Moscow, 338, 341  
 Moskalkenko, V.N., on Pakistan, 184-7  
 Moskovskiy, Uzb., 58  
 Moskva rayon, Kirg., 58  
 Mozaffar-ed-din, 80  
 Muhieddin, Makhdum, 96  
 Mukanov, Sabit, 355, 357  
 Mukhammedov, B., 126  
 Mukhatov, Anna, 360  
 Mukhitdinov, N.A., 55  
 Mukhtar, A., 354  
 Mullodzhanov, Masud, 359  
 Murgab rayon, Turk., 58  
 Murovdagskiy Mountains, Azerb., 270  
 Musabekov, Gazanfar, 127  
 Muslim League, 179ff.  
 Musrepov, Gabit, 158, 358, 360, 363  
 Mustaufi ol Mamalek, 402  
 Mustafin, Gabiden, 355  
 Muynak rayon, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 206, 209  
 Muynak, Uzb., 365  
 Muzaffar, Emir of Bukhara, 48

Nabi, leader of Kachak Movement in Azerb., 12-18  
 Naftalan, Azerb., 144, 270  
 Naim Khan, Afghan Foreign Minister, 65-66  
 Nakhichevan', 134  
     uyezd, 14, 15, 16, 17, 134  
 Nal'skiy, Ya., 361  
 Namboodiripad, Ye.M. Shankaram, 309  
 Nariman Narimanov, 60-61  
 Naryn, Tyan'-Shan' oblast, 364  
 Naryn, river, 378  
 Nasafi, al-, 226  
 Nasi people, Tibet, 385  
 Nasimi, 123  
 Nasiravaz, Nakhichevan', 14  
 Nasrullah, Emir of Bukhara, 48  
 Navoi, Alisher, 44, 107, 122, 124  
 Na Yan'-chen, 277ff.  
 Nebit-Dag, Turk., 24, 29, 154  
 Neftyanyye Kamni, Azerb., 145  
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 66, 68, 71, 77, 198, 286ff.  
 Nepal, 63, 68, 70-72, 97, 199, 294-6, 310, 416. See also Part I of  
     Index.  
     foreign policy, 296, 310  
     political events 1959-61, 294-6, 70-72  
     political parties, 70, 294ff.  
     Rana dynasty, 294  
     relations with China, 71-72, 97, 296  
     relations with India, 71  
     Soviet aid to, 70, 199  
     State structure, 70, 71  
     Tibetan people in, 384  
 Neyveli, Madras, 416  
 Nikolay Island (now Vozrozhdeniye Island), 370  
 Nikolayev, Andriyan, Peak, 333  
 Nisa, Parthia, 244  
 Nixon, Richard, 287, 289  
 Niyazi, Shavkat, 382  
 Niyazov, 126  
 Nizhe-Chirchik rayon, Uzb., 35  
 Novaya Kazanka, Dzhangalinskiy rayon, Kaz., 157  
 Novoshul'binskiy rayon, Kaz., 263  
 Nu people, Tibet, 383  
 Nukha, Azerb., 144, 145  
 Nukhur-Bakharden rayon, Turk., 154  
 Nurek, Tad., 161  
 Nurpeisov, A., 356  
 Nutsyan, river, Tibet, 385

Oberemko, V.I., 168  
 Oguz people, 119ff.  
 Oktyabr rayon, Karaganda, Kaz., 59  
 Omar Khayyam, 107  
 Ordzhonikidze rayon, Tashkent, Uzb., 34  
 Orenburg, 208, 366-7  
 Oriental studies. See Part I of Index: News Digest.  
 Ormsby-Gore, Sir W.P., British Ambassador in Washington, 168  
 Osh, Kirg., 364, 381  
 Osmanly, Azerb., 131  
 Ossetian people, 233ff., 322  
 Otmanovaly, Azerb., 140  
 Ovezov, B., 153  
 Oxus. See Amu-Dar'ya.

Pakistan, 63, 65, 72-74, 97-98, 111, 160, 178-87, 189, 199-200, 310-11,  
 412-14, 417. See also Part I of Index.

- agriculture, 72, 412
- American-Pakistani Agreement 1954, 287
- China's views on, 412-14
- Communist Party, 72, 178, 180
- cultural development, 90
- economy and industry, 72-73, 91, 182-4, 413
- foreign policy, 74, 94, 199-200
- Kashmir. See under Kashmir.
- militarization of, 72, 73, 90ff.
- oil industry, 406-11
- political structure, 72, 74, 92
- Pushtunistan. See under Pushtunistan.
- relations with Afgh., 96, 97, 199, 298ff.
- relations with India, 68-69, 74
- relations with USA, 73, 287, 413-14, 417
- relations with USSR, 74, 409ff.
- working-class, 91ff., 178-82
- Youth Movement, 184-7

Pakhtunistan. See Pushtunistan.  
 Pamiri people, 322  
 Panchen Lama, 388  
 Panja, river, 305  
 Parthia, 120  
 Pathan people, 306. See also Pushtun people.  
 Pavlodar, Kaz., 32, 381  
 Peking, 97, 103, 273ff.  
 Pendzhikent, Tad., 262, 340, 341  
 Perovsk (now Kzyl-Orda), 367ff.  
 Persia, 16, 17, 50, 63, 71, 74, 78-84, 85-89, 91, 98-99, 111, 130, 169,  
 176, 188-93, 200, 204, 265, 269, 297, 311-12, 315, 341, 398-405,  
 417-18. See also Part I of Index.

agrarian reform, 75, 193, 200  
 American influence, 75, 76, 189-90, 192-3, 200  
 British activities in, 1914-20, 85-89, 400  
 coal industry, 194-6  
 Communist (Tudeh) Party, 76, 191, 399, 405  
 economy, 190-1  
 foreign policy, 76  
 Jangalis, 399  
 military policy, 188-9  
 "national liberation movement" 1920-6, 399ff.  
 popular unrest, 191-2, 200  
 Persian-Soviet Friendship Treaty, 1921, 79, 88, 400  
 relations with Afgh., 298  
 relations with USSR, 75, 88, 311-12, 418  
 revolution of 1905-11, 78-84  
 Reza Shah Pahlavi's rise to power, 398-405  
 Shah of Persia, 76, 87, 98, 311, 417  
 Soviet Army in, 400  
 Western influence in, 189-90  
 Persian language, 41, 43, 44, 119, 124, 202, 214, 215, 221, 222ff.  
 Petro-Aleksandrovsk (now Turktul'), Uzb., 369, 371  
 Petropavlovsk, 5, 9  
 Peysikov, L.S., 41  
 Pichakchi, Azerb., 140  
 Plekhanov, G.V., 81  
 Pokrovskiy, M.N., Soviet historian, 56, 176  
 Polinova, O., 97  
 Polivanov, 40  
 Popov, M.V., 398  
 Popovich, Pavel, Peak, 333  
 Potapova, K., 354  
 Prasad, Dr. Rajendra, 68  
 Przheval'sk, Kirg., 62  
     rayon, 375  
 Punjab, 94, 179, 181, 182, 412  
 Pushtu language, 305  
 Pushtun people, 65, 66, 93, 186, 199. See also Pathan people.  
 Pushtunistan [Pakhtunistan], 65, 74, 306-7, 417  
 Puta, Azerb., 131  
 Pyandzh, river, 46, 369  
  
 Qavam es Saltaneh, Persian statesman, 402ff.  
 Qavam-ol-Molk-Shirazi, 83  
 Qazvin, Persia, 407  
 Qazvini, Mohammad, 81  
 Qom, Persia, 403  
 Qutayba ibn Muslim, Arab Commander, 103, 214ff.  
 Quelquejay, Mme. Chantal, French expert on Muslims of USSR, 319

Habad-Sangi, Afgh., 95  
 Raim, Syr-Dar'ya river, 366  
 Rajagopalchari, C., 68  
 Rana. See under Nepal.  
 Rashidov, Sh.R., First Secretary, Uzbek Party, 125, 160, 332, 361, 382  
 Rastorguyeva, V.S., 40  
 Rasulov, D., First Secretary of the Tadzhik Party, 125  
 Raukhverger, M., 62  
 Rawalpindi, Pak., 73, 417  
 Red'ko, I.B., Soviet author, on India, 286-8  
     on Nepal, 294-6  
 Redzhebov, D.M., on working-class in Turk., 19, 22-30  
 Religious Affairs. See under Republics and Part I of Index.  
 Research. See Part I of Index.  
 Resht, Persia, 400  
 Reutov, Turk., 20  
 Reza Shah Pahlavi. See under Persia.  
 Reza Rusta, 98  
 Rizayev, 127, 128  
 Ronin, S.L., 313, 319  
 Rudaki, Abdul Hasan, 113, 124  
 Rudnyy, Kaz., 34  
 Rushan, Tad., 46  
 Russian language, 43, 54, 102, 326-7  
 Russian people, in Kaz., 320, 343, 373  
 Ruziyev, T., on Pakistan, 178-82  
 Rybach'ye, Kirg., 62  
 Ryskulov, Ramis, 359

Sabirabad, Azerb., 130  
 Saki, Iranian people, 119  
 Sakki, 44  
 Sal'yany, Azerb., 134, 140  
 Samarkand, 113, 340, 375  
     private property in, 148-9  
     Treaty of 712, 214-228  
     oblast, 321  
 Samoylovich, 44  
 Samsonovo (renamed Amu-Dar'ya), Kerkinskiy rayon, Turk., 262  
 Sangachal, Azerb., 131ff.  
 Sanskrit language, 124  
 Saray, 369  
 Sardesai, S.G., Indian Communist, 96  
 Sarynbayev, Sh., 42  
 Sattar Khan, Persian revolutionary leader, 79ff.  
 Scarbrough, Earl of, 100  
 Scythian people, 341  
 Seidi, 245

Semenyuk, G., 357  
 Semipalatinsk, Kaz., 32, 36  
 Semirech'ye, 102  
 Serebryanka, East-Kaz. oblast, 375  
 Sergeli rayon, Uzb., 264  
 Sergeevka, Kaz., 380  
 Serikov, Major-General M.K., 357  
 Seyfullin, Saken, 358  
 Seytakov, Beki, 353-4  
 Seytliyev, Kara, 360  
 Shabadin, Zangezur uyezd, Azerb., 16  
 Shafaq, Rezazadeh, Persian historian, 82  
 Shakhrisyabz, Uzb., 47  
 Shakhwazarov, G., 331  
 Shamleve, Aisha, 259  
 Shamota, N., 331  
 Sharuro-Daralagez uyezd, Azerb., 16  
 Shashkin, Zein D., 126, 354-5, 362  
 Shaul'der rayon, Kaz., 267  
 Shaumyanovsk, Shaumyanovsk rayon, Azerb., 57  
 Shemlan, Lebanon, Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, 101  
 Shemonaikha, East-Kaz. oblast, 58  
 Shepilov, D.M., 125  
 Shevchenko rayon, Kaz., 375  
 Shigatsdze, Tibet, 385ff.  
 Shirabad valley, Uzb., 380  
 Shir Ali, Khan of Kokand, 48  
 Shiraz, Persia, 404  
 Shugnan khanate, 46  
     river, 47  
 Sikkim, India, 68  
     Tibetan people in, 384  
 Sifan' people, Tibet, 383ff.  
 Sind, Pak., 412  
 Sinkiang, 8, 63, 99, 102-3. See also Part I of Index.  
     Jangir uprising, 271-5  
     Kazakh latinized language in, 293  
     Tsin Administration 1800-50, 271-84  
 Smirnov, N.A., Soviet historian, 203  
 Smirnova, O.I., on the Samarkand Treaty of 712, 214-28  
 Snegin, D., 356  
 Sofronov, A., 159  
 Sogd, 215ff.  
 Sogdiana, 340  
 Sogdian people, 221ff.  
 Soheyl, Dr. Muhammad Asif, 308  
 Sokolovskiy, Marshal V.D., 95  
 Solonichka, Kaz., 163  
 Soloukhin, V., 330ff.

Soltanniyazov, 126  
 Sorkin, G.Z., on colonialism, 173-4  
 South-Kazakhstan kray, 263  
     oblast, 263  
 Sovetabad, Tad. (now Khodzhent, q.v.), 157  
 Soviet rayon, Alma-Ata, 59  
 Soviet rayon, Ashkhabad, 57  
 Spasskiy, Kaz., 6ff.  
 Srinagar, Kashmir, 309  
 Stalin, I.V., 56, 125ff., 176-7, 335, 363  
 Stalin rayon, Alma-Ata, Kaz. (now Soviet rayon), 59  
 Stalin rayon, Andizhan oblast, Uzb. (now Moskovskiy rayon), 58  
 Stalin rayon, Ashkhabad, Turk. (now Soviet rayon), 57  
 Stalin rayon, Baku, Azerb. (now 26 Baku Commissars), 57  
 Stalin rayon, Karaganda, Kaz. (now Oktyabr rayon), 59  
 Stalin rayon, Kirg. (now Moskva rayon), 58  
 Stalin rayon, Mary oblast, Turk. (now Murgab rayon), 58  
 Stalin rayon, Tselinograd oblast, Kaz. (now Lenin rayon), 58  
 Stalinabad, Tad. (now Dushanbe), 58  
 Stalino, Andizhan oblast (now Moskovskiy), 58  
 Stalinskiy, Leninskiy rayon, Tselinograd oblast (now Aksu), 158  
 Stalinskoye, Moskva rayon, Kirg. (now Belovodskoye), 58  
 Stepanakaert, Azerb., 130, 143, 144  
 Stevens, Sir Roger, British writer and Ambassador to Persia, 1934-8,  
     260  
 Stockholm, XIth International Congress of Historians, 338  
 Suhrawardi, Shahid, 200  
 Sukhareva, O.A., on Islam in Central Asia, 104, 111-18  
 Sultanov, Gamid, 127  
 Sungait, Azerb., 131, 142, 144, 145, 161  
 Surkhan valley, Uzb., 379-80  
 Suvanna Phouma, Prince, 93  
 Svan people, 322  
 Svetlichnyy, V., 360  
 Sydykzbekov, T., 350, 353  
 Syr-Dar'ya, river, 119, 122, 207, 365ff., 379  
  
 Tabari, al-, 214ff.  
 Tabriz, city, Persia, 17, 79ff., 398ff.  
 Tadzhik language, 40-41, 342, 382  
     people, 102, 119, 120, 124, 204, 213, 231ff., 322ff., 342, 354  
 Tadzhikistan, 32, 95ff., 102, 156, 241, 378  
     administrative changes, 57  
     archaeology, 59, 334  
     Communist Party activities, 125, 376, 381  
     education, 156, 230ff., 266, 376  
     Germans in, 373  
     irrigation, 61, 268

nationalities, 237  
 territorial changes, 58, 157, 262  
 Taincha (now Krasnoarmeysk), Krasnoarmeyskiy rayon, Kokchetav oblast,  
 263  
 Tairova, Kh.Z., Chairman, State Planning Committee, Tadzhik SSR, 57  
 Takhta-Kupyr, rayon, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 208, 212  
 Taldyk, Kara-Kalpak ASSR, 365  
 Taldy-Kurgan rayon, Kaz., 152  
 Talysh people, 322  
 Taqi Khan, Colonel, 402  
 Taqizadeh, Hasan, 78ff., 404  
 Taranovskiy rayon, Kaz., 163  
 Tarbagatay, Jungaria, 282  
 Tarbiyat, Mohammed Ali Khan, 81ff.  
 Tarkhun, King of Sogd, 226ff.  
 Tarlanov, M., 59  
 Tasbeskum Island, Aral Sea, 207  
 Tashauz, Turk., 36, 37, 144  
 oblast, Turk., 265  
 Tashigang, China, 387  
 Tashkent, 97, 109, 128, 158, 200, 205, 241, 310, 311, 328, 333, 371,  
 415  
 Communist Party, XXIIInd Congress and, 125ff.  
 Conference of all-Union Higher Educational Establishments, 331-2  
 Conference of all-Union Orientalists, 265  
 Congress of Intelligentsia of Uzb., 159-60  
 education, 33, 35, 377  
 International Seminar of African Women (Educationalists), 337  
 population of, 270  
 private property, 148ff.  
 television, 382  
 transport and communications, 144, 208, 264, 364  
 Tashkurghan, Sink., Tadzhiks in, 213  
 Tashnazarov, Oraz, 126  
 Tatar people, 24, 50, 107, 111, 233ff.  
 Tatars, Crimean, 2, 314  
 Tats people, 322  
 Taylakdhigen, Island, Aral Sea, 207  
 Taymurtash, Persian statesman, 402  
 Tbilisi, Georgia, 14, 130, 134, 143, 265, 331  
 Tedzhen, river, Turk., 268  
 Tehran, 190, 200, 311, 401, 418  
 Teras Shevchenko peninsula, 368  
 Termenbes Island, Aral Sea, 209  
 Termez, Uzb., 33, 340, 371, 375  
 Tibetan languages, 384ff.  
 people, 69, 72, 77, 383-97  
 Tibet, 63, 68, 76-77, 99, 200-1, 383-97. See also Part I of Index.  
 agriculture, 395, 396

distribution and ethnic composition of peoples of, 383-6, 393-4  
 1959 uprising in, 76-77  
 since 1951, 394-7  
 social structure, customs and occupations, 386-92  
 Titov, F.Ye., Second Secretary, Uzbek CP., 374  
 Titov, Peak, 33  
 Tiva, Nakhichevan' uyezd, 16  
 Tokombayev, A., 125  
 Tokombayev, Aaly, 358  
 Toktogul, Kirg., 379  
 Tolstov, S.P., 3  
 Transcaspiya, 4, 85, 86  
 Transoxania, 102  
 Transcaucasia, 81, 85, 86, 158, 173, 377  
 Transport and communications. See under republics, main towns and  
     Part I of Index.  
 Tsamerian, I.P., 313, 319  
 Tsang-Po, river, 385  
 Tselinnoye More, 380  
 Tselinnyy Kray, Germans in, 373  
 Tselinograd (formerly Almolinsk, q.v.), 5, 6, 9, 36  
 Tselinomorsk, Kaz., 380  
 Tsova-Tushin, Caucasian people, 322  
 Tsyau people, Tibet, 383ff.  
 Tszetan, China, 387  
 Tszyazhun people, Tibet, 383ff.  
 Tuksum, China, 387  
 Tuleyev, A., 61  
 Turcoman people, Persia, 404  
 Turfan, Uygur princely family, 276ff.  
 Turkestan rayon, Kaz., 267  
 Turkestan, Chinese, 272ff., 390  
     Russian, 8, 50, 86, 117, 269, 340, 366, 367  
 Turkestanskiy Mountains, 333  
 Turkey, 17, 65, 85, 87, 107, 111, 173, 189, 265  
 Turki people, 341  
 Turkic languages, 8, 119ff., 323ff., 341  
 Turkish language, 202  
 Turkmen language, 40, 244ff.  
     people, 105, 204, 231ff., 242ff., 324ff., 343  
 Turkmenistan, 95, 96, 102. See also Part I of Index.  
     Academy of Sciences, 242-8  
     archaeology, 334ff.  
     Communist Party, XXIInd Party Congress and, 125ff.  
     education, 32, 229ff., 265-6  
     folklore, 119-28  
     housing, 378  
     irrigation, 268  
     Islam in, 105ff.

literature, 353ff.  
 nationalities, 238  
 territorial changes, 57, 262  
 Tursun-Zade, Mirzo, 158, 159  
 Twenty-Six Commissars rayon, Baku, 57  
 Tyagunenko, V., on new states of Asia and Africa, 169-71  
 Tyan'-Shan Mountains, Kirg., 340  
 Tynystanov, K., 358, 359  
 Tyup rayon, Issyk-Kul' oblast, Kirg. (now Ak-Bulak), 58  
     river, 62  
 Tyurk people, 321  
  
 Uch-Kurgan, Kirg., 360  
 Udin people, 322  
 Udmurt people, 233ff.  
 Udzhary, Azerb., 133ff.  
 Ufa, Bashkiria, 109  
 Ukraine, 7, 173  
 Ukrainian people, 19ff., 233ff., 320ff., 343, 373  
 Ulugh Beg, 59, 107  
 Ulug-Zoda, S.U., 415  
 Ul'yanov, Ul'yanov rayon, Kaz., 59  
 Umayyad, Caliph al-Walid, 226  
 Umetaliyev, Sh., 359  
 UNESCO, 171, 313, 314, 377  
 United Arab Republic, 74, 76, 94, 169ff., 310. See also Egypt.  
 United Nations, 168ff., 200, 309, 311  
 United States of America, 64ff., 68, 71ff., 172, 298ff.  
 Ural'sk, Kaz., 367  
 Ura-Tyube, Tad., 262  
 Urdu language, 185  
 Urfa, Turkey, 155  
 Urgench, Uzb., 382  
 Urmiya, Persia, 17  
 Urmus, Nakhichevan' uyezd, 14  
 Ust'-Kamenogorsk, Kaz., 259, 381  
 Usubaliyev, T., First Secretary, Kirgiz CP., 125  
 Uygur language, 44, 45  
     people, 259, 273, 385  
 Uz, Zanzegur uyezd, Azerb., 16  
 Uzbek language, 39-40  
     people, 24, 102, 204, 231ff., 321ff., 342, 343, 348  
 Uzbekistan, 96, 102, 205  
     administrative changes, 374  
     archaeology, 59, 334ff., 375  
     Communist Party, XXIInd Party Congress and, 125ff.  
     education, 230ff., 377

Germans in, 373  
housing, 378  
irrigation, 379  
Islam in, 111ff.  
literature, 350ff.  
nationalities in, 235  
relations with foreign countries, 380  
television, 382  
territorial changes, 58  
transport, 264  
"universities of culture", 32ff.

Vakhan, Pamirs, Tad., 46  
Vartashen, Vartashen rayon, Azerb., 57  
Velikov, Chary, 126  
Verevkin, General, 368  
Veysov, M.K., 127  
Vinnikov, Ya.R., 373  
Vinogradov, V.V., Director of Institute of Linguistics, AN/USSR, 41,  
45  
Voroshilov rayon, Karaganda oblast, Kaz. (now Ul'yanov rayon), 59  
Voroshilov rayon, Andizhan oblast, Uzb. (now Il'ichev rayon), 58  
Vozrozhdeniye Island (formerly Nikolay Island), Aral Sea, 370

West-Kazakhstan kray, 263  
oblast, 263, 356

Yagnobi people, 322  
Yakut people, 233ff., 323  
Yangi-Hissar, Sink., 272ff.  
Yaqubi, al-, 215, 222  
Yarkend, Sink., 276ff.  
Yashen, Kamil, 158  
Yelagin, A.S., 357  
Yeleuov, T., 357  
Yelinin, M., 356  
Yerevan, Armenia, 14, 15, 17, 81, 129ff., 265  
Yermak, Kaz., 58  
Yersov, Yu., on Pakistan, 406-11  
Yesenzhanov, Kh., 356  
Yevlakh, Azerb., 130ff.  
Yomut people, 120  
Yule, Colonel H., 48  
Yuldashev, M.Yu., on the Aral Flotilla, 365-71  
Yunasaliyev, B.M., 43, 358, 359

Yusipova, R.R., 45  
Yusuf, 279, 283

Zadeh, Soltan, Persian Communist, 399  
Zahir, Sajjad, Indian writer, 96  
Zahir-Shah, Muhammad, King of Afghanistan, 308, 415  
Zailiyskiy Alatau Mountains, Kaz., 333  
Zakataly, Azerb., 130, 144, 145  
Zamanov, Abas, 377  
Zanzegur uyezd, Azerb., 13, 15, 16  
Zang-Tepe Hill, Uzb., 375  
Zardob, Azerb., 140  
Zeravshan, river, 47  
Zeyva, Nakhichevan' uyezd, 14  
Zhdanko, P.A., on life in the Islands of the Southern Aral, 206-13  
Zhuravlev, Yu.I., on Tibet, 383-97  
Ziaoddin, Sayyed, Persian politician, 401  
Zill-as-Sultan, 83  
Ziya-ad-din-Nakhshaki, 124  
Ziyayev, Kh., 272  
Zul'fiya, 158